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Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking
dc.creator | Konjović, Marko | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-23T08:23:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-23T08:23:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0353-3891 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2309 | |
dc.description.abstract | There are two widely-held intuitions about morality. One is the claim that all persons have equal moral worth; the other is that sometimes we are morally allowed or even required to give preference to those individuals whom we love. How can we justify our reasons of love in the face of moral egalitarianism? As of recently, there are three mutually competing accounts of why it could be said that we have reasons of love: (i) the projects view, (ii) the relationship view, and (iii) the individuals view. In this paper, I first examine these three views and find fault with each of them as they stand. I then proceed to propose a complex, yet a more compelling, account of reasons of love that builds on the individuals view | sr |
dc.language.iso | en | sr |
dc.publisher | Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade | sr |
dc.rights | openAccess | sr |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Belgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjak | sr |
dc.subject | reasons of love | sr |
dc.subject | moral equality | sr |
dc.subject | moral thinking | sr |
dc.subject | partiality | sr |
dc.subject | impartiality | sr |
dc.title | Reasons of Love and Moral Thinking | sr |
dc.type | article | sr |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC-ND | sr |
dcterms.abstract | Коњовић, Марко; Реасонс оф Лове анд Морал Тхинкинг; Реасонс оф Лове анд Морал Тхинкинг; | |
dc.citation.volume | 32 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5937/BPA1932115K | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | sr |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/8226/bitstream_8226.pdf |