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Disappearing knowledge

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Nišavić, Ivan
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Abstract
Following the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even thoug...h nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already ”in the game”. Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels ”now you know it, now you don’t” and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis’s analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted.

Nakon izlaganja osnovnih stavova kontekstualističke pozicije u odnosu na invarijantističku, koja pojam znanja uzima u strogom i nepromjenljivom značenju, tekst se dalje bavi analizom pojma znanja koju nam je ponudio Luis (David Lewis) sa ambicijom da riješi uobičajene epistemološke probleme, pa među njima i lutrijski paradoks. Prihvatajući folibilizam kao jedinu plauzibilnu opciju za mogućnost sticanja znanja, Luis, zajedno sa postuliranjem pravila koja nam omogućavaju ispravno eliminisanje alternativnih mogućnosti, smatra da je moguće prenebregnuti pomenuti paradoks. Ako znanje želimo da utemeljimo na vjerovatnoći, a ne na apsolutnosti, i direktno ga uslovimo sa kontekstom u kom ono biva zasnovano ili izrečeno, onda je očigledno da će ono zavisiti od toga da li su uslovi za znanjem visoki i niski. Stoga, u jednom slučaju se može desiti da imamo znanje, a u drugom da nemamo, iako se ništa nije promijenilo sem konverzacionih faktora koji su u ’igri’. Takvo znanje, znanje koje je neposto...jano, koje se gubi, Diroz (DeRose) naziva ’sad ga ima, sad ga nema’ znanje i smatra da je direktna posledica Luisove analize, te kao takvo ne bi trebalo da bude prihvaćeno.

Keywords:
contextualism / kontekstualizam / eliminisanje mogućnosti / vjerovatnoća / nepostojanost znanja / lutrijski paradoks / eliminations of possibilities / probability / non-existence of knowledge / lottery paradox
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2016, 27, 4, 869-883
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

DOI: 10.2298/FID1604869N

ISSN: 0353-5738

WoS: 000408374000013

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=467
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1882
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  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
  • Radovi istraživača
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Nišavić, Ivan
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=467
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1882
AB  - Following the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even though nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already ”in the game”. Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels ”now you know it, now you don’t” and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis’s analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted.
AB  - Nakon izlaganja osnovnih stavova kontekstualističke pozicije u odnosu na invarijantističku, koja pojam znanja uzima u strogom i nepromjenljivom značenju, tekst se dalje bavi analizom pojma znanja koju nam je ponudio Luis (David Lewis) sa ambicijom da riješi uobičajene epistemološke probleme, pa među njima i lutrijski paradoks. Prihvatajući folibilizam kao jedinu plauzibilnu opciju za mogućnost sticanja znanja, Luis, zajedno sa postuliranjem pravila koja nam omogućavaju ispravno eliminisanje alternativnih mogućnosti, smatra da je moguće prenebregnuti pomenuti paradoks. Ako znanje želimo da utemeljimo na vjerovatnoći, a ne na apsolutnosti, i direktno ga uslovimo sa kontekstom u kom ono biva zasnovano ili izrečeno, onda je očigledno da će ono zavisiti od toga da li su uslovi za znanjem visoki i niski. Stoga, u jednom slučaju se može desiti da imamo znanje, a u drugom da nemamo, iako se ništa nije promijenilo sem konverzacionih faktora koji su u ’igri’. Takvo znanje, znanje koje je nepostojano, koje se gubi, Diroz (DeRose) naziva ’sad ga ima, sad ga nema’ znanje i smatra da je direktna posledica Luisove analize, te kao takvo ne bi trebalo da bude prihvaćeno.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Disappearing knowledge
IS  - 4
VL  - 27
SP  - 869
EP  - 883
DO  - 10.2298/FID1604869N
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Nišavić, Ivan",
year = "2016",
abstract = "Following the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even though nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already ”in the game”. Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels ”now you know it, now you don’t” and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis’s analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted., Nakon izlaganja osnovnih stavova kontekstualističke pozicije u odnosu na invarijantističku, koja pojam znanja uzima u strogom i nepromjenljivom značenju, tekst se dalje bavi analizom pojma znanja koju nam je ponudio Luis (David Lewis) sa ambicijom da riješi uobičajene epistemološke probleme, pa među njima i lutrijski paradoks. Prihvatajući folibilizam kao jedinu plauzibilnu opciju za mogućnost sticanja znanja, Luis, zajedno sa postuliranjem pravila koja nam omogućavaju ispravno eliminisanje alternativnih mogućnosti, smatra da je moguće prenebregnuti pomenuti paradoks. Ako znanje želimo da utemeljimo na vjerovatnoći, a ne na apsolutnosti, i direktno ga uslovimo sa kontekstom u kom ono biva zasnovano ili izrečeno, onda je očigledno da će ono zavisiti od toga da li su uslovi za znanjem visoki i niski. Stoga, u jednom slučaju se može desiti da imamo znanje, a u drugom da nemamo, iako se ništa nije promijenilo sem konverzacionih faktora koji su u ’igri’. Takvo znanje, znanje koje je nepostojano, koje se gubi, Diroz (DeRose) naziva ’sad ga ima, sad ga nema’ znanje i smatra da je direktna posledica Luisove analize, te kao takvo ne bi trebalo da bude prihvaćeno.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Disappearing knowledge",
number = "4",
volume = "27",
pages = "869-883",
doi = "10.2298/FID1604869N"
}
Nišavić, I.. (2016). Disappearing knowledge. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 27(4), 869-883.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604869N
Nišavić I. Disappearing knowledge. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2016;27(4):869-883.
doi:10.2298/FID1604869N .
Nišavić, Ivan, "Disappearing knowledge" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 27, no. 4 (2016):869-883,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604869N . .

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