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Intentionality and Objectification - Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience

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2014
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Authors
Takács, Ádám
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
Husserl’s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investiga¬tions, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a struc¬ture of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of con-sciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel’s theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted t...o the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specifi¬city of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it.

Keywords:
Husserl, Edmund / intentionality / Simmel / objektifikacija
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2014, 42-55
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

DOI: 10.2298/FID1402042T

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URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/200
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  • Glavna kolekcija
  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Takács, Ádám
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/200
AB  - Husserl’s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investiga¬tions, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a struc¬ture of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of con-sciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel’s theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted to the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specifi¬city of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Intentionality and Objectification - Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience
SP  - 42
EP  - 55
DO  - 10.2298/FID1402042T
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Takács, Ádám",
year = "2014",
abstract = "Husserl’s transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the Logical Investiga¬tions, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a struc¬ture of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of con-sciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel’s theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted to the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specifi¬city of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Intentionality and Objectification - Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience",
pages = "42-55",
doi = "10.2298/FID1402042T"
}
Takács, Á.. (2014). Intentionality and Objectification - Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 42-55.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1402042T
Takács Á. Intentionality and Objectification - Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2014;:42-55.
doi:10.2298/FID1402042T .
Takács, Ádám, "Intentionality and Objectification - Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2014):42-55,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1402042T . .

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