This paper aims to present Searle’s conception of institutional reality as an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy and social theory. Its importance notwithstending, the two objections will be raised concerning the central notion of collective intentionality. Searle thinks of this notion as crucial for explaining human cooperation and social reality. The first objection is that Searle missed to take into accout the rationality assumption in his explanation of cooperation and human interaction. The second objection is related to the previos one. Additionally, Serle missed to investigate the role of autonomous moral agent in the procedure of
constructing social reality. Given this shortcoming, there is no possibility for addressing the question of justice within Serle’s theory of institutional reality.
Keywords:
institution / social reality / collective intentionality / konstitutivna pravila / racionalnost
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2009, 185-198
Publisher:
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
TY - JOUR
AU - Mladenović, Ivan
PY - 2009
UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/454
AB - This paper aims to present Searle’s conception of institutional reality as an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy and social theory. Its importance notwithstending, the two objections will be raised concerning the central notion of collective intentionality. Searle thinks of this notion as crucial for explaining human cooperation and social reality. The first objection is that Searle missed to take into accout the rationality assumption in his explanation of cooperation and human interaction. The second objection is related to the previos one. Additionally, Serle missed to investigate the role of autonomous moral agent in the procedure of
constructing social reality. Given this shortcoming, there is no possibility for addressing the question of justice within Serle’s theory of institutional reality.
PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1 - Serlovo shvatanje institucionalne realnosti
T1 - Searle’s Conception of Institutional Reality
SP - 185
EP - 198
DO - 10.2298/FID0903185M
ER -
@article{
author = "Mladenović, Ivan",
year = "2009",
abstract = "This paper aims to present Searle’s conception of institutional reality as an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy and social theory. Its importance notwithstending, the two objections will be raised concerning the central notion of collective intentionality. Searle thinks of this notion as crucial for explaining human cooperation and social reality. The first objection is that Searle missed to take into accout the rationality assumption in his explanation of cooperation and human interaction. The second objection is related to the previos one. Additionally, Serle missed to investigate the role of autonomous moral agent in the procedure of
constructing social reality. Given this shortcoming, there is no possibility for addressing the question of justice within Serle’s theory of institutional reality.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Serlovo shvatanje institucionalne realnosti, Searle’s Conception of Institutional Reality",
pages = "185-198",
doi = "10.2298/FID0903185M"
}
Mladenović, I.. (2009). Serlovo shvatanje institucionalne realnosti. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 185-198.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID0903185M
Mladenović I. Serlovo shvatanje institucionalne realnosti. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2009;:185-198.
doi:10.2298/FID0903185M .
Mladenović, Ivan, "Serlovo shvatanje institucionalne realnosti" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2009):185-198,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID0903185M . .
