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Narcissism as a moral incompetence

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Authors
Fatic, Aleksandar
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
In this paper I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not. My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgement, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, n...amely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psychopathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic.

Keywords:
values, moral emotions, empathy, affective psychopathology, responsibility
Source:
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy, 2023, 30
Publisher:
  • Johns Hopkins University Press
Note:
  • Tekst je recenziran, revidiran i prihvaćen za objavljivanje. U pripremi je simpozijum o tekstu, zbog čega njegovo objavljivanje čeka 2023, da bi jedan filozof i jedan kliničar završili svoje osvrte na tekst, nakon koga autor piše sopstveni odgovor, i sva 4 teksta izlaze u istom broju časopisa.
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Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2771
URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2771
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača
Institution/Community
IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2771
AB  - In this paper I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not. My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgement, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, namely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psychopathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic.
PB  - Johns Hopkins University Press
T2  - Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy
T1  - Narcissism as a moral incompetence
VL  - 30
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "In this paper I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not. My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgement, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, namely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psychopathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic.",
publisher = "Johns Hopkins University Press",
journal = "Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy",
title = "Narcissism as a moral incompetence",
volume = "30"
}
Fatic, A.. (2023). Narcissism as a moral incompetence. in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy
Johns Hopkins University Press., 30.
Fatic A. Narcissism as a moral incompetence. in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy. 2023;30..
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Narcissism as a moral incompetence" in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy, 30 (2023).

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