Kant’s Moral Theory as a Guide in Philanthropy

Abstract

This paper focuses on Kant’s moral theory and how it can guide our actions in philanthropy. Philanthropy is usually defined as a voluntary action aimed at relieving suffering and improving the quality of lives of others. It has been argued that, within the framework of Kant’s theory, it is our duty to be beneficent, sacrificing a part of our welfare for others. The duty of beneficence is a wide one. Interpreters of Kant disagree on what the wide duty of beneficence requires. While a few argue that it only requires that we provide help sometimes, others hold that the duty of beneficence should be seen as more demanding, particularly in cases of emergency when help is urgently required. We are morally obliged to promote the happiness of others, but the duty of beneficence does not tell us whose happiness and how much of our resources to give. Other than emergency cases, in fulfilling the duty of beneficence, we can prioritize the ends of those near and dear to us who concern us more. Moreover, on condition that we are not indifferent to others, it is morally permissible to prioritize our ends. Finally, the paper argues that it is not always straightforward what kind of action is required in helping someone in need, and that beneficence in Kantian terms is not limited to the philanthropic sector.

U fokusu ovog rada je Kantova moralna teorija i na koji način ona može da usmerava naše odluke u domenu filantropije. Filantropija se obično definiše kao dobrovoljna radnja koja ima za cilj ublažavanje patnje i poboljšanje kvaliteta života drugih. Dobročinstvo je u okviru Kantove teorije dužnost. Kantovi interpretatori se ne slažu oko toga šta zahteva dužnost dobročinstva. Dok neki tvrde da je dovoljno da samo ponekad pružimo pomoć , drugi smatraju da bi dužnost dobročinstva trebalo posmatrati kao zahtevniju, posebno u hitnim slučajevima kada se pružanje pomoći smatra striktno obaveznom. Moralno smo dužni da unapređujemo sreć u drugih, ali nam dužnost dobročinstva ne govori čiju sreć u i koliko svojih sredstava u te svrhe treba da posvetimo. Osim kada su hitni slučajevi u pitanju, u ispunjavanju dužnosti dobročinstva, možemo dati prednost onima koji su nam bliski i dragi. Štaviše, pod uslovom da nismo ravnodušni prema drugima, moralno je dozvoljeno da dajemo prioritet sopstvenim ciljevima. Konačno, u radu se tvrdi da nije uvek nedvosmisleno koju konkretno radnju treba preduzeti da bismo postupali u skladu sa dužnošću dobročinstva, te da dobročinstvo u kantovskim terminima nije ograničeno na filantropski sektor.