Pocepani portret subjekta poverenja: Frojd i Sartr

Abstract

U ovom članku će biti spekulativno razmatrana jedna specifična forma subjektivnosti, koja nastaje iz fundamentalne uslovljenosti egzistenci-je subjekta poverenjem. Polazeći od hipoteze da poverenje teži ka stvaranju subjektiviteta koji bi postojao samostalno, kao totalitet i odvojenost od sveta, pokušaćemo da razvejemo ovu iluziju, prikazuju-ći konstitutivnu fragmentarnost subjekta poverenja, kao i granice i procepe koji ga sačinjavaju. Preispitujući jednu takvu ontogenezu, is-pitaćemo psihološke, ali i epistemološke uslove, koje poverenje name-će subjektu u njegovom nastajanju. Frojdova psihoanalitička teorija i Sartrova ontološka fenomenologija, daće nam glavne (nekada suprot-stavljene, nekada pomirljive) pojmovne aparate, kojima ćemo se služi-ti, ali koje ćemo takođe i dovoditi u pitanje u analizi koja sledi. Njihovim kritičkim preklapanjem, težićemo da dobijemo optimalan alat za de-konstrukciju subjekta poverenja, dekonstruišući pritom i neke tradici-onalno oprečne filozofske kategorije, kao što su svesno i nesvesno, subjekat i objekat, egzistencija i postajanje, verovanje i znanje, itd.

In this article we will consider, in a speculative manner, a specific form of subjectivity that arises from a fundamental condition that trust imposes on the existence of the subject. Departing from the hypothesis that trust tends towards a formation of sub-jectivity that could exist independently, as a totality and separateness from world, we will try to shed that illusion, showing thus the constitutively fragmentary nature of the subject of trust, as well as its limits and tears from which it is made. While examining this particular ontogenesis, we will also question the psychological and epistemologi-cal condition which trust imposes on the subject in its becoming. Freudian psycho-analysis and Sartre’s ontological phenomenology will provide us with our main notional tools which will be reconsidered while serving our own analyses. Through their critical superposition, we will tend to obtain an optimal tool for a deconstruction of the sub-ject of trust, while also deconstructing some traditionally opposed categories, such as the unconscious and the conscious, subject and object, existence and becoming, belief and knowledge, etc.