Kantov zaokret u shvatanju osećaja: kritički odgovor na osećajnost osamnaestog veka

Abstract

U pr voj polo vini osamnaestog ve ka nemač ku filo zofiju je obeležavao ra ci o na li zam. U nje go voj dru goj po lo vi ni po ja vi la se jed na no va ten den ci ja ko ja je, u ve ćoj me ri ori jen ti sa na na oblast este ti ke i s oslon cem u ne po srednom ose ća ju, vo di la ka ra nom ro man ti zmu. Na me ra ovog ra da je da po ka že osnov na obe lež ja Kan to vog od go vo ra na ovu ten den ci ju. On se, me đu tim, mora shvatiti unutar Kanto ve transcendentalne filo zofije i tripartitne podele osnov nih mo ći du še. Uče njem o ose ća ju, kao po seb noj mo ći du še i prin ci pu svr ho vitosti, kao jednom apriornom principu za ovu moć, Kant je raz vio sopstve nu po zi ci ju.

Rationalism marked the first half of XVIII century German philosophy. Yet, in the second half of the century a new tendency – which based its orientation towards aesthetics on immediate feeling – emerged and ultimately paved the way to German romanticism. This paper aims to show the main features of Kant’s response to this new tendency. However, this response must be understood in terms of Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his tripartite division of irreducible faculties of the mind. I will argue that the development of Kant’s position was based on his account of the Feeling as a separate faculty of the mind, and the principle of purposiveness as an apriori principle for this faculty.