Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations
Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje
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Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism;
both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting
through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we
think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless
in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world
and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on
general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various
fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the
world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns
identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of
human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive
justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such
analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using ...distinctive
strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein
and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections
required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and
why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating.
Kant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. ‘Transcendentalni karakter’ ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološk...e refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim.
Кључне речи:
scepticism / skepticizam / transcendental proof / mental content externalism / Kant / Hegel / C.I. Lewis / Heidegger / Wittgenstein / transcendentalni dokaz / eksternalizam mentalne sadržine / Kant / Hegel / K.I. Luis / Hajdeger / VitgenštajnИзвор:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2017, 28, 1, 113-135Издавач:
- Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
URI
http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=507http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1535
Институција/група
IFDTTY - JOUR AU - Westphal, Kenneth R. PY - 2017 UR - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=507 UR - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1535 AB - Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating. AB - Kant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. ‘Transcendentalni karakter’ ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološke refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim. PB - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju T2 - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society T1 - Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations T1 - Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje IS - 1 VL - 28 SP - 113 EP - 135 DO - 10.2298/FID1701113W ER -
@article{ author = "Westphal, Kenneth R.", year = "2017", abstract = "Kant provided two parallel, sound proofs of mental content externalism; both prove this thesis: We human beings could not think of ourselves as persisting through apparent changes in what we (apparently) experience – nor could we think of the apparent spatio-temporal world of objects, events and people – unless in fact we are conscious of some aspects of the actual spatio-temporal world and have at least some rudimentary knowledge of it. Such proofs turn, not on general facts about (or features of) the world, but on appreciating various fundamental regards in which our finite human cognizance depends upon the world we inhabit. The ‘transcendental’ character of these analyses concerns identifying and appreciating various fundamental features of our finite form of human mindedness, and basic constraints upon, and prospects of, cognitive justification within the non-formal domain of human empirical knowledge. Such analyses and proofs have been developed in various ways, using distinctive strategies, not only by Kant, but also by Hegel, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Frederick Will. Here I examine and defend the methodological reflections required to understand, assess and appreciate such transcendental proofs, and why so few analytic epistemologists have found them persuasive or illuminating., Kant nam nudi dva paralelna i valjana dokaza eksternalizma mentalne sadržine, koji dokazuju tezu: kao ljudska bića, mi ne možemo misliti o nama samima kao postojećim u sklopu promena koje iskušavamo – niti možemo uopšte misliti prostorno-vremenski svet objekata, događaja i ljudi – ako nismo svesni nekih aspekata postojećeg prostorno-vremenskog sveta, i ako nemamo barem osnovno znanje o njemu. Ovi dokazi se okreću, ne ka opštim faktima o svetu, već ka razumevanju raznih fundamentalnih načina na koje naše ljudsko saznanje zavisi od sveta kojeg nastanjujemo. ‘Transcendentalni karakter’ ovih analiza se tiče identifikovanja i razumevanja različitih temeljnih svojstava konačne forme ljudske razumnosti i temeljnih ograničenja kognitivnog opravdanja u okviru neformalnih domena ljudskog empirijskog saznanja. Takve analize i dokazi su razvijeni na mnogo načina, i sa različitim strategijama, kod Hegela, Luisa, hajdegera, Vitgenštajna i Frederika Vila. U ovom radu ću istražiti i braniti metodološke refleksije potrebne da se razumeju takvi transcendentalni dokazi, koje samo mali broj analitičkih epistemologa smatra ubedljivim i prosvetljujućim.", publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju", journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society", title = "Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations, Skepticizam i transcendentalni argumenti: metodološko razmatranje", number = "1", volume = "28", pages = "113-135", doi = "10.2298/FID1701113W" }
Westphal, K. R.. (2017). Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 28(1), 113-135. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1701113W
Westphal KR. Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;28(1):113-135. doi:10.2298/FID1701113W .
Westphal, Kenneth R., "Scepticism & transcendental arguments: Some methodological reconsiderations" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 28, no. 1 (2017):113-135, https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1701113W . .