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Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection

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2021
Authors
Cvejić, Igor
Book part (Published version)
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Abstract
In the following chapter, I will attempt to argue that feelings, and, above all, pleasure in mere reflection, ought to be understood as intentional states, and moreover, as feeling-intentionality sui generis. In the first portion of the text, I present the fundamentals of the Kantian understanding of feelings, and attempt to demonstrate why we should reject some of the conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert. In part two, I outline some of the particulars of pleasure in mere reflection. In part three, I detail problems relating to the question of the object of pleasure in the context of mere reflection. Finally, in part four, I propose an approach in which intentionality of pleasure in mere reflection can be understood as feeling-intentionality sui generis, explain why this understanding should be ascribed to Kant, and discuss how this might resolve some of the problems surveyed in part three.
Source:
ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid, 2021, 87-106
Publisher:
  • Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter
Funding / projects:
  • Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Republic of Serbia, Grant no. 200025 (University of Belgrade, Institute for Phylosophy and Social Theory) (RS-200025)

DOI: 10.1515/9783110720730-008

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URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2307
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  • Radovi istraživača
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IFDT
TY  - CHAP
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2307
AB  - In the following chapter, I will attempt to argue that feelings, and, above all, pleasure in mere reflection, ought to be understood as intentional states, and moreover, as feeling-intentionality sui generis. In the first portion of the text, I present the fundamentals of the Kantian understanding of feelings, and attempt to demonstrate why we should reject some of the conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert. In part two, I outline some of the particulars of pleasure in mere reflection. In part three, I detail problems relating to the question of the object of pleasure in the context of mere reflection. Finally, in part four, I propose an approach in which intentionality of pleasure in mere reflection can be understood as feeling-intentionality sui generis, explain why this understanding should be ascribed to Kant, and discuss how this might resolve some of the problems surveyed in part three.
PB  - Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter
T2  - ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid
T1  - Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection
SP  - 87
EP  - 106
DO  - 10.1515/9783110720730-008
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2021",
abstract = "In the following chapter, I will attempt to argue that feelings, and, above all, pleasure in mere reflection, ought to be understood as intentional states, and moreover, as feeling-intentionality sui generis. In the first portion of the text, I present the fundamentals of the Kantian understanding of feelings, and attempt to demonstrate why we should reject some of the conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert. In part two, I outline some of the particulars of pleasure in mere reflection. In part three, I detail problems relating to the question of the object of pleasure in the context of mere reflection. Finally, in part four, I propose an approach in which intentionality of pleasure in mere reflection can be understood as feeling-intentionality sui generis, explain why this understanding should be ascribed to Kant, and discuss how this might resolve some of the problems surveyed in part three.",
publisher = "Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter",
journal = "ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid",
booktitle = "Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection",
pages = "87-106",
doi = "10.1515/9783110720730-008"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2021). Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection. in ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid
Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter., 87-106.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008
Cvejić I. Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection. in ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid. 2021;:87-106.
doi:10.1515/9783110720730-008 .
Cvejić, Igor, "Intentionality Sui Generis of Pleasure in Mere Reflection" in ant on Emotions: Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context, edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid (2021):87-106,
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-008 . .

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