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Kantova teorija osećaja

Kant's Theory of Feeling

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2017
Disertacija (2.841Mb)
Authors
Cvejić, Igor
Contributors
Grubor, Nebojša
Babić, Jovan
Popović, Una
Doctoral thesis (Published version)
Metadata
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Abstract
Uobičajene su interpretacije po kojima Kant osećaje objašnjava ili kauzalno ili kao intencionalna stanja. Pod kauzalnim objašnjenjem, podrazumeva se da je osećaj prost oset (materijalna predstava čula) koja se ne može nikako drugačije objasniti osim preko svojih uzroka. Prema intencionalnom objašnjenju, kakvo je ono Rejčel Zakert, Kant osećaj shvata kao mentalno stanje drugog reda, kao svest o, ili predstavu o, nekom drugom stanju i njegovoj relacionoj karakteristici. Oslanjajući se na podelu osnovnih moći duše, u radu će se braniti teza da obe prethodne interpretacije ne mogu adekvatno da objasne Kantovo shvatanje osećaja. Prema razlici osnovnih odredbi duše osećaji, kao mentalna stanja sui generis, sami nisu predstave, prema tome ni oset, ni predstava višeg reda. Naprotiv, osećaj jeste subjektivni kauzalitet predstave, težnja da se u datom stanju predstavljanja održi ili da se ono odbaci – koja se i bez predstave višeg reda manifestuje kao svest...
Two main contemporary interpretations of Kant’s account concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure argue that he explains feeling either causally or as an intentional mental state. According to the causal interpretation a feeling is an opaque sensation, which could not be explained by itself, but rather by its causes. As claimed by Rachel Zuckert, chosen due to her detailed explanation of intentional interpretation, feeling for Kant could be understood as a second order mental state, as a ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representations of’ another mental state and its relational characteristic. Relaying on Kant’s division of the faculties of the soul, the thesis will be defended, that both interpretations could not adequately explain Kant’s account of feeling. According to the difference between basic determinations of the soul, feelings, as mental states sui generis, are themselves not representations, therefore, they are nor sensations, nor second-order representations. Instead, a fee...ling should be understood as a subjective causality of representation, a tendency to maintain or restrain the state of representation – which is by itself manifested as a consciousness...

Keywords:
Kant, Imanuel / osećaj / moć suđenja / ukus / intencionalnost / feeling / faculties / taste / judgement power / Intentionality
Source:
2017
Funding / projects:
  • Studying climate change and its influence on environment: impacts, adaptation and mitigation (RS-43007)
[ Google Scholar ]
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_7727
URI
http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=48753679
http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=4655
https://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:14826/bdef:Content/download
http://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/123456789/7727
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1464
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  • Radovi istraživača
Institution/Community
IFDT
TY  - THES
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://vbs.rs/scripts/cobiss?command=DISPLAY&base=70036&RID=48753679
UR  - http://eteze.bg.ac.rs/application/showtheses?thesesId=4655
UR  - https://fedorabg.bg.ac.rs/fedora/get/o:14826/bdef:Content/download
UR  - http://nardus.mpn.gov.rs/123456789/7727
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1464
AB  - Uobičajene su interpretacije po kojima Kant osećaje objašnjava ili kauzalno ili kao intencionalna stanja. Pod kauzalnim objašnjenjem, podrazumeva se da je osećaj prost oset (materijalna predstava čula) koja se ne može nikako drugačije objasniti osim preko svojih uzroka. Prema intencionalnom objašnjenju, kakvo je ono Rejčel Zakert, Kant osećaj shvata kao mentalno stanje drugog reda, kao svest o, ili predstavu o, nekom drugom stanju i njegovoj relacionoj karakteristici. Oslanjajući se na podelu osnovnih moći duše, u radu će se braniti teza da obe prethodne interpretacije ne mogu adekvatno da objasne Kantovo shvatanje osećaja. Prema razlici osnovnih odredbi duše osećaji, kao mentalna stanja sui generis, sami nisu predstave, prema tome ni oset, ni predstava višeg reda. Naprotiv, osećaj jeste subjektivni kauzalitet predstave, težnja da se u datom stanju predstavljanja održi ili da se ono odbaci – koja se i bez predstave višeg reda manifestuje kao svest...
AB  - Two main contemporary interpretations of Kant’s account concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure argue that he explains feeling either causally or as an intentional mental state. According to the causal interpretation a feeling is an opaque sensation, which could not be explained by itself, but rather by its causes. As claimed by Rachel Zuckert, chosen due to her detailed explanation of intentional interpretation, feeling for Kant could be understood as a second order mental state, as a ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representations of’ another mental state and its relational characteristic. Relaying on Kant’s division of the faculties of the soul, the thesis will be defended, that both interpretations could not adequately explain Kant’s account of feeling. According to the difference between basic determinations of the soul, feelings, as mental states sui generis, are themselves not representations, therefore, they are nor sensations, nor second-order representations. Instead, a feeling should be understood as a subjective causality of representation, a tendency to maintain or restrain the state of representation – which is by itself manifested as a consciousness...
T1  - Kantova teorija osećaja
T1  - Kant's Theory of Feeling
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_7727
ER  - 
@phdthesis{
author = "Cvejić, Igor",
year = "2017",
abstract = "Uobičajene su interpretacije po kojima Kant osećaje objašnjava ili kauzalno ili kao intencionalna stanja. Pod kauzalnim objašnjenjem, podrazumeva se da je osećaj prost oset (materijalna predstava čula) koja se ne može nikako drugačije objasniti osim preko svojih uzroka. Prema intencionalnom objašnjenju, kakvo je ono Rejčel Zakert, Kant osećaj shvata kao mentalno stanje drugog reda, kao svest o, ili predstavu o, nekom drugom stanju i njegovoj relacionoj karakteristici. Oslanjajući se na podelu osnovnih moći duše, u radu će se braniti teza da obe prethodne interpretacije ne mogu adekvatno da objasne Kantovo shvatanje osećaja. Prema razlici osnovnih odredbi duše osećaji, kao mentalna stanja sui generis, sami nisu predstave, prema tome ni oset, ni predstava višeg reda. Naprotiv, osećaj jeste subjektivni kauzalitet predstave, težnja da se u datom stanju predstavljanja održi ili da se ono odbaci – koja se i bez predstave višeg reda manifestuje kao svest..., Two main contemporary interpretations of Kant’s account concerning the feeling of pleasure and displeasure argue that he explains feeling either causally or as an intentional mental state. According to the causal interpretation a feeling is an opaque sensation, which could not be explained by itself, but rather by its causes. As claimed by Rachel Zuckert, chosen due to her detailed explanation of intentional interpretation, feeling for Kant could be understood as a second order mental state, as a ‘consciousness of’ or ‘representations of’ another mental state and its relational characteristic. Relaying on Kant’s division of the faculties of the soul, the thesis will be defended, that both interpretations could not adequately explain Kant’s account of feeling. According to the difference between basic determinations of the soul, feelings, as mental states sui generis, are themselves not representations, therefore, they are nor sensations, nor second-order representations. Instead, a feeling should be understood as a subjective causality of representation, a tendency to maintain or restrain the state of representation – which is by itself manifested as a consciousness...",
title = "Kantova teorija osećaja, Kant's Theory of Feeling",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_7727"
}
Cvejić, I.. (2017). Kantova teorija osećaja. .
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_7727
Cvejić I. Kantova teorija osećaja. 2017;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_7727 .
Cvejić, Igor, "Kantova teorija osećaja" (2017),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_7727 .

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