Justification of Atemporal Values in Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects

Abstract

In the history of philosophy, Alexius Meinong’s interest in axiology has traditionally been seen as confined to his earlier works. However, if we analyze his writing after 1917, in which Meinong discusses timeless values, it becomes clear that he became increasingly disinterested in psychology. Moreover, since the theory of the object, in Meinong’s view, could not be a part of metaphysics, he had to deal with the additional methodological difficulty of proving that the good exists independently of human subjectivity. The article discusses A. Meinong’s understanding of the object of desire, the object of a value-feeling and the connection between ethical values as objects of consciousness and time. It is shown that, according to Meinong, language is where values actually reside and only through language can their reality be explained.

U istoriji filozofije se Majnongovo interesovanje za aksiologiju tradicionalno videlo kao vezano za njegova ranija dela. Međutim, ako analiziramo njegove radove posle 1917. u kojima Meinong razmatra vanvremenske vrednosti, postaje jasno da se prestao interesovati za psihologiju. Štaviše, pošto teorija objekta, po Majnongovom viđenju, ne može biti deo metafizike, morao se pozabaviti dodatnom metodološkom teškoćom dokazivanja da dobro postoji nezavisno od ljudske subjektivnosti. Članak razmatra Majnongovo razumevanje objekta želje, objekta osećanja vrednosti i vezu između etičkih vrednosti kao objekata svesti i vremena. Pokazano je da se, prema Majnongu, vrednosti u stvari nalaze u jeziku i mogu se objasniti samo kroz jezik.