Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog

Abstract

Tekst analizira problem dodavanja konceptu bića (ens) kod Tome Akvinskog. U prvom delu teksta razmotrena je nemogućnost dodavanja božanskom biću, a drugi se bavi odsustvom dodavanja u zajedničkom biću (ens commune). Dok božansko bivstvovanje nije u stanju da primi nikakva dodatna određenja, zajedničko bivstvovanje aktualno ne sadrži dodatna određenja, ali jeste u stanju da ih primi. U tom kontekstu, ističe se razlika između dodavanja rodnim pojmovima i dodavanja zajedničkom biću. U trećem delu teksta tumači se De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 i pokazuje da je zajedničko biće u stanju da primi dodatak ili na način kontrahovanja nečim realnim na determinatum modum essendi ili na način izražavanja savršenstava koja nisu eksplicitno iskazana rečju biće. Prvo su kategorije, drugo su transcendentalije.

The article analyzes the problem of addition to the concept of being (ens) in Thomas Aquinas. The first part analyzes the impossibility of addition to divine being, and the second one is dedicated to the lack of addition in common being (ens commune). Divine being cannot receive any further determinations, common being does not contain any further determinations, but it can receive it. In that context, the difference between adding to generic notions and adding to common being is highlighted. In the third part the De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 is interpreted and it is shown that common being is capable of receiving additions either as a contration of something real to the determinatum modum essendi, or as an expression of the prerfections that are not explicitly contained in being. The first additions are the categories, the second ones are transcendentals.