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The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It

Igra u kojoj si: obmanjivanje kroz socijalne norme i šta je pogrešno u vezi sa tim

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Herzog, Lisa
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Abstract
This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate this phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications.
U članku se razmatra fenomen obmanjivanja u vezi sa „igrom u kojoj jesi“. Indi- vidue koje na ovaj način obmanjuju druge iskorišćavaju činjenicu da se oslanjamo na socijalne norme pri regulisanju stepena opreznosti, otvorenosti i poverenja, koje upotrebljavamo u različitim epistemičkim situacijama. Pretvarajući se da učestvuju u izvesnoj igri sa izvesnom epistemičkom situacijom, oni mogu primamiti druge da otkriju informaciju ili da pokažu manje stepene obazrivosti, time idući protiv sopstvenih interesa. Razgraničavam ovaj fenomen od neposredne laži i implicitnih činova obmane, i razmatram neke njegove varijacije. Potom pitam zašto i pod kojim uslovima je moralno pogrešno obmanjivati druge o igri u kojoj jesu. Razlikujem tri normativna ugla za razumevanje tog fenomena: deontološka ograničenja, iskorišćavanje zajedničke kulturne infrastrukture i implicitnu diskriminaciju stranaca i atipičnih aspiranata. Zaključujem kratkim raspravljanjem nekih praktičnih implikacija.
Keywords:
epistemic situations / lying / misleading / social norms / epistemičke situacije / laganje / obmana / socijalne norme
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2017, 28, 2, 250-269
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

DOI: 10.2298/FID1702250H

ISSN: (Online) 2334-8577; (Print) 0353-5738

WoS: 000408377100003

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1408
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  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
Institution/Community
IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Herzog, Lisa
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1408
AB  - This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game 
you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we 
rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we 
use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with 
a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to 
exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate 
this phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and 
discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally 
wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative 
angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding 
on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders 
and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications.
AB  - U članku se razmatra fenomen obmanjivanja u vezi sa „igrom u kojoj jesi“. Indi-
vidue koje na ovaj način obmanjuju druge iskorišćavaju činjenicu da se oslanjamo na socijalne norme pri regulisanju stepena opreznosti, otvorenosti i poverenja, koje upotrebljavamo u različitim epistemičkim situacijama. Pretvarajući se da učestvuju u izvesnoj igri sa izvesnom epistemičkom situacijom, oni mogu primamiti druge da otkriju informaciju ili da pokažu manje stepene obazrivosti, time idući protiv sopstvenih interesa. Razgraničavam ovaj fenomen od neposredne laži i implicitnih činova obmane, i razmatram neke njegove varijacije. Potom pitam zašto i pod kojim uslovima je moralno pogrešno obmanjivati druge o igri u kojoj jesu. Razlikujem tri normativna ugla za razumevanje tog fenomena: deontološka ograničenja, iskorišćavanje zajedničke kulturne infrastrukture i implicitnu diskriminaciju stranaca i atipičnih aspiranata. Zaključujem kratkim raspravljanjem nekih praktičnih implikacija.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It
T1  - Igra u kojoj si: obmanjivanje kroz socijalne norme  i šta je pogrešno u vezi sa tim
IS  - 2
VL  - 28
SP  - 250
EP  - 269
DO  - 10.2298/FID1702250H
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Herzog, Lisa",
year = "2017",
abstract = "This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game 
you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we 
rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we 
use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with 
a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to 
exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate 
this phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and 
discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally 
wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative 
angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding 
on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders 
and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications., U članku se razmatra fenomen obmanjivanja u vezi sa „igrom u kojoj jesi“. Indi-
vidue koje na ovaj način obmanjuju druge iskorišćavaju činjenicu da se oslanjamo na socijalne norme pri regulisanju stepena opreznosti, otvorenosti i poverenja, koje upotrebljavamo u različitim epistemičkim situacijama. Pretvarajući se da učestvuju u izvesnoj igri sa izvesnom epistemičkom situacijom, oni mogu primamiti druge da otkriju informaciju ili da pokažu manje stepene obazrivosti, time idući protiv sopstvenih interesa. Razgraničavam ovaj fenomen od neposredne laži i implicitnih činova obmane, i razmatram neke njegove varijacije. Potom pitam zašto i pod kojim uslovima je moralno pogrešno obmanjivati druge o igri u kojoj jesu. Razlikujem tri normativna ugla za razumevanje tog fenomena: deontološka ograničenja, iskorišćavanje zajedničke kulturne infrastrukture i implicitnu diskriminaciju stranaca i atipičnih aspiranata. Zaključujem kratkim raspravljanjem nekih praktičnih implikacija.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It, Igra u kojoj si: obmanjivanje kroz socijalne norme  i šta je pogrešno u vezi sa tim",
number = "2",
volume = "28",
pages = "250-269",
doi = "10.2298/FID1702250H"
}
Herzog, L.. (2017). The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 28(2), 250-269.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1702250H
Herzog L. The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;28(2):250-269.
doi:10.2298/FID1702250H .
Herzog, Lisa, "The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What’s Wrong with It" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 28, no. 2 (2017):250-269,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1702250H . .

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