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Democratic values, emotions and emotivism

Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam

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Vranić, Bojan
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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to re- flexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in mor- al and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum’s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and polit- ical disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of rank...ing is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents’ emotional judgments.

Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera.
Keywords:
demokratija / democracy / emotivism / emotional judgments / moral disagreement / emotivizam / emocionalni sudovi / moralni sporovi
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2016, 27, 4, 723-738
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Funding / projects:
  • Serbia’s political identity in the regional and global context (RS-179076)

DOI: 10.2298/FID1604723V

ISSN: 0353-5738

WoS: 000408374000002

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=459
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1888
Collections
  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
Institution/Community
IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Vranić, Bojan
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=459
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1888
AB  - The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to re- flexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in mor- al and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum’s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and polit- ical disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents’ emotional judgments.
AB  - Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Democratic values, emotions and emotivism
T1  - Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam
IS  - 4
VL  - 27
SP  - 723
EP  - 738
DO  - 10.2298/FID1604723V
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Vranić, Bojan",
year = "2016",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to re- flexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in mor- al and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum’s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and polit- ical disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents’ emotional judgments., Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Democratic values, emotions and emotivism, Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam",
number = "4",
volume = "27",
pages = "723-738",
doi = "10.2298/FID1604723V"
}
Vranić, B.. (2016). Democratic values, emotions and emotivism. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 27(4), 723-738.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604723V
Vranić B. Democratic values, emotions and emotivism. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2016;27(4):723-738.
doi:10.2298/FID1604723V .
Vranić, Bojan, "Democratic values, emotions and emotivism" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 27, no. 4 (2016):723-738,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604723V . .

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