Knežević, Aleksandra

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orcid::0000-0002-0497-4967
  • Knežević, Aleksandra (12)
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Author's Bibliography

The Integrative Potential of Contemporary Perspectives on the Nature/Culture Conceptual Relationship

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2024)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2024
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3698
AB  - In this paper, I analyze and compare Maria Kronfeldner’s and Tim Ingold’s views on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. I show that despite the differences, their views remain close particularly in terms of their integrative potential. The ultimate purpose of this examination is to lay the groundwork for further research on the problem of conceptual integration between sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. The paper comprises four main sections. First, I briefly explore the history of Darwinism to show how nature and culture were conceptualized within this framework. Second, I deal with Kronfeldner’s separationist stance and Ingold’s holistic perspective on the nature/culture conceptual relationship. Third, I discuss the implications of their views on the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. While I interpret Ingold as supporting methodological integration, Kronfelder argues for a version of integrative pluralism. Lastly, I provide an outlook for further discussions on conceptual integration and integrative pluralism.
PB  - Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - The Integrative Potential of Contemporary Perspectives on the Nature/Culture Conceptual Relationship
IS  - 1
VL  - 35
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3698
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2024",
abstract = "In this paper, I analyze and compare Maria Kronfeldner’s and Tim Ingold’s views on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. I show that despite the differences, their views remain close particularly in terms of their integrative potential. The ultimate purpose of this examination is to lay the groundwork for further research on the problem of conceptual integration between sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. The paper comprises four main sections. First, I briefly explore the history of Darwinism to show how nature and culture were conceptualized within this framework. Second, I deal with Kronfeldner’s separationist stance and Ingold’s holistic perspective on the nature/culture conceptual relationship. Third, I discuss the implications of their views on the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. While I interpret Ingold as supporting methodological integration, Kronfelder argues for a version of integrative pluralism. Lastly, I provide an outlook for further discussions on conceptual integration and integrative pluralism.",
publisher = "Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "The Integrative Potential of Contemporary Perspectives on the Nature/Culture Conceptual Relationship",
number = "1",
volume = "35",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3698"
}
Knežević, A.. (2024). The Integrative Potential of Contemporary Perspectives on the Nature/Culture Conceptual Relationship. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory., 35(1).
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3698
Knežević A. The Integrative Potential of Contemporary Perspectives on the Nature/Culture Conceptual Relationship. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2024;35(1).
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3698 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "The Integrative Potential of Contemporary Perspectives on the Nature/Culture Conceptual Relationship" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 35, no. 1 (2024),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3698 .

Kritički aspekti pragmatizma: između opravdanja i ironije

Prodanović, Srđan; Knežević, Aleksandra

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2023)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Prodanović, Srđan
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3697
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Priručnik kritike
T1  - Kritički aspekti pragmatizma: između opravdanja i ironije
SP  - 385
EP  - 420
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3697
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Prodanović, Srđan and Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2023",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Priručnik kritike",
booktitle = "Kritički aspekti pragmatizma: između opravdanja i ironije",
pages = "385-420",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3697"
}
Prodanović, S.,& Knežević, A.. (2023). Kritički aspekti pragmatizma: između opravdanja i ironije. in Priručnik kritike
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 385-420.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3697
Prodanović S, Knežević A. Kritički aspekti pragmatizma: između opravdanja i ironije. in Priručnik kritike. 2023;:385-420.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3697 .
Prodanović, Srđan, Knežević, Aleksandra, "Kritički aspekti pragmatizma: između opravdanja i ironije" in Priručnik kritike (2023):385-420,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3697 .

Feministička kritika znanja

Knežević, Aleksandra; Lončarević, Katarina; Zaharijević, Adriana

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2023)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
AU  - Lončarević, Katarina
AU  - Zaharijević, Adriana
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3696
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Priručnik kritike
T1  - Feministička kritika znanja
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3696
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra and Lončarević, Katarina and Zaharijević, Adriana",
year = "2023",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Priručnik kritike",
booktitle = "Feministička kritika znanja",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3696"
}
Knežević, A., Lončarević, K.,& Zaharijević, A.. (2023). Feministička kritika znanja. in Priručnik kritike
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3696
Knežević A, Lončarević K, Zaharijević A. Feministička kritika znanja. in Priručnik kritike. 2023;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3696 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, Lončarević, Katarina, Zaharijević, Adriana, "Feministička kritika znanja" in Priručnik kritike (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3696 .

The epistemic value of participant observation: Between explanation and understanding

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2023)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3703
AB  - Participant observation is a method that tries to capture the beliefs and practices of the
people being studied as they occur in their natural settings. Bronislaw Malinowski was the
first to describe participant observation as an empirical method. Following Clifford Geertz,
this method has been described as enabling “thick description”. It has been presented as a
method for the “hermeneutical analysis” of culture. As such, it is seen as the means for the
production of interpretations of human actions, contributing thereby to our understanding
of sociocultural phenomena. That is to say, participant observation is understood as being
at odds with the research that explores the causes of the phenomena observed.
This method also tends to be the defining feature of sociocultural anthropology and
practicing it for at least a year (usually during the PhD) is the inescapable rite of passage
for calling oneself a sociocultural anthropologist. Despite its central role in sociocultural
anthropology, participant observation stands aside as a scientific method. It obviously
differs from the experimental method, which is often presented as the paramount example
of scientific practice. It also differs from mere observational methods – as practiced, for
instance, by astronomers observing stars or even by ethologists observing animals’ behavior.
Indeed, the participant observer has to be directly involved, for a sufficient amount of
time, in the lives of the ‘observed’. Only this can bring the genuine understanding that
sociocultural anthropologists are after. Participant observation has therefore an epistemic
value, but it is one of a specific kind.
Two questions follow: first, what makes participant observation so valuable in
knowledge production? Second, does participant observation have epistemic value for
those who are looking for causal explanations?
In this paper, I analyze the processes through which knowledge is produced by way
of participant observation. My argument rests on a description of the cognitive feats of
participant observation since I hold that the cognitive activity of interpreting has not
yet been fully described and assessed as such. My argument goes as follows: I argue that
the process of interpretation in participant observation involves relying heavily on what
cognitive scientists call “mind-reading” capabilities. Second, I claim that this characteristic
use of mind-reading makes participant observation useful for identifying the causes of
sociocultural phenomena. Thus, I conclude that participant observation is an adequate
method for describing the causal relationships that constitute sociocultural phenomena.
AB  - Посматрање са учествовањем је метод којим се описују веровања и праксе
људи у њиховом природном окружењу. Бронислав Малиновски први је користио
и описао посматрање са учествовањем као емпиријски метод. Након Клифорда
Герца, овај метод се користио за долазак до „густих описа”. Односно, представљен
је као метод за „херменеутичку анализу” културе, то јест као средство за долазак
до интерпретација људских поступака, доприносећи на тај начин разумевању
социокултурних феномена. Према томе, посматрање са учествовањем сматра се у
супротности са истраживањем које тражи узроке посматраних појава.
Овај метод је такође дефинишућа карактеристика социокултурне антропологије
и практиковање посматрања са учествовањем најмање годину дана (обично током
доктората) неизбежан је „обред преласка” у социокултурног антрополога. Упркос
својој централној улози у овој дисциплини, посматрање са учествовањем стоји
по страни као научни метод. Очигледно се разликује од експерименталне методе,
која се често представља као парадигматичан пример научне праксе. Такође се
разликује од пуких метода посматрања – како то практикују, на пример, астрономи
који посматрају звезде или етолози који посматрају понашање животиња. Заиста,
посматрач-учесник мора бити директно укључен, довољно времена, у животе
„посматраних”. Само се тако може доћи до истинског разумевања које траже
социокултурни антрополози. Посматрање са учествовањем, стога, има сазнају
вредност, али посебне врсте.
Следе два питања: прво, шта посматрање са учествовањем чини тако вредним у
производњи знања? Друго, да ли посматрање са учествовањем има сазнајну вредност
за оне који траже узрочна објашњења?
У овом раду анализирам процесе кроз које се знање производи путем посматрања
са учествовањем. Мој аргумент почива на опису когнитивних процеса који леже у
основи овог метода будући да сматрам да когнитивна активност интерпретације
још увек није у потпуности описана. Мој аргумент је следећи: тврдим да процес
интерпретације у посматрању са учествовањем укључује у великој мери ослањање на
оно што когнитивни научници називају способностима „читања ума”. Друго, тврдим
да ова карактеристична употреба „читања ума” чини посматрање са учествовањем
корисним за изналажење узрока социокултурних феномена. Дакле, закључујем да је посматрање са учествовањем адекватан метод за описивање узрочних веза које
конституишу социокултурне феномене.
PB  - Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu
C3  - Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci
T1  - The epistemic value of participant observation: Between explanation and understanding
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3703
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2023",
abstract = "Participant observation is a method that tries to capture the beliefs and practices of the
people being studied as they occur in their natural settings. Bronislaw Malinowski was the
first to describe participant observation as an empirical method. Following Clifford Geertz,
this method has been described as enabling “thick description”. It has been presented as a
method for the “hermeneutical analysis” of culture. As such, it is seen as the means for the
production of interpretations of human actions, contributing thereby to our understanding
of sociocultural phenomena. That is to say, participant observation is understood as being
at odds with the research that explores the causes of the phenomena observed.
This method also tends to be the defining feature of sociocultural anthropology and
practicing it for at least a year (usually during the PhD) is the inescapable rite of passage
for calling oneself a sociocultural anthropologist. Despite its central role in sociocultural
anthropology, participant observation stands aside as a scientific method. It obviously
differs from the experimental method, which is often presented as the paramount example
of scientific practice. It also differs from mere observational methods – as practiced, for
instance, by astronomers observing stars or even by ethologists observing animals’ behavior.
Indeed, the participant observer has to be directly involved, for a sufficient amount of
time, in the lives of the ‘observed’. Only this can bring the genuine understanding that
sociocultural anthropologists are after. Participant observation has therefore an epistemic
value, but it is one of a specific kind.
Two questions follow: first, what makes participant observation so valuable in
knowledge production? Second, does participant observation have epistemic value for
those who are looking for causal explanations?
In this paper, I analyze the processes through which knowledge is produced by way
of participant observation. My argument rests on a description of the cognitive feats of
participant observation since I hold that the cognitive activity of interpreting has not
yet been fully described and assessed as such. My argument goes as follows: I argue that
the process of interpretation in participant observation involves relying heavily on what
cognitive scientists call “mind-reading” capabilities. Second, I claim that this characteristic
use of mind-reading makes participant observation useful for identifying the causes of
sociocultural phenomena. Thus, I conclude that participant observation is an adequate
method for describing the causal relationships that constitute sociocultural phenomena., Посматрање са учествовањем је метод којим се описују веровања и праксе
људи у њиховом природном окружењу. Бронислав Малиновски први је користио
и описао посматрање са учествовањем као емпиријски метод. Након Клифорда
Герца, овај метод се користио за долазак до „густих описа”. Односно, представљен
је као метод за „херменеутичку анализу” културе, то јест као средство за долазак
до интерпретација људских поступака, доприносећи на тај начин разумевању
социокултурних феномена. Према томе, посматрање са учествовањем сматра се у
супротности са истраживањем које тражи узроке посматраних појава.
Овај метод је такође дефинишућа карактеристика социокултурне антропологије
и практиковање посматрања са учествовањем најмање годину дана (обично током
доктората) неизбежан је „обред преласка” у социокултурног антрополога. Упркос
својој централној улози у овој дисциплини, посматрање са учествовањем стоји
по страни као научни метод. Очигледно се разликује од експерименталне методе,
која се често представља као парадигматичан пример научне праксе. Такође се
разликује од пуких метода посматрања – како то практикују, на пример, астрономи
који посматрају звезде или етолози који посматрају понашање животиња. Заиста,
посматрач-учесник мора бити директно укључен, довољно времена, у животе
„посматраних”. Само се тако може доћи до истинског разумевања које траже
социокултурни антрополози. Посматрање са учествовањем, стога, има сазнају
вредност, али посебне врсте.
Следе два питања: прво, шта посматрање са учествовањем чини тако вредним у
производњи знања? Друго, да ли посматрање са учествовањем има сазнајну вредност
за оне који траже узрочна објашњења?
У овом раду анализирам процесе кроз које се знање производи путем посматрања
са учествовањем. Мој аргумент почива на опису когнитивних процеса који леже у
основи овог метода будући да сматрам да когнитивна активност интерпретације
још увек није у потпуности описана. Мој аргумент је следећи: тврдим да процес
интерпретације у посматрању са учествовањем укључује у великој мери ослањање на
оно што когнитивни научници називају способностима „читања ума”. Друго, тврдим
да ова карактеристична употреба „читања ума” чини посматрање са учествовањем
корисним за изналажење узрока социокултурних феномена. Дакле, закључујем да је посматрање са учествовањем адекватан метод за описивање узрочних веза које
конституишу социокултурне феномене.",
publisher = "Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu",
journal = "Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci",
title = "The epistemic value of participant observation: Between explanation and understanding",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3703"
}
Knežević, A.. (2023). The epistemic value of participant observation: Between explanation and understanding. in Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci
Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3703
Knežević A. The epistemic value of participant observation: Between explanation and understanding. in Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci. 2023;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3703 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "The epistemic value of participant observation: Between explanation and understanding" in Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3703 .

Uncovering the ontology of social change

Knežević, Aleksandra

(International Social Ontology Society, 2023)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3329
AB  - I start this talk with the following assumption: if we understand the ontology of social change, we are enabled to deliberately initiate it in a socially desired direction. Therefore, the main aim of this talk is to examine said ontology.
To that aim, I first assume that social change happens when there is a change in social norms. For this reason, I argue that to uncover the ontology of social change, we need to understand the ontology of social norms. Further, by understanding the ontology of social norms, I claim that we are able to understand what social actions are necessary for initiating social change.
Second, I use Sperber’s (1985) framework of Cultural Cognitive Causal Chains (CCCC) to explain the metaphysics of social norms. Sperber uses CCCC to elucidate how cultural phenomena (e.g., social norms) exist. He defines cultural phenomena as long-lasting and widely distributed cultural representations. For Sperber, cultural representations are a causal complex of two different kinds of representations: mental representations and public productions. Simply speaking, mental representations include things “in the head” such as beliefs, intentions, desires, etc., and public productions include social objects that are public and include, for example, works of art, utterances, written symbols, etc. Therefore, Sperber argues that cultural phenomena exist as a chain or a complex in which two kinds of things causally interact: individual beliefs and
social objects.
In the last part of my talk, my ultimate goal is to show that CCCC can be used for clarifying how causal and constitutive social construction cooperate in construing social kinds such as social beliefs and social objects. To do so, I first compare Sperber’s framework of CCCC and Haslanger’s (2007) ontology of social structures to demonstrate their similarities. Then, contra Haslanger (2003) and Díaz-León (2013, 2018), I state my reasons for holding that causal social construction is relevant for those who aim to design strategies for achieving social change. Lastly, I claim that social change as a change in social norms can be deliberately initiated in a socially desired direction by manipulating the social objects constituted by causally constructed public meanings.
PB  - International Social Ontology Society
C3  - Social Ontology 2023
T1  - Uncovering the ontology of social change
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3329
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2023",
abstract = "I start this talk with the following assumption: if we understand the ontology of social change, we are enabled to deliberately initiate it in a socially desired direction. Therefore, the main aim of this talk is to examine said ontology.
To that aim, I first assume that social change happens when there is a change in social norms. For this reason, I argue that to uncover the ontology of social change, we need to understand the ontology of social norms. Further, by understanding the ontology of social norms, I claim that we are able to understand what social actions are necessary for initiating social change.
Second, I use Sperber’s (1985) framework of Cultural Cognitive Causal Chains (CCCC) to explain the metaphysics of social norms. Sperber uses CCCC to elucidate how cultural phenomena (e.g., social norms) exist. He defines cultural phenomena as long-lasting and widely distributed cultural representations. For Sperber, cultural representations are a causal complex of two different kinds of representations: mental representations and public productions. Simply speaking, mental representations include things “in the head” such as beliefs, intentions, desires, etc., and public productions include social objects that are public and include, for example, works of art, utterances, written symbols, etc. Therefore, Sperber argues that cultural phenomena exist as a chain or a complex in which two kinds of things causally interact: individual beliefs and
social objects.
In the last part of my talk, my ultimate goal is to show that CCCC can be used for clarifying how causal and constitutive social construction cooperate in construing social kinds such as social beliefs and social objects. To do so, I first compare Sperber’s framework of CCCC and Haslanger’s (2007) ontology of social structures to demonstrate their similarities. Then, contra Haslanger (2003) and Díaz-León (2013, 2018), I state my reasons for holding that causal social construction is relevant for those who aim to design strategies for achieving social change. Lastly, I claim that social change as a change in social norms can be deliberately initiated in a socially desired direction by manipulating the social objects constituted by causally constructed public meanings.",
publisher = "International Social Ontology Society",
journal = "Social Ontology 2023",
title = "Uncovering the ontology of social change",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3329"
}
Knežević, A.. (2023). Uncovering the ontology of social change. in Social Ontology 2023
International Social Ontology Society..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3329
Knežević A. Uncovering the ontology of social change. in Social Ontology 2023. 2023;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3329 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Uncovering the ontology of social change" in Social Ontology 2023 (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3329 .

Priroda i kultura, još jednom: šta neodarvinizam i teorija razvojnih sistema imaju da kažu?

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za etnologiju i antropologiju, 2023)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://antropologija.com/index.php/an/article/view/447
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2847
AB  - U ovom radu bavim se konceptualnim odnosom prirode i kulture u lamarkizmu, darvinizmu, sociobiologiji, neodarvinizmu i teoriji razvojnih sistema. Cilj rada je da ukažem na koji način sociobiologija odstupa od onoga što je o ovom odnosu postulirano u neodarvinizmu. Naime, zahvaljujući Avgustu Vajzmanu i njegovoj teoriji jakog nasleđivanja i Alfredu Kreberu i njegovoj tezi o kulturnom determinizmu, neodarvinizam, za razliku od redukcionizma socibiologije, polazi od jake konceptualne separacije prirode i kulture u kojoj su priroda i kultura dva odvojena uzročna faktora jednako važna za objašnjenje ljudskog ponašanja i ljudske društvenosti. Na kraju, bavim se kritikom Tima Ingolda koja je usmerena prema ovoj oštroj konceptualnoj separaciji i koja dolazi iz pozicije onih koji u evolucionoj biologiji zastupaju teoriju razvojnih sistema.
AB  - In this paper, I deal with the conceptual relationship between nature and
culture in Lamarckism, Darwinism, sociobiology, neo-Darwinism, and developmental
systems theory. The aim of the paper is to show how sociobiology deviates from what is
postulated about this relationship in neo-Darwinism. Namely, thanks to August Weismann’s
theory of hard inheritance and Alfred Kroeber’s cultural determinism, neo-Darwinism,
unlike the reductionism of sociobiology, starts from a strong conceptual separation
of nature and culture in which nature and culture are two separate causal factors
equally important for explaining human behavior and human sociability. Finally, I deal
with Tim Ingold’s critique of this sharp conceptual separation, which comes from the
position of developmental systems theorists in evolutionary biology.
PB  - Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za etnologiju i antropologiju
T2  - Antropologija
T1  - Priroda i kultura, još jednom: šta neodarvinizam i teorija razvojnih sistema imaju da kažu?
T1  - Nature and culture revisited: What do neo-Darwinism and developmental systems theory have to say?
IS  - 1
VL  - 23
SP  - 25
EP  - 45
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2847
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2023",
abstract = "U ovom radu bavim se konceptualnim odnosom prirode i kulture u lamarkizmu, darvinizmu, sociobiologiji, neodarvinizmu i teoriji razvojnih sistema. Cilj rada je da ukažem na koji način sociobiologija odstupa od onoga što je o ovom odnosu postulirano u neodarvinizmu. Naime, zahvaljujući Avgustu Vajzmanu i njegovoj teoriji jakog nasleđivanja i Alfredu Kreberu i njegovoj tezi o kulturnom determinizmu, neodarvinizam, za razliku od redukcionizma socibiologije, polazi od jake konceptualne separacije prirode i kulture u kojoj su priroda i kultura dva odvojena uzročna faktora jednako važna za objašnjenje ljudskog ponašanja i ljudske društvenosti. Na kraju, bavim se kritikom Tima Ingolda koja je usmerena prema ovoj oštroj konceptualnoj separaciji i koja dolazi iz pozicije onih koji u evolucionoj biologiji zastupaju teoriju razvojnih sistema., In this paper, I deal with the conceptual relationship between nature and
culture in Lamarckism, Darwinism, sociobiology, neo-Darwinism, and developmental
systems theory. The aim of the paper is to show how sociobiology deviates from what is
postulated about this relationship in neo-Darwinism. Namely, thanks to August Weismann’s
theory of hard inheritance and Alfred Kroeber’s cultural determinism, neo-Darwinism,
unlike the reductionism of sociobiology, starts from a strong conceptual separation
of nature and culture in which nature and culture are two separate causal factors
equally important for explaining human behavior and human sociability. Finally, I deal
with Tim Ingold’s critique of this sharp conceptual separation, which comes from the
position of developmental systems theorists in evolutionary biology.",
publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za etnologiju i antropologiju",
journal = "Antropologija",
title = "Priroda i kultura, još jednom: šta neodarvinizam i teorija razvojnih sistema imaju da kažu?, Nature and culture revisited: What do neo-Darwinism and developmental systems theory have to say?",
number = "1",
volume = "23",
pages = "25-45",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2847"
}
Knežević, A.. (2023). Priroda i kultura, još jednom: šta neodarvinizam i teorija razvojnih sistema imaju da kažu?. in Antropologija
Univerzitet u Beogradu – Filozofski fakultet, Institut za etnologiju i antropologiju., 23(1), 25-45.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2847
Knežević A. Priroda i kultura, još jednom: šta neodarvinizam i teorija razvojnih sistema imaju da kažu?. in Antropologija. 2023;23(1):25-45.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2847 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Priroda i kultura, još jednom: šta neodarvinizam i teorija razvojnih sistema imaju da kažu?" in Antropologija, 23, no. 1 (2023):25-45,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2847 .

Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen

Knežević, Aleksandra

(2022)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://philosophy.ceu.edu/sites/philosophy.ceu.edu/files/attachment/article/900/map-conf-abstracts-fin-version-1004.pdf
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2848
AB  - van der Vossen argues that political activism (i.e., “being a member of a political party,
campaigning during elections” etc.) biases philosophers’ thinking, making them worse at seeking the truth. Consequently, he states that the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher introduced by Plato and Marx should be replaced by an ideal of a philosopher as a disinterested seeker of the truth. For this reason, he holds that universities should resemble ivory towers more than they do now. I understand van der Vossen’s argument as follows: if philosophy aims to produce knowledge that benefits society (as the proponents of the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher assume, and it is warranted to suppose that van der Vossen grants this assumption), philosophy should produce unbiased knowledge. Further, if philosophy aims to produce unbiased knowledge, philosophers should be disinterested in their exploration of the truth, and not politically active (for the reason mentioned); thus, hidden in their ivory towers. Against van der Vossen, I first argue that socially beneficial knowledge does not require disinterestedness and unbiasedness (these are, after all, not human traits) but the ability to distance oneself from one’s biases so one can revise them in face of criticism. Consequently, although I admit that political activism can strengthen one’s biases, I argue that it does not follow that politically active philosophers are more likely to produce biased philosophy than those who are not interested in politics. Finally, I claim that a socially engaged philosopher does not need to be a political activist at all. A socially engaged philosopher is one who produces answers to questions that matter to society. However, to get to know what these questions are, a socially engaged philosopher must climb down the ivory tower and engage
with the social context of her research but without the need to engage in political activism.
C3  - Inclusion Beyond Face Value: Metaphilosophy of/with Social Justice
T1  - Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2022",
abstract = "van der Vossen argues that political activism (i.e., “being a member of a political party,
campaigning during elections” etc.) biases philosophers’ thinking, making them worse at seeking the truth. Consequently, he states that the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher introduced by Plato and Marx should be replaced by an ideal of a philosopher as a disinterested seeker of the truth. For this reason, he holds that universities should resemble ivory towers more than they do now. I understand van der Vossen’s argument as follows: if philosophy aims to produce knowledge that benefits society (as the proponents of the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher assume, and it is warranted to suppose that van der Vossen grants this assumption), philosophy should produce unbiased knowledge. Further, if philosophy aims to produce unbiased knowledge, philosophers should be disinterested in their exploration of the truth, and not politically active (for the reason mentioned); thus, hidden in their ivory towers. Against van der Vossen, I first argue that socially beneficial knowledge does not require disinterestedness and unbiasedness (these are, after all, not human traits) but the ability to distance oneself from one’s biases so one can revise them in face of criticism. Consequently, although I admit that political activism can strengthen one’s biases, I argue that it does not follow that politically active philosophers are more likely to produce biased philosophy than those who are not interested in politics. Finally, I claim that a socially engaged philosopher does not need to be a political activist at all. A socially engaged philosopher is one who produces answers to questions that matter to society. However, to get to know what these questions are, a socially engaged philosopher must climb down the ivory tower and engage
with the social context of her research but without the need to engage in political activism.",
journal = "Inclusion Beyond Face Value: Metaphilosophy of/with Social Justice",
title = "Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848"
}
Knežević, A.. (2022). Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen. in Inclusion Beyond Face Value: Metaphilosophy of/with Social Justice.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848
Knežević A. Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen. in Inclusion Beyond Face Value: Metaphilosophy of/with Social Justice. 2022;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen" in Inclusion Beyond Face Value: Metaphilosophy of/with Social Justice (2022),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848 .

Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2846
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.
IS  - 3
VL  - 32
SP  - 481
EP  - 482
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2846
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2021",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.",
number = "3",
volume = "32",
pages = "481-482",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2846"
}
Knežević, A.. (2021). Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(3), 481-482.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2846
Knežević A. Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(3):481-482.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2846 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020." in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 3 (2021):481-482,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2846 .

Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2941
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.
IS  - 3
VL  - 32
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2941
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2021",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.",
number = "3",
volume = "32",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2941"
}
Knežević, A.. (2021). Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(3).
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2941
Knežević A. Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(3).
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2941 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Jana Ndiaye Berenkova; Michael Hauser; Nick Nesbitt (Eds.), Revolutions for The Future: May ‘68 and The Prague Spring, Suture Press 2020." in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 3 (2021),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2941 .

The epistemic value of participant observation

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Budapest : Central European University, 2020)

TY  - THES
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3330
AB  - Although participant observation is considered to be the hallmark of cultural anthropology, the epistemic value of this method has not been sufficiently spelled out. One of the most important and influential descriptions of participant observation is given by Clifford Geertz who argues that the epistemic value of participant observation is in interpreting human actions and recovering their meaning, and thus, enabling “thick descriptions”. How does participation contribute to the production of valid interpretation? I argue that doing participant observation involves taking a position from which one can observe the “micro-context” of action. This type of observation and the consequent knowledge acquired enables producing reliable interpretations. However, this production also relies on mind-reading, that is, the psychological capacity to ascribe mental states to others. I argue that first participant observation enables to better “mind-read” the members of the community studied, and second, recruiting mind-reading in participant observation enables the ethnographer to recover the meaning of human actions in terms of their mental causes. Subsequently, I argue that the epistemic value of participant observation is in producing interpretations of human actions that can be integrated into causal explanations of cultural phenomena. I conclude that participant observation is compatible with naturalism in the social sciences.
PB  - Budapest : Central European University
T2  - CEU Philosophy Department master theses
T1  - The epistemic value of participant observation
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3330
ER  - 
@mastersthesis{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2020",
abstract = "Although participant observation is considered to be the hallmark of cultural anthropology, the epistemic value of this method has not been sufficiently spelled out. One of the most important and influential descriptions of participant observation is given by Clifford Geertz who argues that the epistemic value of participant observation is in interpreting human actions and recovering their meaning, and thus, enabling “thick descriptions”. How does participation contribute to the production of valid interpretation? I argue that doing participant observation involves taking a position from which one can observe the “micro-context” of action. This type of observation and the consequent knowledge acquired enables producing reliable interpretations. However, this production also relies on mind-reading, that is, the psychological capacity to ascribe mental states to others. I argue that first participant observation enables to better “mind-read” the members of the community studied, and second, recruiting mind-reading in participant observation enables the ethnographer to recover the meaning of human actions in terms of their mental causes. Subsequently, I argue that the epistemic value of participant observation is in producing interpretations of human actions that can be integrated into causal explanations of cultural phenomena. I conclude that participant observation is compatible with naturalism in the social sciences.",
publisher = "Budapest : Central European University",
journal = "CEU Philosophy Department master theses",
title = "The epistemic value of participant observation",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3330"
}
Knežević, A.. (2020). The epistemic value of participant observation. in CEU Philosophy Department master theses
Budapest : Central European University..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3330
Knežević A. The epistemic value of participant observation. in CEU Philosophy Department master theses. 2020;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3330 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "The epistemic value of participant observation" in CEU Philosophy Department master theses (2020),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3330 .

Towards Methodological Pluralism in Psychological Sciences

Deb, Angarika; Knežević, Aleksandra

(Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Deb, Angarika
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2399
AB  - An overreliance on experimental methods in psychology comes with its problems of low context-sensitivity, ecological invalidity, and limited scope of study. A move towards interdisciplinarity and methodological pluralism, along with an increased attention to the cultural context of behavior, can give greater validity to its findings, making psychology a more robust science.
PB  - Cham: Springer International Publishing AG
T2  - Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Sciences
T1  - Towards Methodological Pluralism in Psychological Sciences
DO  - 10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3868-1
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Deb, Angarika and Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2020",
abstract = "An overreliance on experimental methods in psychology comes with its problems of low context-sensitivity, ecological invalidity, and limited scope of study. A move towards interdisciplinarity and methodological pluralism, along with an increased attention to the cultural context of behavior, can give greater validity to its findings, making psychology a more robust science.",
publisher = "Cham: Springer International Publishing AG",
journal = "Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Sciences",
title = "Towards Methodological Pluralism in Psychological Sciences",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3868-1"
}
Deb, A.,& Knežević, A.. (2020). Towards Methodological Pluralism in Psychological Sciences. in Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Sciences
Cham: Springer International Publishing AG..
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3868-1
Deb A, Knežević A. Towards Methodological Pluralism in Psychological Sciences. in Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Sciences. 2020;.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3868-1 .
Deb, Angarika, Knežević, Aleksandra, "Towards Methodological Pluralism in Psychological Sciences" in Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Sciences (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3868-1 . .
2

Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?

Knežević, Aleksandra

(Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor, 2019)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Knežević, Aleksandra
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3317
AB  - The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why specific organisms have phenomenal experience or qualia. In other words, the hard problem is the problem of explaining how, physical processes in the brain lead to a subjective experience. In order to explain the rise of the specific phenomenal experience, there is a tendency in philosophy and science to start an explanation from elaborating how neural mechanisms and other processes in the brain work. This approach is encountered in many problems. One of them is presented by David Chalmers, who also introduced us to the hard problem. He argues that the explanation of phenomenal experience is not reducible to any empirical explanation because empirical explanations would always be insufficient. That is why a group of scientists and philosophers led by Giulio Tononi took the opposite approach. Instead of proceeding from scientific facts, they proceed from consciousness itself, in whose existence they are certain. The first step in this approach is the identification of the essential properties of consciousness – axioms and, from there, inferring the postulates that describe the properties physical mechanisms should have in order to explain the emergence of consciousness. This is the process of Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT is a qualitative and quantitative formal framework on the basis of which it can be determined whether a particular physical system is conscious and if it is, to what extent. The main parameter for determining the amount of consciousness in a system is the value of Φ, which is the measure of integrated information in a system. If the value of Φ is above 0, then the system is conscious. A computer scientist, Scott Aaronson, noted that IIT has weird predictions. For example, it implies that if a simple system, such as a 2D grid, has a value of Φ five times greater than someone’s brain, than 2D grid is five times more conscious then someone’s brain. That is why, according to Aaronson, having a large value of Φ is not a sufficient condition for consciousness, even though there might be a possibility that the value of Φ is a necessary condition.
My main goal is to investigate what are the consequences of IIT and its criticisms, especially in terms of panpsychism. Panpsychism is a view that every physical thing is in one way or another associated with consciousness. This theory of mind juggles between physicalism and dualism, successfully managing to avoid the strongest criticisms pointed to each one of them. For the purposes of my main goal, I will present my research in the order similar to the one expressed above. First, I will explain the hard problem in a more detailed way, continuing with the discussion on panpsychism, which naturally follows. Second, I will present the axioms and postulates of IIT and then I will explain what integrated information really is. In this section, I will discuss explanatory and predictive powers of IIT but also its contra-intuitive predictions. I will finish by making a comparison between panpsychism and IIT.
PB  - Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor
PB  - Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
C3  - International Symposium: Philosophy Students' Symposium 2019
T1  - Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3317
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Knežević, Aleksandra",
year = "2019",
abstract = "The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why specific organisms have phenomenal experience or qualia. In other words, the hard problem is the problem of explaining how, physical processes in the brain lead to a subjective experience. In order to explain the rise of the specific phenomenal experience, there is a tendency in philosophy and science to start an explanation from elaborating how neural mechanisms and other processes in the brain work. This approach is encountered in many problems. One of them is presented by David Chalmers, who also introduced us to the hard problem. He argues that the explanation of phenomenal experience is not reducible to any empirical explanation because empirical explanations would always be insufficient. That is why a group of scientists and philosophers led by Giulio Tononi took the opposite approach. Instead of proceeding from scientific facts, they proceed from consciousness itself, in whose existence they are certain. The first step in this approach is the identification of the essential properties of consciousness – axioms and, from there, inferring the postulates that describe the properties physical mechanisms should have in order to explain the emergence of consciousness. This is the process of Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT is a qualitative and quantitative formal framework on the basis of which it can be determined whether a particular physical system is conscious and if it is, to what extent. The main parameter for determining the amount of consciousness in a system is the value of Φ, which is the measure of integrated information in a system. If the value of Φ is above 0, then the system is conscious. A computer scientist, Scott Aaronson, noted that IIT has weird predictions. For example, it implies that if a simple system, such as a 2D grid, has a value of Φ five times greater than someone’s brain, than 2D grid is five times more conscious then someone’s brain. That is why, according to Aaronson, having a large value of Φ is not a sufficient condition for consciousness, even though there might be a possibility that the value of Φ is a necessary condition.
My main goal is to investigate what are the consequences of IIT and its criticisms, especially in terms of panpsychism. Panpsychism is a view that every physical thing is in one way or another associated with consciousness. This theory of mind juggles between physicalism and dualism, successfully managing to avoid the strongest criticisms pointed to each one of them. For the purposes of my main goal, I will present my research in the order similar to the one expressed above. First, I will explain the hard problem in a more detailed way, continuing with the discussion on panpsychism, which naturally follows. Second, I will present the axioms and postulates of IIT and then I will explain what integrated information really is. In this section, I will discuss explanatory and predictive powers of IIT but also its contra-intuitive predictions. I will finish by making a comparison between panpsychism and IIT.",
publisher = "Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor, Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science",
journal = "International Symposium: Philosophy Students' Symposium 2019",
title = "Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3317"
}
Knežević, A.. (2019). Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?. in International Symposium: Philosophy Students' Symposium 2019
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3317
Knežević A. Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?. in International Symposium: Philosophy Students' Symposium 2019. 2019;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3317 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Integrated Information Theory and Panpsychism – Are There Any Connections?" in International Symposium: Philosophy Students' Symposium 2019 (2019),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3317 .