Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology

Abstract

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.

Koja epistemološka vrednost je standard prema kome se trebaju upoređivati, procenjivati i dizajnirati institucionalna uređenja s obzirom na njihova epistemološka svojstava? Dve klasične opcije su razvoj agenata (u smislu individualnih epistemoloških vrlina ili sposobnosti) i dostizanje istine. Opcije su predstavljene kroz dva autoritativna savremena iskaza – razvoj agenata kroz rad Roberta Telisija u Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009), te dostizanje istine kroz rad Dejvida Istlunda, najistaknutije u Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Ovaj članak pokazuje da su obe opcije nezadovoljavajuće jer su podložne problematičnom riziku “zaglavljivanja” u suboptimalnom epistemološkom stanju. Članak argumentuje da je sposobnost sistema da revidira suboptimalna epistemološka stanja najbolja opcija za komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji.