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Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity

Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost

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2013
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Authors
Sládeček, Michal
Contributors
Jovanov, Rastko
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
The introductory part of the article deals with general features of Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity. In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application, and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersu...bjectivity involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.

Keywords:
Habermas, Jirgen / Kripke / language / mormativity / rules
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2013, 245-267
Funding / projects:
  • Studying climate change and its influence on environment: impacts, adaptation and mitigation (RS-43007)

DOI: 10.2298/FID1304245S

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URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/96
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  • Glavna kolekcija
  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/96
AB  - The introductory part of the article deals with general features of
Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s
interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as
Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity.
In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and
rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as
immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically
shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application,
and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences
of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments
as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also
claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity
involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives
rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity
T1  - Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost
SP  - 245
EP  - 267
DO  - 10.2298/FID1304245S
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2013",
abstract = "The introductory part of the article deals with general features of
Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s
interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as
Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity.
In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and
rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as
immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically
shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application,
and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences
of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments
as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also
claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity
involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives
rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity, Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost",
pages = "245-267",
doi = "10.2298/FID1304245S"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Sládeček, M.. (2013). Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 245-267.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304245S
Jovanov R, Sládeček M. Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2013;:245-267.
doi:10.2298/FID1304245S .
Jovanov, Rastko, Sládeček, Michal, "Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2013):245-267,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304245S . .

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