Može li postojati negativan estetski sud o uzvišenom

Abstract

Kada govorimo o estetskom sudu kod Kanta svakako je glavni primer sud ukusa, odnosno o lepom i ružnom. Međutim, pored suda ukusa, Kant govori o drugoj vrsti estetskih refleksivnih sudova, sudu o uzvišenom. Glavno pitanje kojim se ovaj rad bavi je da li možemo u slučaju uzvišenog da govorimo o negativnom estet- skom sudu, o sudu o onome što bi bilo suprotno uzvišenom na način na koji je ružno suprotno lepom. Nakon razmatranja sličnosti i razlika ružnog i uzvišenost, te iznošenja formalnih problema da uopšte mislimo estetski sud o onome što je suprotno uzvišeno, pokušaćemo da pozitivan odgovor. Razmatraće se prvo sadržajni (objekt) argument, zatim argument na osnovu odnosa duševnih moći, koji će se pokazati kao nedostatni. Kao najpribližnije rešenje razmatraće se specifičan vid smešnog.

When we talk about the aesthetic judgement in Kant, certainly the main example is the judgement of taste, that is, beautiful and ugly. However, in addition to the judgement of taste, Kant speaks of another kind of aesthetic reflexive judgments - sublime. The main question addressed in this paper is whether in the case of the sublime we can speak of a negative aesthetic judgment, a judgment of what would be contrary to the sublime in the way that the ugly is opposite to the beautiful. After considering the similarities and differences of the ugly and sublime and outlining the formal problems of thinking at all about the aesthetic judgment of what is contrary to sublime, we will try to give a positive answer. The content (object) argument will be considered first, then the argument based on the relation of faculties, which will prove to be insufficient. The closest solution will be to consider in the specific kind of ridiculous.