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Constitutive Justice and Human Rights

Konstitutivna pravda i ljudska prava

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2019
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Authors
Jovanov, Rastko
Velinov, Marija
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2) introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s legal positivism.
Da bismo pokazali valjanost ovde predložene koncepcije socijalne ontologije i njene pred-nosti u odnosu na deskriptivne teorije društvene stvarnosti, koje u analizi socijalno-ontološ-kog statusa ljudskih prava nalaze samo pravno shvaćenu normativnost kao prisutnu u druš-tvenoj stvarnosti, na prvom mestu (1) iznosimo Serleovo tumačenje ljudskih prava. Zatim (2), uvodimo metodski pristup i osnovne pojmove našeg socijalno-ontološkog shvatanja i objaš-njavamo strukturu odnosa pravde, zakona, morala, društvenih institucija i kolektivne inten-cionalnosti. Te na kraju (3) pokazujemo na koji način ovde iznesena teorija socijalne ontolo-gije intuitivnije i sa opširnijim argumentima objašnjava ontološki status institucije ljudskih prava od Serlovog pravnog pozitivizma.
Keywords:
constitutive justice / collective intentionality / human rights / social ontology / John Searle
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2019, 30, 4, 478-492
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Funding / projects:
  • Politics of Social Memory and National Identity: Regional and European Context (RS-179049)

DOI: 10.2298//FID1904478J

ISSN: 0353-5738

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1904478J
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2046
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  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
  • Radovi istraživača
Institution/Community
IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Jovanov, Rastko
AU  - Velinov, Marija
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.2298%2FFID1904478J
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2046
AB  - In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2) introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s legal positivism.
AB  - Da bismo pokazali valjanost ovde predložene koncepcije socijalne ontologije i njene pred-nosti u odnosu na deskriptivne teorije društvene stvarnosti, koje u analizi socijalno-ontološ-kog statusa ljudskih prava nalaze samo pravno shvaćenu normativnost kao prisutnu u druš-tvenoj stvarnosti, na prvom mestu (1) iznosimo Serleovo tumačenje ljudskih prava. Zatim (2), uvodimo metodski pristup i osnovne pojmove našeg socijalno-ontološkog shvatanja i objaš-njavamo strukturu odnosa pravde, zakona, morala, društvenih institucija i kolektivne inten-cionalnosti. Te na kraju (3) pokazujemo na koji način ovde iznesena teorija socijalne ontolo-gije intuitivnije i sa opširnijim argumentima objašnjava ontološki status institucije ljudskih prava od Serlovog pravnog pozitivizma.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Constitutive Justice and Human Rights
T1  - Konstitutivna pravda i ljudska prava
IS  - 4
VL  - 30
SP  - 478
EP  - 492
DO  - 10.2298//FID1904478J
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Jovanov, Rastko and Velinov, Marija",
year = "2019",
abstract = "In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2) introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s legal positivism., Da bismo pokazali valjanost ovde predložene koncepcije socijalne ontologije i njene pred-nosti u odnosu na deskriptivne teorije društvene stvarnosti, koje u analizi socijalno-ontološ-kog statusa ljudskih prava nalaze samo pravno shvaćenu normativnost kao prisutnu u druš-tvenoj stvarnosti, na prvom mestu (1) iznosimo Serleovo tumačenje ljudskih prava. Zatim (2), uvodimo metodski pristup i osnovne pojmove našeg socijalno-ontološkog shvatanja i objaš-njavamo strukturu odnosa pravde, zakona, morala, društvenih institucija i kolektivne inten-cionalnosti. Te na kraju (3) pokazujemo na koji način ovde iznesena teorija socijalne ontolo-gije intuitivnije i sa opširnijim argumentima objašnjava ontološki status institucije ljudskih prava od Serlovog pravnog pozitivizma.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Constitutive Justice and Human Rights, Konstitutivna pravda i ljudska prava",
number = "4",
volume = "30",
pages = "478-492",
doi = "10.2298//FID1904478J"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Velinov, M.. (2019). Constitutive Justice and Human Rights. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 30(4), 478-492.
https://doi.org/10.2298//FID1904478J
Jovanov R, Velinov M. Constitutive Justice and Human Rights. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2019;30(4):478-492.
doi:10.2298//FID1904478J .
Jovanov, Rastko, Velinov, Marija, "Constitutive Justice and Human Rights" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 30, no. 4 (2019):478-492,
https://doi.org/10.2298//FID1904478J . .

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