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Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism

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2017
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Authors
Sládeček, Michal
Article (Published version)
,
Dialogue and Universalism
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Abstract
In the first part of the article author discusses some objections to Brian Barry’s interpretation of justice as impartiality, in particular those regarding freestanding position of principles of justice. In the second part author offers his own critique of Barry’s conception, according to which Barry does not distinguished two senses of impartiality adequately, conflating impartiality as non-discrimination and equal opportunity with impartiality as neutrality between conceptions of the good. Impartiality as the equal treatment of persons regardless of their characteristics or belonging to groups is compatible with neutrality in the sense of equal respect and acknowledgement of the right of persons to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, it is also compatible with non-neutrality as the unequal treatment of conceptions of the good, insofar as some of them are unreasonable, that is, only reasonable conceptions are considered as relevant in public deliberation.
Keywords:
Brian Barry / liberalism / neutrality / impartiality / perfectionism
Source:
Dialogue and Universalism, 2017, XXVII, 1, 123-134
Publisher:
  • Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences
Funding / projects:
  • Politics of Social Memory and National Identity: Regional and European Context (RS-179049)

ISSN: PL ISSN 1234-5792

[ Google Scholar ]
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613
URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1613
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača
Institution/Community
IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1613
AB  - In the first part of the article author discusses some objections to Brian Barry’s interpretation of justice as impartiality, in particular those regarding freestanding position of principles of justice. In the second part author offers his own critique of Barry’s conception, according to which Barry does not distinguished two senses of impartiality adequately, conflating impartiality as non-discrimination and equal opportunity with impartiality as neutrality between conceptions of the good. Impartiality as the equal treatment of persons regardless of their characteristics or belonging to groups is compatible with neutrality in the sense of equal respect and acknowledgement of the right of persons to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, it is also compatible with non-neutrality as the unequal treatment of conceptions of the good, insofar as some of them are unreasonable, that is, only reasonable conceptions are considered as relevant in public deliberation.
PB  - Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences
T2  - Dialogue and Universalism
T1  - Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism
IS  - 1
VL  - XXVII
SP  - 123
EP  - 134
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2017",
abstract = "In the first part of the article author discusses some objections to Brian Barry’s interpretation of justice as impartiality, in particular those regarding freestanding position of principles of justice. In the second part author offers his own critique of Barry’s conception, according to which Barry does not distinguished two senses of impartiality adequately, conflating impartiality as non-discrimination and equal opportunity with impartiality as neutrality between conceptions of the good. Impartiality as the equal treatment of persons regardless of their characteristics or belonging to groups is compatible with neutrality in the sense of equal respect and acknowledgement of the right of persons to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, it is also compatible with non-neutrality as the unequal treatment of conceptions of the good, insofar as some of them are unreasonable, that is, only reasonable conceptions are considered as relevant in public deliberation.",
publisher = "Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences",
journal = "Dialogue and Universalism",
title = "Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism",
number = "1",
volume = "XXVII",
pages = "123-134",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2017). Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism. in Dialogue and Universalism
Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences., XXVII(1), 123-134.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613
Sládeček M. Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism. in Dialogue and Universalism. 2017;XXVII(1):123-134.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism" in Dialogue and Universalism, XXVII, no. 1 (2017):123-134,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613 .

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