Приказ основних података о документу

dc.creatorKonjović, Marko
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-23T08:23:57Z
dc.date.available2021-10-23T08:23:57Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn0353-3891
dc.identifier.urihttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2309
dc.description.abstractThere are two widely-held intuitions about morality. One is the claim that all persons have equal moral worth; the other is that sometimes we are morally allowed or even required to give preference to those individuals whom we love. How can we justify our reasons of love in the face of moral egalitarianism? As of recently, there are three mutually competing accounts of why it could be said that we have reasons of love: (i) the projects view, (ii) the relationship view, and (iii) the individuals view. In this paper, I first examine these three views and find fault with each of them as they stand. I then proceed to propose a complex, yet a more compelling, account of reasons of love that builds on the individuals viewsr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherInstitute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgradesr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceBelgrade Philosophical Annual/Filozofski godišnjaksr
dc.subjectreasons of lovesr
dc.subjectmoral equalitysr
dc.subjectmoral thinkingsr
dc.subjectpartialitysr
dc.subjectimpartialitysr
dc.titleReasons of Love and Moral Thinkingsr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dcterms.abstractКоњовић, Марко; Реасонс оф Лове анд Морал Тхинкинг; Реасонс оф Лове анд Морал Тхинкинг;
dc.citation.volume32
dc.identifier.doi10.5937/BPA1932115K
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/8226/bitstream_8226.pdf


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