Приказ основних података о документу
Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint
Perfekcionizam o odobrenju kao ograničenju uticaja
dc.creator | Sládeček, Michal | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-30T10:39:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-30T10:39:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-5738 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/fid/article/view/944 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2395 | |
dc.description.abstract | The article deals with Hurka’s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson’s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her – primarily by state action – overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka’s and Arneson’s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless options can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person’s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy. | sr |
dc.description.abstract | Tekst se bavi Hurkinom kritikom Kimlike (Kymlicka), kao i Arnesonovom kritikom Dvorkina (Dworkin) povodom teze o odobrenju osobe kao ograničenju državne intervencije ili uticaja. Prema ovoj tezi koju zastupaju Kimlika i Dvorkin osoba ne može da ima vredan život ukoliko su joj vrednosti nametnute – pre svega kroz delovanje države – prenebregavajući njene pre ferencije i uverenja o dobrom životu. Ova teza je često poistovećivana sa neutralističkim li beralizmom, a suprotstavljana perfekcionizmu. U tekstu se tvrdi da argumentacije Hurke i Arnesona protiv teze o odobrenju, prema kojima umerena prinuda i paternalistička redukcija trivijalnih, loših i bezvrednih opcija može da dovede do vrednijeg života, nisu valjane. U njima se ne uviđa u dovoljnoj meri razlika između prinude od strane neposredne društvene okoli ne i državne prinude, koje nisu jednako legitimne. Moja kritika, ipak, ne isključuje legitimnost perfekcionističkih mera, pošto osoba može državnu intervenciju da prihvati kao opravdanu kada se ona odnosi na podršku pojedinih vrednosti ili dobara, dok istovremeno osoba ne odobrava ove vrednosti ili dobra. Sva odobravana dobra ili aktivnosti ne treba da budu jed nako tretirane i određena politika može na legitiman način da podržava one koje su u većoj meri relevantne ili vredne. | sr |
dc.language.iso | en | sr |
dc.publisher | Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju | sr |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/inst-2020/200025/RS// | sr |
dc.rights | openAccess | sr |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society | sr |
dc.subject | liberalism | sr |
dc.subject | neutrality | sr |
dc.subject | perfectionism | sr |
dc.subject | endorsement constraint | sr |
dc.subject | Arneson | sr |
dc.subject | Dworkin | sr |
dc.subject | Hurka | sr |
dc.subject | Kymlicka | sr |
dc.title | Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint | sr |
dc.title | Perfekcionizam o odobrenju kao ograničenju uticaja | sr |
dc.type | article | sr |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC-ND | sr |
dc.citation.issue | 1 | |
dc.citation.volume | 32 | |
dc.citation.spage | 89 | |
dc.citation.epage | 104 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/FID2101089S | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | sr |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/8476/bitstream_8476.pdf |