Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen
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van der Vossen argues that political activism (i.e., “being a member of a political party,
campaigning during elections” etc.) biases philosophers’ thinking, making them worse at seeking the truth. Consequently, he states that the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher introduced by Plato and Marx should be replaced by an ideal of a philosopher as a disinterested seeker of the truth. For this reason, he holds that universities should resemble ivory towers more than they do now. I understand van der Vossen’s argument as follows: if philosophy aims to produce knowledge that benefits society (as the proponents of the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher assume, and it is warranted to suppose that van der Vossen grants this assumption), philosophy should produce unbiased knowledge. Further, if philosophy aims to produce unbiased knowledge, philosophers should be disinterested in their exploration of the truth, and not politically active (for the reason mentioned); thus, hidden in thei...r ivory towers. Against van der Vossen, I first argue that socially beneficial knowledge does not require disinterestedness and unbiasedness (these are, after all, not human traits) but the ability to distance oneself from one’s biases so one can revise them in face of criticism. Consequently, although I admit that political activism can strengthen one’s biases, I argue that it does not follow that politically active philosophers are more likely to produce biased philosophy than those who are not interested in politics. Finally, I claim that a socially engaged philosopher does not need to be a political activist at all. A socially engaged philosopher is one who produces answers to questions that matter to society. However, to get to know what these questions are, a socially engaged philosopher must climb down the ivory tower and engage
with the social context of her research but without the need to engage in political activism.
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https://philosophy.ceu.edu/sites/philosophy.ceu.edu/files/attachment/article/900/map-conf-abstracts-fin-version-1004.pdfhttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2848
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IFDTTY - CONF AU - Knežević, Aleksandra PY - 2022 UR - https://philosophy.ceu.edu/sites/philosophy.ceu.edu/files/attachment/article/900/map-conf-abstracts-fin-version-1004.pdf UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2848 AB - van der Vossen argues that political activism (i.e., “being a member of a political party, campaigning during elections” etc.) biases philosophers’ thinking, making them worse at seeking the truth. Consequently, he states that the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher introduced by Plato and Marx should be replaced by an ideal of a philosopher as a disinterested seeker of the truth. For this reason, he holds that universities should resemble ivory towers more than they do now. I understand van der Vossen’s argument as follows: if philosophy aims to produce knowledge that benefits society (as the proponents of the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher assume, and it is warranted to suppose that van der Vossen grants this assumption), philosophy should produce unbiased knowledge. Further, if philosophy aims to produce unbiased knowledge, philosophers should be disinterested in their exploration of the truth, and not politically active (for the reason mentioned); thus, hidden in their ivory towers. Against van der Vossen, I first argue that socially beneficial knowledge does not require disinterestedness and unbiasedness (these are, after all, not human traits) but the ability to distance oneself from one’s biases so one can revise them in face of criticism. Consequently, although I admit that political activism can strengthen one’s biases, I argue that it does not follow that politically active philosophers are more likely to produce biased philosophy than those who are not interested in politics. Finally, I claim that a socially engaged philosopher does not need to be a political activist at all. A socially engaged philosopher is one who produces answers to questions that matter to society. However, to get to know what these questions are, a socially engaged philosopher must climb down the ivory tower and engage with the social context of her research but without the need to engage in political activism. T1 - Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848 ER -
@conference{ author = "Knežević, Aleksandra", year = "2022", abstract = "van der Vossen argues that political activism (i.e., “being a member of a political party, campaigning during elections” etc.) biases philosophers’ thinking, making them worse at seeking the truth. Consequently, he states that the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher introduced by Plato and Marx should be replaced by an ideal of a philosopher as a disinterested seeker of the truth. For this reason, he holds that universities should resemble ivory towers more than they do now. I understand van der Vossen’s argument as follows: if philosophy aims to produce knowledge that benefits society (as the proponents of the ideal of a socially engaged philosopher assume, and it is warranted to suppose that van der Vossen grants this assumption), philosophy should produce unbiased knowledge. Further, if philosophy aims to produce unbiased knowledge, philosophers should be disinterested in their exploration of the truth, and not politically active (for the reason mentioned); thus, hidden in their ivory towers. Against van der Vossen, I first argue that socially beneficial knowledge does not require disinterestedness and unbiasedness (these are, after all, not human traits) but the ability to distance oneself from one’s biases so one can revise them in face of criticism. Consequently, although I admit that political activism can strengthen one’s biases, I argue that it does not follow that politically active philosophers are more likely to produce biased philosophy than those who are not interested in politics. Finally, I claim that a socially engaged philosopher does not need to be a political activist at all. A socially engaged philosopher is one who produces answers to questions that matter to society. However, to get to know what these questions are, a socially engaged philosopher must climb down the ivory tower and engage with the social context of her research but without the need to engage in political activism.", title = "Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848" }
Knežević, A.. (2022). Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen. . https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848
Knežević A. Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen. 2022;. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848 .
Knežević, Aleksandra, "Socially engaged philosophy is biased but not in a bad way: A reply to van der Vossen" (2022), https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2848 .