Habitus and Higher Order Desires: Going Beyond Determinism
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2023
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In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu’s notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, ...I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor’s compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change.
Keywords:
Bourdieu / Habitus / Determinism / Incompatibilism / CompatibilismSource:
The American Sociologist, 03-2023, 54, 1, 176-192Funding / projects:
- This article was realised with the support of The Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, according to the Agreement on the realisation and financing of scientific research.
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IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Prodanović, Srđan PY - 2023-03 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2882 AB - In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu’s notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor’s compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change. T2 - The American Sociologist T1 - Habitus and Higher Order Desires: Going Beyond Determinism IS - 1 VL - 54 SP - 176 EP - 192 DO - 10.1007/s12108-022-09561-0 ER -
@article{ author = "Prodanović, Srđan", year = "2023-03", abstract = "In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu’s notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor’s compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change.", journal = "The American Sociologist", title = "Habitus and Higher Order Desires: Going Beyond Determinism", number = "1", volume = "54", pages = "176-192", doi = "10.1007/s12108-022-09561-0" }
Prodanović, S.. (2023-03). Habitus and Higher Order Desires: Going Beyond Determinism. in The American Sociologist, 54(1), 176-192. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-022-09561-0
Prodanović S. Habitus and Higher Order Desires: Going Beyond Determinism. in The American Sociologist. 2023;54(1):176-192. doi:10.1007/s12108-022-09561-0 .
Prodanović, Srđan, "Habitus and Higher Order Desires: Going Beyond Determinism" in The American Sociologist, 54, no. 1 (2023-03):176-192, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-022-09561-0 . .