The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach
Moralni status životinja: stepeni moralnog statusa i pristup zasnovan na interesima
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This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.
Tema ovog rada je problem moralnog statusa ne-ljudskih životinja, tj. pitanje da li osećajne životinje imaju moralni značaj. Razmatraju se argumenti u prilog i protiv moralne relevantno-sti životinja, pre svega argument marginalnih slučajeva. Zastupa se tvrdnja da osećajne živo-tinje imaju moralni status na osnovu toga što imaju interese u pogledu svoje iskustvene do-brobiti, ali da postoje različiti stepeni moralnog statusa. Predstavljaju se i razmatraju dva pristupa zasnovana na interesima: Degrasijino gledište da osećajne životinje imaju interes da nastave da žive i da treba pripisati moralni značaj njihovim interesima. i Mekmanova TRIA teorija koja slično tome postulira da životinje imaju interese i da bi u datoj situaciji trebalo uporediti interese ljudi i životinja u pitanju. Najzad, zaključak je da bi trebalo odustati od an-tropocentričnog pristupa zarad biocentrične etike.
Keywords:
animal / sentient / moral / status / well-being / interest / human / personSource:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2021, 32, 2, 282-295Publisher:
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
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IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Todorović, Zorana S. PY - 2021 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2252 AB - This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics. AB - Tema ovog rada je problem moralnog statusa ne-ljudskih životinja, tj. pitanje da li osećajne životinje imaju moralni značaj. Razmatraju se argumenti u prilog i protiv moralne relevantno-sti životinja, pre svega argument marginalnih slučajeva. Zastupa se tvrdnja da osećajne živo-tinje imaju moralni status na osnovu toga što imaju interese u pogledu svoje iskustvene do-brobiti, ali da postoje različiti stepeni moralnog statusa. Predstavljaju se i razmatraju dva pristupa zasnovana na interesima: Degrasijino gledište da osećajne životinje imaju interes da nastave da žive i da treba pripisati moralni značaj njihovim interesima. i Mekmanova TRIA teorija koja slično tome postulira da životinje imaju interese i da bi u datoj situaciji trebalo uporediti interese ljudi i životinja u pitanju. Najzad, zaključak je da bi trebalo odustati od an-tropocentričnog pristupa zarad biocentrične etike. PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society T1 - The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach T1 - Moralni status životinja: stepeni moralnog statusa i pristup zasnovan na interesima IS - 2 VL - 32 SP - 282 EP - 295 DO - 10.2298/FID2102282T ER -
@article{ author = "Todorović, Zorana S.", year = "2021", abstract = "This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics., Tema ovog rada je problem moralnog statusa ne-ljudskih životinja, tj. pitanje da li osećajne životinje imaju moralni značaj. Razmatraju se argumenti u prilog i protiv moralne relevantno-sti životinja, pre svega argument marginalnih slučajeva. Zastupa se tvrdnja da osećajne živo-tinje imaju moralni status na osnovu toga što imaju interese u pogledu svoje iskustvene do-brobiti, ali da postoje različiti stepeni moralnog statusa. Predstavljaju se i razmatraju dva pristupa zasnovana na interesima: Degrasijino gledište da osećajne životinje imaju interes da nastave da žive i da treba pripisati moralni značaj njihovim interesima. i Mekmanova TRIA teorija koja slično tome postulira da životinje imaju interese i da bi u datoj situaciji trebalo uporediti interese ljudi i životinja u pitanju. Najzad, zaključak je da bi trebalo odustati od an-tropocentričnog pristupa zarad biocentrične etike.", publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju", journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society", title = "The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach, Moralni status životinja: stepeni moralnog statusa i pristup zasnovan na interesima", number = "2", volume = "32", pages = "282-295", doi = "10.2298/FID2102282T" }
Todorović, Z. S.. (2021). The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(2), 282-295. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2102282T
Todorović ZS. The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(2):282-295. doi:10.2298/FID2102282T .
Todorović, Zorana S., "The Moral Status of Animals: Degrees of Moral Status and the Interest-Based Approach" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 2 (2021):282-295, https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2102282T . .