Hume’s Theory of Social Constitution of the Self
Hjumova teorija društvene konstitucije sopstva
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Hume distinguishes between the self of thought and imagination and the self of the passions. He is criticized for contradicting himself as he allegedly attributes fictitiousness to the self in book one of the Treatise but later reintroduces the self in books two and three. Hume’s account of the idea of the self, however, is not contradictory: he shows the impossibility of a pure associationist-empiricist account of the self. Instead, he proposes a social account of the constitution of the idea of the self and consciousness. In doing so, Hume’s account of the self anticipates social-historical theories of the self.
Hjum razlikuje sopstvo misli i uobrazilje i sopstvo strasti. Kritikuje se jer protivreči sebi zbog toga što navodno pripisuje fiktivnost sopstvu u prvoj knjizi Rasprave, a kasnije ponovo uvodi sopstvo u drugoj i trećoj knjizi. Hjumovo razmatranje ideje sopstva, međutim, nije protivreč-no: on pokazuje nemogućnost čisto asocijaciono-empirističkog razmatranja sopstva. Umesto toga, predlaže društveno razmatranje konstitucije ideje sopstva i svesti. Čineći to, Hjumovo razmatranje sopstva anticipira društveno-istorijske teorije sopstva.
Keywords:
Hume / consciousness / self / subjectivitySource:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2019, 30, 4, 511-534Publisher:
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
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http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1904511Ahttp://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2048
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IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Azeri, Siyaves PY - 2019 UR - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1904511A UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2048 AB - Hume distinguishes between the self of thought and imagination and the self of the passions. He is criticized for contradicting himself as he allegedly attributes fictitiousness to the self in book one of the Treatise but later reintroduces the self in books two and three. Hume’s account of the idea of the self, however, is not contradictory: he shows the impossibility of a pure associationist-empiricist account of the self. Instead, he proposes a social account of the constitution of the idea of the self and consciousness. In doing so, Hume’s account of the self anticipates social-historical theories of the self. AB - Hjum razlikuje sopstvo misli i uobrazilje i sopstvo strasti. Kritikuje se jer protivreči sebi zbog toga što navodno pripisuje fiktivnost sopstvu u prvoj knjizi Rasprave, a kasnije ponovo uvodi sopstvo u drugoj i trećoj knjizi. Hjumovo razmatranje ideje sopstva, međutim, nije protivreč-no: on pokazuje nemogućnost čisto asocijaciono-empirističkog razmatranja sopstva. Umesto toga, predlaže društveno razmatranje konstitucije ideje sopstva i svesti. Čineći to, Hjumovo razmatranje sopstva anticipira društveno-istorijske teorije sopstva. PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society T1 - Hume’s Theory of Social Constitution of the Self T1 - Hjumova teorija društvene konstitucije sopstva IS - 4 VL - 30 SP - 511 EP - 534 DO - 10.2298//FID1904511A ER -
@article{ author = "Azeri, Siyaves", year = "2019", abstract = "Hume distinguishes between the self of thought and imagination and the self of the passions. He is criticized for contradicting himself as he allegedly attributes fictitiousness to the self in book one of the Treatise but later reintroduces the self in books two and three. Hume’s account of the idea of the self, however, is not contradictory: he shows the impossibility of a pure associationist-empiricist account of the self. Instead, he proposes a social account of the constitution of the idea of the self and consciousness. In doing so, Hume’s account of the self anticipates social-historical theories of the self., Hjum razlikuje sopstvo misli i uobrazilje i sopstvo strasti. Kritikuje se jer protivreči sebi zbog toga što navodno pripisuje fiktivnost sopstvu u prvoj knjizi Rasprave, a kasnije ponovo uvodi sopstvo u drugoj i trećoj knjizi. Hjumovo razmatranje ideje sopstva, međutim, nije protivreč-no: on pokazuje nemogućnost čisto asocijaciono-empirističkog razmatranja sopstva. Umesto toga, predlaže društveno razmatranje konstitucije ideje sopstva i svesti. Čineći to, Hjumovo razmatranje sopstva anticipira društveno-istorijske teorije sopstva.", publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju", journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society", title = "Hume’s Theory of Social Constitution of the Self, Hjumova teorija društvene konstitucije sopstva", number = "4", volume = "30", pages = "511-534", doi = "10.2298//FID1904511A" }
Azeri, S.. (2019). Hume’s Theory of Social Constitution of the Self. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 30(4), 511-534. https://doi.org/10.2298//FID1904511A
Azeri S. Hume’s Theory of Social Constitution of the Self. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2019;30(4):511-534. doi:10.2298//FID1904511A .
Azeri, Siyaves, "Hume’s Theory of Social Constitution of the Self" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 30, no. 4 (2019):511-534, https://doi.org/10.2298//FID1904511A . .