Can Memory Erasure Contribute to a Virtuous Tempering of Emotions?
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The paper deals with a perspective of Christian philosophy on artificial memory erasuse for psychotherapeutic purposes. Its central question is whether a safe and reliable technology of memory erasure, once it is available, would be acceptable from a Christian ethics point of view. The main facet of this question is related to the Christian ethics requirement of contrition for the past wrongs, which in the case of memory erasure of particulary troubling experiences and personal choices would not be possible. The paper argues that there are limits to the ethical significance of contrition in the writings of the leading Christian fathers on the theme (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas), where excessive suffering and inability to forgive oneself for one’s actions is an impediment to the achivement of tranquility of mind and spiritual redemption, rather than a prerequisite for it. The paper thus concludes that there is no hindrance in principle from the Christian ethics point of view to pursuing a v...oluntary and selective memory erasure as a psychotherapeutic technique once a fully adequate technology is available.
Tekst se bavi perspektivom hrišćanske filozofije na pitanje o veštačkom brisanju pamćenja u psihoterapeutske svrhe. Centralno pitanje oko koje se konstituiše argumentacija teksta je da li bi bezbedna i pouzdana tehnologija brisanja sećanja, onda kada bude raspoloživa, bila prihvatljiva sa tačke gledišta hrišćanske etike. Osnovna dimenzija ovog pitanja odnosi se na-glašavanje pokajanja u hrišćanskoj etici. Kada je reč o brisanju sećanja na posebno mučna iskustva i lične izbore, takvo brisanje sećanja bi onemogućilo pokajanje. U tekstu se argu-mentiše da postoje granice etičkog značaja pokajanja u spisima vodećih hrišćanskih očeva o ovoj temi (npr. Sv. Tome Akvinskog), te da oni preteranu patnju i nesposobnost da se oprosti sebi samo za sopstvene radnje opisuju kao prepreku za postizanje duševnog mira i duhov-nog spasenja, a ne kao uslove za to spasenje. Tekst stoga zaključuje da nema u principu pre-preke, sa hrišćanske tačke gledišta, za dobrovoljno i selektivno brisanje sećanja u svrhu... psi-hoterapije onda kada bude na raspolaganju potpuno adekvatna tehnologija za to.
Keywords:
christian ethics / contrition / tranquility / redemption / sufferingSource:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2019, 30, 2, 257-269Publisher:
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
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http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=747http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1982
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IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Fatić, Aleksandar PY - 2019 UR - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=747 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1982 AB - The paper deals with a perspective of Christian philosophy on artificial memory erasuse for psychotherapeutic purposes. Its central question is whether a safe and reliable technology of memory erasure, once it is available, would be acceptable from a Christian ethics point of view. The main facet of this question is related to the Christian ethics requirement of contrition for the past wrongs, which in the case of memory erasure of particulary troubling experiences and personal choices would not be possible. The paper argues that there are limits to the ethical significance of contrition in the writings of the leading Christian fathers on the theme (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas), where excessive suffering and inability to forgive oneself for one’s actions is an impediment to the achivement of tranquility of mind and spiritual redemption, rather than a prerequisite for it. The paper thus concludes that there is no hindrance in principle from the Christian ethics point of view to pursuing a voluntary and selective memory erasure as a psychotherapeutic technique once a fully adequate technology is available. AB - Tekst se bavi perspektivom hrišćanske filozofije na pitanje o veštačkom brisanju pamćenja u psihoterapeutske svrhe. Centralno pitanje oko koje se konstituiše argumentacija teksta je da li bi bezbedna i pouzdana tehnologija brisanja sećanja, onda kada bude raspoloživa, bila prihvatljiva sa tačke gledišta hrišćanske etike. Osnovna dimenzija ovog pitanja odnosi se na-glašavanje pokajanja u hrišćanskoj etici. Kada je reč o brisanju sećanja na posebno mučna iskustva i lične izbore, takvo brisanje sećanja bi onemogućilo pokajanje. U tekstu se argu-mentiše da postoje granice etičkog značaja pokajanja u spisima vodećih hrišćanskih očeva o ovoj temi (npr. Sv. Tome Akvinskog), te da oni preteranu patnju i nesposobnost da se oprosti sebi samo za sopstvene radnje opisuju kao prepreku za postizanje duševnog mira i duhov-nog spasenja, a ne kao uslove za to spasenje. Tekst stoga zaključuje da nema u principu pre-preke, sa hrišćanske tačke gledišta, za dobrovoljno i selektivno brisanje sećanja u svrhu psi-hoterapije onda kada bude na raspolaganju potpuno adekvatna tehnologija za to. PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society T1 - Can Memory Erasure Contribute to a Virtuous Tempering of Emotions? IS - 2 VL - 30 SP - 257 EP - 269 DO - 10.2298/FID1902257F ER -
@article{ author = "Fatić, Aleksandar", year = "2019", abstract = "The paper deals with a perspective of Christian philosophy on artificial memory erasuse for psychotherapeutic purposes. Its central question is whether a safe and reliable technology of memory erasure, once it is available, would be acceptable from a Christian ethics point of view. The main facet of this question is related to the Christian ethics requirement of contrition for the past wrongs, which in the case of memory erasure of particulary troubling experiences and personal choices would not be possible. The paper argues that there are limits to the ethical significance of contrition in the writings of the leading Christian fathers on the theme (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas), where excessive suffering and inability to forgive oneself for one’s actions is an impediment to the achivement of tranquility of mind and spiritual redemption, rather than a prerequisite for it. The paper thus concludes that there is no hindrance in principle from the Christian ethics point of view to pursuing a voluntary and selective memory erasure as a psychotherapeutic technique once a fully adequate technology is available., Tekst se bavi perspektivom hrišćanske filozofije na pitanje o veštačkom brisanju pamćenja u psihoterapeutske svrhe. Centralno pitanje oko koje se konstituiše argumentacija teksta je da li bi bezbedna i pouzdana tehnologija brisanja sećanja, onda kada bude raspoloživa, bila prihvatljiva sa tačke gledišta hrišćanske etike. Osnovna dimenzija ovog pitanja odnosi se na-glašavanje pokajanja u hrišćanskoj etici. Kada je reč o brisanju sećanja na posebno mučna iskustva i lične izbore, takvo brisanje sećanja bi onemogućilo pokajanje. U tekstu se argu-mentiše da postoje granice etičkog značaja pokajanja u spisima vodećih hrišćanskih očeva o ovoj temi (npr. Sv. Tome Akvinskog), te da oni preteranu patnju i nesposobnost da se oprosti sebi samo za sopstvene radnje opisuju kao prepreku za postizanje duševnog mira i duhov-nog spasenja, a ne kao uslove za to spasenje. Tekst stoga zaključuje da nema u principu pre-preke, sa hrišćanske tačke gledišta, za dobrovoljno i selektivno brisanje sećanja u svrhu psi-hoterapije onda kada bude na raspolaganju potpuno adekvatna tehnologija za to.", publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju", journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society", title = "Can Memory Erasure Contribute to a Virtuous Tempering of Emotions?", number = "2", volume = "30", pages = "257-269", doi = "10.2298/FID1902257F" }
Fatić, A.. (2019). Can Memory Erasure Contribute to a Virtuous Tempering of Emotions?. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 30(2), 257-269. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1902257F
Fatić A. Can Memory Erasure Contribute to a Virtuous Tempering of Emotions?. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2019;30(2):257-269. doi:10.2298/FID1902257F .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Can Memory Erasure Contribute to a Virtuous Tempering of Emotions?" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 30, no. 2 (2019):257-269, https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1902257F . .