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dc.creatorGuerreiro, Vitor
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-23T11:43:03Z
dc.date.available2019-04-23T11:43:03Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1901036G
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1950
dc.description.abstractThis paper is about the dilemma raised against musical ontology by Roger Scruton, in his The Aesthetics of Music: either musical ontology is about certain mind-independent “things” (sound structures) and so music is left out of the picture, or it is about an “intentional object” and so its puzzles are susceptible of an arbitrary answer. I argue the dilemma is merely apparent and deny that musical works can be identified with sound structures, whether or not conceived as abstract entities. The general idea is this: both Platonism and nominalism about musical works are a kind of fetishism: musical works are not “things”, in Danto’s sense of “mere real things”; they rather involve complex relationships between objects, events, and different kinds of functional properties. For this, I draw on Levinson and Howell’s notion of indication, combined with Searle’s approach to institutional reality... with a little twist of my own.en
dc.description.abstractOvaj rad posvećen je dilemi u vezi sa ontologijom muzike, koju je u svom delu The Aesthetics of Music izneo Rodžer Skruton: ili se ontologija muzike bavi određenim „stvarima” nezavisnim od uma (zvučne strukture), u kom slučaju je sama muzika isključena, ili se ona bavi „intencionalnim objektom”, te su stoga njeni problemi podložni arbitrarnim rešenjima. Naš je stav da je u pitanju prividna dilema, te da se muzička dela ne mogu izjednačiti sa zvučnim strukturama, bilo da ih razumemo kao apstraktne entitete ili ne. Načelno, ideja je sledeća: i platonizam i nominalizam u pogledu muzičkih dela su vrste fetišizma – muzička dela nisu „stvari” u Dantoovom smislu „pukih realnih stvari”. Naprotiv, ona podrazumevaju kompleksne veze između objekata, događaja i različitih vrsta funkcionalnih svojstava. U tom pogledu, oslanjam se na Levinsonov i Hauvelov pojam indikacije, kao i na Serlov pristup institucionalnoj realnosti... uz mali zaokret sa moje strane.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherBeograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teorijusr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Societysr
dc.subjectmusical ontologysr
dc.subjectPlatonismsr
dc.subjectnominalismsr
dc.subjectartworkssr
dc.subjecttypessr
dc.titleAre Musical Works Sound Structures?sr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dcterms.abstractГуерреиро, Витор;
dc.citation.issue1
dc.citation.volume30
dc.citation.spage36
dc.citation.epage53
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901036G
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/4517/bitstream_4517.pdf


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