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Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View

Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje

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2014
1313.pdf (219.3Kb)
Authors
Baccarini, Elvio
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
Jonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared reasons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that Quong puts forward in opposition to the convergence view is represented by the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the requirement of sincerity.
Keywords:
consensus / convergence / Gaus / Quong / javni um
Source:
Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 2014, 75-95
Publisher:
  • Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

DOI: 10.2298/FID1401075B

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1315
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  • Glavna kolekcija
  • Filozofija i društvo [Philosophy and Society]
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IFDT
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Baccarini, Elvio
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1315
AB  - Jonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared reasons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that Quong puts forward in opposition to the convergence view is represented by the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the requirement of sincerity.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View
T1  - Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje
SP  - 75
EP  - 95
DO  - 10.2298/FID1401075B
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Baccarini, Elvio",
year = "2014",
abstract = "Jonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared reasons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that Quong puts forward in opposition to the convergence view is represented by the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the requirement of sincerity.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View, Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje",
pages = "75-95",
doi = "10.2298/FID1401075B"
}
Baccarini, E.. (2014). Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 75-95.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1401075B
Baccarini E. Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2014;:75-95.
doi:10.2298/FID1401075B .
Baccarini, Elvio, "Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2014):75-95,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1401075B . .

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