Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma.
The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object... of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.
TY - JOUR
AU - Cvejić, Igor
PY - 2019
UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2003
AB - Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma.
AB - The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.
PB - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2 - Theoria
T1 - Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga
IS - 2
VL - 62
SP - 53
EP - 68
DO - 10.2298/THEO1902053C
ER -
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Osnovno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li je i na koji način u Kantovoj teoriji uzvišenog objekat integrisan u osećajni doživljaj. Da bismo razumeli ovaj problem u radu se iznose Kantove ambivalentne tvrdnje, prvo o predmetu kao uzvišenom, te zatim o tome da uzvišeno u pravom smislu nije predmet koji se prosuđuje već stanje subjekta praćena još jačom tezom o besformnosti objekta, koja implicira da objekat ne može biti deo svesnog doživljaja. U nastavku rada razmatraćemo Kantovu tezu o subrepciji poštovanja prema vlastitoj odredbi sa onim prema objektu i njene različite interpretacije. Na kraju rada ponudiće se nešto drugačije moguće čitanje, koje bi mogli da pruži plauzibilniju sliku o intencionalnosti osećaja uzvišenog. Prema ovoj tezi Kant pokušava dostupnim jezikom da ukaže da u svesnom doživljaju nema objekta saznanja, međutim da se objekat konstituiše kao objekat nasilne emotivne intencionalnosti, podređivanja čulne prirode idejama uma., The main question in this paper is if (and how) in Kant’s theory of sublime the
object could be integrated into an emotional experience. In order to understand this
problem, the ambivalent Kant’s claims will be addressed: (1) about the object as sublime and (2) that correctly understood it is not an object, but the state of the subject
which is sublime. The latter thesis could be even strengthened with accompanying
claim about formlessness of the object, which implies that this object can not be a part
of conscious experience. Further, I will discuss Kant’s thesis about a subreption of a
respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject, as well as
various interpretations of it. In the final part of the paper, I will introduce alternative
interpretation which could give us a more plausible outline about the intentionality of
the feeling of sublime. My claim is that Kant uses language available to him in order
to state that in sublime there is no object of cognition in conscious experience. However, the object is constituted as an object of the violent emotional intentionality – sensibility brought under ideas of reason.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga",
number = "2",
volume = "62",
pages = "53-68",
doi = "10.2298/THEO1902053C"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2019). Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga. in Theoria
Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 62(2), 53-68.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902053C
Cvejić I. Nasilna intencionalnost uzvišenoga. in Theoria. 2019;62(2):53-68.
doi:10.2298/THEO1902053C .
