dc.creator | Guerreiro, Vitor | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-23T11:43:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-23T11:43:03Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-5738 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1901036G | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1950 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper is about the dilemma raised against musical ontology by Roger Scruton, in his The Aesthetics of Music: either musical ontology is about certain mind-independent “things” (sound structures) and so music is left out of the picture, or it is about an “intentional object” and so its puzzles are susceptible of an arbitrary answer. I argue the dilemma is merely apparent and deny that musical works can be identified with sound structures, whether or not conceived as abstract entities. The general idea is this: both Platonism and nominalism about musical works are a kind of fetishism: musical works are not “things”, in Danto’s sense of “mere real things”; they rather involve complex relationships between objects, events, and different kinds of functional properties. For this, I draw on Levinson and Howell’s notion of indication, combined with Searle’s approach to institutional reality... with a little twist of my own. | en |
dc.description.abstract | Ovaj rad posvećen je dilemi u vezi sa ontologijom muzike, koju je u svom delu The Aesthetics of Music izneo Rodžer Skruton: ili se ontologija muzike bavi određenim „stvarima” nezavisnim od uma (zvučne strukture), u kom slučaju je sama muzika isključena, ili se ona bavi „intencionalnim objektom”, te su stoga njeni problemi podložni arbitrarnim rešenjima. Naš je stav da je u pitanju prividna dilema, te da se muzička dela ne mogu izjednačiti sa zvučnim strukturama, bilo da ih razumemo kao apstraktne entitete ili ne. Načelno, ideja je sledeća: i platonizam i nominalizam u pogledu muzičkih dela su vrste fetišizma – muzička dela nisu „stvari” u Dantoovom smislu „pukih realnih stvari”. Naprotiv, ona podrazumevaju kompleksne veze između objekata, događaja i različitih vrsta funkcionalnih svojstava. U tom pogledu, oslanjam se na Levinsonov i Hauvelov pojam indikacije, kao i na Serlov pristup institucionalnoj realnosti... uz mali zaokret sa moje strane. | sr |
dc.language.iso | en | sr |
dc.publisher | Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju | sr |
dc.rights | openAccess | sr |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society | sr |
dc.subject | musical ontology | sr |
dc.subject | Platonism | sr |
dc.subject | nominalism | sr |
dc.subject | artworks | sr |
dc.subject | types | sr |
dc.title | Are Musical Works Sound Structures? | sr |
dc.type | article | sr |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC-ND | sr |
dcterms.abstract | Гуерреиро, Витор; | |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.volume | 30 | |
dc.citation.spage | 36 | |
dc.citation.epage | 53 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/FID1901036G | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | sr |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/4517/bitstream_4517.pdf | |