Mogućnosti primene teorije igara: Slučaj igre „javnog dobra“

Abstract

Socijalne dileme su situacije u kojima postoji sukob između pojedinačnog i kolektivnog interesa. Ponašanje ljudi u ovakvim situacijama izučava se preko modela igre u kojoj učesnici odlučuju koliko žele da doprinesu javnom dobru. Za pojedinca je primamljivo da doprinese što manje, nadajući se da će se okoristiti saradljivim ponašanjem ostalih članova kolektiva, ali, ako se svi odluče za nesaradnju, na duže staze je ceo kolektiv na gubitku (tzv. problem grebatorstva, eng. free-riding). Ako pojedinca posmatramo kao homo economicus-a, od njega bi se očekivalo da postupi racionalno upravo time što će postati grebator. Međutim, brojna istraživanja sa igrom „javnog dobra“ u kojima su učesnici stvarne osobe izveštavaju o višoj stopi saradljivosti nego što to predviđa tradicionalna teorija racionalnosti. U ovom radu prikazujem glavne nalaze laboratorijskih i terenskih eksperimenata sa igrom „javnog dobra“ i ilustrujem mogućnosti njihove praktične primene u realnim socijalnim dilemama, kao što su davanje dobrotvornih priloga, volontiranje, plaćanje poreza i ekološki odgovorno ponašanje.

Social dilemmas are situations characterized by a tension between acting in one's immediate self interest and acting in the longer-term collective interest. Many social dilemmas take the form of a public goods game, in which people decide how much to contribute to a public good (such as paying for public transportation, recycling or engaging in teamwork). One major challenge is the free-rider problem – it is individually tempting to contribute as little as possible to the public good, while profiting off others’ cooperation. If everyone decides to behave uncooperatively, the collective is worse off than it might have been otherwise. In terms of homo economicus characterization of human behavior, free-riding constitutes a rational choice. However, an overwhelming amount of psychological and behavioral economics research shows that players in the public goods game behave more cooperatively than strict rationality would permit. In this paper, I have presented the most important findings from public good experiments in the lab and the field. I have also discussed how this empirical evidence can help interpret some naturally occurring phenomena, like charitable giving, volunteering, tax morale, and management of common-pool natural resources. I conclude by pointing out that the fact that people donate to charities, volunteer, mostly do not evade taxes on a large scale, care for the environment, etc. suggests that rational choice hypothesis is inconsistent with the degree of cooperation in social dilemmas and that psychological game theory approach is required to solve this problem.