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Comprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism

dc.creatorSládeček, Michal
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-30T11:07:22Z
dc.date.available2021-10-30T11:07:22Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn1848-2309
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2398
dc.description.abstractU članku se tvrdi da John Rawls u svojoj kritici perfekcionizma sa stajališta liberalističke neutralnosti razmatra koncepcije dobra bez demarkacije između njih, odnosno bez njihova razlikovanja. Naime, Rawls ne razrješava pitanje o tome je li tu riječ o sveobuhvatnoj religijskoj odnosno filozofsko-etičkoj koncepciji ili je riječ o parcijalnom poimanju lokalnih vrijednosti, dobara i ciljeva. Bez obzira na spornu upotrebu pojma sveobuhvatnosti, neophodno je zadržati koncept razložnosti jer poimanja dobra, da bi bila relevantna u političkoj raspravi, trebaju biti relativno dobro zasnovana, konzistentna i koherentna. Kada se pođe od danih razlikovanja, može se tvrditi da u pojedinim slučajevima uvođenje razmatranja određenih dobara u rasprave o osnovnim principima političkog ustrojstva može biti dobro potkrepljeno i, sa stajališta razložnog pluralizma, moralno opravdano. Ipak, umjereni liberalistički perfekcionizam treba precizirati odnose li se političke odluke na stvaranje opcija, na promociju vrijednih ili na odvraćanjsr
dc.description.abstractComprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism Abstract The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral libe­ralism scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordinglysr
dc.language.isoothersr
dc.publisherZagreb: Hrvatsko filozofsko društvosr
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/inst-2020/200025/RS//sr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceFilozofska istraživanjasr
dc.subjectneutralnostsr
dc.subjectliberalizamsr
dc.subjectperfekcionizamsr
dc.subjectrazložne koncepcije dobrasr
dc.subjectdoktrinesr
dc.subjectJohn Rawlssr
dc.titleSveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizmasr
dc.titleComprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionismsr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dc.rights.holderHrvatsko filozofsko društvosr
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.volume40
dc.citation.spage269
dc.citation.epage282
dc.identifier.doi10.21464/fi40204
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/8463/FI_158_1_4_Temat_Sladecek.pdf


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