Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology
Komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji
Чланак у часопису (Објављена верзија)
Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.
Koja epistemološka vrednost je standard prema kome se trebaju upoređivati, procenjivati i
dizajnirati institucionalna uređenja s obzirom na njihova epistemološka svojstava? Dve klasične
opcije su razvoj agenata (u smislu individualnih epistemoloških vrlina ili sposobnosti) i
dostizanje istine. Opcije su predstavljene kroz dva autoritativna savremena iskaza – razvoj
agenata kroz rad Roberta Telisija u Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009), te dostizanje istine
kroz rad Dejvida Istlunda, najistaknutije u Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
(2008). Ovaj članak pokazuje da su obe opcije nezadovoljavajuće jer su podložne problematičnom
riziku “zaglavljivanja” u suboptimalnom epistemološkom stanju. Članak argumentuje
da je sposobnost sistema da revidira suboptimalna epistemološka stanja najbolja opcija za
komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji.
Кључне речи:
division of cognitive labour / pragmatism / knowledge governance / epistemic performance / social epistemic systemsИзвор:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2019, 30, 3, 418-430Издавач:
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Институција/група
IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Zubčić, Marko Luka PY - 2019 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2029 AB - Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology. AB - Koja epistemološka vrednost je standard prema kome se trebaju upoređivati, procenjivati i dizajnirati institucionalna uređenja s obzirom na njihova epistemološka svojstava? Dve klasične opcije su razvoj agenata (u smislu individualnih epistemoloških vrlina ili sposobnosti) i dostizanje istine. Opcije su predstavljene kroz dva autoritativna savremena iskaza – razvoj agenata kroz rad Roberta Telisija u Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009), te dostizanje istine kroz rad Dejvida Istlunda, najistaknutije u Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Ovaj članak pokazuje da su obe opcije nezadovoljavajuće jer su podložne problematičnom riziku “zaglavljivanja” u suboptimalnom epistemološkom stanju. Članak argumentuje da je sposobnost sistema da revidira suboptimalna epistemološka stanja najbolja opcija za komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji. PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society T1 - Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology T1 - Komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji IS - 3 VL - 30 SP - 418 EP - 430 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029 ER -
@article{ author = "Zubčić, Marko Luka", year = "2019", abstract = "Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology., Koja epistemološka vrednost je standard prema kome se trebaju upoređivati, procenjivati i dizajnirati institucionalna uređenja s obzirom na njihova epistemološka svojstava? Dve klasične opcije su razvoj agenata (u smislu individualnih epistemoloških vrlina ili sposobnosti) i dostizanje istine. Opcije su predstavljene kroz dva autoritativna savremena iskaza – razvoj agenata kroz rad Roberta Telisija u Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009), te dostizanje istine kroz rad Dejvida Istlunda, najistaknutije u Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Ovaj članak pokazuje da su obe opcije nezadovoljavajuće jer su podložne problematičnom riziku “zaglavljivanja” u suboptimalnom epistemološkom stanju. Članak argumentuje da je sposobnost sistema da revidira suboptimalna epistemološka stanja najbolja opcija za komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji.", publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju", journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society", title = "Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology, Komparativni standard u institucionalnoj epistemologiji", number = "3", volume = "30", pages = "418-430", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029" }
Zubčić, M. L.. (2019). Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 30(3), 418-430. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029
Zubčić ML. Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2019;30(3):418-430. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029 .
Zubčić, Marko Luka, "Comparative Standard in Institutional Epistemology" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 30, no. 3 (2019):418-430, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2029 .