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Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy

Razmatranja o nefokusiranoj mržnji: identitet omraženog i kriterijumi adekvatnost

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Cvejić, Igor
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Abstract
Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto’s account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is treated by members of society as hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hat...red (actually, they trace properties of someone being hateworthy). If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group’s own criteria.

Tomas Santo je nedavno uveo tezu da mržnja ne može biti podesna emocija zbog toga što je njen fokus zamagljen, te prema tome ona ne može pratiti svojstva svog intencionalnog objekta. Mada se slažem sa osnovom Santovog argumenta želeo bih nešto više pažnje da posvetim dva povezana problema koja mogu biti važna. Prvo ću se baviti pitanjem da li nepodesnost mržnje ima ikakve povezanosti sa mogućnošću da omražena osoba ne identifikuje sebe sa onim zbog čega je omražena. Zaključiću da, ukoliko je fokus mržnje zamagljen, mr žnja neće pratiti identifikaciju omražene osobe ili grupe. Zatim ću pokušati da ukažem na mogućnost da (izvesni) kriterijumi adekvatnosti mržnje (zbog čega se neko tretira kao vredan mržnje od strane članova društva) budu ukorenjeni u kulturalnom i socijalnom okviru na ta kav način da nisu neophodno opravdani svojom vezom za fokusom emocije i značajem koji on ima. Pod takvim okolnostima, mržnja bi i dalje bila nepodesna, ali bi ovi kriterijumi kreirali kva...zi-korektnost mržnje (zapravo bi pratili svojstva koja određuju da li je nešto ili neko vredan mržnje). Ukoliko je to tačno, mogli bismo da zadržimo tezu o nepodesnosti mržnje, a da u isto vreme možemo da koristimo uobičajeni vokabular koji koristimo u slučajevima kada grupa ne odustaje od svoje mržnje i kada je potrebno da argumentujemo da neke pojedince ili grupe ljudi ne treba mrzeti čak ni prema kriterijumima same grupe koja je nosilac mržnje.

Keywords:
hatred / identity / fittingness / criteria of adequacy / appropriateness / emotions
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2021, 32, 3, 377-386
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Funding / projects:
  • Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Republic of Serbia, Grant no. 200025 (University of Belgrade, Institute for Phylosophy and Social Theory) (RS-200025)

DOI: 10.2298/FID2103377C

ISSN: 0353-5738

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URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2274
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  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
  • Radovi istraživača
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2274
AB  - Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto’s account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is treated by members of society as hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hatred (actually, they trace properties of someone being hateworthy). If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group’s own criteria.
AB  - Tomas Santo je nedavno uveo tezu da mržnja ne može biti podesna emocija zbog toga što 
je njen fokus zamagljen, te prema tome ona ne može pratiti svojstva svog intencionalnog 
objekta. Mada se slažem sa osnovom Santovog argumenta želeo bih nešto više pažnje da 
posvetim dva povezana problema koja mogu biti važna. Prvo ću se baviti pitanjem da li nepodesnost mržnje ima ikakve povezanosti sa mogućnošću da omražena osoba ne identifikuje 
sebe sa onim zbog čega je omražena. Zaključiću da, ukoliko je fokus mržnje zamagljen, mr žnja neće pratiti identifikaciju omražene osobe ili grupe. Zatim ću pokušati da ukažem na 
mogućnost da (izvesni) kriterijumi adekvatnosti mržnje (zbog čega se neko tretira kao vredan 
mržnje od strane članova društva) budu ukorenjeni u kulturalnom i socijalnom okviru na ta kav način da nisu neophodno opravdani svojom vezom za fokusom emocije i značajem koji 
on ima. Pod takvim okolnostima, mržnja bi i dalje bila nepodesna, ali bi ovi kriterijumi kreirali 
kvazi-korektnost mržnje (zapravo bi pratili svojstva koja određuju da li je nešto ili neko vredan mržnje). Ukoliko je to tačno, mogli bismo da zadržimo tezu o nepodesnosti mržnje, a da 
u isto vreme možemo da koristimo uobičajeni vokabular koji koristimo u slučajevima kada 
grupa ne odustaje od svoje mržnje i kada je potrebno da argumentujemo da neke pojedince 
ili grupe ljudi ne treba mrzeti čak ni prema kriterijumima same grupe koja je nosilac mržnje.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy
T1  - Razmatranja o nefokusiranoj mržnji: identitet omraženog  i kriterijumi adekvatnost
IS  - 3
VL  - 32
SP  - 377
EP  - 386
DO  - 10.2298/FID2103377C
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto’s account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is treated by members of society as hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hatred (actually, they trace properties of someone being hateworthy). If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group’s own criteria., Tomas Santo je nedavno uveo tezu da mržnja ne može biti podesna emocija zbog toga što 
je njen fokus zamagljen, te prema tome ona ne može pratiti svojstva svog intencionalnog 
objekta. Mada se slažem sa osnovom Santovog argumenta želeo bih nešto više pažnje da 
posvetim dva povezana problema koja mogu biti važna. Prvo ću se baviti pitanjem da li nepodesnost mržnje ima ikakve povezanosti sa mogućnošću da omražena osoba ne identifikuje 
sebe sa onim zbog čega je omražena. Zaključiću da, ukoliko je fokus mržnje zamagljen, mr žnja neće pratiti identifikaciju omražene osobe ili grupe. Zatim ću pokušati da ukažem na 
mogućnost da (izvesni) kriterijumi adekvatnosti mržnje (zbog čega se neko tretira kao vredan 
mržnje od strane članova društva) budu ukorenjeni u kulturalnom i socijalnom okviru na ta kav način da nisu neophodno opravdani svojom vezom za fokusom emocije i značajem koji 
on ima. Pod takvim okolnostima, mržnja bi i dalje bila nepodesna, ali bi ovi kriterijumi kreirali 
kvazi-korektnost mržnje (zapravo bi pratili svojstva koja određuju da li je nešto ili neko vredan mržnje). Ukoliko je to tačno, mogli bismo da zadržimo tezu o nepodesnosti mržnje, a da 
u isto vreme možemo da koristimo uobičajeni vokabular koji koristimo u slučajevima kada 
grupa ne odustaje od svoje mržnje i kada je potrebno da argumentujemo da neke pojedince 
ili grupe ljudi ne treba mrzeti čak ni prema kriterijumima same grupe koja je nosilac mržnje.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy, Razmatranja o nefokusiranoj mržnji: identitet omraženog  i kriterijumi adekvatnost",
number = "3",
volume = "32",
pages = "377-386",
doi = "10.2298/FID2103377C"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2021). Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(3), 377-386.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2103377C
Cvejić I. Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(3):377-386.
doi:10.2298/FID2103377C .
Cvejić, Igor, "Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 3 (2021):377-386,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2103377C . .

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