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Dispositional Explanations in Dualism

Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu

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2013
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Authors
Nešić, Janko
Contributors
Jovanov, Rastko
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.
Keywords:
dispositions / powers / causal explanation / dualism / absences
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2013, 218-241

DOI: 10.2298/FID1304218N

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URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/85
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  • Glavna kolekcija
  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nešić, Janko
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/85
AB  - In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to
dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist
can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently
of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a
price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and
solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental
explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can
be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Dispositional Explanations in Dualism
T1  - Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu
SP  - 218
EP  - 241
DO  - 10.2298/FID1304218N
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Nešić, Janko",
year = "2013",
abstract = "In order to defend mental explanations dualists may appeal to
dispositions (powers). By accepting a powers theory of causation, a dualist
can more plausibly defend mental explanations that are given independently
of physical explanations. Accepting a power-based theory still comes with a
price. Absences and double preventers are not causes in a powers theory, and
solutions based on them can only defend their explanatory relevance in mental
explanations. There is still a chance that such mental explanations can
be causal explanations, though they do not refer to real causes.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Dispositional Explanations in Dualism, Dispoziciona objašnjenja u dualizmu",
pages = "218-241",
doi = "10.2298/FID1304218N"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Nešić, J.. (2013). Dispositional Explanations in Dualism. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 218-241.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304218N
Jovanov R, Nešić J. Dispositional Explanations in Dualism. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2013;:218-241.
doi:10.2298/FID1304218N .
Jovanov, Rastko, Nešić, Janko, "Dispositional Explanations in Dualism" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2013):218-241,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304218N . .

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