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Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog

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Milidrag, Predrag
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
Tekst analizira problem dodavanja konceptu bića (ens) kod Tome Akvinskog. U prvom delu teksta razmotrena je nemogućnost dodavanja božanskom biću, a drugi se bavi odsustvom dodavanja u zajedničkom biću (ens commune). Dok božansko bivstvovanje nije u stanju da primi nikakva dodatna određenja, zajedničko bivstvovanje aktualno ne sadrži dodatna određenja, ali jeste u stanju da ih primi. U tom kontekstu, ističe se razlika između dodavanja rodnim pojmovima i dodavanja zajedničkom biću. U trećem delu teksta tumači se De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 i pokazuje da je zajedničko biće u stanju da primi dodatak ili na način kontrahovanja nečim realnim na determinatum modum essendi ili na način izražavanja savršenstava koja nisu eksplicitno iskazana rečju biće. Prvo su kategorije, drugo su transcendentalije.
The article analyzes the problem of addition to the concept of being (ens) in Thomas Aquinas. The first part analyzes the impossibility of addition to divine being, and the second one is dedicated to the lack of addition in common being (ens commune). Divine being cannot receive any further determinations, common being does not contain any further determinations, but it can receive it. In that context, the difference between adding to generic notions and adding to common being is highlighted. In the third part the De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 is interpreted and it is shown that common being is capable of receiving additions either as a contration of something real to the determinatum modum essendi, or as an expression of the prerfections that are not explicitly contained in being. The first additions are the categories, the second ones are transcendentals.
Keywords:
zajedničko biće / common being / dodavanje / kategorije / transcendentalije / rod i vrsta / božansko bivstvovanje / Toma Akvinski / ens commune / addition / transcendentals / genus and species / divine being / Thomas Aquinas / categories
Source:
Theoria, 2017, 63, 1, 110-130
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
Funding / projects:
  • Politics of Social Memory and National Identity: Regional and European Context (RS-179049)

DOI: 10.2298/THEO1701110M

ISSN: 0351-2274

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URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1484
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  • Radovi istraživača
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milidrag, Predrag
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1484
AB  - Tekst analizira problem dodavanja konceptu bića (ens) kod Tome Akvinskog. U prvom delu teksta razmotrena je nemogućnost dodavanja božanskom biću, a drugi se bavi odsustvom dodavanja u zajedničkom biću (ens commune). Dok božansko bivstvovanje nije u stanju da primi nikakva dodatna određenja, zajedničko bivstvovanje aktualno ne sadrži dodatna određenja, ali jeste u stanju da ih primi. U tom kontekstu, ističe se razlika između dodavanja rodnim pojmovima i dodavanja zajedničkom biću. U trećem delu teksta tumači se De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 i pokazuje da je zajedničko biće u stanju da primi dodatak ili na način kontrahovanja nečim realnim na determinatum modum essendi ili na način izražavanja savršenstava koja nisu eksplicitno iskazana rečju biće. Prvo su kategorije, drugo su transcendentalije.
AB  - The article analyzes the problem of addition to the concept of being (ens) in Thomas Aquinas. The first part analyzes the impossibility of addition to divine being, and the second one is dedicated to the lack of addition in common being (ens commune). Divine being cannot receive any further determinations, common being does not contain any further determinations, but it can receive it. In that context, the difference between adding to generic notions and adding to common being is highlighted. In the third part the De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 is interpreted and it is shown that common being is capable of receiving additions either as a contration of something real to the determinatum modum essendi, or as an expression of the prerfections that are not explicitly contained in being. The first additions are the categories, the second ones are transcendentals.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog
IS  - 1
VL  - 63
SP  - 110
EP  - 130
DO  - 10.2298/THEO1701110M
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Milidrag, Predrag",
year = "2017",
abstract = "Tekst analizira problem dodavanja konceptu bića (ens) kod Tome Akvinskog. U prvom delu teksta razmotrena je nemogućnost dodavanja božanskom biću, a drugi se bavi odsustvom dodavanja u zajedničkom biću (ens commune). Dok božansko bivstvovanje nije u stanju da primi nikakva dodatna određenja, zajedničko bivstvovanje aktualno ne sadrži dodatna određenja, ali jeste u stanju da ih primi. U tom kontekstu, ističe se razlika između dodavanja rodnim pojmovima i dodavanja zajedničkom biću. U trećem delu teksta tumači se De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 i pokazuje da je zajedničko biće u stanju da primi dodatak ili na način kontrahovanja nečim realnim na determinatum modum essendi ili na način izražavanja savršenstava koja nisu eksplicitno iskazana rečju biće. Prvo su kategorije, drugo su transcendentalije., The article analyzes the problem of addition to the concept of being (ens) in Thomas Aquinas. The first part analyzes the impossibility of addition to divine being, and the second one is dedicated to the lack of addition in common being (ens commune). Divine being cannot receive any further determinations, common being does not contain any further determinations, but it can receive it. In that context, the difference between adding to generic notions and adding to common being is highlighted. In the third part the De veritate, q. 21, a. 1 is interpreted and it is shown that common being is capable of receiving additions either as a contration of something real to the determinatum modum essendi, or as an expression of the prerfections that are not explicitly contained in being. The first additions are the categories, the second ones are transcendentals.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
pages = "110-130",
doi = "10.2298/THEO1701110M"
}
Milidrag, P.. (2017). Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog. in Theoria
Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 63(1), 110-130.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1701110M
Milidrag P. Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog. in Theoria. 2017;63(1):110-130.
doi:10.2298/THEO1701110M .
Milidrag, Predrag, "Problem dodavanja (additio) biću kod Tome Akvinskog" in Theoria, 63, no. 1 (2017):110-130,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1701110M . .

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