The Ethics of the Self as an Educational Practice

Abstract

Rad se bavi Fukoovom analizom određenih aspekata stoičke filozofije i njihovog odnosa spram obrazovanja. Fuko polazi od teze da su „naše eto-poetičke prakse postale orijentisane ka otkrivanju naše istinske i sušinske prirode“, te se okreće etici koja vodi odvajanju naših etičkih ili samo-formirajućih praksi od obaveze da kažemo istinu o svojoj prirodi. Prvo pitanje rada je da li pojmovi i prakse stoičke filozofije poput Stultitia i Askesis (u značenju vežbi i priprema za život), a u njihovoj vezi sa istinom ili izricanjem istine i specifičnim odnosom spram slušanja, čitanja i pisanja, predstvljaju obrazovnu praksu? Takođe, ukoliko je cilj etike sopstva konstitucija subjekta kroz svesnu praksu slobode, a askezu odredimo kao subjektivaciju dirskursa istine, postavlja se pitanje da li je u pitanju vrsta učenja koje može da emancipuje? Preciznije, da li briga o sebi ili etika sopstva, kao preobraćanje koje sopstvo stvara putem prisvajanja istine i postajanja subjektom iskazivanja istine, može istovremeno da bude slobodno i nezavisno ili emancipovano?

The paper deals with Foucault’s analysis of certain aspects of Stoicism and its relation to education. Foucault begins with the thesis that “our etho-poetic practices have become oriented towards discovering our true and substantive nature”. He turns to the ethics that separates our ethical or self-forming practices from the obligation to tell the truth about our nature. The first question is whether the concepts and practices of Stoicism such as Stultitia and Askesis, in their relation to truth or truth-telling and their specific relation to listening, reading and writing, constitute educational practice? Also, if the goal of the ethics of the self is the constitution of the subject through the conscious practice of liberty, and if we define Askesis as the subjectivation of the discourse of truth, the question rises as to whether this is the kind of learning that could emancipate? More precisely, whether self-care or the ethics of self as transformation, which is achieved through the appropriation of truth and becoming the subject of truth-telling, can be free and independent, or emancipated?