Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity
Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost
Abstract
The introductory part of the article deals with general features of
Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s
interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as
Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity.
In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and
rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as
immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically
shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application,
and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences
of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments
as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also
claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersu...bjectivity
involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives
rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.
Keywords:
Habermas, Jirgen / Kripke / language / mormativity / rulesSource:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2013, 245-267Funding / projects:
- Studying climate change and its influence on environment: impacts, adaptation and mitigation (RS-43007)
Institution/Community
IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Sládeček, Michal PY - 2013 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/96 AB - The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested. T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society T1 - Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity T1 - Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost SP - 245 EP - 267 DO - 10.2298/FID1304245S ER -
@article{ editor = "Jovanov, Rastko", author = "Sládeček, Michal", year = "2013", abstract = "The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.", journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society", title = "Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity, Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost", pages = "245-267", doi = "10.2298/FID1304245S" }
Jovanov, R.,& Sládeček, M.. (2013). Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 245-267. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304245S
Jovanov R, Sládeček M. Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2013;:245-267. doi:10.2298/FID1304245S .
Jovanov, Rastko, Sládeček, Michal, "Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2013):245-267, https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304245S . .