

NACIJA KAO PROBLEM ILI REŠENJE ISTORIJSKI REVIZIONIZAM U SRBIJI



NATION AS A PROBLEM OR SOLUTION
HISTORICAL REVISIONISM IN SERBIA

**NACIJA KAO PROBLEM ILI REŠENJE
ISTORIJSKI REVIZIONIZAM U SRBIJI**

Izdavač:

Futura publikacije
Novi Sad

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Edicija:

Istraživanja

Produkcija:

Omladinski centar CK13, Novi Sad

Realizacija:

Centar za nove medije_kuda.org
Alternativna kulturna organizacija AKO
Centar za socijalna istraživanja CSI

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Daniel Print, Novi Sad

Tiraž:

500

Info:

www.ckl3.org/sr/nacionalizam_i_revizionizam

Novi Sad, 2008

Projekat podržali:

Ambasada Kraljevine Holandije, Beograd / Ambassade van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden,
Belgrad
Fond za otvoreno društvo, Beograd

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Ko kontroliše sadašnjost, kontroliše prošlost.
Ko kontroliše prošlost, kontroliše budućnost.

George Orwell

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UVOD

U protekle dve decenije u Srbiji je zabeležena čitava serija političkih i društvenih ekscesa, zasnovanih na nacionalnom pitanju i uzajamnoj netoleranciji. Posledice takvog delovanja u velikoj meri uticale su i na sadašnje društvene okolnosti, posebno one u kojima žive i odrastaju mlade generacije. Za Vojvodinu uobičajena atmosfera tolerancije, kulturne, nacionalne i verske različitosti drastično se izmenila, što je dovelo do porasta etnički, religijski i politički motivisanih incidenata. Novi sistem vrednosti, manifestovan u nekritičkom usvajanju nacionalističkih dogmi i modelu nasilnog ponašanja, naišao je na veliki odjek među mladima. Odrastajući u vremenu ratova, mržnje i siromaštva, u društvu gde predrasude zauzimaju značajno mesto, mlađe generacije postale su plodno tle za inkorporiranje različitih retrogradnih ideologija.

Upravo u ovakvim okolnostima postali smo svedoci značajnih promena u javnom diskursu na polju različitih istorijskih i realpolitičkih tema, što u mnogome predstavlja posledicu krize identiteta koja je zahvatila savremeno srpsko društvo. Problem revalidacije i ponovnog tumačenja bliže i dalje prošlosti na ovim prostorima javlja se kao jedan od najizraženijih u čitavom korpusu. Poznato je da u prevrednovanju istorije najvažniju ulogu igraju potrebe političkih elita da poput Altera odvajaju "korisnu" od "nekorisnu" prošlosti. Imajući u vidu da onaj ko kontroliše sadašnjost raspolaže monopolom u tumačenju prošlosti i da pri tom igra odlučujuću ulogu u kreiranju budućnosti, ova pojava dobija na značaju. Paralelno postojanje najmanje dve verzije istih istorijskih događaja, rehabilitacija četničkog pokreta, reaktualizacija sledbenika Dimitrija Ljotića i Milana Nedića, revizija istorijskih udžbenika itd., samo su neke od tema koje traže detaljno prispitivanje u svetlu naučne objektivnosti.

Projekat *Nacija kao problem ili rešenje - Istorijski revizionizam u Srbiji* pokrenut je upravo sa ciljem traženja odgovora na brojna pitanja: koja je uloga nacionalizma u životu savremene Evrope; da li postoje, i ako postoje, koje su specifičnosti nacionalizama na postjugoslovenskom prostoru; kakva je perspektiva takvog nacionalizma, i pre svega, kakva je perspektiva mlade generacije koja odrasta u okruženju u kome se pothranjuju predrasude, nacionalna isključivost i netolerancija? Namera sadržana u projektu jeste i otkrivanje razmera i uloge revizionističkih tendencija u savremenom srpskom društvu, i uticaja koji one imaju na opšte društvene tokove; da li se uz pomoć tako iskrivljenih i populističkih interpretacija prošlosti formira "novi srpski čovek" regrutovan iz redova omladine.

U osnovi projekta leži želja za multidisciplinarnim pristupom istraživanju najrazličitijih aspekata problema nacije, nacionalizma, njihovih definicija i istorijskog razvoja, njihove uloge u savremenom srpskom društvu, te perspektive u vremenu sve širih globalizacijskih procesa, kao i istraživanju fenomena istorijskog revizionizma, njegovih definicija i posebne povezanosti sa nacionalizmom. Naročito treba istaći pokušaj da se problemi nacije, nacionalizma i istorijskog revizionizma sagledaju iz vizure mladih ljudi

današnjice, pre svega kroz sagledavanje uticaja koji imaju na formiranje stavova, ponašanja i delovanja mladih generacija.

Utoliko je neophodno istaći da i sami tekstovi obuhvaćeni publikacijom predstavljaju rezultat rada mladih, većinom neafirmisanih ili slabo afirmisanih autora, samih pripadnika tih mladih generacija koje su, najčešće na negativan način, neposredno iskusile uticaj nacionalističke politike i opće revizije sistema vrednosti.

Na posletku treba reći da publikacija *Nacija kao problem ili rešenje - Istorijski revizionizam u Srbiji*, koja je nastala kao rezultat istoimenog istraživačkog projekta, ne predstavlja i njegovo definitivno okončanje, tim pre jer ne smatramo da je ovim projektom sama njegova problematika zahvaćena u celini, pa tako ne može biti ni "razrešena" ili rastumačena u potpunosti. Utoliko ova publikacija neće predstavljati kraj istraživanja, već upravo njegov stvarni početak.

Uredništvo

Dorđe Tomić

KAKO DEFINISATI NACIJU?

NACIJA I NACIONALIZAM KAO PREDMET NAUČNOG IZUČAVANJA

Ovaj tekst predstavlja kratak pregled najznačajnijih radova na temu nacije i nacionalizma i pokušava da odredi neke osnovne odlike nacije na osnovu ponuđenih definicija, kao i da ukaže na ključna pitanja i teorijske pristupe u vezi sa ovom temom.

Ključne reči: nacija, nacionalizam, teorije nacionalizma

Da li je moguće zamisliti svet bez pojma „nacija“? Da li se svet može zamisliti bez granica nacionalnih država? Da li je moguće odrediti ljude bez njihove nacionalne pripadnosti? Kako bi izgledao život bez pasoša, tj. bez državljanstva bilo koje države? Kakvi god bili odgovori na ova pitanja, oni ukazuju na kompleksnost odnosa koji se vezuju za „naciju” i „nacionalizam”.

Pojmovi *nacija, nacionalni identitet, nacionalna država, nacionalizam* su sastavni delovi jedne ideje koja od početka devetnaestog veka do danas određuje način na koji je ceo svet uređen. Kao ideja, ali i kao istorijska stvarnost, nacija i odgovarajuća ideologija, nacionalizam imaju danas ne samo velik politički i društveni značaj, nego predstavljaju i predmet istraživanja različitih naučnih disciplina.

Ovaj tekst predstavlja kratak pregled najznačajnijih radova na temu nacije i nacionalizma, i iako ne pretenduje na sveobuhvatnost pokušava da odredi neke osnovne odlike nacije na osnovu ponuđenih definicija, kao i da ukaže na ključna pitanja i teorijske pristupe u vezi sa ovom temom.

Traganje za definicijom

Objavlivanjem dela danas najznačajnijih autora teorijskih radova o nacionalizmu, Benedikta Andersona, Erika Hobsbauma i Ernesta Gelnera početkom osamdesetih godina, na prvi pogled konačno je pobeđena takozvana primordijalistička struja u raspravi o tome šta je, *kako je, kada je, odnosno zašto je NACIJA*¹.

Sve do početka osamdesetih godina nacija, odnosno nacionalizam, smatrani su za prirodno, pa samim tim i idealno društveno uređenje. Pokušaj da se nacija kao koncept veže za društvo shvaćeno kao sistem koji se zasniva na komunikaciji (Karl Deutsch) i principu solidarnosti (Max Weber) unutar tog sistema predstavljaju značajne definicije nacije.

Ono što je karakteristično za ove najranije definicije nacije je tvrdnja da nacija postoji i da jedno društvo i ne može drugačije da postoji nego kao nacija. Ljudi pritom moraju da veruju da pripadaju toj naciji (Hugh Seton - Watson). Nacija shvaćena kao solidarna zajednica koja je svesna svoje zajedničke prošlosti, ali se pre svega ogleda u sadašnjosti mora se *želeći* (Ernest Renan). Činjenica da krajem 18. veka u većem delu

¹ Termin NACIJA ovde se ne odnosi na državu, kao što je to slučaj u anglosaksonskoj terminologiji, već označava suštinu i cilj ideologije koja jednu određenu grupu ljudi pokušava da definiše na osnovu određenih zajedničkih karakteristika te grupe, koja može, ali ne mora da sebe vidi kao etničku grupu, tj. grupu koju odlikuju „etnički” atributi poput istog jezika, srodnosti i zajedničkog porekla, kulture, običaja i sl.

Evrope većina ljudi ili pripadnika jedne „nacije” nije bila „svesna” pripadnosti svojoj naciji, dovelo je možda do stvaranja slike „uspavane lepotice”, koja čeka nekoga da je probudi. Nacionalizam je u tom kontekstu shvaćen kao ideja koja vodi ka „buđenju” naroda ili društva, tj. uspostavljanju prirodnog stanja te nacije. Nacija postoji oduvek, a nakon uspešnog „buđenja” trajaće zauvek. Nacionalizam bi u tom smislu bio „budilnik”.

Ideja o „*buđenju*” (staleža) koja je ostvarena u vidu Francuske revolucije i stvaranja francuske nacije uticala je i na buđenje drugih „nacija” u Evropi. Rezultat ovog buđenja, iako ono u osnovi nije bilo zamišljeno kao „nacionalno” je jednostavan koncept „nacija jeste država”, tj. teritorija. Pojavljivanje nečega što možemo nazvati političkim nacionalizmom i u onim „nacijama” koje nisu „imale” određenu „svoju” teritoriju predstavljalo je problem. Tako je nacionalizam kao ideja prerastao u ideju o slobodi, tj. oslobođenju od „okupacije” i „jarma” neke „tuđe”, jer ne „naše” vlasti, mada bi se do uvođenja moderne demokratije svaka vlast mogla posmatrati kao „okupaciona”. Problem teritorijalnih aspiracija pojedinih nacionalizama tzv. „malih naroda” (Hroch) bili su problem koji je u sebi sadržao veliki konfliktni potencijal. To je slučaj i dva veka kasnije, gde „slobodna teritorija” predstavlja problem, uprkos poznatoj činjenici da „teritorije ne mogu biti slobodne, nego samo ljudi” (Sundhaussen, 2007). Taj konfliktni potencijal bio je kasnije argument za podelu nacionalizama na progresivne i reakcionarne (Hans Kohn), pri čemu su progresivni nacionalizmi tzv. „državnih nacija”, tj. onih koje već poseduju državu na određenoj teritoriji, a reakcionarni nacionalizmi tzv. „kulturnih nacija” (Friedrich Meinecke). Da li slučajno ili ne i za ovaj primer neki autori vezuju progresivnost „Zapada” u odnosu na „Istok”, bar kad je reč o području Evrope. Progresivan ili ne, nacionalizam je u svom razvoju kao politička ideologija doveo konačno i do zločina u Drugom svetskom ratu kao i do činjenice da dobar deo evropskih „nacija” svoju nacionalnu tradiciju zasniva na proterivanju ljudi koji nisu smatrani za deo te nacije.

Nacija kao konstrukt?

Osamdesetih godina nauka počinje da naciju i nacionalizam proučava kao fenomen. Prekretnicu u posmatranju nacije kao „živog bića” i konačnog cilja ka kom se istorija kretala od početka čovečanstva predstavljaju radovi Benedikta Andersona, Erika Hobsbauma i Ernesta Gelnera. Osnovna ideja koja povezuje ove autore jeste saznanje daje nacija *idejna tvorevina* ili *konstrukt* i da u tom obliku ne postoji sve do 19. veka. Objašnjenja zašto dolazi do *svesnog stvaranja* nacije, odnosno ko su *akteri* iza ovog procesa se razlikuju.

Anderson recimo, tvrdi da su štampa i tzv. „kapitalizam štampe” ti faktori koji omogućavaju širem krugu ljudi da „zamisli” neku zajednicu, pa tako zamišlja svoju zajednicu, a time počinje i da se identifikuje sa tom zajednicom, te da se oseća pripadnikom ili pripadnicom te zajednice. Mogućnost komunikacije putem štampanih medija na „narodnom” jeziku između udaljenih pojedinaca pruža se osim toga i zahvaljujući činjenici da im je jezik zajednički. Napuštanje tzv. „svetog jezika crkve”,

rezervisanog za mali broj privilegovanih i razvoj tržišta štampanih izdanja su faktori koji omogućavaju bržu razmenu informacija i komunikaciju između pripadnika jednog društva. Za razliku od Andersona, Gelner vezuje nacionalizam za problem države i društva. Gelnerova teza je da je nacionalna kultura ili nacionalna ideja bila uslov za funkcionisanje države u doba industrijalizacije, jer nacionalna mobilizacija društva putem jedinstvene kulture, komunikacionog sistema i obrazovanja predstavlja u to doba najefikasniji garant i zaštitu države.

Razvoj nacionalizma kao ideje koju artikulišu određene elite od kraja 18. veka pa sve do danas možda najbolje opisuje Erik Hobsbaum. On pritom ne negira sasvim postojanje određenog „praoblika” nacije pre moderne nacije koji naziva *protonacionalizam*. Osećanje pripadnosti jednoj zajednici na osnovu određenih kriterijuma, koji, međutim, za Hobsbauma nisu u prvom redu jezik i srodstvo, već svest o pripadnosti jednoj političkoj celini, može predstavljati osnovu za stvaranje nacije u modernom smislu.

Kako tzv. „elite” jedne grupe ljudi mogu da utiču na stvaranje nacije možda najbolje objašnjava model nastanka nacije u 19. veku češkog istoričara Miroslava Hroha. Hroh razlikuje tri faze u nastanku nacije: (A) nacionalizam „učenih ljudi”, (B) nacionalne pokrete i (C) masovnu prihvaćenost nacije. U prvoj fazi (A) određeni mladi obrazovani ljudi u toku svojih studija dolaze u dodir sa idejom nacije, počinju da se naučno bave narodnim jezikom, književnošću, običajima i si. Po „povratku²” u svoju jezičku sredinu oni nastavljaju da pišu, objavljuju radove o „nacionalnim” temama i polako okupljaju male krugove tzv. „patriota”. U drugoj fazi (B), tzv. „fazi agitacije” grupe tih patriota se organizuju u vidu partija ili udruženja, objavljuju časopise, letke i počinju da formulišu jasne političke ciljeve pre svega „svoju” državu. Treća faza je faza masovne podrške nacionalne ideje. U toj fazi (C) većina u društvu prihvata nacionalne ciljeve i „patriotama” daje legitimitet. U datim istorijskim okolnostima ova faza vodi do stvaranja „slobodne” nacionalne države. Ovaj model, primenjen prvobitno na „male narode”, tj. „ugnjjetavane” narode koji postaju nacije u imperijalnom kontekstu (u ovom slučaju Austro-Ugarske) iako kao i svaka pojedinačna teorija nepotpun u svom objašnjavanju, ima značajan uticaj i na neke novije radove o nacionalizmu (vidi Biberovu studiju o nacionalizmu u Srbiji nakon 1945³).

Značaj ove grupe autora koji pripadaju tzv. „konstruktivistima” je pre svega u tome što su uspjeli da zauvek otklone primordijalističku „istinu o prirodnom” u pogledu nacije, iako je i konstruktizam sam bio izložen kritici. Jedan od najvažnijih kritičara je Antoni D. Smit koji odbija ideju da je nacija *konstrukt* 19. veka, te da je naciju moguće *stvoriti*, a da prethodno ne postoji odgovarajuća *etnijska*. Okrećući se argumentima vezanim za identifikaciju pojedinca sa zajednicom koju je inače teško empirijski proveriti, Smit ide

2 Uglavnom su te studije bile na «stranom» jeziku. Česti ciljevi studenata slovenskog porekla u Austriji bili su Beč ili drugi univerziteti na nemačkom govornom području.

3 Florian Bieber: *Nationalismus in Serbien vom Tode Titos bis zum Ende der Ära Milošević*. (Nacionalizam u Srbiji od smrti Tita do kraja ere Milošević). Beč 2005, 33-34,

dotle da tvrdi da su antički Grci imali svest o „svojoj, grčkoj” etničkoj grupi. Ako se uzme u obzir činjenica da su „stranci” koji nisu pripadali toj grupi ili zajedničkoj kulturi smatrani i nazivani varvarima, možda ne treba sasvim odbaciti ovu tezu.

Teorija nacionalizma?

Smitova kritika konstruktivizma dovela je do rasprave između konstruktivista i „etno-symbolista” kojima poput Smita pripada i Džordž Mos. Kao i Smita, Mosa zanima uloga simbola i mitova u prihvatanju nacionalne ideje većeg broja ljudi. Ova rasprava koja nakon više od dvadeset godina nije jasno rešena u korist nijedne od dve strane uglavnom je utihnula, zato što se svaki autor bavio različitim pitanjima, samo pominjući određene aspekte koje kritikuje. Činjenice da različiti teoretičari predmet svog istraživanja postavljaju na sasvim različite načine i da nikada nemaju istu kombinaciju problema kojima se bave, onemogućavaju jednu „metateoretsku debatu” (Tambini, 1998). Proučavanje nacionalizma ne postavlja jasna pitanja već se kreće oko nekoliko centralnih problemskih kompleksa:

1. Problem epohe nacija
2. Problem sadržaja diskursa nacionalizma
3. Problem nacionalizma i političke mobilizacije
4. Problem nacionalizacije „masa”

Za prvi problem vezuje se pitanje: *kada i zašto baš tada dolazi do nastanka nacije?* Moguća objašnjenja su funkcionalistička i odnose se na industrijalizaciju, modernizaciju, veću mobilnost i komunikaciju, procese koji tek u devetnaestom veku stvaraju uslove za razvoj nacije. Ono što se time ne objašnjava jesu pojave nacionalizma u sredinama u kojima je modernizacija prethodila nacionalnoj ideji.

Drugi problemski kompleks pokušava da objasni sam sadržaj nacionalnih ideja, odnosno nastanak nacionalne doktrine. Osnovna pitanja u ovom kontekstu su: (1) da li se prilikom izmišljanja/ rođenja/ buđenja nacije koriste racionalno odabrani simboli ili postoje jasni, unapred utvrđeni kulturni sadržaji i (2) šta čini diskurs nacionalizma. Kad je reč o nastanku nacije i nacionalizma odgovori se kreću od kontekstualnog objašnjenja da je razlog za nastanak moderne nacije industrijalizacija, pa sve do objašnjenja da su nemački filozofi 19. veka služili kao uzor u stvaranju drugih nacionalizama.

Treći kompleks pokušava da objasni *koji su motivi elita da mobilišu sve veći broj ljudi nacionalnim idejama*. Jedan odgovor bi mogao biti, da je u pitanju racionalni izbor, tj. jasni politički interesi pojedinih aktera. To, međutim, ne daje odgovor na pitanje koje pripada četvrtom bloku problema, a to je: zašto „masa” pristaje da bude mobilisana. Zašto i na koji način veći broj ljudi prihvata jednu takvu ideju i identifikuje se sa njom. Moguća objašnjenja su u vezi sa osećanjem pripadnosti jednoj zajednici, a sam osećaj pripadnosti moguće je stvoriti ili jačati npr. obrazovanjem. Kroz obrazovanje koje

Programski koncipira država prenose se i određena učenja o naciji. Postoje naravno i stavovi da ta *kolektivna svest etnije* postoji i mimo obrazovanja, te može dovesti to tzv. *collective action*. Svest o pripadnosti etniji može dakle dovesti do političkog nacionalizma. Jedno drugo objašnjenje bi bilo da pojačana mobilnost i društvena komunikacija u modernim industrijskim društvima vode do „sticanja svesti o pripadnosti” određenoj naciji, tj. do tzv. *kulturne homogenizacije* (Deutsch).

Interesantno je da većina pomenutih autora, iako pokušava da odgovori na većinu ovih pitanja, ostaje dosledna u isticanju pojedinih aspekata koji možda samo u kombinaciji sa pitanjima ličnog, kolektivnog identita, ličnih interesa i drugim elementima „nacionalne identifikacije” mogu da izvan konkretnog istorijskog konteksta daju odgovor na pitanje: zašto nacija kao ideja ima sposobnost da mobiliše tako veliki broj ljudi, odnosno *zašto je čak i danas toliko veliki broj ljudi spreman čak i da se žrtvuje i ako treba umre za naciju*. U tom smislu bi možda trebalo ispitati određene vrednosti koje su za pojedinca od velikog značaja kao čast, hrabrost, društveno priznanje i si. Broj radova koji pokušavaju da objasne ove procese prevazilazi obim ovog rada, ali vredni pomenuti studije autora kao što su Šef (1994), Grinfeld (1992) ili Kalhun (1993, 1997). Teorijski radovi o nacionalizmu danas se generalno vrlo kritički odnose prema različitim teorijskim pozicijama. Zanimljivi su osim toga radovi koji nacionalizam posmatraju kroz prizmu različitih drugih političkih ideologija i novijih teorijskih pristupa (Kalhun, 1993; Avineri, 1991; Juval, 2003), kao i radovi koji se teorijski bave nacionalizmima dvadesetog i ovog veka (Fenton, 2004; Keli/ Kaplan, 2001; Wilson, 2001). Interesantni su zatim i radovi koji revidiraju pojmove kao što su nacija (Vitmajer, 2002), etnija, etnicitet (King, 2002; Eriksen, 1991), nacionalni identitet (Smith, 2000; Van den Boshe, 2003) ili radovi koji istražuju odnos između nacionalizma i religije (Rifer, 2003), nacionalizma i umetnosti (Terzić, 2007; Aberbah, 2003) ili čak nacionalizma i komunikacije putem interneta (Čen, 2005).

Šta je nacija?

Jedno pitanje koje nakon svih rasprava i dalje ostaje bez jasnog odgovora jeste: *šta je tačno nacija*? Ako definicijama pomenutih na početku dodamo i definicije Hobsbauma, Andersona i Gelnera videćemo da se definicije jednog istog pojma prilično razlikuju. Za Hobsbauma je nacija svaka dovoljno velika zajednica ljudi, čiji pripadnici sebe vide kao pripadnike jedne nacije. Nacija za njega pritom nije nikakva iskonska i nepromenljiva društvena jedinica, već pripada jednoj određenoj, modernoj istorijskoj epohi. Ona može da postoji samo u vezi sa konceptom nacionalne države. Gelner naciju definiše na sledeći način: (1) ljudi pripadaju istoj naciji, ako dele istu kulturu (u smislu jednog sistema misli, znakova, asocijacija i načina ponašanja i komunikacije). Pripadajući toj kulturi, pojedinac pripada naciji; (2) ljudi pripadaju istoj naciji, ako jedni druge prepoznaju i priznaju kao pripadnike iste nacije. To priznavanje implicira i priznavanje izvesnih uzajamnih prava i obaveza. I konačno, Anderson o naciji govori kao o zamišljenoj političkoj zajednici zamišljenoj kao istovremeno ograničenoj i suverenoj. To

znači da nacija ima svoje granice, tj. samo određene osobe su članovi te nacije, zatim ona je suverena u odnosu na druge i shvata se kao solidarna zajednica pored svih nejednakosti koje unutar te nacije postoje.

Iako ne postoji jedna univerzalna definicija nacije, mogu se izdvojiti neke bitne karakteristike nacije, oko kojih su različiti autori saglasni. Za pojam nacije bitno je sledeće:

1. ZAJEDNICA: Nacija predstavlja *zamišljenu solidarnu zajednicu* ljudi koji poseduju svest o *pripadnosti* toj naciji.

2. EKSKLUZIVNOST: Naciji po pravilu pripada samo ograničen broj ljudi. Ostali ili „drugi” ne pripadaju toj naciji.

3. VREME NASTANKA: Nacija predstavlja moderan fenomen i postoji tek od kraja osamnaestog odnosno početka devetnaestog veka.

4. DRŽAVA: Nacija se kao fenomen po pravilu vezuje za *državu*. Nacija teži ka „sopstvenoj” (nacionalnoj) državi. Po shvatanju nacionalizama devetnaestog veka pripadnici te nacije mogu biti *slobodni* samo ako imaju i „svoju” nacionalnu državu.

One karakteristike oko kojih autori nisu uvek saglasni su sledeće:

1. KULTURA: Nacija predstavlja jednu „sopstvenu” kulturu. Toj kulturi mogu pripadati: *jezik, zajednička prošlost* i sećanje na nju, simboli i određen sistem vrednosti.

2. IDENTITET: Naciji u modernom smislu prethodi neki oblik *svesti o pripadnosti* etniji ili etničkoj grupi. Samo u slučaju da postoji takav „etnički identitet” može doći do stvaranja nacije. Nacionalnom identitetu može isto tako prethoditi neka vrsta političkog identiteta, tj. svesti pojedinca da pripada nekoj političkoj zajednici ili državi, koja se ogleda, recimo u lojalnosti vladaru.

Ako uzmemo u obzir da nijedna definicija ne može biti „tačna” ili „pogrešna” već samo *korisna* ili ne, shvatamo da je ovakav skup određenih karakteristika nacije preširok da bi služio kao teorijska osnova za konkretna istraživanja fenomena nacije. Zato se na osnovu ovih odlika nacije mogu i moraju formulisati konkretna pitanja. Osnovna pitanja koja se mogu izvesti iz ovog pregleda bila bi sledeća:

- Postoje li „objektivne” karakteristike nacije i koje bi to karakteristike bile?
- Da li nacija postoji izvan *svesti* čoveka?
- Koju ulogu u vezi sa nacijom igra *kultura*, a koju *država*?
- Koliko dugo postoje nacije? *Kada je nacija*?
- U kakvim konstelacijama nastaje nacija? Kakvu ulogu ima modernizacija u nastanku nacija?
- Koji je odnos između nacije i nacionalizma?

Pored ovih opštih postoji naravno, čitav niz različitih drugih pitanja u vezi sa nacijom odnosno u vezi sa nacionalizmom, kako na teorijskom nivou tako i u vezi sa praktičnim

primerima, o čemu svedoči skoro nepregledna literatura o nacionalizmu i naciji.

Iako su neki autori krajem dvadesetog veka tvrdili da je nacionalizam mrtav i da nacija u obliku koji je imala od 19. veka na ovamo nema budućnost, vidimo da nacionalizam - bar kada je Evropa u pitanju - ostaje ako ne dominantna, a ono bar izuzetno rasprostranjena ideologija i u 21. veku. Uprkos ideji supranacionalne Evropske unije kao kulturnog okvira (a ne samo ekonomske unije), izgleda da nacionalne države i dalje ostaju nosioci slobode za većinu građana. To potvrđuje i sve veći broj konzervativnih vlada u različitim evropskim državama koje bi trebalo da „nacionalne interese” tih država zaštite od procesa globalizacije. Zašto je nacija i danas toliko bitna, pitanje je koje ostaje aktuelno, pa čak možda i dobija na značaju.

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Aleksandar Trudić

KRATKA SOCIOLOŠKA STUDIJA O NACIONALIZMU

Tomas Hilan Eriksen je socijalni antropolog koji se uhvatio u koštac sa različitim terminima od kojih zazire veliki broj mislioca XX veka. Etnicitet, nacionalizam, multikulturalizam samo su deo šire naučne celine zapisane u korpusu (ne)stručne antropološke literature. Predstavio je vrstu metodološkog kvaliteta prednjačeći nad kvantitetom šturih podataka, iskoristivši ih za objašnjavanje gore navedenih termina.

Sušтина svega toga leži u razlikovanju nacije i etničkih kategorija u odnosu prema državi. Tumačeći Gelnera, Eriksen predpostavlja da je nacionalizam moderna etnička ideologija, prema kojoj određena društvena grupa treba da dominira u državi. Tu sad nastaju početne problemske situacije. Šta sa grupama koje se ne mogu u potpunosti asimilovati? On uviđa da je i Gelner priznao postojanje takvih grupa sa istrajnošću dubljeg ispitivanja kulturnog identiteta podudarnog sa teritorijalnim, uz prisustvo emocionalno obojenih rodbinsko-vrednosnih veza. Zašto rodbinsko-vrednosne? Procesom socijalizacije i njenog prethodnog procesa internalizacije, usvajaju se načini zadovoljenja specifičnih potreba. Prvi stadijumi se dešavaju u porodici, kao primarno društvenoj grupi, naravno ne zapostavljajući vršnjačke i ostale uticaje drugih društvenih grupa. Još treba dodati da se o nacionalnom identitetu govori kao o konstrukciji, ne o njenoj „prirodnosti“ (Eriksen 2004: 173). Eriksen spominje da ta konstrukcija leži u širokom pojmu kulture, a mikrosociološki gledano na etnički, odnosno nacionalni identitet polazi se od prvobitnih društvenih odnosa koji se dešavaju u prvoj desetini čovekovog života, kada je svest deteta velikim delom u porodičnoj stvarnosti ili u stvarnosti koja zamenjuje porodicu, ako dete nema upotpunjenu porodičnu strukturu ili porodicu nema uopšte. Sa politikom kao reprezentativnim fenomenološkim „receptom“, nacionalističke ideologije dobijaju još više na snazi, ako tu dodamo i simbole koji imaju znakovnu, značenjsku i emocionalnu ulogu repetitora duhovne konotacije. Krajnji ishod je u međusobnoj korelaciji pojedinac-društvo i obrnuto.

Terminom „banalnog nacionalizma“ u svakodnevnom životu npr. kod učenika kroz školske mape države u učionicama ili na poštanskim markama, novčićima, još više se „betonira“ ideja nacionalizma u svesti, što i Eriksen napominje koristeći Biligovo objašnjenje (Eriksen 2004: 178). Jačanje vulgarnog „banalnog nacionalizma“ koji može da leži u patološkom razumevanju i kasnijem ispoljavanju ekstremnog oblika nacionalizma, vodi ka konfliktnim komunikacijskim relacijama čija se esencija nalazi u spoljašnjem tumačenju simbola i jezika nacionalizma sa vrednostima koja ga prate. Ovakvo stanovište zahteva detaljniju metodološko-naučnu potporu u istraživanjima klasno-slojnih struktura društava. Ipak, postoje neki predočeni rezultati u istraživanjima u područjima socijalne psihologije koja su se bavila poreklom etničkih stereotipija, predrasuda i oblicima nacionalne vezanosti (Rot 2003: 425). Sintezom određenih rezultata dobijaju se zaključci o naglašenijoj (najčešće pozitivnoj) autostereotipiji nad etničkim predrasadama i stereotipijama. Relativnost ove rečenice leži u socijalno-kultur-

nom kontekstu vremena u kome se ispitanici koji predstavljaju reprezentativni uzorak nalaze, jer društvene prilike nisu konstantne, te u skladu sa tim pod stalnim su uticajem političkih, ekonomskih, kulturnih i ostalih činilaca. Potopuniji uvid u informacije o mestu i vremenu nastanka etničkog i nacionalnog identiteta, mogu nam pružiti antropološka, istorijska i politička nauka.

Do društvenih promena može doći na različite načine: uticajem mas-medija, promenama međunacionalnih odnosa u državama u kojima postoji sukob interesa različite vrste i dr. Ne sme se olako zapadati u naučne redukcionizme o uzročnosti nastanka etničkih i nacionalističkih predrasuda.

U tom kontekstu, pogrešno je pretpostaviti da je vulgarni „banalni nacionalizam” svojstven (samo) nižim društvenim slojevima, kao i kategorijama siromašnih i nezaposlenih u celokupnom urban-rural kontinuumu. Ova teza se usložnjava stalno prisutnom vertikalnom i horizontalnom pokretljivošću u društvenoj strukturi, što ne opovrgava činjenicu da postoje zajedničke karakteristike pojedinaca u ponašanju, kada je u pitanju ideja o nacionalnoj pripadnosti, posmatrajući pojedinca (grupu) kao činioca promena i jedinicu posebno izdvojenu za posmatranje bez učestvovanja.

U svakom slučaju, ovde će se više govoriti o pojmu nacionalizma sa epistemološkom vodiljom u Eriksenovom delu *Etnicitet i nacionalizam*. O etnicitetu i multikulturalizmu neće biti posebno puno reči, ali će biti spomenuti zbog prikladne očevidne veze sa nacionalizmom. U tom pogledu, ne treba nacionalizmu prilaziti kao temi koja ne iziskuje puno pažnje, već naprotiv nacionalizam je i te kako aktuelna tema na ovim prostorima. Etnicitet podrazumeva više kategorija, počevši od kulturnog identifikovanja narodnosti grupe tj. društva sa integrišućom funkcijom, u jednu koherentnu, homogeniju celinu, što opet svakako ne podrazumeva kontekst u kome se pojima etnicitet. Shvaćen je idealno-tipski, što ne znači i da je nacionalizam spašen. No, u dosadašnjem izučavanju, nacionalizam odlikuje stav prema državi i građaninu, a etnicitet stav o pripadnosti narodu. U nekim društvima diskriminacija počinje i od etniciteta, sa potkom u genezi jedne grupe tj. društva, težeći ka etnocentrizmu kao odgovoru na nametanje drugačijeg načina i stila života. Kada dođe do preklapanja kulturološkog i teritorijalnog graničenja u egzistenciji društva, može se govoriti o preplitanju ove dve analitičke jedinice. Zbog očito vidljive kompleksnosti u distinkciji nacionalizam-etnicitet, mreža pitanja se mora i treba izroditi.

Jedan od Eriksenovih primera nacionalizma jeste norveški, čiji integritet je iznađen u jasnom određenju jezika. Zajedno sa simbolima, jezik pruža vid sigurnosti u teritorijalnim granicama kulturnog identifikovanja, služeći kao sredstvo za stvaranje dela nacionalnog identiteta, pogotovo u industrijalizovanom društvu koje je počelo stremiti otuđenju, masovnoj mobilnosti i demografskoj heterogenosti. Situacija se komplikuje kada se na jednoj određenoj teritoriji nalazi relativno kohezivna grupa čije se vrednosti razlikuju od vrednosti većinske populacije. Prvobitne misli o nacionalizmu sa strasno naglašenom, gorućom, kako Eriksen kaže, „izmišljenom” nacijom u kojoj su sva prava svih ljudi izjednačene pod određenim uslovima, preuzimale su forme u skladu sa razvojem i promenama na globalnom, svetskom planu. Eriksen je izložio jedno zani-

mljivo istraživanje Forsajtove o shvatanju nemačkog nacionalizma pre pada Berlinskog zida, sa rezultatima koji govore o nekim nejasnoćama oko određivanja nemačkog identiteta „biti Nemač” i sa stavovima prema strancima (Eriksen 2004: 196). Nepodudarnost idealno-tipski i kulturološki tumačenog etničkog identiteta sa nacionalnim (u smislu okvira teritorijalnih granica) nalazi se u društvima na trusnom području ratovanja, samo što se problemi mogu nalaziti izvan, unutar granica ili sa obe strane.

U homogenizovanju heterogene celine stanovništva jedne države sa kulturom, Eriksen smatra da su tehnička sredstva u simboličkoj komunikaciji pružila masovnije širenje shvatanja nacionalnog identiteta sa jedne strane, i spoljašnjeg razjedinjavanja društava (u razlikovanju „mi” i „oni”) sa druge strane, ne uvidevši previranja i konflikte unutar same države među velikim brojem različitih grupa, baš uz pomoć posrednih sredstava masovnog komuniciranja. U neizbežno zamršenoj naučnoj deskripciji multikulturnih i multietničkih društava, Eriksen daje podelu nacionalizma na etniški i multietniški nacionalizam, sa zajedniškom karakteristikom u određenju državnih granica. Masovna kultura sa masovnim medijima (u modernim državama) shvaćenim kao delom posrednih sredstava masovnog komuniciranja, jeste kanal za protok različitih informacija. Informacije o kulturi i vrednostima nacije svakako mogu biti različito tumačene od strane pojedinaca, najčešće političkih vođa ili vladajuće stranke kao izvršnog tela interesa.

Drugi pojam, pojam homogenizacije masovne kulture (Kloskovska 2001: 223) od poljske sociološkinje Antonjine Kloskovske objašnjava neke od mnogih uloga različitog tumačenja sadržaja poruke koja se plasira na različite načine, što preko tehničkih sredstava, što drugim vidovima simboličkog komuniciranja. Vulgarizirajuća homogenizacija podrazumeva površno, pojednostavljeno tumačenje sadržaja poruke o nečemu vrlo bitnom, ne samo u umetničkim delima, kao što je u ovom slučaju nacionalni identitet jednog društva (Kloskovska 2001: 224). Elita, koju čine pojedinci ili grupe ljudi sa mogućnostima (finansijskim, obrazovnim, etičkim, neretko fizičkim) neraspoloživim ogromnom broju ljudi, pokušavaju da stvore javno mnjenje pomoću reklamne ili neke druge vrste propagande, za obezbeđivanje trenutnog ili budućeg položaja. U toj većitoj borbi interesa, gubi se prvobitna misao o tome da je društvo zaista jedna heterogena celina sa različitim vrednostima, koja se nalazi u stalnoj neizvesnosti zbog promena koje se dešavaju.

Sa definicijom vrednosti kao „dispozicije koje određuju širok obim ponašanja i koje kontinuirano i trajno deluju” (Rot 2003: 322), naglasak može da se stavi na dispozicijski deo sa stavovima, jezički formulisanim, noseći sadržaj poruke koji važi društvenim konsenzusom u državi.

Površno protumačen sadržaj vrednosti jedne ili više grupa, može biti vrlo opasan u svim segmentima života. Aksiološka disonanca (Kloskovska 2001: 124) kreće kao *conditio sine qua non* u društvu sa navedenim problemom tumačenja vrednosti. Zato treba pristupiti sa određenom dozom rezerve novinarskim sadržajima u emitovanju poruka različitog tipa, što zbog sklonosti ka hiperbolisanju situacije, što zbog širenja

negativnih predrasuda sa kojima se dotiče u trenucima kada je raspoloživost informacijama niska. Parcijalna ideološka struktura političkih programa nekih stranaka plasiranih putem televizijskog aparata, puki su indikatori nerealnog lirskog oslikavanja budućeg stanja stvari u državi. Racionalno promišljanje i objektivnost stupaju na snagu sa pravim tumačenjem vrednosti kroz otvoreni dijalog u obzirnosti prema različitim etničkim grupama.

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Ana Ranitović

ISTRAŽIVANJE O NACIONALNOM IDENTITETU U SAVREMENOM DRUŠTVU - STUDIJA O NAJSLABIJOJ KARICI

Istraživanje o nacionalnom identitetu koncipirano je kao studija o jačini različitih dimenzija identiteta, sa posebnim akcentom na nacionalnom identitetu, među populacijom gde se očekuje *da identifikacija sa nacionalnošću bude najslabija*. Rezultati su dobijeni analizom stavova „progresivne“ omladine iz devet zemalja Istočne i Jugoistočne Evrope i dve zapadne zemlje. Pokazalo se da su različite dimenzije ličnosti, dinamične celine koja se sastoji iz različitih identiteta, plodna osnova za istraživanje uticaja koji granice zemlje imaju na to kako ispitanici vide sebe. Nacionalni identitet većine ispitanika izgrađen je na osnovu, često dramatičnih i teških, istorijskih iskustava i, u mnogim slučajevima, ovaj proces još uvek nije završen. Stoga se može očekivati da dimenzija nacionalnog identiteta bude posebno značajna u nacionalnoj i, naročito, spoljnoj politici, i da će imati uticaja na formiranje stavova prema regionalnim i globalnim institucijama, kao što su EU i NATO.

Nacionalni identitet u postkomunizmu

Istraživanje o temeljima nacionalnog identiteta trebalo bi da se bazira na generalizacijama stavova izraženih u ovom ispitivanju, ali moraju se uzeti u obzir i istorijsko i socijalno iskustvo u tim zemljama, sa akcentom na činjenici da su preko 40 godina bili pod vladavinom komunizma i na načinu na koji su obrazovali svoju postkomunističku nezavisnost. Priroda nacionalne identifikacije razlikuje se od zemlje do zemlje. U nekim slučajevima, nacionalni identitet je usko povezan sa osećanjem da je dotična zemlja „velika evropska“ nacija, zahvaljujući identifikaciji sa evropskom kulturom, dok je u drugim slučajevima nacionalni identitet povezan sa nedavno stečenom nezavisnošću i može se povezati sa suverenitetom zemlje. U nekim slučajevima, obe stvari su u pitanju. Dalje, u mnogim slučajevima, ova nezavisnost od političke potčinjenosti „ugnjetaču“ (bilo da se radi o Sovjetskom Savezu ili o Jugoslaviji) sinonimna je pribegavanju Zapadu, tako da se mnogo više ceni identifikacija sa Evropom, nego sa Istokom ili sa Balkanom.

Prelaz sa diktatorske na demokratske oblike vladavine uglavnom je uspešan, a osnovni kriterijumi demokratije - vladavina zakona, slobodni i poštenu izbori, ljudska prava i sloboda izražavanja i organizacije, prava manjina - ispunjeni su u gotovo svim državama Jugoistočne i Istočne Evrope. Međutim, kvalitet demokratskih principa varira tokom vremena, zbog političkih partija koje su još uvek polarizovane na antikomunističkoj i nacionalističkoj strani. Uprkos činjenici da je proces političke transformacije sastavni deo postsocijalne tranzicije, država je uglavnom ostala centralizovana i paternalizovana, a nekadašnja bliska veza između partije i države zamenjena je sličnim odnosom između vladajuće elite i javne uprave.

Izgradnja identiteta

Izgradnja savremenog nacionalnog identiteta u Jugoistočnoj i Istočnoj Evropi oblikovana je raskidom sa komunizmom i ekonomskim, društvenim i političkim procesima tranzicije koji su usledili. Za neke je pokretačka snaga bila ideja osnovnih sloboda i demokratije, dok je za druge to bio viši životni standard i pristup zapadnim dobrima. Međutim, ispostavilo se da period tranzicije ima mnogo izazova i u mnogim slučajevima podrazumeva teže uslove za život i više nesigurnosti nego u starom sistemu. Stoga su se stavovi ljudi u ovim zemljama promenili. Neki su žalili za predvidivošću i redom prethodnog režima, dok su drugi bili sumnjičavi u vezi sa novom politikom i njenim demokratskim institucijama.

Pokreti za nezavisnost dosta naglašavaju istorijske događaje i ličnosti, kao i nacionalne simbole i osobine, kao način ponovnog otkrivanja prošlosti, sa ciljem da se izgradi identitet odvojen od komunizma. Moderni nacionalni identitet predstavlja kombinaciju selektivne istorijske prošlosti zemlje, selektivnih događaja iz 20. veka, etničkog sastava, kulturnog nasleđa i geografskog položaja. U okviru ovog procesa ponovne izgradnje identiteta leži proces individualne identifikacije svake zemlje sa Evropom, lako većina zemalja Jugoistočne i Istočne Evrope smatra sebe evropskim zemljama (nezavisno od toga da li su članice EU), postoji ogromna razlika među nacijama, po ovom pitanju. Razlike se tiču nacionalnog pogleda na vezu između nacionalnog i evropskog identiteta (Gesu li komplementarni ili se međusobno isključuju?), kao i toga da li smatraju da su kroz istoriju stalno učestvovali u razvoju evropskog društva, ili su povremeno bivali isključeni iz Evrope, tako što su potpadali pod tuđinsku vlast.

STUDIJA

Hipoteza

S jedne strane, hipoteza glasi da će zemlje sa jakim osećanjem istorijskog pripadanja Evropi prepoznati procese sticanja nezavisnosti, demokratsku integraciju i sazrevanje nacionalnosti kao paralelan i komplementaran proces sticanju njihovog zasluženog položaja u Evropi. Međutim, zahvaljujući činjenici da je globalizacija umnogome kontradiktoran proces, teško je jednoobrazno definisati ulogu nacionalnosti i nacionalnog identiteta u njoj. Kao što je već rečeno, nacionalni identitet formiran 1990-ih godina sastojao se od jake identifikacije sa Evropom i označavao je raskid sa komunizmom. S druge strane, mnoge od ovih zemalja smatraju sebe malim i podložnim spoljnoj dominaciji i stoga se boje razblaživanja njihovog (novog) nacionalnog i kulturnog identiteta.


Imajući ovo u vidu, važno je istražiti u kojoj meri pojedinci smatraju da je njihova nacionalnost, definisana (novoutvrđenim) granicama ili kulturom, važna u određivanju njihovog ličnog identiteta, lako je to teško ispitati, u ovoj studiji je to shvaćeno kao

uticaj društva i njegovih grupa, institucija, organizacija i koncepcija na pojedinca. Naš cilj je da istražimo u kojoj meri pojedinci te stvari smatraju važnim i da prepoznamo važnost nacionalnosti u odnosu prema tome. Dalje, očekujemo da stavovi ispitanika budu nedosledni, i na ličnom i na nacionalnom i na višenacionalnom nivou, tj. da odražavaju kontradiktornu ulogu nacionalnosti i nacionalnog identiteta danas.

Uzorak

Zbog ograničenih sredstava, sprovedena studija nije bila opsežna i može se smatrati pilot-projektom za buduća istraživanja. U cilju davanja adekvatnog odgovora na pitanje opravdanosti granica danas, odlučeno je da se ti stavovi ispituju među populacijom gde se očekuje da *nacionalni identitet i subjektivna bliskost nacionalnosti budu najslabiji* - među omladinom starosti 19-29 godina, koji rade na tome da steknu ili su stekli najmanje fakultetsku diplomu, onih koji se smatraju liberalnima ili slobodnjacima i koji su politički ili društveno aktivni po tim pitanjima. Tako se, uprkos veličini uzorka, došlo do indikativnih zaključaka, koji bi trebalo da predstavljaju plodnu osnovu za dalja istraživanja.

Istraživanje je obavljeno na uzorku od 165 ljudi, naznačenog starosnog doba, iz 11 zemalja - iz dve zemlje Zapadne Evrope, koje su poslužile kao kontrolni uzorak - Italija i Nemačka, i iz devet zemalja Jugoistočne i Istočne Evrope: Srbije, Bosne, Makedonije, Albanije, Bugarske, Rumunije, Ukrajine, Belorusije i Rusije. Svaka od ovih zemalja slučaj je za sebe, i trebalo bi da se tako i analizira. Međutim, zbog sličnosti u *objektivnim* karakteristikama ispitanika, uzeli smo za pravo da ustanovimo izvesne generalizacije iz odgovora ispitanika, uzetih kao celina. Ove generalizacije možda nisu u potpunosti precizne, ali mogu poslužiti kao pouzdani indikatori trenutnih stavova prema značaju nacionalnosti. Iteimičan pogled na stavove onih za koje se smatra da su nepristrasni i svesni postmodernih pogleda na koncepte nacionalnosti može nam pružiti uvid u to koliko je nacionalnost važna stanovništvu.



Prikupljanje podataka sprovedeno je kroz polustrukturisano ispitivanje. Ispitanicima je pružena mogućnost da slobodno i samostalno definišu pojam nacije, i da izraze svoje viđenje o njenom značaju. To je bilo vrlo korisno, pošto su se onda ti podaci mogli uporediti sa pitanjima zatvorenog tipa, u vezi sa tim problemom.

Upitnik

Godina rođenja: _____

Pol: • muški • ženski

Nacionalnost:

Molimo vas da objasnite šta Je, po vašem mišljenju, nacija I koliki Je njen značaj u savremenom društvu?

Razmislite o pojmovima nacionalnosti, nacije, nacionalne države. Opišite kakva osećanja u vama bude.

- pozitivna
- više pozitivna nego negativna
- neutralna
- više negativna nego pozitivna
- negativna

Razmislite o tome kako biste opisali sebe. Koje grupe su vam najhitnije da biste definisali ko ste? Molimo vas da naznačite najvažniju, drugu i treću grupu po važnosti.

1. Vaša politička partija, grupa ili pokret
2. Vaša starosna grupa
3. Vaša nacionalnost
4. Vaše zanimanje
5. Vaša veroispovest

6. Vaš pol (muški/ženski)
7. Vaša porodica
8. Vaša društvena klasa
(viša, srednja, niža, radnička)
9. Deo zemlje u kom živite

Najvažnija grupa: _____

Druga grupa po važnosti: _____

Treća grupa po važnosti: _____

Koliku bliskost osećate prema: (osećati bliskost znači „identifikovati se sa“)

	Vrlo blisko	Blisko	Ne baš blisko	Nimalo blisko
Vašem gradu	•	•	•	•
Vašem okrugu	•	•	•	•
Vašoj zemlji	•	•	•	•
Evropi	•	•	•	•

Naznačite koliko su sledeće stvari važne da bi osoba bila određene nacionalnosti. Molimo vas da označite ponuđene faktore.

	Vrlo važno	Prilično važno	Nije od velike važnosti	Nije važno
Biti rođen u toj zemlji	•	•	•	•
Imati državljanstvo te zemlje	•	•	•	•
Živeti u toj zemlji dugo	•	•	•	•
Govoriti jezik te zemlje	•	•	•	•
Pripadati glavnoj religijskoj zajednici te zemlje	•	•	•	•
Ponašati se u skladu sa kulturom te zemlje	•	•	•	•
Osećati se kao da ste te nacionalnosti	•	•	•	•
Imati pretke iz te zemlje	•	•	•	•

Neki ljudi smatraju da su, pre svega, Evropljani. Drugi smatraju da su prvenstveno pripadnici određene nacionalnosti (npr. Italijani, Rusi, Bošnjaci, itd). Molimo vas da opišete kako vidite sebe.

- Samo kao Evropljanina/Evropljanku
- Više kao Evropljanina/Evropljanku nego kao *Italijana/Italijanku*
- Podjednako kao Evropljanina/Evropljanku i kao *Italijana/Italijanku*
- Samo kao *Italijana/Italijanku*

Rezultati i analiza

1. Molimo vas da objasnite šta je, po vašem mišljenju, nacija i koliki je njen značaj u savremenom društvu.

Kada je od ispitanika bilo traženo da svojim rečima opišu koncept nacije, većini je trebalo dosta vremena i bilo im je teško da se uobličie svoje misli. Često bi prvo odgovarali sa: „*svi znaju šta je to nacija*” i „*mogu da vam kažem kako je definišu u knjigama*”, a zatim bi izneli svoje mišljenje na tu temu u vidu nabiranja nekoliko reči koje povezuju s idejom nacije. Uglavnom su te asocijacije bile neutralne, ili su imale pozitivnu konotaciju: *teritorija, narod, kultura, jezik, granice, vlada, jedinstvo*. Zanimljivo je primetiti da su te liste reči, u većini slučajeva, bile ili neutralne i pozitivne ili potpuno negativne. Negativan stav prema konceptu nacije najčešće je izražavan sledećim rečima: *rat, sukob, nacionalizam, granice između ljudi*.

Otprilike jedna trećina ispitanika odgovarala je bez mnogo razmišljanja, odmah navodeći neke od definicija nacije koje su čuli ili pročitali. Te definicije su varirale od onih koje negiraju postojanje nacije: „*nacija je veštački koncept*”, „*to je izmišljotina*”, „*imaginarna zajednica ljudi*”, funkcionalističkih definicija: „*nacije su način organizovanja stvarnosti*”, do kulturoloških definicija poput: „*zajednica ljudi sa istim jezikom, kulturom i teritorijom*” i retkih esencijalističkih karakterizacija: „*ljudi istog porekla, koji žive na teritoriji koju istorijski smatraju svojom*”.

Bez obzira na to šta bi prvo naveli kao odgovor, ispitanici su uglavnom dolazili do zaključka da je „*danas tako teško odrediti šta je nacija*”, jer je „*sve tako dinamično, sve se tako brzo menja, pa i koncept i realnost nacija*” i da „*ljudi u različitim zemljama drugačije shvataju nacionalnost i naciju*”, pošto „*nije isto ako si Amerikanac, Grk, Makedonac ili Palestinac*”, što implicira da su kontekst i njegove političke, socijalne, ekonomske i istorijske dimenzije od velike važnosti, kao i to „*kako te drugi definišu*” i to da se „*definicija nacije menja kroz vreme, i da u slučaju malih zemalja nacija predstavlja ulogu koju njen narod igra tokom određenog perioda, a tu ulogu određuje međunarodna zajednica*”.


Mnogi su bili mišljenja da iako „*postoje negativne strane nacija kao što je nacionalizam, one mogu predstavljati i nešto dobro mogu se boriti protiv negativnih aspekata kulturne globalizacije*”, i da „*nacije štite kulture i interese malih i nemoćnih zemalja*”, dok su drugi mislili da su one „*spomenik prošlosti*” i da „*usporavaju integraciju na višem nivou*”, kao i da „*može biti teško odreći se individualnosti koju dobijamo nasleđem, ali možda je bolje da svi budemo isti nego da ratujemo*”.

2. Razmislite o pojmovima nacionalnosti, nacije, nacionalne države. Opišite osećanja koja u vama bude.


Sve ukupno, izračunato je da se nacija na skali od -10 (potpuno negativno) do 10 (potpuno pozitivno), nalazi na 3,6. Najveći rezultat bio je 6,1, a najmanji -3,2, mada je to bio jedini negativni rezultat. Kada su bili upitani da izraze svoje stavove prema ideji „nacije”, većina ispitanika pomislila je prvo na „*svoju sopstvenu naciju*”, stoje imalo za

posledicu prevashodno pozitivne rezultate. Ispitanici iz zemalja koje su tokom devedesetih godina dvadesetog veka stekle nezavisnost od sovjetske vlasti smatrali su da je nacionalnost veoma značajna, što je povećalo ukupni rezultat. S druge strane, ispitanici iz zemalja koje su učestvovala u ratovima i krvavim sukobima bili su svesniji činjenice da se nacija odnosi na „*moju naciju, ali i druge nacije i izgleda da nikako ne možemo da živimo u miru*”, napominjući da „*posle svega što se izdešavalo u Jugoslaviji i što se događa u Srbiji, jednostavno više ne znam šta da mislim*” i da „*nacionalnost jeste lepa stvar, ali u Bosni su je preskupo platili*”.

Međutim, većina je označila „neutralna” ili „više pozitivna nego negativna”, pošto „*nacija podrazumeva kulturu*”, i „*iako nerado to priznajem, moja nacionalnost me u velikoj meri čini onim što jesam a ne mogu sebe da okarakterišem kao nešto negativno!*”.



3. Koje grupe su vam najbitnije kada opisujete sebe?




Grupe sa kojima se ispitanici identifikuju - ukupni rezultati

Iz rezultata prikazanih na grafikonu, vidi se da je zanimanje daleko najvažnija oblast života za većinu ispitanika, pošto je označeno kao najvažnija grupa u 42% slučajeva, dok porodica, pol i nacionalnost slede sa znatno manjih 14%, 11% i 10%. Međutim, nacija se nalazi na drugom mestu i ima indeks identiteta 17,7 zbog činjenice


da je većina ispitanika naciju navela kao drugu najvažniju grupu - 30%, dok su ostale grupe navođene u manje od 10% slučajeva. Takođe je bitno uzeti u obzir to što su zanimanje i nacija dve grupe koje su ispitanici najčešće odlučivali da uvrste u prve tri najvažnije grupe zanimanje u 61%, a nacija u 56% slučajeva.

Iako „kriza porodice“ nije bila predmet ove studije, zanimljivo je primetiti da se porodica nalazi na trećem mestu, a kao jedna od tri najvažnije grupe javlja u 48% svih slučajeva.

Sledeći grafikon pokazuje kako su ispitanici iz različitih zemalja ocenili značaj svoje nacije u određivanju njihovih identiteta. Važno je zapaziti da prikazani rezultati značajno korespondiraju sa rezultatima drugog pitanja. Takođe, treba imati na umu da bi rezultati bili nešto drugačiji da Italija i Nemačka nisu bile obuhvaćene studijom.




Na sledećem dijagramu prikazane su varijacije u načinu na koji su rangirane prvih šest grupa u Bosni i Hercegovini (u daljem tekstu: Bosna), Srbiji i Makedoniji - zanimanje zauzima tipično visoku poziciju, a nacija odgovara opštem proseku. „Deo



zemlje” pokazao se kao vrlo značajan za građane Bosne - s indeksom identiteta od preko 17, što je znatno više od opšteg prosečnog indeksa koji za ovu determinantu iznosi 7. Razlog tome može se naći u činjenici da je Bosna teritorijalno i politički podeljena, a stanovništvo u skladu s tim organizovano, pri čemu pripadnici određenih nacionalnosti (etniciteta) naseljavaju određene teritorije ili delove zemlje.



4. Koliku bliskost osećate prema svom gradu, okrugu, zemlji I Evropi?




Kod ovog pitanja, od ispitanika nije bilo traženo da rangiraju, već jednostavno da označe koliku bliskost osećaju prema teritorijama koje su administrativno, geografski i politički obeležene, pri čemu je grad bio najmanja, a kontinent najveća takva teritorija. Opseg indeksa bio je od 0 (nimalo blisko) do 100 (vrlo blisko). Grad i zemlja korespondiraju na sličan način kao i okrug i Evropa - moguće je da ispitanici smatraju da je način na koji se njihova zemlja odnosi prema Evropi sličan onome na koji se mesto ili grad u kome žive odnosi prema okrugu u kome se nalazi. Postojanje ove relacije ima kulturološke implikacije, s obzirom na to da je pitanje bilo vrlo subjektivne prirode, s ciljem da se utvrdi u kojoj se meri ispitanici identifikuju s prostorom koji se smatra mestom od značaja.


Na sledećem grafikonu dat je procentualni prikaz odgovora na postavljeno pitanje o teritorijalnoj bliskosti, lako se na osnovu ukupnog rezultata čini da su ispitanici dali slične odgovore za grad i državu s jedne strane, i okrug i Evropu s druge strane, procentualni prikaz pokazuje da nije tako. Kao što se može videti, većina ispitanika oseća bar neku bliskost prema svom gradu - samo 7% njih ne oseća nikakvu bliskost, lako je procenat ispitanika koji ne osećaju nikakvu bliskost prema zemlji više nego duplo veći (16% njih),

ukupni rezultati za grad i zemlju podudaraju se zbog toga što je više od jedne trećine ispitanika označilo da prema zemlji oseća veliku bliskost, što je znatno više nego što je to slučaj s ostale tri teritorije. S druge strane, 27% svih ispitanika ne oseća nikakvu bliskost prema Evropi, što je daleko najveći udeo ispitanika od svih koji su označili „nimalo blisko” za bilo koju od ponuđenih teritorija. Jedino je u slučaju zemlje većina ispitanika označila „vrlo blisko” (35%), dok je u ostalim slučajevima većina označavala „blisko”.





5. Koji faktor je najhitniji u određivanju nacionalnosti?




Dobijeni odgovori na pitanje šta najbitnije određuje nacionalnost pokazali su da ispitanici uglavnom smatraju većinu ponuđenih faktora relativno važnim. Najveći broj poena (75 na skali od 0 do 100) ispitanici su dali subjektivnom osećaju pripadnosti određenoj nacionalnosti, a odmah zatim činjenici da se živi (ili da se živelo tokom dužeg perioda) u dotičnoj zemlji. Zapravo, pronađena je prilično jaka uzajamna veza između faktora koji se nalaze na prva tri mesta (osećati se tako, živeti u toj zemlji,

govoriti taj jezik) - od ukupnog broja svih ispitanika koji su obeležili da je važno „osećati se tako”, 72% njih je imalo sličan stav i prema druga dva faktora. Takođe postoji uzajamna veza između državljanstva, jezika i življenja u toj zemlji. Ukoliko se uzmu u obzir sva četiri faktora zajedno, njihova uzajamna veza je slabija, ali ne i zanemarljiva jasno se može zaključiti da prevladava građansko shvatanje nacionalnosti, nasuprot etničkom.

S obzirom na to da je „osećati se tako” najjači faktor, čini se da ispitanici individualni osećaj pretpostavljaju objektivnim karakteristikama. To, međutim, nije sasvim tačno. Naime, skoro 80 % ispitanika označilo je „osećati se tako” kao vrlo ili prilično važno (dok je samo 10% njih smatralo da to nije uopšte važno), ali bi pored toga još najmanje dva faktora označili kao važne. Mada nije uspostavljen puni koncenzus, „osećati se tako” je bila konstanta, dok su druga dva ili tri važna faktora varirala u odgovorima ispitanika prisustvo određenog osećanja bilo je neminovna posledica uticaja ostalih varijabli. Stoga se može zaključiti da su ispitanici smatrali da određeni faktori zajedno mogu uticati na proces identifikacije jedne ličnosti kao i na to kojoj nacionalnosti će ta ličnost osećati da pripada.

6. Neki ljudi sebe vide prvenstveno kao pripadnike određene nacionalnosti, dok drugi sebe vide prvenstveno kao Evropljane. Kako biste opisali način na koji vidite sebe?



Petar Atanacković

PORODICA, VASPITNI OBRASCI I SISTEM VREDNOSTI U PROCESU IZGRADNJE „NACIONALNE SVESTI” U SRBIJI

Od porodice ka državi

Razvoj porodičnih osećanja, privrženosti porodici, veličanje porodičnih vrednosti itd., predstavlja prethodnicu i direktnu pripremu za razvoj nacionalnog osećaja, privrženosti naciji (nacionalističke svesti) i veličanje vrednosti nacije. Naime, nacionalni osećaj predstavlja direktno nastavljanje porodičnog, a porodični stavovi zajedno sa onim religioznim čine osnovne masovnopsihološke elemente nacionalizma¹. Dakle, poreklo nacionalnog sentimenta i nacionalizma treba tražiti upravo u porodici i unutarporodičnim odnosima, budući da su „predstave o domovini i naciji u svojoj subjektivno-osjećajnoj vezi predstave o majci i obitelji. Majka je u građanstvu domovina djeteta kao što je obitelj njegova *nacija u malom*”².

Porodica se može definisati kao neposredni ili *prirodni* oblik običajnog duha (koji prethodi drugim pojavnim oblicima običajnosti, građanskom društvu i državi), koji se manifestuje u tri stvari: u liku svog neposrednog pojma (kao brak), u spoljašnjem opstanku (kao vlasništvu i *dobru* porodice) i u odgoju dece i razrešenju porodice³. Brak bi dakle predstavljao početak porodice, imovina tj. vlasništvo njenu pojavnost u zbilji, a deca opredmećenje braka (tj. odnosa ljubavi koji bi po definiciji trebao da se nalazi u njegovoj osnovi), budući da „u deci postaje jedinstvo braka kao samo jedinstvo jedna za sebe bitkujuća egzistencija i predmet”⁴. Iz spomenutog se uviđa velika, takoreći presudna važnost odgoja dece, odnosno, ovde se odgoj dece pojavljuje kao primarni zadatak porodične zajednice. Drugim rečima, porodica predstavlja najznačajniji proizvodni pogon klasne (pa tako i nacionalne) ideologije i u isti mah poligon ideološke represije. Ovaj nalaz u potpunosti se naslanja na tezu Vilhema Rajha po kojem „povijest stvaranja ideologije uči da se svaki društveni sustav svjesno ili nesvjesno služi utjecajem na djecu svakog naraštaja (...) kako bi se učvrstio u strukturi ljudi”⁵.

U vezi sa tim, zaštita, održanje i snaženje porodice i porodičnih vrednosti predstavljaju značajnu stavku u programu svih političkih opcija sa desne strane političkog spektra, bilo da je reč o desnom centru, konzervativnim, nacionalističkim ili ekstremno desnim (fašističkim i nacističkim) grupama i organizacijama. U tom smislu možemo navesti nekoliko primera iz Srbije, služeći se političkim programima stranke G17 plus, Demokratske stranke Srbije (DSS) i Nove Srbije (NS), tri političke organizacije koje se nalaze na vlasti od marta 2004. godine do danas. U političkom programu G17 plus, koja se može označiti strankom desnog centra, stoji da se ova politička grupacija „zalaže za jačanje porodice, kao osnovnog oslonca buduće države” (kurziv P. A.). Dalje se navodi da je neophodno donošenje zakonskih rešenja kojima bi se podstaklo „zasnivanje i jačanje porodice”, budući da je to „jedan od prioriteta nove evropske Srbije”⁶. U političkom programu Demokratske stranke Srbije porodica takođe zauzima

1 Wilhelm Reich, *Masovna psihologija fašizma*, Zagreb, 1999, str. 121.

2 Ibid, str. 66.

3 G. W. F. Hegel, *Osnovne crte filozofije prava*, Sarajevo, 1989, str. 286-289.

4 Ibid, str. 305.

5 Wilhelm Reich, *Spolna revolucija*, Zagreb, 1985, str. 282.

6 Program G17 plus, str. 42.

značajno mesto, jer se navodi da će posebna pažnja biti posvećena porodici „koja je temelj društva i države”, te da je „u svim slučajevima narušavanja porodičnog života i porodične celine” neophodna „socijalna sigurnost i zaštita”⁷. Na posletku tu je politički program Nove Srbije, koji donosi mnogo više informacija od programa dve prethodno spomenute političke organizacije. Na samom početku, kroz definisanje „političkih vrednosti” Nove Srbije uožava se gotovo totalitarni karakter (ili barem totalitarne ambicije) ove stranke, kroz floskulu o tome da je Nova Srbija „narodna stranka koja zastupa interese i očekivanja naroda kao celine”, ali već nakon nekoliko rečenica dobijamo i definiciju „naroda kao celine”: to su svi oni koji „prihvataju srpske i evropske narodnjačke, rodoljubive, kulturne, moralne i socijalne vrednosti”, i zalažu se za „opšte blagostanje nacije i države”⁸. Dakle, u mnogo čemu program ove partije predstavlja prototip izuzetno ambiciozne desničarske tj. reakcionarne političke opcije, mada začuđuje to što među svim frazama o nacionalnoj svesti („koja inspiriše ljude da se bore za napredak svoje zemlje”), kulturi (koja je „osnova društvene svesti kod identifikacije pojedinaca i naroda”) ili neophodnosti razvoja i negovanja svesti o Jedinstvu nacionalnog bića” među svim Srbima na području ex-Jugoslavije, porodica ne zauzima naglašenije mesto. Iz spomenutog programa otkriva se jedino da je porodica „ciljna grupa socijalne brige i staranja u Srbiji”, te da je potrebno prekinuti „transformaciju Srbije u zemlju starih građana” pri čemu je upravo „pravilna socijalna politika jedan od mehanizama za sprečavanje *bele kuge*”⁹. Međutim, na samom početku programa ove stranke postoji jedna prilično problematična, iako uvijena i gotovo politički korektna (ali opet nesumnjivo jasna) sintagma o „nedodirljivosti prava na život od začeca do prirodne smrti, osim iz zdravstvenih i krivično-pravnih razloga”¹⁰.

Pogledajmo sada druge primere: iako dolaze iz drugačijeg vremenskog i prostornog okvira, prepoznatljiva je zajednička nit koju dele sa programima aktuelnih vladajućih partija u Srbiji. U predizbornom programu Adolfa Hitlera na predsedničkim izborima 1932. godine u Nemačkoj stoji da bi „konačno uništenje obitelji bilo kraj svake više čovječnosti” te da je „najviši zadatak omogućiti obojici životnih drugova i drugova u radu” (tj. muškarcu i ženi) „da na svijetu zasnuju obitelj”, budući da je zasnivanje porodice „posljednji cilj istinski organskog i logičkog razvoja”. Naime, porodica je prema ovom programu NSDAP „najmanja, ali najdragocenija jedinica izgradnje državne građevine”¹¹. Godinu dana kasnije, sada već sa pozicija vlasti, nacističko glasilo *Angriff* povodom obeležavanja „dana majki” navodi da nakon uspešne *nacionalne revolucije* „ideje opet vode skupa - obitelj, društvo, narod”, te da se kroz obeležavanje spomenutog praznika upravo odaje počast onome što je suština „nemačke ideje”, a to je „nemačka majka”. Za *novu Nemačku* (čini se baš kao i za *novu Srbiju* iz programa jedne od spomenutih srpskih političkih partija) majka ima teško opisivo značenje, budući da je „majka čuvateljica onoga obiteljskog života iz kojeg izviru snage koje će

⁷ Program DSS, str. 17.

⁸ Program Nove Srbije, str. 1.

⁹ Ibid, str. 56.

¹⁰ Ibid, str. 1.

¹¹ Wilhelm Reich, *Masovna psihologija fašizma*, str. 69-70.

naš narod povesti opet naprijed”. Upravo nemačka majka, kao simbol porodice, „jedina je nositeljica njemačke narodne misli”¹².

Dakle, uprkos brojnim (stvarnim ili prividnim) razlikama u političkim programima tri političke organizacije iz Srbije, uprkos stvarnim ili prividnim razlikama između njihovih programa i proglaša i programa nemačkih nacista, opaža se jedinstvena zajednička nit, a to je odnos prema porodici, koja ne samo što predstavlja *osnovu društva* već i „temelj” ili „osnovni oslonac” države. Naizgled neobična, možda čak i bizarna teza, ali samo ukoliko se zanemari saznanje o značaju porodice u procesu ideološke reprodukcije postojećeg društvenog (klasnog) sistema. Naime, ono što se naziva modernom porodičnom zajednicom oblikovano je prema dominantnom društvenom modelu, ili drugim rečima, porodica predstavlja klasno društvo u malom. Zato se može reći da porodica predstavlja jednu od najvažnijih potpora (građanskoj) državi, jer se može definisati kao njen centralni ideološki zametak tj. najvažnije mesto produkovanja građanskog (ili malograđanskog - prim. aut.) čoveka¹³.

Dijalektika ideološke represije

Velik značaj porodice i njenog daljeg održanja i snaženja jednako za sve političke organizacije sa desne strane političkog spektra postaje jasniji kada se u obzir uzme upravo bitna uloga porodice u izgradnji onoga što se naziva „nacionalnom svešću” odnosno, nazovimo to pravim imenom, izazivanju i raspirivanju nacionalističkih osećanja. Presudna povezanost porodice i države, bitna povezanost porodične i nacionalne ideologije, može se raščlanjivati na različite načine. Samo njihovim poređenjem može se opaziti da su porodice međusobno razgraničene na isti način kao i nacije, te da su temelji za to u oba slučaja ekonomski motivi. Isto tako, tendencija malograđanske porodice sa mnogo dece ka ekonomskoj ekspanziji ujedno reprodukuje imperijalističku ideologiju na državnom nivou - uostalom, nisu li fraze o nacijama koje trebaju prostor i nove resurse za svoj rast preuzete iz sfere porodice? Možda je baš zato malograđanin posebno prijemčiv za imperijalističku ideologiju. Na taj način zapravo se objektivni državni imperijalizam ideološki reprodukuje u subjektivnom porodičnom imperijalizmu¹⁴. Ako bi se otišlo korak dalje, moguće je utvrditi da kriza nacionalnih država, sukob nacionalnog i nadnacionalnog modela (kakav predstavlja npr. Evropska unija), u određenoj meri korespondira sa krizom klasične (malo)građanske porodice - međutim, nije opravdano tvrditi da će sa prevazilaženjem nacionalne države doći i do prevazilaženja porodice, budući da sa prevazilaženjem nacionalne države ne dolazi do prevazilaženja države kao takve tj. da izmenom forme ne dolazi i do izmene suštine.

Porodica predstavlja određene društvene sadržaje i u njenom posredovanju, ne u smislu posredovanja mnjenja i pogleda, već u proizvodnji društveno poželjne duševne strukture, leži njena najvažnija društvena funkcija. Naime, porodica se pojavljuje u ulogi svojevrstnog pomoćnika pri izgradnji autoritarnog karaktera dece tj. njihove vere u autoritet i sklonosti ka podređivanju istom, koja naročito do izražaja dolazi u kasnijim

¹² Ibid, str. 66-67.

¹³ Ibid, str. 101.

¹⁴ Ibid, str. 68.

godinama života. Ključnu ulogu u spomenutom ima kreiranje one psihološke instance koja se naziva Nad-Ja (*Ideal-Ja, Super-Ego*), a koje se ne može odvojiti od ukupne nagnoske strukture i karaktera čoveka kakav se proizvodi u porodici¹⁵.

Super-Ego ima ogromno značenje u formiranju karaktera ličnosti: to je ona instanca koja obavlja funkcije moralne svesti (savesti), igra važnu ulogu pri potiskivanju, predstavlja nosioca tradicije i bitno određuje obrazovanje ideala. Formiran u okviru porodice, pre svega putem poistovećivanja sa figurom oca - koji predstavlja ne samo oličenje spoljašnjeg, društvenog autoriteta, već je i utemeljen na društvenom autoritetu - i pounutarnjivanjem očevih zapovesti i zabrana, *Super-Ego* stiče attribute morala i moći. Na taj način posredstvom *Nad-Ja* spoljašnji autoritet i sila se pretvaraju u unutrašnje, a pojedinac deluje prema zahtevima društvenog autoriteta ne samo iz straha od spoljašnje kazne, već i zbog straha od psihičke instance u njemu samom. Uostalom, prosta pretnja društvenom sankcijom ne bi bila dovoljna za održavanje društvenog sistema ukoliko prethodno ne bi bila utvrđena i u psihičkoj strukturi pojedinca. Kao što se *Super-Ego* formira introjektivom spoljašnjih autoriteta, isto tako se javlja i obrnuti proces, te se *Super-Ego* projektuje na nosioce spoljašnjeg autoriteta: svojstva sopstvenog Nad-Ja projektuju se na društvene autoritete, što dalje utiče na povratnu projekciju tako projektovanih društvenih autoriteta na *Nad-Ja*. Na taj način realni spoljašnji autoriteti izmiču mogućnosti racionalnog sagledavanja, a pogotovo kritike, jer predstavljaju idealni prikaz onoga što autoritarni pojedinac želi (*Super-Ego* kao najvažniji faktor u obrazovanju ideala), idealnu sliku njega samog, Idealno Ja¹⁶. Zapravo, *Super-Ego* i spoljašnji autoritet ne treba razdvajati: prvi je introjektivni drugi, drugi sadrži kvalitete prvog i upravo stoga postaje delotvoran. Iz ovoga se takođe opaža dinamički karakter *Nad-Ja*, što opovrgava tezu da ova instanca, nakon što nastaje u detinjstvu, u okviru porodice, ostaje jednako snažna i delotvorna tokom vremena i da nema potrebe za dodatnim impulsima. Naprotiv, *Super-Ego* bi ako ne u potpunosti iščezao, a ono menjao svoj karakter i sadržaj kada društveni autoriteti ne bi neprestano obnavljali tj. nastavljali proces njegovog obrazovanja započet u detinjstvu¹⁷. Drugim rečima, velika važnost permanentne ideološke represije u održanju vladajućeg sistema ogleda se u odlučujućem uticaju na reprodukciju vrednosti vladajućeg sistema i društvenih autoriteta u psihičkim strukturama ljudi. A porodica, kako smo videli, igra nezamenjivu ulogu u spomenutom procesu.

Dakle, moguće je zaključiti da se psihička struktura svakog pojedinca, pa tako i *Ego* i *Super-Ego* kao njeni sastavni delovi, formira prema dominantnom ideološkom modelu u društvu, a njegova dalja reprodukcija u psihičkim strukturama ima presudan značaj u njegovom daljem održanju u spoljašnjem svetu. Pri tome se svakako ne misli samo na reprodukovanje u psihičkim strukturama pojedinaca koji se već nalaze u „procesu obrade“, već jednako i na prostiranje ideološke represije na nove generacije tj. kroz porodični uticaj na decu, što je već na nekoliko mesta u ovom tekstu jasno istaknuto. Ovu tvrdnju nedvosmisleno potvrđuje nalaz Sigmunda Frojda po kojem je *Nad-Ja* deteta

¹⁵ Erich Fromm, *Autoritet i porodica*, Zagreb, 1989, str. 53-54.

¹⁶ Ibid, str. 48-50.

¹⁷ Ibid, str. 51.

izgrađeno po uzoru na roditeljsko *Nad-Ja* tj. da se ono ispunjava istim sadržajem i postaje nosilac tradicije i vrednosti nastalih tokom prethodnih generacija, odnosno, da kroz ideologije *Nad-Ja* prošlost de *facto* nastavlja da živi¹⁸. U tom smislu porodično obrazovanje ima presudnu ulogu u procesu formiranja nacionalne svesti i vaspitanju u nacionalističkom duhu. Na negovanje porodičnih vrednosti i autoriteta porodice, odanosti prema porodici, pre svega prema roditeljima, nadovezuje se podsticanje „ljubavi prema naciji” - iako je teško objasniti kako uopšte može biti reči o ispoljavanju emocija prema jednoj pomalo apstraktnoj političkoj kategoriji. Potom dolazi razvijanje odanosti prema nacionalnoj državi, praćeno ponosom zbog toga što ova predstavlja opredmećenje stvarno ili moguće najbolje i najuspešnije nacije (ikada), zatim prema nacionalnom vladaru (vođi), pa čak i običnim artefaktima kakvi su fotografije vladara ili komadi tkanine sa nacionalnim obeležjima (koji uvek u sebi sadrže nešto gotovo transcendentno - u svakom slučaju, znatno više od onoga što se navodi u proizvođačkoj deklaraciji o vrsti materijala). I nije važno da li je reč o pevanju patriotskih pesama deci, anegdotskim epizodama iz slavne prošlosti koje im se se pričaju u večernjim satima, ideološkim svaštarama pod maskom dečjih časopisa koje im se serviraju ili stupidnim diskusijama odraslih o tome „šta da se radi” (koje deca prosto upijaju), rezultat je nastanak ličnosti koje (kao psihološki profili) predstavljaju klonove svojih roditelja. Pridružimo li ovome kasnije uticaje društvene sredine, pre svega kroz školsko obrazovanje i vaspitanje sa nastavom istorije kao predvojničkom obukom, razvitkom sklonosti ka mitu i mitskom koja se postiže kroz nastavu nacionalne književnosti i religijskim obrazovanjem, koje podstiče sklonost ka nekritičkom „mišljenju”, ali i sledbeništvu - pojedinac zapravo i nema mnogo izbora i mogućnosti. Na posletku, takav pojedinac počinje zaista da veruje u to da „nacionalna svest inspiriše ljude da se bore za napredak svoje zemlje”, jer naprosto „nacija profiluje svako ljudsko biće moralno, kulturno i politički”¹⁹. U tom slučaju kod njega je zaista prevladalo uverenje da za naciju vredi živeti, ali jednako tako (ako ne i više) i umirati.

Korak napred, dva koraka nazad: dva veka moderne Srbije

Uloga koju porodica u klasnom društvu ima u razvoju nacionalnih osećanja i podsticanju nacionalizma na primeru srpskog društva još je i izraženija, naročito ako se uzmu u obzir dva prethodna stoleća srpske istorije. Naime, čitav ovaj period obeležen je neprestanim sukobom dve istorijske tendencije, patrijarhalne i moderne, u čijem se centru nalazi odnos prema Zapadnoj Evropi, ali više od toga pitanje pravca u kojem će se srpsko društvo razvijati. Spomenuto pitanje naročito značaj dobija nakon sticanja državne nezavisnosti (1878. godine), kada su se pred srpskom političkom i kulturnom elitom našla dva oprečna rešenja: sa jedne strane, orijentacija ka unutrašnjem razvoju, ekonomskoj, kulturnoj, političkoj modernizaciji, a sa druge strane, fokusiranje na oslobođenje i ujedinjenje celokupnog srpskog etnosa, sa konačnim ciljem obnove srednjevekovne srpske države (svakako u granicama iz vremena cara Dušana)²⁰. Na osnovi

¹⁸ Ibid, str. 58.

¹⁹ Program Nove Srbije, str. 2.

²⁰ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije. Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*, Beograd, 2006, str. 18-19.

ovog pitanja dve tendencije u političkom životu Srbije vremenom se sve jasnije profiliraju: sa jedne strane zapadnjaci (Liberalna i Naprednjačka stranka), sa druge strane narodnjaci („slovenofili“), u vidu Radikalne stranke i malobrojnih socijalista; na jednoj strani ideja sveobuhvatnih reformi sa ciljem transformacije jedne de facto *old-fashion*, patrijarhalne zajednice u moderno društvo zapadnoevropskog tipa, na suprotnoj strani suštinski totalitarna ideologija *narodne demokratije*, koja se „realizuje kroz *narodnu partiju, narodnu samoupravu i narodnu državu*“. Antagonizam dve opcije vodi političkim konfliktima koji se na posletku pretvaraju u borbu na život i smrt: u sukobu ideologija pristalice modernizacije bivaju poražene, a politika koju su zastupali odbačena i prokažena. Naprosto, orijentacija države na sopstveni razvoj, ekonomski razvitak, politički i kulturni napredak, pojmljena je i osuđena kao udaljavanje, čak izdaja, *zavetne ideje predaka* o oslobođenju i ujedinjenju srpskog naroda²¹. Uostalom, individualni napredak, sloboda i blagostanje u Srbiji su uvek bili podređeni napretku, slobodi i blagostanju kolektiva. Činjenica da društvene reforme ne isključuju državnu ekspanziju ili da su za državnu ekspanziju potrebni izuzetno snažna ekonomska osnova i odgovarajući demografski potencijal nije igrala značajniju ulogu u ovom konfliktu.

Srpska politička elita „nekim čudom“ uspele je na posletku da ostvari svoju nameru, te je oslobođenje i ujedinjenje srpskog naroda bilo izvršeno, iako treba spomenuti da misterija kojom je to postignuće obavljeno biva demistifikovana kada se uzme u obzir da je njena cena iznosila preko milion ljudskih života (ukupni demografski gubitak u toku decenije ratova od 1912. do 1918.). Rezultat svega, međutim, nije bila Velika Srbija, već Goš veća) Jugoslavija, u koju Srbija kao svoj ulog unosi spiskove poginulih u ratu i okolnostima potpuno neprimerenu ideologiju narodne države, što naprosto nije bilo dovoljno. U novoj zajednici opšta nestabilnost postaje konstanta jer se pokazalo da granice zapravo nisu predstavljale prepreku ujedinjenju srpskog naroda i njegovom povezivanju sa ostatkom Južnih Slovena, već su znatno veću ulogu odigrale razlike nastale usled nejednakosti uslova razvoja²². Slom države u kratkotrajnom Aprilskom ratu 1941. predstavljao je logičan epilog dotadašnjeg pravca razvoja.

Druga ili „socijalistička“ Jugoslavija predstavljala je pokušaj drugačijeg usmerenja, i donela je mnogo toga novog, pre svega modernizaciju (ili barem jedan njen deo). Međutim, industrijalizacija, urbanizacija, kulturni razvoj, ogroman rast kvaliteta života itd., nisu bili praćeni suštinskom izmenom političke kulture, obrazovno-vaspitnih modela, dominantnog ideološkog obrasca, što je svakako imalo ozbiljne posledice. Krajem 60-ih i početkom 70-ih Jugoslavija ulazi u krizu, koja se vremenom sve više produbljuje i konačno kulminira i razrešava se u toku poslednje decenije XX veka: rezultat je raspad državne zajednice i serija ratova, sa svim pratećim pojavama, od ponovnog uvećanja spiskova poginulih, opšteg osiromašenja, mržnje kao glavne odlike interpersonalnih odnosa i tako dalje. Spomenuta kriza iz sedme decenije XX veka nalazi se u vezi sa opštom krizom modernizacije koja je zahvatila sve zemlje mediteranskog basena, istočne i srednje Evrope. Naime, kriza modernizacije postavljala je pred sva

²¹ Ibid, str. 19-23.

²² Ibid, str. 67-68.

društva pitanje pravca njihovog daljeg razvoja tj. problem prelaska sa kvantitativne faze razvoja (koju odlikuju industrijalizacija i urbanizacija) na kvalitativnu fazu razvitka, problem konačnog napuštanja seljačkog i definitivnog prelaska u moderno industrijsko društvo. Istovremeno, ova kriza dobija i jasno političko obeležje, te je zavisno od političkog odgovora na krizu došlo ili do njenog prevazilaženja ili do daljeg generisanja krize. Sa ovim problemom suočile su se Grčka, Italija, Španija, Portugal i sve socijalističke zemlje; i dok su Grčka, Španija i Portugal (na različite načine) napustili diktatorske ili fašističke oblike političke vlasti i opredelili se za demokratski poredak, a Italija potvrdila svoju privrženost demokratiji, u socijalističkim društvima nije došlo do ovog preokreta, kriza se produbila i transformisala u generalnu krizu socijalizma, koja je vrhunac dosegla krajem osamdesetih godina²³. Na ovaj izazov državni vrh Jugoslavije ne odgovara političkim reformama i podsticanjem političkog i socijalnog pluralizma, već zasnivanjem nacionalnog pluralizma tj. decentralizacijom i federalizacijom, koje su predstavljale supstitut demokratizaciji. Ovakvo rešenje nije doprinelo prevazilaženju problema, već generisanju krize, koja se sve više manifestovala u formi dezintegrativnog nacionalizma: kako se kriza produbljivala, sve više je napredovao i nacionalizam koji je, uostalom, imao poreklo unutar sistema i šta više predstavljao direktan proizvod sistema. Naime, sa transformacijom Jugoslavije u konfederaciju, koja je počela više da liči na savez feudalnih oblasti nego na socijalističku zajednicu, proklamovane su i nove vrednosti umesto jugoslovenstva, republički i pokrajinski nacionalizmi, umesto jedinstvenog ekonomskog sistema zasnovanog na egalitarizmu, međusobno suprotstavljene nacionalne ekonomije²⁴. Predlog sa kraja osamdesetih da se kriza jugoslovenskog društva pokuša razrešiti time što bi se faktičko stanje dodatno potvrdilo, uz istovremeni prelazak na demokratski sistem, predstavljao je jedino moguće rešenje u datim uslovima. Međutim, opredeljenje srpske političke elite i državnog vrha, čvrsto uverenih u „svetlu budućnost“ i dodatno osnaženih nakon talasa „antibirokratske revolucije“, nije išlo u prilog ovom rešenju. Na izazove krize modernizacije, odgovoreno je begom od modernizacije, odbacivanjem jedne sveobuhvatne (ekonomske, političke itd.) reforme, što je predstavljalo odgovor koji je bio u potpunosti na tragu istorijske konstante u Srbiji. Jednostavno, ujedinjenje srpskog naroda u jednu državu ponovo je dobilo primat nad društvenim reformama i odlagalo je modernizaciju srpskog društva na kraju XX veka, jednako kao i stotinu godina pre toga²⁵.

„Rani sina i šalji na vojsku, Srbija se umirit' ne može!”

Tek sa kratkim pregledom glavnih tokova srpske istorije u proteklih dva stoleća moguće je približiti se shvatanju važnosti koju nacionalni osećaji i nacionalizam imaju u srpskom društvu. U okolnostima gotovo potpunog zapostavljanja društvenog razvitka u korist državne ekspanzije, dominacija (zatečene tj. manje-više autohtone) primitivne patrijarhalne kulture se javlja ne kao smetnja društvenom razvoju, već naprotiv njego

²³ Laslo Sekelj, *Jugoslavija, struktura raspadanja: ogled o uzrocima strukturne krize jugoslovenskog društva*, Beograd, 1990, str. 136-137.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, str. 143-145.

²⁵ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, str. 70.

prednost. Pri tome i sama politička elita u takvom karakteru dominantne kulture sagledava pozitivnu pojavu, što se nalazi na tragu određenih ruskih političkih mislilaca iz XIX veka, prema kojima je upravo zaostalost predstavljala prednost. Na bazi takve kulture formiraju se društvene institucije, čiji dometi stoga i ne mogu biti viši zapravo, njihova namera i nije da menjaju (reformišu) društvene prilike, već da ih održavaju na istom stepenu tj. da ih konzervišu. Ukoliko i imaju za cilj mobilizaciju društva, ove ustanove čine to ne menjajući suštinske postavke u društvu, i u tom smislu njihova postignuća u Srbiji mogu se jasnije sagledati. Naime, sve značajne društvene institucije - ustanove od značaja u procesu formiranja ličnosti pojedinca (škola, crkva, vojska, zatim štampa, usmena i pisana književnost itd.) - stavljene su u službu ostvarenja istog cilja: ujedinjenja srpskog naroda. Najvažniji zadatak u tome bilo je formiranje i održavanje nacionalne svesti tj. podsticanje nacionalističkih osećanja, zbog čega su sva druga osećanja često bila potiskivana i zanemarivana, jer je sve drugo bilo beznačajno pred zavetom predaka: osveta Kosova i obnova Dušanovog carstva. Dakle, najvažnija uloga u ostvarenju ovog cilja pripadala je upravo porodici²⁶.

Dominantni oblik porodične organizacije u Srbiji je patrijarhalna porodica zadružnog tipa, što ne iznenađuje s obzirom na opštu zaostalost društva. Međutim, porodična zadruga predstavljala je čestu pojavu i među Srbima u Habzburškoj monarhiji - dakle, u znatno drugačijim društvenim okolnostima - pretežno na području Vojne granice, rede u Provincijalu, iako krajem 18. veka definitivno počinje da izumire²⁷. Na području Srbije porodična zadruga nastavlja da živi i nakon ovog perioda, šta više početkom 19. veka ona još uvek predstavlja preovlađujući vid porodične i radne zajednice, sa kolektivnom imovinom, kolektivnim načinom privređivanja itd., što je predstavljalo koncept potpuno suprotan modernom pojmu vlasništva i mobilnosti zemljišnog poseda i radne snage. Srpski građanski zakonik iz 1844. zakonski je sankcionisao postojanje porodičnih zadruga, ali je istovremeno pravno zasnovao mogućnost njihove podele, čime je zapravo ozakonjen proces njihovog raspadanja, koji je uveliko bio u toku²⁸. Proces odumiranja porodičnih zadruga bio je uslovljen pre svega velikim demografskim rastom (tzv. „demografskim prelazom“), koji je izazvao izmene porodične strukture u društvu - trend je išao u pravcu stalnog smanjenja veličine porodične zajednice, podelom na više manjih zadruga ili izdvajanjem pojedinačnih porodica iz velike zadruge. Porodična zadruga međutim nije imala isključivo ekonomsku već i značajnu socijalnu ulogu, pošto je njena funkcija obuhvatala promovisanje određenog sistema vrednosti tj. očuvanje opšteg morala (računajući pri tom i verski pogled na život i kodekse običajnog prava), čime je ona predstavljala ekonomsku, pravnu ali i etičko-duhovnu osnovu predmodernog srpskog društva. Utoliko je njen raspad izazvao bojazan za budućnost srpskog društva, pre svega za budućnost vladajućeg sistema vrednosti, što je primetno u spisima savremenika²⁹. Uostalom, to je u svetlu političkih ciljeva srpske države bilo potpuno opravdano strahovanje - težnja za ispunjavanjem zaveta o obnovi Dušaneve im-

²⁶ Ibid, str. 65.

²⁷ *Privatni život u srpskim zemljama u osvit modernog doba*, prir. A. Fotić, Beograd, 2005, str. 760-762.

²⁸ Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Socijalna istohja Srbije 1815-1941*, Beograd, 2004, str. 36-37.

²⁹ Ibid, str. 51-53.

perije ne bi bila moguća bez porodične zajednice koja na svaki način reprodukuje kako sam ovaj imperativ, tako i vrednosti koje prevashodno služe njegovom ostvarenju. Međutim, duhovno-socijalne komponente porodične zadruge, uključujući tu i primitivnu etiku i sistem vrednosti, preživele su njen stvarni raspad, pa u mnogome i danas utiču na „strukture tradicionalnih shvatanja“ na selu³⁰. Uzimajući u obzir specifičnu interakciju između sela i grada u poslednjih 15 i više godina u Srbiji tj. uzevši u obzir efekat tzv. „Rurbanizacije“ ili „rustifikacije“ („poseljačivanja“ gradova) - efekat prenošenja, uspešnog razvoja i mutacije seoske kulture, sa njenim vrednostima, kulturnim modelima, obrascima ponašanja, u gradske sredine ne smeju nas iznenaditi neke „neobične“ pojave u savremenom srpskom društvu. Bilo da je reč o primitivizmu, izraženom konzervativizmu i patrijarhalnosti, ksenofobičnosti, nacionalizmu ili (*last but not least*) fašizmu, zapravo se govori o fenomenu *longue durée*, dugotrajnom procesu koji predstavlja jednu od konstanti istorijskog razvitka srpskog društva.

Vrednosti koje je promovisala stara porodična zadruga u Srbiji, a koje su i danas jednako dominantne i jednako se promovišu u savremenoj porodici, mogu se označiti kao tipično patrijarhalne. U takvoj sredini muškarcu pripada primat: otac (starešina porodice) kao *alfa mužjak* nalazi se u centru, a velika pažnja pripada muškoj deci. Dakle, u patrijarhalnoj sredini poželjno je roditi se kao muškarac, ali u isti mah to podrazumeva i veliku odgovornost. Svetu dužnost muškarca predstavlja „vraćanje duga državi“ tj. služenje vojne obaveze, budući da se na prvom mestu u opisu njegove društvene funkcije nalaze istovredne odrednice *vojnika* i *otac porodice*. Obavljanje vojne službe za mladog muškarca (treba da) predstavlja čast koju mu država „blagonaklono“ ukazuje, ali u isti mah ona je i posebna vrsta ispita zrelosti: u vojsku se stupa kao nezreli mladić, a iz nje se izlazi kao potpuni muškarac. Naravno, u tome je sadržana jedva skrivena seksualna tj. homoseksualna aluzija, što za vojsku, uostalom, nije ni najmanje neobično. O odnosu prema instituciji vojske u srpskom društvu najbolje govori običaj proslavljanja odlaska regruta na služenje vojnog roka (tzv. „ispraćaj“), koji je bio jednako raširen i početkom XX veka, i u periodu između dva svetska rata, i u razdoblju socijalizma, ali i danas. Takav je umnogome bio i odnos prema ratu, jer se „u rat išlo kao u svatove“: početak prvog od tri ratna sukoba iz vremena decenije ratova (1912-1918) dočekan je sa burnim oduševljenjem, jer se konačno pružila ozbiljna prilika za ispunjenje istorijskog zaveta³¹. Slične reakcije javljaju se i u vreme nemačkog napada na Jugoslaviju 1941, iako je oduševljenje ubrzo ustupilo mesto panici, koja se pretvorila u opštu rezignaciju: uoči 6. aprila 1941. samouvereno se pevalo: „*Čuj, draga moja, na Srbiju Švaba krete, / naleteće ovih dana na srpske bajonete*“³², ili „*Oj Hitleru, junak na mejdanu, / ostavićeš kosti na Balkanu*“³³, da bi samo par dana kasnije vojnici poražene vojske bili dočekivani sa prezirom, uvredama i kletvama. Jedan od hiljada srpskih seljaka tada je zavapio: „*Zar se tako brani zemlja (...) i vodi borba protiv neprijatelja? Ne, tako se mi nismo borili. Ako se i moji sinovi tako ponašaju, bolje da poginu nego da se vrate kući kao kukavice*“³⁴. Oduševljenje predstojećim ratnim sukobom postojalo je u

30 Ibid, str. 56.

31 Latinka Perović, Između anarhije i autokratije, str. 66.

32 S. L. Salcberger, *Drugi svetski rat*, Beograd, 1970, str. 100.

33 Kosta Nikolić, *Strah i nada u Srbiji 1941-1944: svakodnevni život pod okupacijom*, Beograd, 2002, str. 19.

34 Ibid, str. 26.

većem delu srpskog društva i 1991. kada su stotine tenkova krenule autoputem Bratstva-Jedinstva (kakve li ironije) prema zapadu, „na Zagreb”; bilo da je u pitanju početak, sredina ili kraj 20. veka, matrica je bila u potpunosti ista.

Ponos zbog izvršavanja vojne službe praćen sažaljenjem prema vojno nesposobnima i prezirom prema onima koji bi/su odbijali vojnu službu kao i opšta fascinacija militarizmom, predstavljaju neke od od istorijskih konstanti srpskog društva (iako su usled poraza u ratovima u toku poslednje decenije XX veka donekle oslabljene). Upravo porodici i porodičnom odgoju, a zatim i uticaju ostalih društvenih ustanova, treba pripisati odgovornost za razvoj ovakvog raspoloženja. Od ranog detinjstva deca su vaspitavana kao ratnici i osvetnici, u mržnji prema *vekovnim neprijateljima - Turčinu, Austrijancu i Švabi* (u toku 1990-ih na listu je dospelo i novi neprijatelj, *Amerikanac*), što su jasno приметili i brojni strani posmatrači i putopisci. Deca su od ranih nogu odgajana sa ciljem ispunjenja već spominjanog zaveta predaka, najčešće kroz svojevrsne „porodične pitalice”, tzv. „porodične katehizise”, uz koje dolaze i javni katehizisi, među kojima treba posebno istaći *Katehizis za narod srpski* iz 1888. godine. Tako ruski slavista P. A. Rovinski navodi primer jedne „porodične pitalice”, kojoj su deca poučavana u toku njegovog boravka u Srbiji (1868-1869), u kojoj dete odgovara na očeva pitanja: „*Ko si ti? Srbin. Gde je propalo srpsko carstvo? Na Kosovu polju. Ko je poginuo na Kosovu Polju? Car Lazar, 9 Jugovića i svi srpski junaci. A još ko? Car Murat. Kako je on umro? Njega je rasporio Miloš Obilić. Kako se mi sećamo Cara Lazara, Miloša Obilića i svih drugih srpskih junaka? Večna im pamjat. A Murata? Neka je proklet. Ko je neprijatelj Srba? Turci. A još ko? Švabe. Šta im ti želiš? Uzeću sablju i posećiću gadove!*”. Katehizis iz 1888. nalazi se na istom tragu, ali je još eksplicitniji u nekim momentima: „*Ko je neprijatelj Srba? Glavni neprijatelj Srba je Austrija. Šta treba raditi? Mrzeti Austriju (...)* *Ko je prijatelj Srba? Jedini iskren i siguran prijatelj (...)* *je moćna Rusija. Šta je dužnost svakog Srbina? Voleti svoju domovinu i kralja i umreti za njih(...)*”³⁵. Zapise o vaspitavanju u nacionalnom duhu, čija je ideja vodilja bilo oslobođenje i ujedinjenje Srba, ostavile su i poneke javne ličnosti: tako, na primer, Paulina Lebl Albala navodi da je od socijalizma udaljio neprestani govor o „internacionalnom proletarijatu na čijem oslobođenju treba da radimo” budući da je bila „odmalena napajana idejom da valja raditi na oslobođenju i ujedinjenju srpskog naroda”³⁶.

Doprinosi formiranju, održavanju i prenošenju specifičnog duha određenog primatom nacionalne ideje su vršeni i na druge načine. Usmeno narodno stvaralaštvo imalo je veliku važnost u životu ljudi u prošlosti jer je predstavljalo sastavni deo njihove svakodnevice: bilo da se pevalo u sklopu obreda, radi zabave ili u slavu junaka i predaka, ono je pratilo sve etape ljudskog života³⁷. Upravo zahvaljujući svojoj prisutnosti i popularnosti, usmena („guslarska”) književnost postala je značajan medijum nacionalne propagande: opevanjem veličine stare slave, gorčine poraza na Kosovu i težine „pet vekova turskog ropstva”, pozivala je na borbu i osvetu (palih kosovskih juna-

³⁵ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, str. 65.

³⁶ *Ibid*, str. 382.

³⁷ *Privatni život u srpskim zemljama u osvit modernog doba*, str. 341.

naka, srpskih mučenika, turskog zuluma...) i tako pružala svoj doprinos „razvoju nacionalne svesti“. Ko bi uostalom mogao u takvom društvu da se odupre ponovljenom pozivu kneza Lazara (iz usta narodnog pevača): *ko ne doš'o na boj na Kosovo imalo je daleko veću težinu pet ili šest vekova nakon što je (navodno) izgovoreno*.

Pisana književnost predstavlja posebnu priču: sa uzletom romantizma u umetnosti, nacionalno nadahnuće dolazi do posebnog izražaja, pa se tako javlja i nova kategorija *rodoljubive* ili *patritoske* književnosti. Zabludeli pesnici pružaju svoj doprinos nacionalnoj mobilizaciji, pozivajući na Gazimestan, apelujući da se „ostaje ovde“ jer „sunce tuđeg neba“ nikad ne može ogrejati kao što u tome uspeva *srpsko sunce* na *srpskom nebu*, ili se pravdajući da nisu zaboravili „šta je Srbinu cilj“ i da ih nije „ponela zapadnjačka reka“, u isti mah preuzimajući odgovornost da kao „deca ovog veka“ prihvate predodređenu im ulogu i ostvare zavet predaka. Taj pokajnički model, ta svest o *neisplaćenom dugovanju inteligencije prema narodu* (koju je prvi jasno formulisao ruski socijalista P. L. Lavrov)³⁸ bila je karakteristična za rusku, ali jednako tako i za srpsku inteligenciju poslednjih decenija XIX veka. Griža savesti koju je sa sobom nosila ova koncepcija pritiskala je poput tereta srpske intelektualce i za rezultat je imala, sa jedne strane, neumerene izlive pisanog patriotizma, a sa druge strane dugoročno utapanje inteligencije u narod i njeno faktičko srozavanje ispod nivoa na kojem bi morala biti, ukoliko uopšte pretenduje na naziv inteligencije. Uostalom, male intelektualne potrebe jednog naroda stvorile su i inteligenciju koja se nalazila na nivou koji je te potrebe zadovoljavao. To se pojavilo kao naročito značajan problem zbog činjenice da je unutrašnji impuls za promenama pod turskom vladavinom bio ugašen i morao je dolaziti ili spolja, ili od gore, od inteligencije³⁹.

Poseban vid propagiranja dominantnog ideološkog obrasca predstavlja štampa, iako je teško govoriti o razmerama uticaja štampe na srpsku javnost, pogotovo na prelasku iz XIX u XXvek, u okolnostima kada broj pismenih, u srpskom društvu, nije bio veliki. Pri tome se i oni formalno pismeni nalaze „pod sumnjom“ jer je upitno koliki je broj pripadnika ove kategorije bio funkcionalno nepismen (bez sposobnosti razumevanja konteksta pri čitanju). Sigurno je samo da, bez obzira na pismenost ili literarni nivo stanovništva, profesionalno novinarstvo nije predstavljalo često viđanu pojavu u Srbiji, budući da su razni dinastički, partijski i materijalni interesi stavljeni ispred digniteta novinarske profesije⁴⁰. Otuda su se tekstovi u štampi redovno odlikovali uvredljivim sadržajem, najrazličitijim denuncijacijama, senzacionalizmom, primitivnim rečnikom, raspirivanjem mržnje... Poznato je koliko su pometnje i problema izazivali takvi novinarski natpisi - nije li, uostalom, razmena uvreda i optužbi prethodila jednoj od najpoznatijih afera na ovom prostoru krajem XIX veka, ubistvu prvaka novosadskih liberala Miše Dimitrijevića od strane radikalnog vođe Jaše Tomića? Srpska štampa bila je puna najrazličitijih tekstova pisanih kako u „nacionalnom duhu“, tako i sa ciljem njegove promocije, a uoči Balkanskih ratova dobila je i prvi „stručni“ časopis na tu temu, beogradski *Pijemont*, čiji je naziv dovoljno govorio o vrednostima koje je propagirao.

³⁸ Sava Živanov, *Rusija na prelomu vekova: poslednje decenije ruskog carstva*, Beograd, 2002, str. 212.

³⁹ Latinka Perović, *Izmetu anarhije i autokratije*, str. 73.

⁴⁰ Petar Atanacković, Milivoj Bešlin, *Senzacionalistička („žuta“) štampa u Beogradu između dva svetska rata*, Gesta, Broj 1, Novi Sad, 2006, str. 33.

Ne treba zaobići ni posebnu vrstu štampe namenjenu deci, dečije i omladinske časopise i magazine, čije publikovanje u Srbiji započinje u toku poslednje četvrtine XIX veka. Primarni zadatak dečije i omladinske štampe, u više od veka dugoj istoriji izlaženja, bilo je naravno vaspitavanje u patriotskom duhu. I bez obzira na sadržinsku različitost zaveta očekivanih od mladih (što je pre svega bilo uslovljeno neprestanim političkim promenama), razvijanje nacionalnih osećanja i ljubavi prema otadžbini/domovini predstavljalo je prioritet. Dečija i omladinska štampa najčešće je pri tome koristila isto sredstvo razvijanje ljubavi prema vladaru kao otelotvorenju patriotizma. Najveći broj tekstova pisali su odrasli za decu, ali se vremenom umnožava broj tekstova pisanih od strane same dece, u kojima su ona, između ostalog, trebalo da pokažu usvojeno⁴¹. Pored toga što su sadržali velik broj tekstova pisanih u „nacionalnom duhu”, časopisi su i samom naslovnom stranom, zaglavljima i geslima ukazivali na to šta je osnovni cilj srpske nacionalne politike i čemu „nacionalna omladina” mora stremiti. Časopis *Lasta* iz devedesetih godina XIX veka na naslovnici je imao guslara, grb sa četiri ocila, Vidovdan, Cveti 1815. i natpis *Kraljevina Srbija, Crna Gora, Slavonija, Stara Srbija, Makedonija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Dalmacija, Srem, Banat, Bačka*, jasno sugerišući gde su „zemlje Srbinove”. List *Golub* iz 1905. na naslovnoj strani isticao je, pored uobičajenih nacionalnih simbola, i natpise *Cetinje, Prizren, Novi Sad, Beograd, a Mala Srbadija* iz 1906. imala je Miloša Obilića, Vuka Karadžića, Svetog Savu, Hajduk Veljka Petrovića, gusle i Bibliju. O svrsi pokretanja ovakvih časopisa, njihova uredništva nisu imala ni najmanje sumnje: uredništvo lista *Srpče* iz 1882. navodi da je osnovni cilj lista „izobražavanje” omladine u duhu „plemenitosti i požrtvovanja za Srpstvo” razvijajući u njima patriotizam kao „prvu vrlinu pravih Srpčića, tako da od njih stvorimo ponosne i prave Srbe”. *Podmladak* iz 1897. svoj zadatak među omladinom objašnjava u formi stihova, pa kao svoju nameru između ostalog navodi i: „*Nek odgaji vitezove silne kao grom! / Osvetnike Srbinove Diku rodu svom*”. Biser među svima je *Novi Srbin* iz 1912. koji je, prema rečima uredništva, „namenjen svakom mladom Srbinu, koga su roditelji dali da uči gimnaziju u kojoj profesori nisu Srbi i u kojoj se (...) ne uči iz srpskih knjiga”, jer svi oni koji su krenuli u „nesrpsku školu”, zapravo su „ušli u tuđinu” i njima se mora nadoknaditi „ono što se u takoj školi prećutkuje”⁴². Naravno, i ovde je bilo izvesnih izuzetaka, pa tako Spomenak od 1. avgusta 1900. na naslovnoj strani donosi sledeću čestitku: „*1830. - 1900. I deca srpska, sinovi i kćeri vernoga i odanog naroda srpskog prema presvetlom svome kralju, a prilikom sedamdesetogodišnjice rođenja Mu, kliču iz dubine duše: Živeo premilostivi kralj FRANJA JOSIF PRVI!*”⁴³.

Nakon 1918. godine i opšteg uverenja da je *zavet predaka* (manje ili više) ostvaren, tekstovi i čitava simbolika sadržana u zaglavljima i geslima se menjaju, pa parole pozivaju na očuvanje i odbranu postojeće državne zajednice, veliča se nacionalno jedinstvo „tri plemena istog naroda” itd., ali uloga časopisa ostaje ista: patriotsko vaspitanje i razvijanje ljubavi prema vladaru. Olakšanje koje je u toku decenije ratova donela „osveta Srbije” očigledno je u izvesnoj nepretencioznosti kojom su se u propagi-

⁴¹ Olivera Milosavljević, *Otac-genije-ljubimac: Kult vladara najtrajniji obrazac vaspitavanja dece*, u: Srbija u Modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka (4). Žene i deca, Beograd, 2006, str. 189-190.

⁴² Ibid, str. 191-192.

⁴³ Ibid, str. 203.

ranju ljubavi prema naciji i vladaru odlikovali dečiji časopisi (naročito ako ih uporedimo sa onima sa kraja XIX veka). Listovi *Zorica* i *Dečije novine* iz dvadesetih godina u zaglavlju sadrže sliku tri dečaka u narodnim nošnjama „tri plemena“, *Otađbina* iz 1924. donosi grb sa dvoglavim orlom i četiri ocila i geslo „*Za kralja i otađbinu*“, a *Nova Srbadija* iz 1940. slogan *Jako srpstvo - jaka Jugoslavija*⁴⁴. Nakon 1945. godine situacija se nije značajnije promenila: obrazac je ostao isti, iako je njegova sadržina donekle izmenjena tj. dopunjena pozivima na izgradnju i odbranu socijalizma. Ljubav prema domovini i u novim okolnostima predstavljala je pozitivnu osobinu, kao što se podrazumevalo i zadržavanje idolopokloničkog odnosa prema vladaru. Ipak, Josip Broz Tito nije bio jedini vladar čiji je kult razvijan na stranicama dečije štampe: list *Pioniri* od 1. januara 1946. donosi tekst *Neka živi drug Staljin!*, objavljen povodom rođendana čoveka koji je „od najranije mladosti do današnjeg dana proveo u borbi za slobodu i bolji život naroda Sovjetskog saveza i celog čovečanstva“⁴⁵. U tom smislu, sa neprestanim ponavljanjem jednog istog obrasca u dečijoj štampi od Berlinskog kongresa do 14. kongresa SKJ, iznenađuje nedostatak slične prakse u (malobrojnim) dečijim časopisima u toku poslednje decenije XX veka. Međutim, izostanak elegija u čast „predsednika Miloševića“ ili stripova i priča koji bi dočaravali vreme „kad je Sloba bio mali“ ne znači da je matrica o kojoj govorimo izgubila svoju snagu, odnosno, da su vaspitanje „u duhu plemenitosti i požrtvovanja za Srpstvo“ i obuka za „osvetnike Srbinove“ ili „osvetnike Kosova“ zaista definitivno prevaziđeni.

Zaključak

Ujedinjenje srpskog naroda, kao ideja svih ideja, prožimalo je život celokupnog srpskog društva: nametnuta kao imperativ kroz vaspitanje u porodici i školi, kroz vojni dril i militarističku propagandu, natpise u štampi, crkvene propovedi i kafanske razgovore, kroz pesmu na veseljima ili preko književnih radova, ova ideja je oblikovala specifični duh nacionalizma, duh vojnika-ratnika-osvetnika. Ovaj duh je, zahvaljujući tome što se vaspitanici jednog dana svakako pretvore u vaspitače, uspešno prenošen sa generacije na generaciju i tako je oblikovao karakterističan kolektivni mentalitet, koji se odlikovao jednom istom idejom vodiljom, kako pre jednog i po veka, tako i danas. Dakle, u pitanju je duh koji je na svaki način dominirao u toku perioda dužeg od stotinu godina.

Porodica je u procesu vaspitanja u „duhu nacionalne ideje“ i u formiranju onoga što se nazivalo „pravim Srbima“, imala ulogu od izuzetnog značaja, jer je predstavljala prvog i najvažnijeg posrednika između deteta i zajednice, sa njenim autoritarnim sistemom vrednosti. Međutim, ideološka represija u porodici nikada ne bi mogla biti uspešna u tolikoj meri da nije bila praćena jednako snažnim impulsima od strane doslovno svih drugih društvenih institucija. Na taj način, problem analize ideološke

⁴⁴ Ibid, str. 191.

⁴⁵ Ibid, str. 213.

represije prerasta prvobitni fokus na okvir porodične organizacije, ali u isti mah potvrđuje veliko značenje porodice, kako u samoj analizi, tako i u „svakodnevnom životu”, pre svega za grupe sa desne strane političkog spektra, ali i za državu uopšte.

Kakva je danas situacija u srpskom društvu i, još važnije, kakve su njegove perspektive, teško je i nezahvalno govoriti. Samo jedan pogled na do sada pređeni put može izazvati jedino obeshrabrenje pri tome treba izbeći ono što je Niče opisao kao problem istoričara, koji gledajući unazad konačno počinje i da „*veruje unazad*”⁴⁶. Međutim, činjenice o dvovekovnom iskustvu nesumnjivo govore da su najveći deo XIX i prva polovina XX stoleća prosto protračeni. Isto tako je i sve ono pozitivno postignuto u toku druge polovine XX veka uništeno krajem istog. Sada je prva decenija XXI veka, ali jednako kao i ranije u srpskom društvu nedostaje volje ka pravljenju ozbiljnih rezova, volje ka onome što se kolokvijalno naziva *okretanje novog lista*. Danas, jednako kao i dvesta, sto pedeset ili sto godina ranije, Srbija pravi istu grešku: u ime nečeg imaginarnog (a što treba da nastupi u budućnosti), ali od velikog „nacionalnog značaja”, sadašnjica se potpuno zapostavlja. Srpsko nacionalno pitanje, a Kosovo kao njegov osnovni simbol, predstavlja jednaku preokupaciju danas, kao i pre jednog stoleća, jednako u vreme kralja Milana i u doba Slobodana Miloševića, jednako od prve vlade Nikole Pašića do druge vlade Vojislava Koštunice. U ime dobrobiti nacionalne ideje i u ime njenog ostvarenja opet simbolično povezanog sa Kosovom i „razvezivanjem kosovskog čvora” rešavanje problema današnjice odlaže se na neodređeno vreme, za nekakvo bolje sutra. I to je u potpunosti na tragu srpske istorijske konstante, u kojoj pitanje nacionalnih granica, njihove neodređenosti, ili neodređenosti njihovog širenja predstavlja jednu od glavnih kočnica kretanja srpskog društva putem evropeizacije i modernizacije⁴⁷. Tako će biti i dalje, sve dok *'Rani sina i šalji na vojsku* bude predstavljalo osnovni simbol sistema vrednosti u Srbiji. Na taj način društvo se još jednom osuđuje na zaostajanje; međutim, u ovom trenutku vreme radi protiv srpskog društva, i više nego što je to bio slučaj jedan vek ranije. Otuda je novo zaostajanje osuda Srbije na neminovnu propast. I zato je tzv. „promena paradigme” - sveobuhvatna transformacija društva, dovršenje procesa političke emancipacije, obezbeđivanje prevage racionalnog-modernog pogleda na svet nad mitskim, gotovo srednjevekovnim načinom mišljenja, izgradnja novog sistema vrednosti itd. najneophodnija stvar u ovom trenutku, ne bi li tako Srbija izbegla da na sopstvenom primeru iskusi tačnost Tokvilove teze da mnoge nacije propadnu pre nego što postanu svesne svojih grešaka.

⁴⁶ Fridrih Niče, *Sumrak idola ili kako se filozofira čekićem*, Novi Sad, 1999, str. 11.

⁴⁷ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, str. 65.

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Milivoj Bešlin

OTVARANJE NACIONALNOG PITANJA U SRBIJI KRAJEM 60-IH I POČETKOM 70-IH GODINA XX VEKA

*„Zaboravljanje, čak i pogrešno pamćenje
istorije, suštinski je činilac u formiranju
jedne nacije, što je razlog zašto napredak
istorijskih proučavanja često predstavlja
opasnost za nacionalna osećanja.”*

Ernest Renan

1. Nacija, nacionalizam - pojmovno određenje, definisanje, tipovi

Brojnost i voluminoznost literature o naciji, nacionalizmu i nacionalnom pitanju ne čini posao istraživača ni jednostavnijim ni bržim¹. Mnoštvo definicija, tumačenja, pogleda na jedno od najkompleksnijih pitanja moderne evropske istorije pre može dovesti u konfuziju ili na stranputicu nego li ponuditi jasan i jednoznačan odgovor na „nacionalno pitanje”, koje je, bar na Balkanu, pitanje svih pitanja, a nacija kao takva vrednost sama po sebi. Ipak, razjašnjenju pojma nacije prethodi determinisanje pojma *naroda*, kao specifične prirodne i društvene zajednice, nastale na višem stepenu plemenske integracije u državnom okviru sa potpunom vertikalnom stratifikacijom. U etničkom smislu osnovne integrativne karakteristike svakog naroda su: *kulturne* (jezik, religija, folklor, način života), *političke* (zajednička država ili težnja da se ona stvori) i izražena svest o zajedničkom poreklu. Sledeći stepen istorijskog razvitka etničkih grupa pripada *naciji*, kao najrazvijenijoj etničkoj zajednici, nastaloj sa pojavom građanskog društva, na kompaktnoj državno organizovanoj teritoriji i u okviru zajedničkih kulturno-duhovnih obeležja.

Nacionalizam Hans Urlih Veler definiše kao: sistem ideja, doktrina, slika sveta koja služi stvaranju, mobilizaciji i integraciji veće solidne zajednice (zvane nacija) ali pre svega legitimaciji novovremene političke vladavine. Ovu pojavu prvenstveno karakteriše nekritičko veličanje sopstvenog etniciteta kojim se zagovara ekscesivno potencirani, neprihvatljivo samoljubivi patriotizam². Nacionalističku ideologiju odlikuje apriorna isključivost i parohijalna autarhičnost, jer, kako piše Umberto Eko u studiji *Većni fašizam* „Jedna nacija dolazi do svog identiteta samo preko svojih neprijatelja”.

¹ Erih Hobsbaum, *Nacije i nacionalizam od 1780. Program, mit, stvarnost*, Beograd, 1996. Hans Urlih Veler, *Nacionalizam, istorija-forme-posledice*, Novi Sad, 2002. Patrick Geary, *Mit o nacijama*, Novi Sad, 2007. Ernest Gellner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 1997. Hugh Seton Watson, *Nacije i države*, Zagreb, 1980. Volfgang Šmale, *Istorija evropske ideje*, Beograd, 2003. Benedikt Anderson, *Nacija: zamišljena zajednica*, Beograd, 1998.

² Hans Urlih Veler, *Nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 2002, 10-11.

Zahvaljujući vodećem teoretičaru fenomena nacija i nacionalizma, Ernestu Gelneru (1925-1995), danas je široko prihvaćeno mišljenje da ne stvaraju težnje nacije nacionalizam, već nacionalizam stvara nacije³. Nedoumica oko istorijskog datovanja nacija nema - one su produkti moderne industrijske civilizacije. Nacije-države današnjice, zasnovane na etničkim principima, determinišu se kao „zamišljene zajednice“, nastale zahvaljujući pregalačtvu devetnaestovekovnih intelektualaca i političara, koji su nacional-romantizam književnosti, umetnosti, historiografije, pretočili u delatne političke programe⁴.

Zavisno od tipa nastanka istraživači su identifikovali dva tipa evropskih nacionalizama: etničko-genealoški (krvni) i građansko-teritorijalni (državni) tip. Po prvom shvatanju, u osnovi nemačkom, nacija je skup pojedinaca koje povezuje zajedničko poreklo, jezik i kultura a karakteriše ga mitotvorna svest koja idealizuje prošlost. Po drugom, francusko-američkom tipu, nacionalnost je vezana za pripadnost državi a ne poreklu, u skladu sa liberalno-prosvetiteljskim individualističkim vrednostima i dominantno je kosmopolitskog karaktera. U njima su nacionalnost i državljanstvo sinonimi, te Renan s pravom uočava da je nacionalna pripadnost u ovom slučaju svakodnevni plebiscit⁵. Balkanski nacionalizmi, među njima i srpski pripadaju geneološko-etničkom tipu, zakasnelih nacija a uprkos uglavnom sličnim jezicima i kulturnoj srodnosti na ovim prostorima, liniju razgraničenja činila je religija, za koju je ispravno rečeno da je bila vododelnica nacija, što je bio osnov za formiranje „sektarijanskog“ tipa nacionalizma ili nacionalizma „sudnjega dana“⁶.

2. Srpski nacionalizam koreni, postignuća do 1945.

Srpski nacionalizam, apstrahujući ovom prilikom njegove prethodnice, u biti je čedo srpske revolucije, započete 1804. godine ustankom protiv osmanske vlasti. Međunarodnim sporazumima određena najpre kao autonomna kneževina pod turskim suverenitetom (Hatišerif iz 1830.) a posle Berlinskog kongresa (1878.) i nezavisna kneževina i kraljevina Srbija, omogućila je nesmetan razvoj i zamah nacional-romantizma, čiji je fundamentalni cilj bio okupljanje svih etničkih Srba u jednu državnu tvorevinu. Prema čuvenoj formulaciji pominjanog Gelnera, „nacionalizam pre svega predstavlja politički princip, po kojem se političko i nacionalno jedinstvo moraju podudarati.“⁷ Međutim, od Karađorđevih ustanika, koji prvi bezuspešno pokušavaju da ostvare ovaj cilj, teško je bilo navesti šta su to srpske zemlje, dokle se prostiru i gde se mogu povući granice s drugim narodima.

Razjašnjenju ove nejasnoće i metodama ostvarenja državnog cilja imalo je intenciju da odgovori Načertanije Ilije Garašanina, interni dokument srpske Vlade iz 1844. godine. Prema nacrtu, u sastav buduće srpske države ulazile bi za početak teritorije oslabljenog Osmanskog carstva: Kneževina Srbija, Bosna, Hercegovina, Crna Gora i tzv. Stara Srbija (Kosovo i Makedonija)⁸. Ono što je Garašaniin radio na državnom planu, na

3 Ernest Gelner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 1997, 83.

4 Patrick Geary, *Mit o nacijama*, Novi Sad, 2007. ; Benedikt Anderson, *Nacija: zamišljena zajednica*, Beograd, 1998.

5 Todor Kuljić, *Tito, sociološko-istorijska studija*, Zrenjanin, 2004, 220-221.; Čedomir Popov, *Velika Srbija*, Sremski Karlovci-Novı Sad, 2007, 21-22.

6 Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*. 1, Beograd, 1989, 7-17.

7 Ernest Gelner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 1997.

8 Radoš Ljušić, *Knjiga o „Načertaniju“*, Beograd, 1993. Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji*, Zagreb,

kulturno-jezičkom je postigao Vuk Karadžić, rodonačelnik modernog srpskog jezika i pisma. U svom poznatom radu „Srbi svi i svuda”, napisanom 1836. a objavljenom 1849. on je tvrdio da su svi Južni Sloveni koji govore štokavskim narečjem Srbi. S obzirom na činjenicu da je Ilirski pokret već prihvatio štokavsko narečje za veliku većinu Hrvata, jasno je bilo da su i oni po tom kriterijumu bili uračunati u Srbe. Sledstveno tome, sve zemlje u kojima ži've „štokavski Srbi” imale su postati delom Srbije⁹.

Nakom dobijanja nezavisnosti i teritorijalnog proširenja na Berlinskom kongresu, dalji razvoj srpske države bio je opterećen dugoročnom istorijskom kontroverzom: razvoj realne srpske države i njena modernizacija po ugledu na napredna zapadnoevropska društva, što je podrazumevalo privremeno odustajanje od temeljnih vrednosti i ciljeva nacionalističke, ekspanzivne ideje ili primarno fokusiranje na teritorijalnu ekspanziju s ciljem stvaranja svesrpske države¹⁰. Političke grupacije koje su emanirale ovu ideološku dihotomiju bili su radikali i naprednjaci - prvi koji „su gledali preko plotu” a drugi, za koje se tvrdilo da ne idu „preko plotu”, tj. međunarodno priznatih granica Srbije.

Nakon završetka nestabilnog obrenovičevskog perioda, u Srbiji 1903. trajnu prevagu odnosi konzervativna, militaristička, ekspanzivna ideja a zemlja ulazi u višegodišnje razdoblje ratova iz kojih će izaći 1918. biološki desetkovana ali sa znatno uvećanom teritorijom i, verovalo se, ostvarenim nacionalnim idealima, lako su u novoj Kraljevini SHS svi Srbi konačno bili sabrani pod istim državnim krovom, oni su bili tek deo nacionalno i konfesionalno izuzetno složene građevine.

Jugoslovensko ujedinjenje izvedeno je prekasno, da bi njeni ključni etniciteti mogli biti sliveni u jednu naciju, slično Nemcima i Italijanima, ili je zajednica nastala prerano da bi se razumela i usvojila istorijska neminovnost o dovršenom procesu konstituisanja tri različite etničke grupe: Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Novonastalu državu od prvih trenutaka potresali su nacionalizmi ispoljavani kroz srpsku oslobodilačku tradiciju i intenciju da se bude *primus inter pares* južnoslovenske zajednice, čime se dodatno podjarivao pre svih hrvatski a delom i slovenački san o sopstvenoj nacionalnoj ali i državnoj emancipaciji. Pašićeva nacionalistička politika srpskog jugoslovenstva nametnula je državi centralistički vidovdanski ustavni okvir, ne uvažavajući svu složenost novostvorene zajednice. Pokušaj da se integralno jugoslovenstvo oktroiše s vrha krahirao je kao i unitaristička politika. Pod teretom ovog neuspeha napravljena je 1939. godine Banovina Hrvatska, svojevrsni hrvatski *corpus separatum*. Usvajanjem tog sporazuma, „srpsko pitanje” otvoreno je u novom obliku, zahtevom za srpskom teritorijalnom jedinicom, koja bi obuhvatila i „poslednjeg Srbina u Jugoslaviji”. Najglasniji zagovornik srpskih nacionalističkih ideja postaje u to vreme Srpski kulturni klub, koji je značajno iskoračio iz kulturnih i duboko zagazio u nacionalno ideološko polje. U SKK-u se otvoreno govorilo o deobi Bosne, proterivanju Albanaca, denacionalizaciji Makedonaca¹¹... Ostvarenje nekih od ciljeva omela je nemačka agresija na Jugoslaviju i okupatorsko komadanje zemlje.

⁹ Charles Jelavich, *South Slav Nationalisms*, Ohio, 1990. Čedomir Popov, *Velika Srbija*, Sremski Karlovci-Noví Sad, 2007.

¹⁰ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, Beograd, 2006.
u Čedomir Popov, *Velika Srbija*, Sremski Karlovci-Noví Sad, 2007.

Nosilac srpskog nacionalizma u ratu 1941-1945 bio je Ravnogorski pokret (četnici) generala Dragoljuba Mihailovića. U glavnim verzijama svog nacionalnog programa, četnici su se zalagali za prestrukturiranu Jugoslaviju, u okviru koje bi Srbi, neosporno, bili dominantan narod. Najpoznatiji četnički dokument bio je spis banjalučkog advokata i predratnog zvaničnika SKK-a Stevana Moljevića, „Homogena Srbija”. U spisu nastalom juna 1941. stoji da je prva i osnovna dužnost pred Srbima „da stvore i organizuju homogenu (etnički očišćenu - prim. M. B.) Srbiju koja ima da obuhvati celo etničko područje na kome Srbi žive...¹²” Prema Moljevićevom spisu Velika Srbija u Velikoj Jugoslaviji obuhvatala bi: Srbiju, Makedoniju, bugarski Vidin i Čustendil, Crnu Goru, Bosnu, Hercegovinu, Dubrovnik, severnu Albaniju, severnu Dalmaciju, Liku, Baniju, Kordun, deo Slavonije, Zadar s okolinom, ostrva, Vojvodinu sa Vukovarom, Vinkovcima i Osijekom, Baranju i mađarski Pečuj, te istočni (rumunski) Banat s Temišvarom i Rešicama¹³.

Iako nastao kao antiokupatorski, pod uticajem okolnosti: nemačkih odmazdi nad civilima, genocida nad Srbima u NDH, uspešnoj partizanskoj strategiji ratovanja i porazu njihove „strategije čekanja”, te uskraćivanju savezničke podrške, Ravnogorski pokret vremenom klizi u sve očigledniju kolaboraciju, koja 1944. u jesenjoj ofanzivi Nemaca i kvilinga na nadiruće partizanske i sovjetske snage postaje sasvim eksplicitna. Otvorenom kolaboracijom, neumerenim ekspanzionističkim htenjima, odmazdama nad civilnim nesrpskim stanovništvom, pre svega u istočnoj Bosni, srpski nacionalizam, oličen u četnicima, dugoročno je kompromitovan, omogućivši komunističkim pobednicima da uspostave diskutabilnu i istorijski neutemeljenu ravnotežu sa hrvatskim nacionalizmom oličenom u ustaštvu. Naredne dve decenije u Jugoslaviji je bilo vrlo malo otvorenih manifestacija srpskog nacionalizma. On je postojao, naravno i u ovom periodu ali je bio redukovano na emigrantske krugove hranjene nikad racionalisanom mržnjom i osvetničkim porivima prema svemu što je dolazilo iz socijalističke Jugoslavije. Zbog toga, ali i zbog činjenice da glas iz daleka tj. iz inostranstva nikad nije imao težinu izrečenog ili napisanog u zemlji, ovi krugovi nisu predstavljali opasnost za režim niti su bitnije uticali na intelektualnu scenu unutar Jugoslavije.

3. Uzroci otvaranja nacionalnog pitanja u Srbiji u drugoj polovini 60-ih i početkom 70-ih godina XX veka

Šezdesete godine XX veka predstavljale su nesumnjivo najburniji period razvoja druge Jugoslavije. Nasuprot veoma povoljnom spoljnopolitičkom položaju, unutrašnja kriza bila je duboka, istodobno državna i partijska, idejna i organizaciona, politička i ekonomska, društvena i moralna. Brojni i složeni problemi nagomilavani duže od jedne decenije čekali su rešenja. Fetišizovano samoupravljanje već dobro degenerisano birokratizmom, zbog svoje nedodirljivosti kočilo je dalji društveni razvoj a raspodela društvenog dohotka izazivala sve ozbiljnije međurepubličke antagonizme. Strah od

¹² M. Vesović, K. Nikolić, *Ujedinjene srpske zemlje - ravnogorski nacionalni program*, Beograd, 1996, 190-195.

¹³ Branko Petranović, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Beograd, 1992, 380-383.

Tržišnih mehanizama u privredi izazivao je nervozne reakcije narasle birokratije zabrinute za sudbinu svake akumulacije van državne kontrole. Sve izraženija svest o nepochodnosti promena i tvrdokorno odbijanje da se one pokrenu uz porast republičko-partikularnih egoizama i sve izraženiju privrednu neproduktivnost, prirodno je vodilo podsticanju nacionalizama¹⁴.

Uz ove opštejugoslovenske motive, figurirali su i sasvim osobeni srpski specifikumi, koji su generisali nacionalističku plimu u drugoj polovini šezdesetih i početkom sedamdesetih godina XX veka.

Brionski plenum - smena Rankovića 1966.

Višegodišnja koncepcijska razmimoilaženja u vrhu SKJ u vezi sa reformama privrede, decentralizacijom države, transformacijom Partije, eskalirala su sredinom 1966. u međupartijski obračun, koji se odigrao na Brionima. Strahujući da se smena Rankovića ne doživi kao antisrpski čin, Tito je duže vremena odlagao konačan razlaz¹⁵. Zaobilazeći faktografiju obračuna i njegove mehanizme, zadržao bih se na interpretaciji u delu srpske intelektualne scene. Naime, posle rata *podzemni i zagranični* srpski nacionalizam je na Rankovića gledao sa izrazitom netrpeljivošću zbog razbijanja ostataka četničke organizacije i hvatanja njenog vođe D. Mihailovića, koje je sprovodio policijski aparat pod njegovom kontrolom. Međutim, poslednjih godina na vlasti, Ranković je zbog svog konzervativizma i centralizma bio političar po meri ne samo dogmatama unutar Partije, već je svojim ključnim stavovima emanirao i deo shvatanja takođe konzervativne i centralističke ideologije srpskog nacionalizma. Nakon smene i čišćenja državnog aparata od njemu bliskih kadrova, Ranković u delu srpske nacionalističke javnosti, koja tada diže glavu, apsurdno ali i zbog delimične liberalizacije društva kojoj je zamah dalo njegovo uklanjanje, dobija oreol mučenika i zaštitnika srpstva, postradalog zbog Titove srbofobije. Najgorljiviji ali i najuticajniji zagovornik ove teze je pisac i društveno-politički radnik Dobrica Ćosić, koji Rankovića u svojim dnevnicima karakteriše kao „žrtvu i simbola nacije” (srpske nacije prim. M. B.). Pišući o raspoloženju među ljudima u Srbiji, s kojima je bio u kontaktu, nakon juna 1966. Ćosić kaže: „Opšte je uverenje da je ova afera (Brionski plenum prim. M. B.) antisrpska po motivima, karakteru, posledicama (...) Kako čujem, seljaci su na strani Rankovića. Taj pravi srpski narod odan je njemu i žali ga kao inkarnaciju Srpstva (...) Depresija, očaj, gnev, obuzeli su sve što je misleće, časno i dostojanstveno u srpskom narodu.”¹⁶ Opravdano ili ne, stvarana je nacionalna frustracija, koja će prvu javnu manifestaciju imati mnogo kasnije, na Rankovićevoj sahrani 1983. i biti nastavljena nakon sloma komunizma početkom devedesetih, kada se javlja poplava publicističke literature koja uzdiže i slavi brižljivo građen rankovićevski mit. Čak su i autori udžbenika istorije za srednjoškolce, posle petooktobarskih promena 2000-te, potrošili mnogo štamparske boje i hartije da mladima objasne ovaj nesvakidašnji fenomen.

¹⁴ Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti*, Novi Sad, 2001, 384-385.

¹⁵ Dućan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Zagreb, 1999, 489-491.

¹⁶ Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951-1968)*, Beograd, 2002, 260-279.

Pobeda Kardeljevskog koncepta decentralizacije države

Od početka šezdesetih u partijskom vrhu tinjao je sukob između dva Titova najbliža saradnika Kardelja i Rankovića. Njih dvojica su zapravo personifikovali dve u mnogo čemu suprotstavljene politike i koncepcije budućeg razvoja. Nasuprot Kardeljevim tendencijama koje su išle za većom samostalnosti republika, te istrajavale na pravu naroda na samoopredeljenje, što je neminovno vodilo u konfederalizovanje države, „rankovićevci“ su se zalagali za jedinstvenu, centralističku federaciju sa centrom u Beogradu i (pre)dominantnom ulogom Partije u društvenom životu. Politička likvidacija Rankovića, neminovno je označavala pobedu decentralizatorskog koncepta, što je među nacionalistima u Srbiji tumačeno kao velika opasnost za srpski narod, čiji se do tada jedinstveni etnički prostor drobio na nekoliko mini državica unutar Jugoslavije. Razvijajući i nadograđujući sopstveni koncept, Kardelj je čak dopuštao mogućnost da Jugoslavija jednog dana postane nešto drugo ili da potpuno nestane¹⁷. Sa stanovišta srpskog nacionalizma to je značilo derogiranje fundamentalnog cilja o jedinstvenom i nedeljivom etničkom prostoru.

Prekonponovanje federacije - Ustavni amandmani 1967-71.

Od 1967. do 1971. godine, usvojena su tri paketa ustavnih amandmana. Tim amandmanima, posmatranim kao jedna celina, uveden je novi i mnogo decentralizovaniji ustavni poredak. Uz pomoć prva dva paketa amandmana (amandmani 1-6, usvojeni 18. aprila 1967. i amandmani 7-19, usvojeni 26. decembra 1968), u velikoj meri su ograničena savezna ovlašćenja u vezi sa oporezivanjem i izvršeno je prestrukturiranje saveznog parlamenta kroz jačanje uticaja Veća naroda. Ovo veće moralo je da odobri svaki savezni zakon, a njegovi poslanici bili su strogo obavezni da zastupaju želje skupština svojih republika, koje su ih tamo poslale (neka vrsta imperativnog mandata). Radikalniji paket amandmana (amandmani 20-42, usvojeni 30. juna 1971.) iz osnova su promenili način upravljanja Jugoslavijom. Na osnovu tih amandmana, republike su dobile prvenstveni suverenitet i sva preostala ovlašćenja. Formirano je i kolektivno predsedništvo države. Konačno, amandmanima je institucionalizovan zahtev (koji se već sprovodio u praksi) da se većina saveznih odluka u vezi sa ekonomskim pitanjima, donosi konsenzusom republika i pokrajina¹⁸. Time je zapravo uvedeno pravo veta republika i pokrajina, što je predstavljalo najradikalniju meru iz 1971. godine. Ovim izmenama država je u znatnoj meri konfederalizovana, ali je i pripremljen teren za poslednje dekonponovanje kroz ustav iz 1974. Godine.

Davanje široke autonomije pokrajinama

Ustavnim amandmanima od 1968. do 1971. godine, vitalno je izmenjen položaj autonomnih pokrajina Srbije. Zahvaljujući ovim amandmanima, Kosovo i Vojvodina postali su konstitutivni elementi jugoslovenskog federalizma. Prve značajne promene

¹⁷ Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija - država koja je odumrla*, Beograd, 2003, 146.

¹⁸ Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavenski federalizam ideje i stvarnost 2*, Beograd, 1987, 383-429.

desile su se zahvaljujući paketu ustavnih amandmana, usvojenom u decembru 1968. godine. Kosovo, koje se do tada zvalo „Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija” dobilo je novi naziv, „Socijalistička Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo”. Brisanjem reči „Metohija” (koja potiče od grčke reči metoh, koja označava manastirsko imanje) iz imena pokrajine, umanjenje značaj slovenskog i pravoslavnog elementa u njenoj istoriji. U 18. Amandmanu stoji i da: „Ustavom utvrđena prava i dužnosti pokrajina neposredno štiti Federacija”¹⁹, čime se faktički „preskakala” matična Republika. Promene u organizaciji Partije odvijale su se istovremeno sa promenama u državi. U novembru 1968. godine, nekadašnji ogranci Saveza komunista Srbije za Vojvodinu i Kosovo postali su nezavisni Savezi komunista Vojvodine i Kosova.

Izlazak Ćosića iz SKJ i početak njegovog organizaciono-ideološkog rada

Maja 1968. na 14. plenumu CK SKS pisac i javni radnik Dobrica Ćosić, blizak smenjenom Rankoviću, došao je u direktan sukob sa Partijom. Oštro kritikujući politiku SK na Kosovu, zbog porasta antisrpskog raspoloženja, Ćosić je upozoravao (ili anticipirao) da bi se i u srpskom narodu mogao „razgoreti stari istorijski cilj i nacionalni ideal - ujedinjenje srpskog naroda u jedinstvenu državu”²⁰. Govor je žestoko odjeknuo u javnosti, jer se toliko razlikovao od svega što se moglo čuti do tada. Sam autor ubrzo je napustio Partiju, odbio da se pokaje i počeo oko sebe da okuplja nezadovoljne pojedince sličnog mišljenja, čija je tačka oslonca bila duboko nezadovoljstvo vladajućom politikom prema srpskom nacionalnom pitanju. Tako su udareni temelji alternativnoj političkoj platformi, čija će središnja ličnost postati sam Ćosić, 1969. izabran za predsednika Srpske književne zadruge, tada vodećeg centra nacionalističke opozicije. Okupivši oko sebe raznorodnu grupu intelektualaca: pisce, lingviste, kritičare, umetnike, pravnike, ekonomiste, filozofe i istoričare, Ćosić je stvorio novu *koaliciju*, koja je stajala na nacionalističkom stanovištu srpskog kulturnog i duhovnog jedinstva, nezavisno od postojećih republičkih granica²¹. Bila je ovo preteča širokog nacionalističkog fronta koji će postati dominantan 80-ih godina XX veka.

Albanske demonstracije na Kosovu 1968. i reaktivacija albanskog nacionalizma

Na samom kraju novembra (u vreme kad pada albanski nacionalni praznik, Dan zastave, 28. i jugoslovenski Dan Republike, 29.) 1968. dogodila se eksplozija albanskog nacionalizma kroz nasilne ulične demonstracije u više kosovskih gradova. Reaktivacija albanskog nacionalizma bila je podstaknuta demontažom Rankovićevog represivnog aparata, ali i ustavnim promenama koje su najavljivale znatno viši stepen samouprave albanskoj većini na Kosovu. Iz oštih antirežimskih i antidržavnih parola, dalo se razaznati nekoliko eksplicitnih zahteva: nezavisan univerzitet na albanskom jeziku, status republike za pokrajinu Kosovo, pa čak i ujedinjenje sa susednom Albanijom. Vlast je rušilački karakter demonstracija okvalifikovala kao „kontrarevoluciju”

19 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti*, Novi Sad, 2001, 407.

20 Dobrica Ćosić, *Stvarno i moguće*, Rijeka, 1982, 63.

21 Jasna Dragović Soso, *Spasioci nacije*, Beograd, 2004, 73-74.

i uz upotrebu sile brzo ugušila. Novi partijski vrh Srbije na čelu sa Markom Nikezićem delovao je trezveno, ne prikrivajući dramatičnost trenutka, ali i ne unoseći paniku, strahujući od uzvratne reakcije srpskog nacionalizma²².

Ekspanzija nacionalizma u Hrvatskoj u vreme maspoka

Najintenzivniji i najdramatičniji nacionalistički pokret u Jugoslaviji bio je prisutan u Hrvatskoj od 1967. do 1971. u historiografiji poznat kao *Hrvatsko proljeće* ili *maspok*. Njegove početke treba tražiti još u 1967. kada je objavljena *Deklaracija o hrvatskom književnom jeziku*, kojom se tražilo razdvajanje od srpskog jezika i priznavanje hrvatskog kao posebnog književnog jezika. Uz jezičke, važni motivi ovog pokreta bila su i negodovanja zbog ekonomskog položaja Hrvatske u vezi sa raspodelom deviznih prihoda od turizma na jadranskoj obali. U periodu između Desete sednice CK SKH, u januaru 1970. godine (kada se hrvatsko partijsko rukovodstvo zapravo stavilo na čelo nacionalnog pokreta u procvatu, objavivši da unitarizam predstavlja veću opasnost od hrvatskog nacionalizma), i studentskih demonstracija, u novembru 1971. godine (na kojima se tražilo da Hrvatska dobije svog predstavnika u UN, vlastite oružane snage, zasebnu spoljnu politiku...), taj pokret se proširio, radikalizovao i izmakao partijskoj kontroli. Krajem 1971. godine, Tito (koji je prethodno davao podršku pokretu), ugušio ga je prisilivši u srpskom Karađorđevu, na dan stvaranja prve jugoslovenske države (1. 12. 1971.), hrvatske partijske rukovodioce da podnesu ostavke²³, lako se srpsko *liberalno* rukovodstvo trudilo da ne odgovara simetrijom na provalu hrvatskog nacionalizma, ali i separatizma, nemoguće je bilo izbeći efekat sistema spojenih sudova dve antagonističke nacionalne ideologije, pre svega kroz frekventnije nacionalističke istupe srpske inteligencije, usmerene ka sve izraženijoj zabrinutosti nad sudbinom za Srba u Hrvatskoj.

Politička liberalizacija u Srbiji nakon 1968.

Novi kurs u srpskoj Partiji bio je označen dolaskom Marka Nikezića i Latinke Perović, za predsednika i sekretara CK SKS 1968. godine. Karakterisali su ih otvoreno zalaganje za demokratsku transformaciju društva i političkih odnosa, negiranje administrativno-represivnih mera, insistiranje na dijalogu sa neistomišljenicima i ubeđenje u superiornost idejne akcije komunista. Bio je to srpski pokušaj „socijalizma sa ljudskim likom“, koji će 1972. imati isti epilog kao i onaj četiri godine raniji čehoslovački, ali će u naznačenom periodu dovesti do najšire liberalizacije političkog života nakon 1945. godine. Novonastale okolnosti srpski nacionalizam se trudio da iskoristi za promociju sopstvenog vrednosnog sistema, što mu je uglavnom i uspevalo uprkos čestih režimskih napada na njih²⁴.

²² Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*, Sarajevo, 1991, 80-85; Peđa Marković, „*SDB i albanske demonstracije na Kosovu 1968.*“ u *Istorija XX veka*, 1-2, Beograd, 1999, 169-180; Miloš Mišović, *Koje tražio republiku*, Beograd, 1986, 207-238.

²³ Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Zagreb, 1999; Savka Dabčević Kučar, '71. *Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost*, Zagreb, 1997; Miko Tripalo, *Hrvatsko proljeće*, Zagreb, 1990.

²⁴ Marko Nikezić, *Krhka srpska vetikala*, Beograd, 2003; Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*, Sarajevo, 1991; Zdravko Vuković, *Od deformacija SDB-a do maspoka i liberalizma*, Beograd, 1989; Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969-1980)*, Beograd, 2001.

Temeljne programske odrednice Nikezićevih reformista

Jedna od pet idejnih postavki reformskog rukovodstva u Srbiji bila je politika *čistih računa* sa ostalim republikama i oslobađanje od balasta srpskog jugoslovenstva, tj. napuštanje politike da je Srbija čuvar Jugoslavije, te da je ovoj republici zajednička država potrebija nego drugima²⁵. Prvi put od nastanka južnoslovenske zajednice, jedna vladajuća politička elita nije Srbiju identifikovala sa Jugoslavijom a kada se tome doda pominjana istrajnost na decentralizaciji, biva jasnija uznemirenost i intenzivirana aktivnost glavnih protagonista srpskog nacionalizma. Kao što su insistirali da Srbija nije pozvana da brani Jugoslaviju, *liberali* su odbacivali i svaku ideju da bi Srbija mogla ili trebalo da deluje kao zaštitnica Srba u drugim republikama. U svom govoru u Sarajevu 1970. godine, Nikezić je izrazio stav da su Srbi u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvatskoj jednaki sa drugim narodima koji tamo žive, tako da bi svaka ambicija od strane Srbije da se ponaša kao njihov zaštitnik predstavljala „čist nacionalizam“.

Religijsko-crkveni motivi

Srpska pravoslavna crkva, iako je našla *modus vivendi* sa ateističkim režimom i relativno samostalno delovala, bila je jedno od uporišta antikomunističkog nacionalizma. U periodu o kome je reč, mogu se identifikovati dva događaja koji su posebno provocirali otvaranje srpskog nacionalnog pitanja. Posle višegodišnjih sporova a nakon eskalacije sukoba od jeseni 1966. na zvaničnoj ceremoniji održanoj od 16. do 19. jula 1967. godine. Makedonska crkva je sebe jednostrano proglasila autokefalnom. Jugoslovenska vlast, a naročito SK Makedonije, pružio je punu podršku ovom aktu, a zvaničnoj ceremoniji prisustvovali su visoki zvaničnici kako iz republike, tako i iz federacije. U zvaničnim napisima u štampi, autokefalnost se pozdravljala više u političkom, nego u verskom smislu, kao konačna pobeda suvereniteta Makedonije. Sporno pitanje makedonske nacije, za srpski nacionalizam ovime je postalo znatno iritantnije, podsetivši na istorijske velikodržavne pretenzije, kako srpskih crkveno-nationalističkih krugova, tako i grčkih i bugarskih²⁶.

Drugi, uslovno rečeno verski motiv bilo je rušenje Njegoševe kapele na Lovčenu. Naime, decembra 1968. godine, Opštinska skupština Cetinja donela je odluku o podizanju Njegoševog mauzoleja na Lovčenu po decenijama staroj zamisli i projektu Ivana Meštrovića. U februaru 1969, Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture CG dao je odobrenje opštini Cetinje da „izmesti kapelu“. Sveti arhijerejski sabor Srpske pravoslavne crkve izdao je saopštenje po kome se ne može saglasiti sa odlukom da se Njegoševa zadužbina, posvećena svetom Petru Cetinjskom, sruši, poredeći takav čin sa rušenjem kapele u vreme austrijske okupacije. Međutim, opštinska skupština Cetinja donela je jednoglasno, marta 1969. godine, neopozivu odluku o podizanju mauzoleja na mestu kapele. Poput Crkve i nacionalistički krugovi u Srbiji žestoko su se protivili ovom činu, gledajući u tome svetogrđe, skrnavljenje Vladikinog groba i nastavak procesa „rasrbljavanja“ Crne Gore i preinačavanja smisla Njegoševog dela²⁷.

²⁵ Slavoljub Đukić, *Slom srpskih liberala*, Beograd, 1990, 25.

²⁶ Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970.2*, Beograd, 2002, 279-291.

²⁷ Mihailo Đurić, „Kamen razdora“, u *Umetnost* 27/28, Beograd, 1971, 186-187.

4. Najzapaženije manifestacije otvaranja srpskog nacionalnog pitanja u drugoj polovini 60-ih i početkom 70-ih godina XX veka

Konkretno manifestacije svakako su manje značajne od uzroka istraživane pojave i istorijskog konteksta u kojima se ona javlja. Uz neke pomenute ranije, navešćemo najparadigmatičnije i najzapaženije slučajeve.

Predlog za razmišljanje iz 1967. godine predstavljao je odgovor grupe srpskih pisaca na hrvatsku *Deklaraciju o nazivu i položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika*. Inicijatori Predloga bili su književnici Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz i Antonije Isaković. Dokument počinje potpunim prihvatanjem zahteva, iznetih u hrvatskoj Deklaraciji. Autori su izjavili da oni priznaju „neotuđivo pravo” svakog naroda da izabere naziv i kontroliše razvoj sopstvenog jezika i da, na toj osnovi, oni prihvataju zahtev za jezičkom podelom izražen u *Deklaraciji*. Nakon toga, međutim, oni iznose prava srpskog jezika, zahtevajući da beogradska televizija „prestane da neovlašćeno igra ulogu centralnog jugoslovenskog studija i da uvede ćirilicu u lokalne programe”, te da se Srbima u Hrvatskoj garantuje pravo na „nezavisan razvoj nacionalnog jezika i kulture”. Rečju, ako Hrvati ispoljavaju svoju želju da ostvare kulturnu autonomiju u odnosu na Jugoslaviju, onda će istovetna prava morati da garantuju Srbima u svojoj republici²⁸.

Na pominjanju 14. sednici CK SKS maja 1968. zapažene nacionalističke istupe imali su istoričar dr Jovan Marjanović i pisac Dobrica Ćosić. Marjanović je kritikujući nacionalnu politiku SK, posebno apostrofirao priznavanje muslimanske nacije, nazvavši taj potez Partije „besmislenim”, a naročitu brigu pokazao je za položaj srpskog naroda van Srbije i njegovu ugroženost na Kosovu. Akcenat u svom istupu Ćosić je stavio na „zastrašivanje i ugroženost Srba” na Kosovu, ne zaobilazeći u svojoj osudi „albanskog iredentizma” ni „retrogradni partikularizam” vojvođanskog autonomaštva²⁹.

Vodeće institucionalno uporište srpskog nacionalizma u ovom periodu postaje bezmalto stoletna Srpska književna zadruga. Za njenog predsednika 1969. izabran je Dobrica Ćosić, što je u državnim krugovima ispravno shvaćeno kao pokušaj okupljanja nacionalističke opozije. Članovi rukovodstva ove tradicionalne ustanove, osnovane radi pomoći srpskoj kulturi, uz Ćosića bili su i pisac Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz, slikar Mića Popović, lingvista Pavle Ivić, filozofi Mihajlo Đurić i Mihajlo Marković, ekonomista Kosta Mihajlović i istoričar Radovan Samardžić³⁰. Time je stvoreno antirežimsko jezgro pod Ćosićevim vođstvom, čiji je osnovni vezivni element bila njegova nacionalna platforma „kulturnog i duhovnog jedinstva srpskog naroda bez obzira na postojeće republičke ili državne granice.”³¹ Bila je to esencija i preteča širokog nacionalnog pokreta iz osamdesetih godina XX veka.

Na godišnjoj skupštini Zadruga, 1971. Ćosić je u svom referatu u jeku ustavnih promena u Jugoslaviji aktuelizovao problem srpskog kulturno-duhovnog jedinstva: „To sadržinsko i istorijsko jedinstvo srpske nacionalne kulture, jedinstvo bez obzira na državne granice... do naših dana osporavali su samo Austro-Ugarska i Treći rajh.”³² Prvi

²⁸ Jasna Dragović Soso, *Spasioci nacije*, Beograd, 2004, 62-65.

²⁹ *Četrnaestasednica CKSKS*, Beograd, 1968.

³⁰ Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Istorija SKZ*, Brograd, 1992.

³¹ Slavoljub Đukić, *Dobrica Ćosić - čovek u svom vremenu. Razgovori sa Dobricom Ćosićem*, Beograd, 1989, 209.

³² Dobrica Ćosić, *Stvarno i moguće*, Rijeka, 1982, 120.

put od kraja II svetskog rata tema nacionalnog (ali i državnog) jedinstva postaje dominantna među srpskom inteligencijom. Vladajući komunisti, prvi put u zemlji se javno porede i izjednačavaju sa neprijateljima Srpstva, što će u budućnosti biti jedan od najčešćih lajt motiva antikomunističkog delovanja.

Jedna od najistaknutijih manifestacija zabrinutosti nad ugroženim nacionalnim jedinstvom srpskog etničkog prostora u ovom periodu bila je javna rasprava o trećem talasu ustavnih amandmana iz 1971. održana u martu te godine na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu³³. Veliki broj učesnika rasprave, uglavnom pravnika i filozofa, smatrao je da je proces decentralizacije otišao predaleko, te da su ugroženi bezbednost zemlje i zajedničko tržište. Nazivajući predložene amandmane „istorijskim promašajem i politički neuravnoteženom naučnom zbrkom” Andrija Garns je rekao kako se Srbija našla u situaciji da bude nepravedno optužena za centralističke pretenzije i hegemoniju, te daje pod prinudom prihvatila politiku koja je „suprotna njenim interesima”³⁴. Na meti kritika posebno su se našla proširenja pokrajinskih ingerencija, koje su dignute na rang konstituenata Federacije, čime se Srbija našla u podređenom i neravnopravnom položaju u odnosu na ostale republike. Tako se Pavle Ristić zapitao zbog čega je Albancima data autonomija u Srbiji, a ne i u Makedoniji ili Crnoj Gori, zašto je Vojvodini u kojoj većinski žive Srbi uopšte data autonomija a nisu je dobili Srbi u Hrvatskoj. Ristić je anticipirao da će ovakva ustavna rešenja kao najznačajniju posledicu imati „jačanje nacionalističkih osećaja Srba, usled osećanja podređenosti i nejednakog tretmana njihove matične republike”, te dramatično upozoravao da ova rešenja vode ka „postepenoj dezintegraciji socijalističke Srbije u granice koje nisu ni etničke, ni nacionalne, ni istorijske”³⁵. Većina učesnika je bila saglasna sa ovim stavom, a neki su otišli i dalje tvrdeći da se može očekivati „formiranje šest ili osam nezavisnih država na ovom tlu”.

Ipak, najdalje u ovoj vrsti kritike otišao je profesor Filozofskog fakulteta Mihailo Đurić, čiji će slučaj te, i naredne godine, dosta zaokupiti pažnju intelektualne i političke scene. Na pomenutoj raspravi na Pravnom fakultetu, Đurić je u neobično oštro intoniranom govoru, prenetom u *Analima Pravnog fakulteta* i u *Studentu*, između ostalog rekao: „Treba biti načisto s tim da je Jugoslavija već danas gotovo samo geografski pojam, budući da se na njenom tlu, ili tačnije, na njenim razvalinama (...) uspostavlja nekoliko samostalnih, nezavisnih, čak i međusobno suprotstavljenih nacionalnih država (...) Ali ne pada mi ni na kraj pameti da se zalažem za spašavanje po svaku cenu nečega što se ne može spasti i što (...) nije ni vredelo stvarati”. Nasuprot tome cilj kome bi vredelo težiti po Đuriću je pitanje „identiteta i integriteta” srpskog naroda, tačnije „pitanje njegovog političkog, njegovog državno-pravnog objedinjavanja” jer „granice sadašnje SR Srbije nisu nikakve ni nacionalne ni istorijske granice srpskog naroda (...) Neprikladnost, proizvoljnost i neodrživost tih granica postaje očigledna onda kada se one shvate kao granice nacionalnih država”. U svom govoru Đurić je naglasio da su izuzev u slučaju Slovenije, postojeće međurepubličke granice neadekvatne za sve

³³ Treba imati u vidu vreme održavanja rasprave, mart 1971. kada u Hrvatskoj razmere nacionalističkog pokreta dostižu vrhunac.

³⁴ *Analisa Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu*, broj 3, maj-jun 1971, 234-240.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 214-220.

ostale, apostrofirajući da se čak 40% Srba nalazi izvan Srbije, prema kojima srpski narod ne može da ostane ravnodušan, kako je rekao, jer ni u jednoj od ostalih republika u kojima žive, Srbi „ne žive svojski”, tj. nalaze se u neravnopravnom položaju. U svom istupu, Đurić je ustvrdio da su Srbi nepravedno optuženi za centralizam i unitarizam, koji su po njemu, posle rata sprovedeni zato „da bi se sprečilo postavljanje pitanja nacionalnih odgovornosti za genocid koji je za vreme II svetskog rata počinjen nad srpskim narodom”. Na kraju pozivajući sve Srbe na okup Đurić je apelovao na otrežnjenje od „zabluda prošlosti”, te da „srpski narod mora da se okrene sebi, mora početi da misli na svoj opstanak, mora početi da se bori za svoj opasno ugroženi nacionalni identitet i integritet”³⁶. Ovaj višestruko važan i paradigmatičan govor, otvorenije i jasnije od drugih je davao smernice i okvire srpskog nacionalizma u nastupanju. Jugoslavija je po Đuriću bila neuspešan projekat na čijim razvalinama bi, poništavajući avnojevske granice, trebalo napraviti državu koja će nastati sabiranjem srpskog etničkog prostora. Bila je to nedvosmislena anticipacija ili predskazanje dominantnog diskursa s kraja 80-ih i u devedesetim, kao i pomenuta kolektivna, ili kako je rekao „nacionalna krivica” Hrvata za genocid nad Srbima. Zbog svega izrečenog, od čega je nešto ponovljeno i u drugom spornom istupu, povodom rušenja Njegoševe kapele na Lovčenu, Đurić je izdržao višemesečnu zatvorsku kaznu.

Drugi politički zatvorenik iz ovog perioda, takođe je bio predstavnik opozicionog antikomunističkog nacionalizma vladika žički Vasilije Kostić³⁷, čiji je inkriminisan govor u selu Brezna, oktobra 1971. išao za tim da reafirmiše nekadašnju monarhističku himnu „Bože pravde” i žestoko osuđivao režim zbog nepoštovanja Crkve i srpske tradicije³⁸.

Pod manifestacije nacionalizma u ovom periodu, mogu se podvesti i dve knjige objavljene 1971. Prva, povučena iz prodaje, nakon što je rasprodat skoro ceo tiraž, *Moć i strepnje*, Dobrice Ćosića, sadržala je uglavnom njegove govore i beleške o kulturi i kulturnoj politici. Crvena nit koja se provlači kroz čitavo štivo je svest o kolosalnoj ugroženosti srpskog kulturno-duhovnog nasleđa i potreba njegovog objedinjavanja³⁹. Novosadski profesor lingvistike Pavle Ivić, objavio je iste godine knjigu *Srpski narod i njegov jezik*. Uvaženi lingvista je u knjizi, rušeći dotadašnje tabue, tvrdio da „srpskim jezikom govore i oni koji nisu Srbi”, te da je „Dubrovnik po jeziku uvek bio srpski”. Knjiga Pavla Ivića se zalaže i za promenu imena jezika iz srpskohrvatskog u srpski „ako bi se pokazalo da se jezičko zajedništvo ne može održati”, čime su jezički „raskolnici” iz maspoka dobili simetriju i među srpskim jezikoslovcima⁴⁰.

Manje zapaženih nacionalističkih manifestacija bilo je više puta tokom burne 1971. u *Ježu*, gde se po nacionalističkim istupima isticao Branislav Crnčević i u *Književnim novinama*.

Nakon smene hrvatskog rukovodstva u decembru 1971. u celoj Jugoslaviji se pojačavala antinacionalistička retorika, dostižući razmere histerije, kako su se žalili neki od progonjenih⁴¹. Svaka sredina bila je dužna da „počisti u svom dvorištu”, a naj-

36 Ibid, 230-233.; Mihailo Đurić, *Izazov nihilizma - iskustvo razlike*, Beograd, 1997, 198-203.

37 O njegovom odnosu s vlastima vidi u: Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970*. 1-2, Beograd, 2002.

38 Radisav Celić, *Branio sam Vladiku žičkog dr Vasilija*, Kraljevo, 1995. 17-24; NIN, broj 1085, 24.10.1971, 20-21.

39 Dobrica Ćosić, *Moć i strepnje*, Beograd, 1971; NIN, broj 1097, 16.1.1972, 15.

40 Pavle Ivić, *Srpski narod i njegov jezik*, Beograd, 1971; NIN, broj 1121, 2.7.1972, 32-34.

41 Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969-1980)*, Beograd, 2001, 75; 83; 122.

jači pritisak dogmatskih snaga u Partiji bio je na srpski CK i njegovog predsednika Nikezića i sekretara Perovićevu. Sužavao se njihov manevarski prostor i tražila *direktna akcija*.

Epilog su bile njihove ostavke i smena srpskog rukovodstva u oktobru 1972. Usledile su temeljne i dubinske čistke u Partiji, medijima, privrednim kolektivima i kulturnim institucijama viđenim kao centri otpora režimu. Srpski nacionalizam oteran je u duboku ilegalu, čekajući trenutak za ponovno pojavljivanje na javnoj sceni.

Nesumnjivo da je srpski nacionalizam postojao i pre perioda o kome je reč, ali su njegove manifestacije bile sporadične, pojedinačne, incidentnog i uglavnom podzemnog (nejavnog) karaktera. Posle 1966. srpski nacionalizam nastupa sve organizovanije, postavljaju se temelji njegovog dugoročnog delovanja a on sam iako ponovo potisnut u podzemlje nakon pobede dogmatskog kursa među srpskim komunistima, čekaće trenutak da iskoristi sopstvenu kompatibilnost sa konzervativnim državnim socijalizmom. Njihova sinergija postignuta posle VIII sednice CK SKS 1987. iznedriće sistem kome metodološki precizni i teorijski pismeni proučavaoci još uvek nisu dali adekvatan naziv.

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Ilir Kalemaj

NACIONALIZAM I ODNOS DRŽAVE PREMA SOPSTVENOM RODU: IRENTIZAM U SRPSKOJ SPOUNOJ POLITICI

Uvod

Zadatak ovog rada je analiza srpske inostrane politike i odnosa sa srodnim stanovništvom u susednim državama. Srbija je aktivno podržavala iredentizam tokom perioda koji je vodio raspadu Jugoslavije i to sa različitim stepenom uspeha. Iredentizam možemo da definišemo kao državnu podršku aneksiji susednih teritorija nastanjenih srodnim etnicitetom¹. Često se zasniva na prethodnim stvarnim ili navodnim istorijskim posedima drevnih teritorija koje je neophodno povratiti. Proračunati političari instrumentalizuju ove okolnosti, toliko karakteristične za Balkan, u svojim predizbornim kampanjama. To je bilo posebno naglašeno u srpskoj politici, sa razlikama u intenzitetu zavisno od vremena i prostora. Široko je rasprostranjeno uverenje da se za iredentizam plaća visoka cena „bilo koji pokušaj ponovnog ujedinjenja teritorija nastanjenih etnički srodnim stanovništvom će zasigurno uvesti u sukob susedne države čije su teritorije zahtevane²“. Iako su mnogi autori ponudili različita objašnjenja uzroka koji vode i utiču na iredentističke stavove³, malo ili nimalo sistematičnosti posvetili su „društvenim idejama, interesima i institucijama“ koji su „uticali na ponašanje države, oblikujući zahteve koji su od najvećeg državnog značaja i u senci strateških proračuna vlada⁴“. Dakle, moje pitanje je: kako ove društvene ideje, interesi i institucije formiraju spoljnu politiku prema etnički srodnom stanovništvu koje živi sa one strane granice. Drugo, zašto se ovo u nekim periodima dešava, a u drugim ne?

Pregled literature

Srpski iredentizam bio je i selektivan i nedosledan⁵ i stručnjaci su koristili različite pristupe da objasne skrivene razloge toga. Neki od ovih autora dali su prioritet domaćim faktorima u stvaranju agresivne spoljne politike prema srodnim susedima; drugi su naglašavali spoljašnje faktore. V.P. Ganjon mlađi objasnio je srpsku agresiju kao deo strategije koju sprovodi srpska elita da bi zadržala svoje pozicije dok, u stvari, pretnja njihovoj poziciji raste iznutra⁶. On kaže da su Milošević i vladajući konzervativci pokušali

1 Stephen M. Saideman. *Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia*, Security Studies, Vol.7, No.3, 1998, str.53

2 Stephen M. Saideman. *Irredentism and its absence: International Pressures versus Domestic Dynamics*, in Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *War and Peace in the Aftermath of Communism*, forthcoming.

3 Videti kao primer, Naomi Chazan (ed.), *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder, CO: L. Rienner publishers; London: Admantine Press, 1991; Stephen M. Saideman. *Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia*, Security Studies, Vol.7, No.3, 1998; Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. London: University of California Press, 2000; Stephen M. Saideman. *Irredentism and its absence: International Pressures versus Domestic Dynamics*, in Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *War and Peace in the Aftermath of Communism*, forthcoming; Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses from the 1980s and 1990s*, The Journal of Politics, Vol.62, No.4. (Nov., 2000), str. 1126-1144

4 Andrew Moravcsik. *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, International Organization, Vol.51, No.4. (Autumn, 1997), str. 514.

5 Saideman and Ayres, str. 56.

6 V. P. Gagnon, Jr. *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004, str. 87

da redefinišu interese svojih birača i protivnika koristeći etničke termine i to da bi smanjili rizik od gubitka izbora zbog ekonomskog kolapsa⁷. Da bi to postigli sproveli su strategiju „demobilizacije”, koju Ganjon opisuje kao „proces u kojem su pojedinci, koji su ranije već politički mobilisani ili koji su bili u procesu mobilizacije, učutkivani, marginalizovani i uklonjeni iz javne sfere”⁸. Ganjon se tako usmerava na domaće faktore, rešavajući problem od vrha ka nižim slojevima i argumentuje da elita utiče na mase vođenjem i zavaravanjem.

Ganjonov pristup je na nivou opšte konvencionalne mudrosti koja vidi elitu kao racionalne, proračunate igrače, koji koriste svoju poziciju da bi „instrumentalizovali” mase sa jednom mišlju: zadržati svoju poziciju i pritom steći moć i materijalna sredstva na druge načine. On, dakle, smatra da je srpska elita provocirala etnički sukob da bi uspešno zadržala moć⁹. Ovo viđenje, međutim, ne obraća dovoljno pažnje na druge mogućnosti koje su mogle uzrokovati iredentizam kao što su: glasačko telo, spoljni uticaji ili drugi društveni faktori. Još jedan prigovor ovoj teoriji na koji ukazuje Sajdeman kritikujući Ganjonovo shvatanje iredentizma kao „relativno dosledno”¹⁰, naglašava značajne razlike u shvatanju iredentizma u slučaju Srbije. Potpuno suprotan pristup ima Sajdeman, od nižih slojeva ka vrhu, što objašnjava time da izborna jedinica vrši uticaj na političke odluke a ne obrnuto. On spominje „biračko telo”¹¹ koje u demokratskim sistemima predstavlja jezgro glasača koji podržavaju političku partiju na vlasti. Sajdeman dalje objašnjava da su interesi ovog biračkog tela ti koji utiču na elitu da donosi odluke i bilo kakvi otvoreni iredentistički stavovi preuzeti su sa saglašavanjem i željama ovih birača. Glavni cilj političara u takvom slučaju postaje sprečavanje biračkog tela da promeni svoje stavove.

*Ukoliko se pojavi pretnja da će osokoljeno biračko telo da promeni mišljenje, političari koji zavise od njih postaće nametljiviji. A ako, sa druge strane, pitomiji glasači zaprete napuštanjem svojeg političkog favorita, spoljna politika će postati susretljivija i sklonija saradnji*¹².

U jednom drugom članku Sajdeman kritikuje teoriju „ranjivosti” koja opisuje etničke sukobe¹³ i koja kaže da države koje su sklonije iredentističkoj retorici u okviru svoje teritorije mnogo sklonije i vođenju iredentističke politike. U nastavku Sajdeman naglašava koliko je etnička povezanost značajna prilikom donošenja političkih odluka¹⁴. Etnička povezanost je na izvestan način iskonski sjedinjena sa glasačkim telom, koje zauzvrat ima uticaja na političare.

7 Gagnon, str. 88.

8 Za detaljnije objašnjenje ove strategije „demobilizacije” videti Gagnonov uvod.

9 V. P. Gagnon Jr., *Ethnic nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia*, *International Security* 19, No.3 (winter 1994/95): 135-137. str. 135

10 Saideman, *Inconsistent Irredentism*, str. 60.

11 Saideman and Ayres, radi detaljnijeg objašnjenja pojma „selectorate”, pogledati Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. Autori smatraju, između ostalog, da politički opstanak zavisi od dve osnovne grupacije, pobedničke koalicije i glasačkog tela (selectorate prim, prev.); obe su izvučene iz celokupne populacije u državi. Pobednička koalicija je podgrupa glasačkog tela, a glasačko telo podgrupa celokupne populacije. Glasačko telo su prosto svi oni koji imaju pravo glasa u državi

12 Saideman, *Inconsistent Irredentism*, str. 63.

13 Videti, između ostalih, Jeffrey Herbst. *The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa*, *International Organization* 43 (4), 1989. str. 673-692.

14 Stephen M. Saideman. *Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties*, *International Organization* 51, 4, (Autumn 1997), str. 725-726.

Sajdemanov argument se može dovesti u pitanje na dva, suštinski različita načina. Prvo, svodeći uzroke iredentizma na samo jedan aspekt, on ne uspeva da obezbedi celokupan dosledan korpus varijacija koji prati iredentizam. Drugo, uzimajući u obzir stavove i osećanja biračkog tela kao nepromenljive, Sajdeman ne uspeva da prepoznade druge mogućnosti kao što su uticaj različitih ideja ili interesa koji bi mogli da oblikuju stavove glasača¹⁵.

Uprkos razlikama, ono što Ganjon i Saideman imaju zajedničko je da obojica govore o unutrašnjim razlozima za izbijanje etničkog sukoba koji je doveo do raspada Jugoslavije. Potpuno isključuju moguće uticaje koji su mogli doći od spoljašnjih faktora, kao što je priznanje Slovenije i Hrvatske od strane Nemačke početkom devedesetih moglo da dovede do novog bezbednosnog problema. Ili veliki broj srpske manjine koji je doveden u opasnost u novim nezavisnim državama, kao na primer u Hrvatskoj, gde bi Tuđmanova nacionalistička politika mogla da ugrozi njihove gole živote. Takvi pristupi izgleda da zanemaruju značaj moćnih spoljašnjih igrača na spoljnu politiku zemlje, kao što je dijaspora ili uticajne međunarodne organizacije, tj. intervencije trećih učesnika.

Drugi autori, kao što su Karment i Harvi, više se fokusiraju na spoljne faktore i veruju da je kombinacija prisile i, manje ili više, opravdanih pretnji zadala odlučujući udarac srpskoj spoljnoj politici. Povećanjem pritiska potpomognutog raznoraznim kredibilnim pretnjama međunarodnih igrača, primećuje se da Beograd smanjuje čvrstinu svojih iredentističkih stavova i, bar u zvaničnim izjavama, postaje umereniji u komunikaciji sa srpskim manjinama u okruženju. Između ostalog, oni zaključuju da „od izbijanja sukoba u Bosni, mnogo se lakše strane sile odlučuju da upotrebe vazdušne napade da bi Srbe naterale da sednu za pregovarački sto.”¹⁶ Ovi autori takođe smatraju da, da nije bilo NATO intervencija i pritisaka u Bosni, „nikada ne bi bila razbijena pat pozicija i nikada ne bi postigli sporazum u Dejtonu.”¹⁷ Jasno se vidi da oni naglašavaju spoljašnje uticaje i intervencije trećih strana i smatraju da su ti faktori ključni prilikom formiranja nacionalne spoljne politike.

„Društveno informisan” iredentizam i spoljna intervencija

Cilj ovog rada jeste da pokaže da za srpsku iredentističku politiku nije odgovoran samo jedan vođa, niti grupa oligarha koji donose odluke, a ni „vladavina mase” u celini, kada je biračko telo ono koje ima poslednju reč u donošenju odluka. Pokušaću da ukazem na to da postoje mnogi faktori koji su previđani u postojećoj literaturi a koji su takođe mogli da utiču na putanju kojom se kretala srpska spoljna politika. U nacrtu Moravčikove liberalne teorije o međuvladama (liberal intergovernmentalism, *prim, prev*) raspravlja se o ulogama ovih društvenih ideja, interesa i institucija i naglašava se značaj njihovog uticaja na raznolikost stavova iredentističke politike prema inostranstvu. One su te koje zamenjuju rasprostranjeno nezadovoljstvo građana postojećim stanjem, trenutnim nezadovoljstvom koje dolazi od osećaja ugroženosti zbog same pripadnosti

¹⁵ Takav uticaj ideja i/ili interesa mogu se videti kada reke etnički srodnih izbeglica, isteranih iz svojih domova, potraže utočišta u svojim matičnim zemljama i, na svoje iznenađenje, nađu na svoju etničku braću koja ih gledaju sa visine i psihološki zlostavlja. Ovo je bio slučaj sa Muslimanima koji idu u Sarajevo, ili Srbima koji idu u Beograd, ili Hrvatima koji se vraćaju u Zagreb.

¹⁶ Carment, David and Frank Harvey. *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence*. London: Praeger, 2001, str. 30.

¹⁷ Ibid

određenoj (ugroženoj) etničkoj grupaciji. Ti pojmovi su neraskidivo povezani jer ideje i interesi često rađaju institucije dok, sa druge strane, iz institucija proizilaze mnogobrojne ideje i interesi. U srpskoj politici osnovne društvene ideje su u senci stvaranja odnosa Srbije sa stranim zemljama o čemu svedoče nacrti tekstova Načertanije iz XIX veka koji je napisao Ilija Garašanin, tadašnji ministar spoljnih poslova¹⁸, i skorašnji Memorandum iz 1987. Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti. Akademija je jedna od najbitnijih institucija koje su u novije vreme uticale na politiku Beograda sa značajnim uspehom i uticale na radikalizovanje stava o nacionalnom pitanju. Pravoslavna crkva je još jedna takva institucija koja je značajno uticala na odluke iz Beograda i često izlazila u javnost sa ekstremnim stavovima o nacionalnom pitanju. Interesi su blisko vezani za ove grupe bliske centru moći na koje samo utiču, bez aktivnog učestvovanja u donošenju odluka. Za potrebe ovog rada podelićemo ih u dve najhitnije kategorije: dijaspora i mafijaške grupe¹⁹. Stav iznet u radu je da postoje dva glavna faktora koji zajednički deluju i međusobno sarađuju, obezbeđujući moćnog pokretača u spoljnoj politici i proizvedeći raznolikost u iredentizmu. Prvi faktor je uloga donosioca programa koju institucije i interesne grupe imaju dok utiču na političke rezultate. Ovde se pozivam na liberalnu teoriju o međuvladama da bih postavio sledeće hipoteze:

Hipoteza 1: *Ako moćni društveni činioци (pojedinci, lobiji ili institucije) usmeravaju spoljnu politiku prema srodnom stanovništvu koje živi u inostranim zemljama, onda su oni ti koji imaju ulogu katalizatora promena i postavljaju plan i program političkim vođama.*

Hipoteza 2: *Pripadnici političke elite, sa druge strane, nemaju drugog izbora nego da ispune obećanja koja su javno dali, te zbog svog neuspeha u tome iznevere svoje birače.*

Drugi faktor je spoljašnji i ima veze sa stepenom i posvećenošću spoljašnjih činilaca u menjanju ciljeva na domaćem terenu koristeći oba motivaciona sredstva: saradnju u zajedničkim ciljevima, tzv „šargarepe” i mehanizme pritisaka „štapove”. Efikasna upotreba oba ova vaspitna mehanizma pravi snažnu polugu koja navodi političko vođstvo u datoj zemlji da promeni kurs svoje spoljne politike.

Hipoteza 3a: *Kada su političari suočeni sa „slabašnim” spoljnim pretnjama ili su nedovoljno podstaknuti za saradnju, oni se više uzdaju u svoje postojeće planove i programe domaćih društvenih činilaca.*

Hipoteza 3b: *Ukoliko su političari suočeni sa ozbiljnom pretnjom ili moćnim podsticajem za saradnju, onda oni sami teže saradnji i povlače svoje iredentističke zahteve čak i kada su ovi zahtevi nametani od uticajnih društvenih grupa i institucija.*

Analiza potonje studije srpskog slučaja pomoći će nam da ove hipoteze proverimo na iskustvenim otkrićima, pri čemu ćemo obratiti pažnju na unutrašnju i spoljašnju dinamiku koja bi mogla da utiče na raznolikosti u srpskom iredentizmu.

18 Između ostalog videti, Tim Judah. *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. p.59; Misha Glenny. *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books: 1992; Paulin Kola. *The Myth of Greater Albania*. New York: New York University Press, 2003, str. 11.

19 Ganjon razlikuje tri glavne grupe koje su proizašle iz "posleratnih struktura moći u Srbiji: mafija, tzv. "tajkuni", i jedinica za specijalne namene u okviru Državne bezbednosti." Gagnon, 129. Pojednostavljujem ovu perspektivu jer smatram da se jedinica za specijalne namene razlikuje od druge dve grupe; bila je deo zvanične vladajuće strukture od početka. Moje namere ovde su vezane za grupe koje, bar formalno, nisu bile deo sistema. Ipak, opšte je prihvaćeno da su ove grupe često sarađivale međusobno i pojedini kraljevi Podzemlja su prethodno služili u jedinici za specijalne namene.

Srpski slučaj: unutrašnji faktori

Ideje, interesi i institucije, često neraskidivo povezani, diktirali su pravac srpskog iredentizma stvaranjem okruženja, oblikovanjem i delovanjem na političke programe. Racionalisti su skloni da na interese gledaju nekako instinktivno, uzimajući ih kao date i nepromenljive. Ovi interesi nastaju iz: *"nekakve logike koja je deo strukture određene situacije, obično ekonomske, ali interesi mogu takođe da nastanu iz uverenja koja oblikuju želje, tj. interese. Interesi su pokrenuti željama koje zauzvrat stvaraju institucije: pošto svi razumeju da željeni ishod dolazi od strukture same institucije, svi vredno rade na onom obrascu koji povećava njihove šanse za ispunjenjem želja."*²⁰

Uzimajući interese kao date i vođene materijalističkim i ideološkim porivima i kako zauzvrat oni utiču na želje koje mogu proizvesti institucije, neko bi mogao da tvrdi da političari, kao racionalni igrači, veoma dobro znaju na koji način da iskoriste ovu „lančanu reakciju” u službi svojih ličnih ciljeva. Ipak, takođe bismo mogli da pretpostavimo da uhvaćeni u takvu „društvenu mrežu” političari i nemaju mnogo izbora nego da delaju unutar svog domaćeg okruženja, što ih čini subjektima određenih „pravila igre”. Okrenućemo se sada ka slučaju Srbije; obratićemo pažnju na međuzavisnost ideja, institucija i interesa²¹ da bismo testirali naše hipoteze.

U slučaju Srbije, uloga ideja najviše je povezana sa različitim tumačenjima ideje Načertanija koja je, počevši od vladavine Dušana Mugoše, bila trajna karakteristika srpskog shvatanja identiteta. Kao što Tim Juda piše:

*"Pojavivši se iz ruševina koje je za sobom ostavio savremeni srpski nacionalizam, Načertanije je suštinska veza ka razumevanju razvitka nacionalne ideje. To je tekst koji objedinjuje vekove srpskih snova onakvih kakve ih je sačuvala crkva i epska poezija, i formuliše ih u objavu modernog nacionalizma."*²²

U skorije vreme, ideje slične onima u Načertaniju bivaju promovisane u srpskoj politici ozloglašanim Memorandumom iz 1987. koji je kasnije poslužio kao nacrt srpskim nacionalističkim političarima. Memorandum je predstavljen još kao nacrt teksta srpskoj vladi 1985., ali već godinu dana kasnije je procureo u javnost, i omogućio da se iz početne tačke jugoslovenskog komunizma krene ka sve više jačajućoj retorici srpskog nacionalizma²³. Među ličnostima koje su inspirisale ideje ozloglašenog Memoranduma iz 1986. bio je Vasa Čubrilović, jedan od najstarijih i najupornijih srpskih nacionalista²⁴. Čubrilović, rani „zaverenik u atentatu na austrijskog nadvojvodu Franca Ferdinanda 1914..., ponovo se pojavio kao savetnik jugoslovenske kraljevske vlade i sa te pozicije 1937. potpisao zvanični vladin memorandum "Najezda

²⁰ Peter Gourevitch. Domestic Politics and IR, in Handbook of IR, str. 312.

²¹ Ovo posebno naglašavam jer je često teško razlučiti ideje kao što su Načertanije, Čubrilovićev Memorandum iz 1937. ili skorašnji memorandum iz 1987. od institucija koje su ih proizvele, kao što je SANU ili institucije koje su odigrale značajnu ulogu u njihovom širenju, kao što je Pravoslavna crkva.

²² Tim Judah. The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, str. 59

²³ Robert Stallaerts, *The Disintegration of the Yugoslav Intellectual Community, in Secession, History and the Social Sciences*. Bruno Coppetiers and Michel Huysseune eds., Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press, 2002. Retrieved from: poli.vub.ac.be/publi/orderbooks/secession/secessionorv05.pdf

²⁴ Philip J. Cohen. *The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals, in This Time We Knew*, in Thomas Cushman and Stepan G. Meštrović (eds), New York: New York University Press, 1996, str. 39-40.

Albanaca” koji počinje navođenjem Hitlerovih i Satljinovih uspeha u proterivanju Jevreja i ostalih kao primerima koje bi i Srbija trebalo da primeni.²⁵ Čubrilović je potpisao i nekoliko važnih obaveštenja vlade za vreme Titovog komunističkog režima „što je zadivljujuće svedočenje o moralnoj fleksibilnosti komunističkog režima.”²⁶ Međutim, Čubrilović nije bio jedini istaknuti član Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti iz tog vremena.

Još jedan istaknuti član, strasni zagovornik velike Srbije, bio je Dobrica Ćosić koji je još šezdesetih godina, među prvima, ukazivao na bol i patnju koje srpski narod konstantno trpi u izjavama da su „Srbi iskorištavani i ocrnjivani od strane ostalih jugoslovenskih narodnosti.”²⁷ Stoga je pozvao Srbe da „ustanu i unište višenacionalnu državu da bi ispunili staru istorijsku želju i nacionalni ideal velike Srbije.”²⁸ Ono što je zbunjujuće u ovakvoj retorici za vreme komunizma, uprkos činjenici da su Srbi bili na najvišim pozicijama tokom trajanja Jugoslavije, često neproporcionalno njihovom stvarnom broju, bilo je to što uvaženi srpski intelektualci poput Čubrilovića i Ćosića nisu bili uklonjeni, progonjeni niti zatvoreni zbog javnih izražavanja takvih stavova²⁹, iako su se otvoreno sukobili sa marksističkom i komunističkom ideologijom. Ovi pojedinci su bili uporni u svojoj nacionalističkoj retorici iako su okolnosti bile takve da nisu bili dovoljno medijski praćeni u titoističkom režimu, te njihovi stavovi nisu imali i više uticaja u Srbiji. Zato su čekali da uslovi sazru ne bi li ostvarili ove ideje i na neki način ih institucionalizovali.

Njihov Memorandum „*zacrtao je osnovnu konstrukciju Jugoslavije u kojoj dominiraju Srbi i koja u svom sastavu uključuje Srbiju, Crnu Goru, većinu Bosne i Hercegovine, delove Hrvatske u kojima pretežno žive Srbi, ali isključuje Makedoniju, Sloveniju, veći deo Hrvatske i ustupa Hrvatskoj deo Bosne i Hercegovine na ime kompenzacije.*”³⁰ Tako je stvorena nova atmosfera iz koje se rodio novi društveni diskurs. Ovaj je zauzvrat uticao na glavne tokove političkog diskursa i značajno izmenio vladajuće stavove u Srbiji. Ono što je najvažnije proizašlo iz toga je to daje Miloševiću obezbeđen gotov plan i program na kojem je on i zasnovao svoju političku retoriku i karijeru. Memorandum je pripremio „ulogu za koju se iščekuje vođa, i program za koji se iščekuje izvršilac”³¹ i samo godinu dana kasnije Milošević istupa sa programom koji je u Memorandumu doslovce zapisan. Uspeo je da ukloni Stambolića jer je u etničkom smislu imao više da ponudi³² i stekao jako uporište u srpskoj politici upravo zahvaljujući dobrom povezivanju sa srodnim stanovništvom koje nije direktno ugrožavalo njegove birače. Istaknuto mesto u hranjenju iredentističkih stavova imaju interesi. Interesi su, takođe u tesnoj

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Citirano u Sabrina P. Ramet. *Balkan Babel*. Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002, str. 19.

²⁸ Citirano u Cohen, str. 40.

²⁹ Roy Gatman između ostalog kaže da je puko posedovanje hrvatskog rečnika, pre nego srpsko-hrvatskog, bio glavni razlog za zatvaranje Jugoslavije. Videti Roy Gutman, *Serb Author Lit Balkan Powder Keg*, Newsday, June 28, 1992, str. 1.

³⁰ Saideman, str. 56.

³¹ Ramet, 20. Ovdje Ramet koristi frazu koju je skovao egipatski predsednik Naser da bi opisao Miloševićeve oportunističke ciljeve, koji je našao gotov plan i program da bi ostvario svoje političke ambicije.

³² Stambolić je prvi rekao daje „jedinstvena i jaka Srbija” bila preduslov za jaku Jugoslaviju, ali Milošević je ovo Radikalizovanje nacionalističke retorike video kao svoju političku šansu. Videti Ramet, str. 35.

vezi sa idejama i institucijama koji podstiču nacionalističku politiku i iredentističke stavove. Na primer:

*1987. memorandum je kružio širom sveta po srpskim emigrantskim zajednicama i sakupljao njihovu podršku za srpske nacionalne i teritorijalne ciljeve što je pravdano navodnim žrtvama, koje su Srbi podneli u jugoslovenskoj zajednici, dok o patnjama koje su ostale nacije doživjele od srpske ruke, nije bilo ni reči. Praktično govoreći, memorandum je doprineo da se standardizuje retorika koja bi okupila srpsku emigraciju u odbrani Srbije kada započnu sukobi*³³.

Interesi su, najčešće, naglašavani od strane klasterskih grupa³⁴ unutar društva, koji svoje interese nisu odvajali od interesa države. U cilju izlaganja u ovom radu, izdvojicu dve takve grupe: dijaspora i mafijaške grupe³⁵. Ove grupe su obezbedile značajnu podršku političkoj eliti i obično su zastupale radikalne i borbene stavove u pogledu ciljeva spoljne politike. Ono na šta su ove grupe očekivale zauzvrat za svoje „usluge” su najviši društveni položaji i važnu ulogu u oblikovanju političkog diskursa.

Srpska dijaspora se, u početku, nije mnogo isticala, ali za vreme srpske agresije u Bosni i Hrvatskoj, njen značaj brzo je narastao, naročito u Sjedinjenim Državama³⁶. Bred K. Blic dao je živopisnu sliku srpske dijaspore i uloge koju je želela da ima, dok je formirala svoje lobi grupe, lako pre srpske agresije u Jugoslaviji ona „nije imali tradiciju političkog organizovanja,” srpska dijaspora se brzo organizovala pod vođstvom senatorke Helen Delić Bentli³⁷. Blic povlači paralelu između porasta iredentizma u Srbiji i radikalizacije rečnika dijaspore.

*Ultranacionalistička i ksenofobična osećanja srpskih vođa sa Pala i iz Beograda stigla su u Sjedinjene Države uz pomoć dva glasnika. Prvi su političari i izaslanici koji su putovali između Severne Amerike i bivše Jugoslavije. Druga je Srpska pravoslavna crkva. Kao rezultat, srpska dijaspora se okupila u zajednicama tog tipa i različitim strukturama unutar institucija koje su uspešno usmeravale srpsku javnost ka nacionalističkim stremljenjima Miloševićeve Jugoslavije*³⁸.

Još jedan značajan element je pojačanje koje su već postojeće institucije, kao što je Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva, donele novonastajućoj dijaspori, blagosiljajući njihova nastojanja, promovišući nacionalizam i dajući podršku Miloševićevom režimu. Tako su se SPC i Srpska državna zajednica, i u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i u dijaspori, čvrsto ujedinili³⁹.

Često su pojedinci iz kriminalnog podzemlja i državna bezbednost bili tesno povezani tokom Miloševićeve „vladavine terora” i često se moglo dovesti u pitanje razlika između njih. Takvi su npr. Bili članovi ozloglašenog „Zemunskog klana” za čijeg se vođu Legiju⁴⁰

³³ Cohen, str. 39.

³⁴ Pod ovim mislim na grupe čiji su članovi nerazdvojivo povezani i imaju zajednički način rada koji ih izdvaja iz društva u celini.

³⁵ Mafijaške grupe su često bile i deo vladajuće strukture, što ćemo kasnije napomenuti.

³⁶ Prema mom mišljenju, ovo je najviše zbog fleksibilnosti mogućnosti koje pruža lobiranje što američki sistem dozvoljava i ohrabruje.

³⁷ U to vreme, senatorka Bentli je bila najugledniji lider srpske dijaspore u Sjedinjenim državama i jedini američki političar srpskog porekla. Detaljnije pogledati, Brad K. Blitz, *Serbias War Lobby*, in *This Time We Knew*, in Thomas Cushman and Stepan G. Meštrović (eds), New York: New York University Press, 1996, str. 196.

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Blitz, str. 202.

⁴⁰ Legija je njegov nadimak.

veruje da stoji iza ubistva premijera, Zorana Đinđića i za kojim je raspisan nalog za hapšenje, pa ipak, on uspeva da uživa veliki ugled⁴¹. Ovaj klan koji dominira srpskim podzemljem „ima u svojim redovima mnoge bivše pripadnike paravojnih trupa koji su ratovali za Miloševića na Balkanu u ratovima u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Kosovu“⁴² Milošević im je najčešće davao „odrešene ruke u trgovini drogom“ a njihove nezakonite aktivnosti i „zločini uključivali su i otmice, ubistva i krijumčarenje cigaretama, oružjem i ljudima.“⁴³ Moć ove organizovane kriminalne grupe je, dakle, bila značajna i oni su obezbedili bitnu podršku Miloševićevom režimu, što je njima omogućavalo da zadovoljavaju sopstvene interese. Kada je Milošević, plašeći se moguće namere ovih kriminalnih grupa da ugroze njegov autoritet ukoliko postanu previše moćni i pokušao da umanj njihovu moć, putem zastrašivanja i pritisaka, oni su svoju lojalnost i podršku okrenuli ka opoziciji⁴⁴. Kada je opozicija preuzela vlast 2000. i pokušala da ispuni zahteve Zapada isporučujući ratne zločince i suzbijajući organizovani kriminal, ovi bivši vojni oficiri, preobraženi u kriminalne vođe odlučno su se suprotstavljali vladinim odlukama, preteći, zastrašivajući i, čak, ubijajući bitne političke figure poput premijera Zorana Đinđića. Nova vlada, koja je usledila posle Đinđića, pokušala je da preuzme odlučnu akciju protiv moćnog „ratnog lobija“ koji je nekada uživao zaštitu bivšeg predsednika Slobodana Miloševića i koji je 12. marta ubio Đinđića u očajničkom pokušaju da zaustavi demokratizaciju države i politiku saradnje sa tribunalom za ratne zločine.“⁴⁵

Strana intervencija: „šargarepa“ ili „štap“?

Strana intervencija može da ima direktan ili indirektan upliv na spoljnu politiku države, zavisno od pravovremenog delovanja, interesa i odlučnosti trećeg lica koje je umešano. Dva najčešća stava koja države i međunarodne organizacije koriste su mehanizmi saradnje i pritisaka kao načine kojima se dolazi do željenog političkog ishoda. Ova sredstva u narodu poznatih kao „šargarepa“ i „štap“ u stanju su da snažno podstaknu lidere da izmene svoje političke planove u stepenu u kojem su podsticani ili pritisnuti. Karment i Harvi objašnjavaju kakve rezultate donosi „diplomacija pritisaka“ koja „uključuje širok spektar političkih, diplomatskih i vojnih sredstava.“⁴⁶ Država možda nije u stanju da upotrebi sve ove mehanizme istovremeno, štaviše: *„postoje slučajevi kada se uz odgovarajuću podršku moćnika i organizovanošću nasilje države umanju, sukobi primire i krizom se ovlada. U ovakvim slučajevima, kada postoji mogućnost izbijanja nekontrolisanog nasilja, Zapadne sile se osećaju prinuđenima da podrže upotrebu sile.“*⁴⁷

⁴¹ Za više o ovoj temi videti, John Philips, *In Serbia, prime minister's slaying triggers mafia roundup*, The Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 2003. <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0325/p07s02-woeu.html>> (accessed April 3, 2007).

⁴² Ibid

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Između ostalih videti, Gagnon, 130; Dragan Bujošević and Ivan Radonavić. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2003, str. 27-30.

⁴⁵ Bojan Dimitrijevic and Daniel Sunter, *Serbia: Red Berets Disbanded*, International War and Peace Reporting Balkans Crisis Report, March 27th, 2003. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200303_418_2_eng.txt (accessed April 4th, 2007).

⁴⁶ Carment and Harvey, str. 25.

⁴⁷ Ibid

Ovo zvuči kao razuman argument, ali lako mu je naći zamerku naglašavajući nemogućnost ili nedostatak želje Zapada da interveniše u skladu sa opšteprihvaćenim zahtevom za izbegavanjem krvoprolića. Pre nego što nastavim, želeo bih da razjasnim razliku između ekonomskih i vojnih sankcija, jer se one suštinski razlikuju i samim tim su i njihove posledice različite. Klifton Morgan i švebah dobro su uočili momenat i zabeležili da „*ekonomske sankcije pružaju mogućnost onima koji sankcionišu da pregovaraju napredujući ka željenom ishodu bez potrebe za silom.*” Ipak, slučaj Srbije ne vlada se prema ovom obrascu jer ekonomske sankcije i, što je još važnije, embargo Ujedinjenih nacija nisu se pokazali kao dovoljno velike prepreke koje bi zaustavile Miloševića da ide ka „Velikoj Srbiji” i potpomaže paravojne snage u Bosni i Hrvatskoj. Ovo svakako ne isključuje prednosti koje nametači sankcija uživaju, ali se one mogu umanjiti ukoliko se njihovi troškovi povećaju. Kao rezultat dobijamo igru penkanja u kojoj bi sankcije valjalo nametati kada „postoji realna šansa da će uroditi plodom.”⁴⁹

Postoje tri značajne intervencije u sukobima u Jugoslaviji kojima su Zapadne vlade pokušale da spreče i kazne Srbe u njihovim agresivnim iredentističkim nastojanjima. Jedna je bila intervencija Evropske unije, vođena nemačkim interesima u regionu, što je rezultiralo priznavanjem Slovenije i Hrvatske. Druga intervencija bila je ruska što vredi naglasiti zbog značaja ruske pozicije u telima kao što je Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija. I treća takva intervencija dolazi od strane zajedničkih napora Ujedinjenih nacija, predvođenim Sjedinjenim državama, koja je namerila da privede sukob kraju bez obzira na sredstva.

Sukobi u Jugoslaviji privukli su pažnju evropske spoljne politike samo 1991. kada je Milošević već radikalizovao svoju političku retoriku i „upotrebio koncept etničkih identiteta da bi osvojio i kasnije zadržao svoju poziciju.”⁵⁰ Miloševićev jezik poslužio je da nahrani strahove Hrvatske i Slovenije koje su odlučile da se odvoje u junu 1991.⁵¹ Na njihovom putu u proglašenju nezavisnosti naišle su na oduševljenu podršku Evropske unije predvođene Nemačkom.⁵² Ovo je pojačalo sumnjičavost Srba prema Evropskoj uniji generalno i Nemačkoj pojedinačno jer se na Nemačku gledalo kao na nekoga ko oduvek izražava snažno neprijateljstvo prema Srbima i, istorijski, kao zaštitnika katoličkih Hrvata i Slovenaca. Sjedinjene države su u međuvremenu zadržale uzdržanu poziciju, podržavajući prvo opstanak zajednice da bi postepeno išli ka osudi Srba i podršci novonastaloj nezavisnosti republika. Međutim, čak i kad su SAD konačno otvoreno osudile srpske zločine, i dalje su bile nevoljne da pošalju svoje kopnene snage u sukob, što je navelo Veliku Britaniju i Francusku da uzmu u razmatranje stav SADa, da bi kasnije čak i donele odluku o povlačenju svojih snaga.⁵³ Nemogućnost Zapada da deluje ujednačeno dobro je primetio Žan Bodrijar kada je napisao: „Vojna nesposobnost

48 T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach. *Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises*, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.41, No.1. (March., 1997), str. 30

49 Ibid. Za dobro argumentovano videnje efektivnosti upotrebe sankcija videti Clifton Morgan and Scwebach text.

50 Saideman, *Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties*, str. 741.

51 Ibid

52 Paradoksalno je, ali jedino je mirno odvajanje Makedonije naišlo na skepticizam i nije naišlo odobravanje Evropske unije zbog grčkog snažnog protivljenja njenom imenu.

53 Za više o ovoj temi videti Ramet, str. 214.

Zapada da reaguje na srpsku agresiju jednaka je njegovoj nesposobnosti da rizikuje život makar u jednog jedinog vojnika.”⁵⁴ Bez obzira što su Ujedinjene nacije bile obavezne da obezbede sigurnost narodu, još uvek su delovale po obrascu „državnog centralizma” koji pod spašavanjem ljudskih života podrazumeva „spašavanje kriznih država.”⁵⁵

Stav Rusije prema svojim srpskim „štičenicima” je takođe bio suzdržan, posebno u pogledu rata u Bosni, gde su u slučaju Hrvatske dokazali svoju kritičnost prema Srbima. U tom periodu, spoljna politika Rusije bila je duboko podeljena između „želje da poboljša svoje odnose sa Zapadom i svoje tradicionalne naklonjenosti Srbima.”⁵⁶ U ovom svetlu možemo bolje da razumemo dve oprečne odluke Rusije: podršku nametanju ekonomskih sankcija Srbiji 1992. i „rezolucije koja poziva vladu da iskoristi svoj veto u Savetu bezbednosti da blokira sve vojne akcije protiv bosanskih Srba predložene od strane Ujedinjenih nacija,” koju je usvojio ruski parlament.

Naizgled suzdržan u nametanju sankcija, Zapad odlučno upotrebljava jezik pritiska u prvim fazama rata, što je omogućilo Miloševiću da olako zanemari zapadnu retoriku i da se fokusira na domaću politiku i na učvršćivanje pozicije svog režima. U međuvremenu srpska elita i razni drugi društveni segmenti postali su veoma blagonakloni prema srpskoj iredentističkoj politici, dozvoljavajući Miloševiću da vodi agresivniju politiku prema srpskim manjinama u susednim državama. Snažna veza između želja uticajnih institucija u Srbiji, kao što su pravoslavna crkva i državnog iredentizma, može se videti na primeru tri bitna događaja koji su se desili istovremeno 28. juna 1989. Na taj dan se proslavljalo 600 godina od srpskog poraza od Turaka na Kosovu polju. Istog dana, Milošević je pokazao svoju predanost Kosovu i srpskim „ciljevima” izjavivši da „Srbi tokom svoje istorije nikada nisu nikoga osvajali niti iskorištavali.”⁵⁷ Takođe, istog dana, Srbi iz Krajine izrazili su zahtev za „svojom autonomnom pokrajinom... uz podršku srpske vlade.”⁵⁸ Istog dana Srpska pravoslavna crkva *izdala je svoj zvanični nacionalni program koji je odjeknuo slično kao memorandum iz 1986. Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti ili kao zvanični dokument Komunističke partije i jugoslovenskog državnog aparata. Ovaj proglas, znan kao „predlog nacionalnog programa srpske crkve” pozdravio je jednoglasnu odluku Srbije da ukine autonomije Vojvodine i Kosova. Ponovo pokrećući središnju temu Akademijinog memoranduma, ovaj crkveni dokument opisao je Srbiju kao potlačenu i ugnjetavanu i pozdravio Slobodana Miloševića u započinjanju ispravki navodnih istorijskih grešaka koje su počinjene Srbiji.*⁵⁹

Čini se veoma čudnim da bi ovakva tri ključna, a pritom nepovezana događaja, mogla da se dese istovremeno pukom slučajnošću. Pre bi se reklo da su proizvod zajedničkih napora pojedinih društvenih grupacija da rasprostranjeno nezadovoljstvo kanališu u

54 Jean Baudrillard. *When the West Stands In for the Dead*, in *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia*, Thomas Cushman and Stepjan G. Mestrovic (eds.), New York: New York University Press, 1996, str. 87

55 Za detaljniju diskusiju o ovoj temi, videti Gerald Halman and Steven Ratner, *Saving Failed States*, Foreign Policy 89 (winter 1992-93), str. 3-20.

56 Ibid

57 Cohen, str. 41.

58 Ibid

59 Ibid

agresivnu politiku i „nacionalno pitanje” političara kao što je Milošević koji će umeti da iskoristi takve gotove konstrukcije. U nastavku, nedostatak međunarodnih pritisaka i materijalna podrška tradicionalnih saveznika kao što je Rusija⁶⁰, dozvolila je Miloševiću da odlučnije sprovodi svoje iredentističke planove. Bogdan Denić napominje da „protesti sami po sebi nisu mogli da zaustave srpsku agresiju na Kosovu, niti agresiju protiv Hrvatske i Bosne: jer nisu bili u dovoljnoj meri podržani kredibilnim pretnjama sankcijama.”⁶¹

Sa druge strane, kada je pretnja snažnom intervencijom bila podržana odlučnošću i kredibilitetom i međunarodnom zajednicom koja nastupa ujednačeno, srpsko rukovodstvo shvatilo je ove pretnje ozbiljno i to pokazalo umerenijom retorikom i smanjenjem podrške svojoj sabrači u Hrvatskoj i Bosni. Kada je cena suprostavljanja rastućoj pretnji od intervencija postala prevelika, „Milošević se čak umešao u nametanje sankcija bosanskim Srbima da bi ih prinudio da sednu za pregovarački sto.”⁶² Pošto su potom NATO snage žestoko bombardovale „komunikacione centre bosanskih Srba, konačno postaje jasno da su dani blefiranja odbrojani”⁶³ i omogućile hrvatskim i bosanskim snagama kontraofanzivu protiv srpskih snaga. „NATO skoro da i nije imao gubitaka i mogao je da bombarduje po nahođenju. Tako je završena prenapumpana priča o porazu nepravedne i antisrpske svetske zajednice.”⁶⁴ Konačno se jasno pokazalo da Milošević razume jedino „jezik sile” što je jednom izjavila bivši državni sekretar Medlin Olbrajt⁶⁵. Zato se na vazdušne napade gledalo kao na „oruđe kojim se Srbi primoravaju da sednu za pregovarački sto”⁶⁶. Sajdeman i Ejrs napominju da su međunarodni pritisci imali značaja „jedino ukoliko su dovodile do realnih posledica”. Pretnje same po sebi nisu uzdrmale Miloševića, štaviše, realne posledice koje su se vremenom pojavljivale bile su te koje su uzdrmale i, naposljetku, srušile Miloševića⁶⁷.

Zaključak

Zadatak ovog rada je da prepozna osnovne odrednice iredentizma i to na malo drugačiji način nego što je to uobičajeno u postojećoj literaturi. Umesto da vidi spoljnu iredentističku politiku kao prosto sredstvo političkih vođa u nameri da se iskonski povezu sa biračkim telom, razotkriva i druge moguće faktore koji su uticali i menjali ishode u slučaju Srbije. Skicirajući uvide iz Moravčikove liberalne teorije o međuvladama (*liberal intergovernmentalism*) i njenim uvrštavanjem u analizu uticaja društvenih faktora na pitanja spoljne politike, ističem da ideje, institucije i interesi igraju važnu ulogu u oblikovanju obrazaca razmišljanja vođa i tako utiču na njihove

⁶⁰ Za procenu ruske vojne pomoći, videti npr. Ramet, 215.

⁶¹ Denitch, str. 210.

⁶² Saideman and Ayres, str. 58.

⁶³ Bogdan Denitch. *Ethnic Nationalism: the Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1997, str. 208

⁶⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵ Citirano iz Carment and Harvey, str. 32.

⁶⁶ Carment and Harvey, str. 30.

⁶⁷ Saideman and Ayres, str. 76.

buduće planove. Kod ovih pojmova lako se može uplesti u svojevrstnu nesređenu mrežu, gde je teško razlučiti jedan pojam od drugog. Ipak, međusobno se nadopunjujući, ovi pojmovi stvaraju čvrstu mrežnu konstrukciju koja može da bude od velike pomoći političkim liderima. Važnost društvenih činilaca i institucija koje utiču na kreiranje stavova jedne države, bilo kroz materijalnu ili ideološku podršku, je velika, kako u održanju poludiktatorskog režima u slučaju Srbije, tako i u predviđanju velikih promena u društvu na koje ovi direktno utiču. To objašnjava zašto izvesne društvene grupacije u određenim istorijskim okolnostima podržavaju određene stavove, kao što je iredentizam, a u nekim drugim okolnostima ne. Za „uslugu” podržavanja političkoj eliti, pojedini članovi grupa i institucija bivaju nagrađeni određenim pozicijama u društvu i ponekim društvenim pitanjima, čak i mogućnošću da odlučuju.

Uloga treće strane takođe može da bude od značaja u sprečavanju agresivne politike, što je slučaj Srbije dokazao, ukoliko ta treća strana pokaže volju i upornost u tome⁶⁸. Iskustvo pokazuje da, kada međunarodna zajednica nastupa ujednačeno i potkrepljuje pretnje stvarnim posledicama, šovinističke vođe poput Miloševića uspevaju čak i da razumeju taj „jezik sile” i da svoje iredentističke stavove održavaju umerenima. Međutim, ukoliko se te pretnje zadrže na rečima, bez realne upotrebe mehanizama pritiska, onda međunarodna zajednica ne uspeva da ubedi agresora u odlučnost svojih namera i omogućava mu da se lagodno posveti ostvarivanju svojih planova. Pošto su radikalizovali jezik preko svake mere⁶⁹, što je dovodi do etničkog progona u unutrašnjoj politici, političari na vlasti oslanjaju su se na društvene grupacije koje imaju sposobnost da kanališu nezadovoljstva naroda ka najekstremnijoj iredentističkoj politici i na taj način nađu „zajednički izlaz iz ovih teških vremena.” Dakle, nivo uticaja stranog mešanja je suštinski znašajan u kontrolisanju političkih vođa, bilo u njihovom vođenju domaće ili spoljne politike.

68 Karment i Džejs pokazuju jasnu sliku prve rezolucije Ujedinjenih nacija koja nameće najoštrije ekonomske sankcije ukoliko predsednik Milošević i rukovodstvo bosanskih Srba ne prihvate „Vens-Ovenov” plan „koji bi organizovao Bosnu u decentralizovanu federaciju.” Ali Srbi nisu ovu pretnju shvatili ozbiljno i čak su uznemiravali zvaničnike Ujedinjenih nacija na kopnu. Tek pošto su ove pretnje istrajale, umesto da su iščezle vremenom, Srbi su ponovo uzeli u razmatranje svoju poziciju i vratili se za pregovarački sto. Za više detalja pogledati Carment and James, str. 49-51.

69 Ovo se dešava zato što se političari trude da se održe na vlasti, čak i po cenu ekonomskog propadanja i unutrašnje izolacije. Da bi to postigli, oni radikalizuju svoju retoriku i obeležavaju svoje protivnike kao izdajnike koji služe stranim interesima. Ovo, sa druge strane, podstiče opoziciju da takođe podražava nacionalističku retoriku, što, u suštini odgovara vladajućoj eliti, jer su je oni prvi započeli. Za više o ovome videti Aluinyand Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Politics in Plural Societies: a Theory of Democratic Instability* Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972; Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. London: University of California Press, 2000;

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Janus Plntarič

NACIONALIZAM U SLOVENIJI

KRATKA ISTORIJA NACIONALIZMA U SLOVENIJI - OD XIX VEKA DO DANAŠNJIH DANA

1848. i uspon nacionalizma u Sloveniji

Za mnoge Slovence 1848. je godina kada je rođena slovenačka nacija. Ova godina takođe označava i početak slovenačkog nacionalizma, iako su neke od njegovih temeljnih ideja iz perioda slovenačke istorije poznatog kao „buđenje nacije”, započetog krajem XVIII veka, u doba prosvetiteljstva.

U aprilu te godine slovenački studenti u Beču formirali su politički pokret pod nazivom „Slovenija”. Kasnije su pokreti sličnog karaktera formirani u Gracu, Celovcu i Ljubljani. Cilj ovih pokreta bio je ujedinjenje slovenačkih intelektualaca i iznošenje slovenačkih političkih zahteva. Takođe valja spomenuti da je te godine termin „Slovenija” prvi put upotrebljen u političkom smislu.

Posle liberalno-buržoaske revolucije u Austro-Ugarskoj 1848., mnogi narodi videli su svoju priliku za sticanje većih nacionalnih sloboda i nezavisnosti. Slovenački intelektualci istupili su sa prvim slovenačkim nacionalno-političkim programom pod imenom „Zedinjena Slovenija” (Ujedinjena Slovenija) u kojem se tvrdi da bi Slovenci koji žive u vojvodstvima Stiriji, Karintiji i Karnioli i slovenačkim regijama Primorskoj, Istri i Prekmurju trebalo da se ujedine u „Slovenačku kraljevinu” pod Austro-Ugarskom i da bi slovenački jezik trebalo tretirati ravnopravno sa ostalim jezicima.

U svakom slučaju, program ujedinjene Slovenije je najviše propao zbog neupućenosti buržoazije i, što je važnije, neupućenosti seljaka, koji su u to vreme bili okosnica slovenačke nacije. Slovenački studenti u Austriji i intelektualci nisu bili dovoljno povezani sa ove dve klase slovenačke populacije niti su imali vojne moći kojom bi podržali svoje zahteve. Slovenački političari podelili su se u nekoliko tabora, što nije pomoglo ostvarivanju „Ujedinjene Slovenije”.

Važno je primetiti da je tadašnji slovenački nacionalizam bio veoma različit od današnjeg; raširene su bile sve-slovenske ideje čija se tadašnja popularnost zasnivala na suprotstavljanju germanizaciji Slovenije koja je trajala tokom vekova nemačke vladavine. Takođe, Slovenci su u to vreme imali mnogo svojih obeležja, uključujući i zastavu u sve-slovenskim bojama: crvenoj, plavoj i beloj. Možemo reći da je identitet Slovenaca kakav danas postoji formiran u prvoj polovini XIX veka.

Druga polovina XIX veka - 1914.

Pošto je baron Aleksandar fon Bah uspešno suzbio sve revolucionarne ideje i uspostavio sistem sa centralizovanom vlašću, slovenački nacionalizam je bio više prisutan kao kulturna tekovina nego u politici. Formirano je nekoliko organizacija koje su obrazovale Slovence o njihovoj kulturi i jeziku. Najzapaženiji bili su tzv. „tabori” koji su postojali u obliku neke vrste okupljanja na kojima su Slovenci raspravljali o različitim temama, većinom o Sloveniji i Slovencima. Nacionalisti su shvatili da bi svoje ideje morali da više rašire među seljaštvom koje je predstavljalo većinu slovenačke populacije i bilo veoma patriotski raspoloženo.

Prvi svetski rat, država Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, kraljevina Jugoslavija

U Prvom svetskom ratu, Slovenci su učestvovali na strani Austro-Ugarske imperije i posle njenog raspada ponovo se rodio slovenački nacionalizam na temeljima ideja iz XIX veka o ujedinjenoj Sloveniji. Posle Prvog svetskog rata, Slovenci su se suprotstavili Austrijancima i naselili veći deo slovenačkih delova Karintije i Stirije, koji su bili pod austrijskom okupacijom; takođe, region Prekmurje kojim su vladali Mađari više od hiljadu godina. Najviše zbog uticaja sve-slovenskih ideja, Slovenci su uglavnom prihvatili Kraljevinu SHS i kasnije Kraljevinu Jugoslaviju u kojoj su živeli sa ostalim južnim Slovenima.

Drugi svetski rat, SFRJ, rat za nezavisnost

Tokom Drugog svetskog rata, Slovenci su bili podeljeni u dve grupe. Prvi su podržavali partizane, a drugi, pod imenom „domobranci” su saradivali sa okupacionim snagama, od kojih su komunisti većinu pogubili nakon rata. Po završetku rata, Slovenija je bila jedna od republika socijalističke Jugoslavije i program ujedinjene Slovenije iz XIX veka je do određene mere bio i ostvaren, izuzev činjenice da su umesto pod austrijskom, sada bili pod jugoslovenskom vlašću. U socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji nacionalisti su bili malobrojni, ali su se nacionalističke ideje godinama razvijale sve više i više, dok je kriza u Jugoslaviji rasla. Jedan od glavnih razloga za to bio je i nacionalizam naroda i narodnosti koji u njoj žive.

Nacionalizam u Sloveniji danas

Nacionalizam u Sloveniji danas se prilično razlikuje od onog u XIX veku i, štaviše, veoma malo sličnosti. Važno je reći da termin slovenački nacionalizam uključuje širok spektar ljudi različitih političkih ubeđenja, od uobičajenog desničarskog patriotizma do neonacizma. Dok je 1848. nacionalizam bio veoma sve-slovenski usmeren, većina današnjih nacionalista protive se jugoslovenstvu s obzirom da je većina slovenačkih imigranata iz država bivše Jugoslavije (mnogi od njih su došli još dok je Slovenija bila pod jugoslovenskom vlašću, dok su drugi došli posle skorašnjih balkanskih ratova). U načelu, nacionalisti drugačije gledaju na identitet Slovenaca nego Slovenci u XIX veku, i na neki način se njihovo razumevanje termina „Slovenci” razlikuje od shvatanja današnjih Slovenaca ne-nacionalista.

Za ovo su najviše odgovorne različite vrste revizionizama koje su nacionalisti izvršili; najupečatljivija je tvrdnja da preci Slovenaca nisu Sloveni koji su došli u Sloveniju u VI veku, nego drevno pleme Veneti, koji su tu živeli vekovima pre njih. Moje mišljenje je da popularnost ove teorije dolazi zbog težnji nacionalista da se distanciraju od ostalih južnih Slovena i izbegnu mogućnost zajedničkog porekla sa imigrantima iz bivše Jugoslavije. Široko prihvaćeno obeležje slovenačkog nacionalizma više nije crveno-plavo-bela trobojka, već crni panter na beloj pozadini, što je bio simbol stare slovenačke države Karantanije. U ovo se opet umešao istorijski revizionizam jer zvanična slovenačka istorija ne priznaje pantera kao slovenačko obeležje, jer on datira iz vremena kada je Karantanija bila pod nemačkom vlašću.

Postoje i različite vrste istorijskih revizionizama u Sloveniji. Neki nacionalisti veruju da su „domobranci” koji su saradivali sa Nemcima i Italijanima u Drugom svetskom ratu u stvari „dobri momci” koji su se borili protiv komunističke represije za slobodu Slovenaca. Ovakve ideje su prihvaćene i od nekih ne-nacionalista, uglavnom katolika, jer je biskup Rožman iz Ljubljane podržavao saradnju sa Italijanima. U načelu, današnji slovenački nacionalizam ide ruku pod ruku sa istorijskim revizionizmom, i to verovatno u većoj meri nego u bilo kojoj drugoj evropskoj državi.

ALTERNATIVE ETNONACIONALIZMU

Uvod

Postavljanje alternative etničkom nacionalizmu uvijek povlači sa sobom pitanje alternative naciji. Stoga se postavlja pitanje može li se stvoriti efikasan postnacionalni identitet unutar neke države, a naročito na području Balkana. Ovaj rad deskriptivnom metodom istražuje nekoliko takvih mogućnosti. Prije svega, daje se pregled nacije i nacionalizma, većinom onakvog kako ga vide moderni teoretičari. Dalje se objašnjavaju alternativne mogućnosti, proizašle iz teorija moderne i postmoderne te se ukratko primjenjuju na države tzv. „Zapadnog Balkana”. Rad daje u zaključku dvije smjernice kojom bi se navedene zemlje trebale kretati, ali je više usmjeren na raspravu.

1. Teoretski okvir: Nacija i nacionalizam

Moderna pojava nacionalizma nije u cijeloj Europi ovisila o građanskim revolucijama koje su zadesile Francusku i Ameriku. Štoviše, u tri velika carstva ancien regimea revolucionarni pokreti (ne nužno građanski) došli su kronološki i stoljeće kasnije. Tako je velika revolucija 1848. dovela do „buđenja nacionalne svijesti” naroda u Habsburškoj monarhiji, mladoturski pokret srušio je temelje miletskog Osmanskog carstva 1905., a glomazno Rusko carstvo srušilo se pod naletima Februarske i Oktobarske revolucije tek 1917. Na području današnjih tranzicijskih zemalja Istočne i Jugoistočne Europe ti nacionalni pokreti nisu imali samo značajke modernog građanskog nacionalističkog prevrata nad predmodernim aristokratskim režimima. Građanstvo kao stalež je u tim zemljama bilo tek u povojima¹. U osnovi nacionalističkog pokreta bio je etnički nacionalizam, koji je favorizirao etniju, a ne načela modernizma. Unutar te etnije stoljećima su živjele primordijalističke i perenijalne priče o „narodu”, dapače danas „naciji”. Prema modernom shvaćanju, nacije su proizvod nacionalizma, a ne obrnuto. Nacionalizam služi potrebama društvenog i političkog razvoja, odnosno „izgradnji nacije”. Teoretičari izgradnje nacije smatraju da su nacije u biti teritorijalne političke zajednice, suverene, ograničene i kohezivne, da su primarna politička veza i glavni predmet odanosti svojih pripadnika. Nacije su glavni međunarodi igrači, tvorevine svojih građana, a napose svojih vođa i intelektualnih elita, jedini okvir i sredstvo društvenog i političkog razvoja. Elementi izgradnje nacije su različiti, ali svi teoretičari se slažu da svaki ostvaruje svoj cilj. Klasični modernizam poima naciju kao moderan fenomen, nastao nakon građanskih revolucija i proizvod su modernosti. One nisu ukorijenjene u povijest, nego su posljedica spomenutih revolucija. I nacionalizam je također moderan pokret. Oni su stvoreni proizvodi elite, utemeljeni u komunikaciji.

¹ Primjerice, u balkanskim zemljama „pravim” predstavnicima naroda smatrani su seljaci, a unjetavači su bili stranci koji su živjeli u gradovima. Tako je u Hrvatskoj jak politički pokret bio pravaški i na njegovim zasadama seljački pokret za nacionalno osamostaljenje nasuprot njemačkim, mađarskim i talijanskim upraviteljima. Na tim zasadama razvio se i poseban oblik nacionalističkog, konzervativnog i patrijahalnog poštivatelja seoskog života i tradicije pod nazivom „ognjištar” (prema romanu „Ognjište” pisca Mile Budaka)

Anthony D. Smith nabraja osnovne dokrine nacionalizma (Smith 2003: 191):

1. Svijet se prirodno dijeli na nacije, a svaka do njih ima poseban karakter i sudbinu;
2. Nacija je izvor cjelokupne političke moći, a odanost njoj nadilazi sve druge odanosti;
3. Žele li biti slobodni i realizirati se, ljudi se moraju identificirati s nacijom i pripadati joj;
4. Globalna sloboda i mir jesu funkcije oslobođenja i sigurnosti svih nacija;
5. Nacije se mogu osloboditi i ostvariti samo u vlastitim suverenim državama.

Valja primijetiti da većina modernih teoretičara olako zamjenjuje etniju i naciju. Osnovna razlika između ova dva pojma jest u tome što je etnija kulturna zajednica koja se ne želi ostvariti u državnoj tvorbi već prihvaća vlast države u kojoj se nalazi (primjerice, Laponci u skandinavskim zemljama). S druge strane, nacija svoj izraz nalazi u državi, zapravo u nacionalnoj državi u kojoj se realizira. Nacija uvijek teži osnivanju svoje države, ako ona već ne postoji. U literaturi postoji veliki raskol između teoretičara koji smatraju da je nacija stariji pojam od nacionalizma i onih koji je smatraju njegovim proizvodom. Neki, primjerice Adrian Hastings, nastanak nacije stavljaju u srednji vijek, u doba kad se Biblija prevela na engleski jezik (Hastings, 2003). Iako anglopocentrično, ovakvo viđenje nacije (natio) za razliku od naroda ili puka (gens) svojstveno je i B. Andersonu (Anderson, 1990) i djelomično L. Greenfeldu (Greenfeld, 1992) koji stoje u opreci prema klasičnim teoretičarima modernizma po kojima je nacija proizvod nacionalizma, pokreta i ideologije za koju se svi slažu da je nastala u ranom 18. stoljeću, nakon Francuske revolucije. Bez obzira na kasnija tumačenja kako postoji građanski i etnički nacionalizam, takva razlika je u stvari nejasna i beznačajna, jer se svakodnevna europska politika pokazala istom u Istočnoj, kao i u Zapadnoj Europi². Uostalom, i u tako zvanom „zapadnom, političkom“ i „istočnom, genealoškom“ tipu nacionalizma (tipologija koju je proizveo Hans Kohn nakon Drugog svjetskog rata (Kohn, 1955), prisutan je snažan primordijalan kod, pun etnosimbolizma kakav je razvio Anthony Smith u svom klasičnom djelu (Smith, 2003). Na kraju krajeva, pripadnikom neke europske nacije, bilo ona zapadnoeuropska ili istočnoeuropska, stoji činjenica da je određen rasom (bijelac), vjerom (kršćanin), pa i etnicitetom (Bretonac, ali Francuz; Englez, ali Britanac). Građanstvo i državljanstvo ne čini, izgleda, osobu pripadnikom nacije, čak ni u tom „građanskom“ nacionalizmu koji ne bi trebao biti zasnovan na etničkom podrijetlu. Treba napomenuti da je nacionalizam moguć u svojoj potpunosti tek pojavom liberalizma i učvršćenja demokracije, lako se to čini neshvatljivim, nacionalizam je bio glavni pokretač moderne revolucije i rušitelj starih aristokratskih režima kroz cijeli period 18. stoljeća, a to vrijedi i za današnje vrijeme. I sama prekretna 1990. godina se može sagledavati kao nacionalistička revolucija u cilju oslobođenja naroda³ i ponovne izgradnje nacije⁴. Pitanje da lije nacija moderna pojava ili nije možda

² Ogromno povećanje ekstremne desnice u Švicarskoj, Nizozemskoj, Belgiji, Danskoj, ali i Grčkoj, Poljskoj i Sloveniji dokazuju ovu tvrdnju.

³ Gens, ali prvenstveno oslobođenje od klasnog sustava, jer u komunističkim je zemljama najvažnija bila klasa i to ona radnička

⁴ Nacija nije postojala u komunističkim zemljama, već klasa bez obzira na jezik, „narodnost“.

zaokuplja politologe i druge društvene znanstvenike, ali već spreman odgovor daju sami nacionalisti. Nacija je po njima iskonska. Politička teorija zastaje na težnji za nacijom-državom, fenomenom koji vlada današnjim svijetom. Međutim, u praksi vlastita je etnička ili nacionalna tradicija izuzetno važna, ona je ukorijenjena i primordijalna i ima povijesnu ulogu, štoviše puno povijesniju od susjednih naroda. To je perenijalizam, ideja da je nacija vječna, da je nastala u praskozorje povijesti i da nema previše razlike od etnije. Po toj teoriji nacija je primordijalna, što u goroj verziji tumači da su pripadnici nacije biološko srodni, dapače da postoji nacionalna krv (sic!), a u blažoj varijanti da ih spaja rasa, jezik, regija, religija i običaji u čemu nema previše dvojbe (jedino što nacionalisti te varijable previše upotrebljavaju u svrhu etničke i vjerske isključivosti). Osim toga, nacija je po perenijalistima iskonska, ukorijenjena, organska, bešavna, narodna, utemeljena u podrijetlu.

To vodi do isključivosti, revizionizma povijesnih želja i prohtjeva koji se tumače „višim, nacionalnim” ciljevima. Vodi i do secesionizma, unutarnjih sukoba, a Europa je doživjela po tom pitanju i međudržavne konflikte i terorizam. Kao takav nije spreman na suradnju što se posebno ističe u Europskoj uniji, koja se gleda kao „zajednica nacija”. Revolucije se rađaju u krvi, ali prosperitet rađa evolucija. Stoga je ovakvom, razmahanom tipu nacionalizma u tranzicijskim zemljama Europe potrebna alternativa.

1. Alternative etnonacionalizmu na Balkanu

Alterantivni pomaci od primordijalnog i perenijalnog poimanja nacionalizma temeljenog na etničkoj isključivosti poboljšali bi političku, socijalnu i kulturnu situaciju u tranzicijskim zemljama Europe. Kako su to zemlje u kojima vlada genealoški tip nacionalizma, alternative se moraju izroditi iz same etnije, a ne tražiti rješenje van nje. Kako se radi o zemljama koje vrlo rijetko imaju etnički homogeno stanovništvo valja tražiti druga moguća rješenja državnog uređenja koji bi neutralizirali negativne posljedice etničkog nacionalizma. Takvi modeli mogu biti konsocijativizam, federalizam, multikulturni, interkulturni i transkulturni modeli kulturne politike zemalja, supranacionalizam kakav promovira Europska unija, te druge postnacionalne konstelacije.

Perenijalni nacionalizam, povezan s etnosimbolizmom ukorijenjenim u muziku, običaje i svakodnevni život vrlo je prisutan u zemljama Balkana, kao i u drugim europskim zemljama „nove demokracije”.⁵ S obzirom na to, pristupi pomirljivosti i prestanka revizionističkih, separatističkih i nacionalističkih težnji vrlo su teški za ostvarivanje. Ipak, prostora za razvoj alternativne slike postoje. One izviru iz činjenice da je nacionalizam uvijek neprijateljski raspoložen prema najbližim susjedima. Pitanje alternative žestokom nacionalizmu izvire upravo tu, u susjedstvu. To je i cilj kanadskog multikulturaliste W. Kymlicke koji govori o „soft-nation building-u” (Kymlicka, 2003), modelom koji službenu kulturu smatra ne-etničkom, a za što uvjetuje ograničavanje grupa na političko samoodređenje i traži pametne, ali teške kompromise među susjedima ili teritorijalno isprepletenim etničkim zajednicama. Na Balkanu je to završilo

⁵ Naročito u Poljskoj, zemlji koja praktično nema ljevice, a svaki pokušaj stvaranja stranke koja bi zastupala iole socijalističke ideje, nailazi na prepreku u poljskom Ustavu koji izričito zabranjuje komunističke stranke. Komunitarizam je u Poljskoj, s druge strane, posebno jak, ali utjelovljen u desne, pa i ekstremno desne stranke,

etničkim čišćenjem. No, ne treba smetnuti s uma da se moralna obvezatnost dane osobe prema drugim ljudima smanjuje razmjerno njihovoj međusobnoj udaljenosti. Alternative koje ću ukratko obrazložiti, a u raspravi i primijeniti na područje bivše Jugoslavije, okupljene su u slijedeće skupine: kozmopolitizam, pristupi kulturnoj različitosti, podjela moći, postnacionalne konstelacije i liberalni nacionalizam.

a) Kozmopolitizam

Kozmopolitizam je možda najbolje odrediti u njegovom odnosu prema univerzalizmu i nacionalizmu (Beck, 2006). Univerzalistički pristup priznaje i razvija univerzalne norme pomoću kojih se primjenjuje jedinstven pristup prema svima. Nacionalizam, pak, ostvaruje jedinstvenost samo prema unutra, prema naciji. Kozmopolitizam se razlikuje po tome što u mišljenju, suživotu i djelovanju priznavanje različitosti postaje maksimum, kako prema unutra, tako i prema van. Razlike se ne ukidaju, niti se hijerarhiziraju, već se prihvaćaju i pozitivno ocjenjuju. Kozmopolitski orijentirani teoretik odbacit će naciju kao jedinstven prirodni krug. On će tvrditi da kao ornament prihvatimo priliku da razvijemo sposobnost uživanja u tuđe i spremnost za razumijevanje različitog. U smislu nacionalnog, nastaje etnoraznolikost kao vrijednost po sebi. Osnovna intuicija teoretičara Berlina jest da čak ni sam Bog ne može izabrati najbolji oblik života jer ne postoje nadvrijednosti, kao što su raznovrsnost i red, koje se mogu iskoristiti za mjerenje potpunosti vrijednosti koje društvo ostvaruje. Vrijednosti utjelovljene u svakom društvu iscrpljuju sve opravdanje koje imamo za oblik života. Zamjerke nekoj svjetskoj nad-vladi i sustavu su brojne i kozmopolitizam još uvijek ostaje na teoretskim zamislima od Kanta do Nussbauma. Međutim, jedan drugi, novčani kozmopolitizam se već utjelovio u globalizaciji. Koliko su zemlje Zapadnog Balkana spremne za kozmopolitske ideje? Ne mnogo. Najčešća obrana od kozmopolitske alternative jest da će se u državi favorizirati sve druge kulture nauštrb etnonacionalne. Države Balkana dale su „jedinstvenu” šansu - ili živite u vlastitoj kulturi koja je definirana vašim nacionalno-etničkim okvirom ili izaberite kozmopolitsku, ali izvan vaše zemlje. Zato danas imamo toliko književnika, umjetnika, pa i društvenih znanstvenika koji primarno žive izvan svoje domovine (primjerice Matvejević u Hrvatskoj). Zatim se poteže, ne bez razloga, obilježavanje kozmopolitizma kao mcdonaldizacija društva, lako bi se mogli upitati što rade debrecinske i austrijske kobasice na božićnim sajmovima ili, da budem provokativan, kebab širom Balkana, činjenica ostaje da kozmopolitizam nije lako moguće ostvariti unutar nacionalnih granica.

b) Pristupi kulturnoj različitosti

Obuhvaćaju kulturnu politiku zemlje, lako ostaje u etnonacionalnim okvirima, smjernice državne politike nisu nacionalne, a jedino što ostaje nacionalno je jezik i to isključivo kao sredstvo komunikacije. Tako ovdje imamo multikulturalizam koji označava obvezu u definiranju politika, mjera i inicijativa kojima se omogućava raznim kulturama da se razviju na istom ili susjednom teritoriju s drugim kulturama unutar jedne zemlje.

Multikulturalizam obuhvaća i nove manjine⁶ i autohtone manjine, i znači proces razmjene kulturnih vrijednosti i dostignuća odnosno odnos većinske (nacionalne) kulture prema onim manjinskim. Multikulturalizam polazi od tvrdnje da su kulture koje sačinjavaju neku zajednicu već definirane, i s obzirom na to potrebno je razviti okvir unutar kojeg će se dobrovoljno uklopiti. Zbog ovog statičkog pogleda, ovaj pristup zastupa stavove reduktivnog funkcionalizma i to je jedan od razloga za njegovu laganu smrt u europskim zemljama.

Interkulturalizam definira potencijalne međuodnose te naglašava uzajaman utjecaj različitih kultura unutar jedne zemlje, ali i na međunarodnoj razini. On nastoji prevladati kulturni relativizam i reduktivni funkcionalizam i puno je dublji i složeniji proces od multikulturalizma.

Zatim imamo transkulturalizam, proces koji u okviru globalizacije postavlja pitanje europskog identiteta i europskih vrijednosti, te uspostavljanje europskog kulturnog tržišta (duh Europe), dok plurikulturalizam označava pluralizam vlasništva, pluralizam tržišta i politički pluralizam. U osnovi zadnjeg pristupa je svojevrсни kulturni holizam koji se temelji na europskom tradicionalnom definiranju države kao građanske države, na filozofskim i politološkim refleksijama o totalitarizmu i važnosti uspostavljanja neprofitnog sektora odnosno civilnog društva.

Balkanske zemlje u neku su ruku počele tražiti samo „duh Europe“, star od pamtlivijeka, kao u Hrvatskoj ili Crnoj Gori. Pitanje bošnjačke muslimanske vjere stavljeno je u stranu, i doista je pitanje kako će se autohtoni europski muslimani osjećati u ekskluzivnom kršćanskom klubu. Pristupi kulturalnoj različitosti zastali su na „čišćenju“ nacionalnog jezika od tuđica, negiranja cijelih naroda i imena kao u primjeru Makedonije i Crne Gore i nastojanju da se suživot objasni kao su-postojanje kultura, ali ne i prožimanje. Istovremeno se zastupa ulazak u europske i atlantske integracije i natječe se u europskim vrijednostima. Zanimljivo je ovdje spomenuti nekoliko studija koje su rađene kasnih osamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća u Jugoslaviji o etničkoj toleranciji, a što je i preduvjet za pristupe kulturalnoj različitosti. Prema teoriji etničke konkurencije i primordijalističkim konceptima identiteta (Hannan, 1984), elementi industrijalizacije jačaju etničku identifikaciju i mobilizaciju i stimuliraju etničku netoleranciju. Tolerancija između različitih etničkih, religijskih i lingvističkih grupa bila bi najviša u najviše miješanim područjima. U bivšoj Jugoslaviji to je značilo da su najviše tolerantna mjesta Bosna, Vojvodina i Hrvatska. Studija je najmanje tolerancije pronašla na Kosovu, u Makedoniji i Sloveniji. Crna Gora i Srbija bile su negdje u sredini. Rezultati nakon rata su pokazala da je tolerancija pala upravo u mjestima gdje su razlike među stanovništvom bile najveće, a Bosna i Hercegovina, kao najtolerantnija republika, doživjela je najveće ratne strahote. Čini se da heterogenost potiče i toleranciju i sukob. Nedovoljni resursi mobiliziraju grupiranje prema nacionalnosti i pobuđuju nacionalističke primordijalne i perenijalne osjećaje.

c) Podjela moći

Konsocijativna demokracija, federalizam i autonomije jedan su od efikasnijih načina rješavanja problema segmenata u pluralnim društvima. Temelj konsocijativne demokracije je suradnja među elitama. Četiri su karakteristike posebno upečatljive

(Lijphart, 1980): (1) Velika koalicija koja se sastoji od političkih vođa svih značajnih segmenata pluralnog društva i koja obnaša izvršnu vlast, (2) postojanje veta kako bi se zaštitili vitalni interesi manjina, (3) proporcionalnost kao temeljni preduvjet za političko predstavljanje, namještanje državnih službenika, alokacije javnih fondova i slično, (4) veliki stupanj nezavisnosti i autonomije u donošenju odluka unutrašnjopolitičke prirode. Konsocijativna demokracija, koju tvori tzv. „kartel elita”, čini miran društveni kontekst u kojem svaki segment ima svoj glas. Lijphart kao klasične primjere navodi Austriju, Belgiju, Nizozemsku i Švicarsku, lako ih on stavlja u iste okvire, modeli se međusobno razlikuju, pa ovdje imamo proporcionalne, konkordancijske, konfederalne i druge modele. Zamjera im se odsustvo snažne opozicije, zanemarivanje individualne jednakosti u korist jednakosti segmenata, a kako Nordlinger ističe, postoji i snažan utjecaj strukturalne elite. Također može doći do sporosti odlučivanja velike koalicije, opstrukcije odluka vetom, a autonomija može prijetiti secesijom i prijetnjom teritorijalnom integritetu zemlje.

Elementi konsocijativne demokracije upotrijebljeni su s više ili manje uspjeha u Makedoniji i Bosni i Hercegovini. I dok je komparativno Makedonija uznapredovala u samo nekoliko godina, BiH i dalje jedva postiže konsenzus među segmentima, ako se tako uopće može reći. Vrlo je jednostavan razlog za takvo stanje. Učinkovitost tog uređenja ovisi o elitama koje moraju započeti politiku akomodacije, odnosno politiku prilagodbe i harmonizacije vlastitih politika s politikama drugih elita. Kompulzivni konsocijativizam, nametnut odozgo, ne može zaživjeti u punoj mjeri i na dugi rok ako ne postoji politička volja domaćih elita da učine sve da zaživi u potpunosti.

d) Postnacionalne konstelacije

Pronalaze se u mijenjanju identiteta. Anderson kaže kako je pojam nacionalnog identiteta „moralna zamjena” za nacionalni karakter (Anderson, 1991): „Uža se koncepcija identiteta dobro uklapa u ovu ulogu, sugerirajući intimniju, idealizirajuću sponu, nego što je većina veza svakodnevnih običaja”. O pitanjima identiteta napisana je opsežna i ponešto zbudjujuća literatura. Postnacionalne konstelacije obuhvaćaju nadnacionalni, postnacionalni ili transkulturni identitet (Vrcan, 2006). Oni se ostvaruju imaginacijom koja navodi na razmišljanje o alternativama postojećem poretku na polazištu krvavog povijesnog iskustva, ali i iskustva propasti komunizma i (ne)održivosti socijalne države u socijaldemokratskim projektima. Tako imamo postnacionalnu konstelaciju unutar procesa globalizacije koja naprosto uništava nacionalnu državu ili barem tradicionalne institucijske aranžmane države-nacije poput vlastite vanjske politike, valute ili ekonomske politike. Traženje postnacionalnog kulturnog identiteta našao se u supranacionalnoj regionalnoj zajednici kao što je Europska unija, ali kako ima onih koji se određuju kao Europljani zato jer su kršćani, nastaje i novokonstruirani kulturni identitet, temeljen na etici odgovornosti, a koji ne bi pronalazio svoje ispunjenje u prošlosti nego konstruiranjem budućnosti. Na tom tragu je i Beck sa svojom vizijom kozmopolitske Europe. Izrazito radikalnu verziju iznose civilnodruštvene grupe koje se zalažu za ograničavanje nacionalnog suvereniteta i govore o „izmišljanju novih demokratskih metoda prevencije otrovnih plodova demokracije”.

Nadnacionalni identitet se nekako čini mogućim, pogotovo kad se na umu ima Europska unija. Svi smo mi Europljani, i članovi smo tog kluba zemalja. Ali, srezati ću takvo promišljanje u korijenu. Nadnacionalni identitet zahtijeva vjernost građanskoj državi, i postići će se samo onda kad će građani Bosne i Hercegovine sebe nazivati Bosancima i Hercegovcima, bez obzira na etničko porijeklo. Koliko je to težak i neizvjestan proces vidi se i po situaciji u Belgiji. Za sada je u Europi to u potpunosti uspjelo samo Švicarskoj, no okolnosti su potpuno drugačije.

e) Liberalni nacionalizam

Pitanje je postoji li takva vrsta nacionalizma. Couture kaže da je formiranje nacije posvećeno slobodama i pravima koje su uobičajeno prisutne u liberalnim, ustavnim demokracijama. One omogućavaju svojim članovima demokratske slobode i jednaka prava. No, što je nacionalističko u takvom liberalnom nacionalizmu? Očito to da članovi dijele ili žele dijeliti zajedničku kulturu, jezik, povijest, viđenje samih sebe, institucije i neke zajedničke projekte za svoje društvo, uključujući i projekt za osiguravanjem i realiziranjem političke suverenosti. Solidarnost koja veže članove toga društva objedinjuje ljubav prema pravедnosti i prema državi. S tog stajališta, puno je lakša etnonacionalna solidarnost, no liberalno viđenje pravедnosti ne uključuje samo etničke skupine, već sve građane. To bi nas približilo francuskom idealu građanskog nacionalizma (koji postoji samo u teoriji) odnosno Habermasovoj sintagmi „ustavnog patriotizma”, vjernosti ustavnom uređenju vlastite države, što zapravo s nacionalizmom ima malo ili gotovo ništa u vezi.

Zaključak

Trenutačno stanje u području Zapadnog Balkana ne daje previše nade da bi se većina navedenih alternativa doista i primijenila na terenu. To se posebice tiče kozmopolitizma, koji je i u razvijenijim postindustrijskim zemljama maglovit. Traženje supranacionalnog identiteta unutar državnih granica moguće je jedino u integriranju u Europu, ali važno je naglasiti pod kojim uvjetima i u kakvu Europu. Nadnacionalni identitet u smislu švicarskog modela je vrlo težak za ostvarenje. S obzirom na navedeno, važno je za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana da ustraju na eurointegraciji, jer se time postižu zakonske regule koje nameće Bruxelles koji neće tako lako ponoviti pogrešku preuranjenog primanja Rumunjske i Bugarske. S druge strane, za ove zemlje je važno provoditi oblike i elemente konsocijativne demokracije. Ona mora biti prihvaćena odozdo, a ne nametnuta odozgo. Makedonija bi mogla poslužiti kao primjer, jer je to zemlja u kojoj je upravo većina zatražila podjelu moći s manjinom i stvorila mehanizme koji, bez obzira na neke svoje nedostatke, omogućuju miran suživot dviju etničkih, vjerskih, jezičnih i kulturnih zajednica. Takva podjela moći među elitama ima svoje opasnosti, ali u suštini jest način (i to prvenstveno privremeni način, nikako trajni⁷) da se spriječe revizionizmi, secesionizmi, udarci na državnu suverenost i ugrožavanje života i zdravlja stanovnika

⁷ Konsocijativna demokracija nije vječno rješenje. Više se radi o pomoćnom načinu za miran i uspješan suživot različitih segmenata u pluralnim društvima. Kraj konsocijativizma je u tom smislu dobar znak. Bilo da se radi o vertikalnoj ili horizontalnoj podijeli, subregionalnom teritorijalizmu, europskom ili nekom drugom kulturnom krugu, ovo je jedan od načina koji može spriječiti sukob. Na Balkanu postoje alternative, ali to je izbjicanje dodatne netolerancije i sukoba.

zemlje, između ostalih, i vlastite etničke skupine. Ovakav zadnji diskurs pokazao se stravičnim u posljednjem izboju nacionalizma, onog nacionalizma koji pitanje „drugih” nastoji riješiti samo jednim riješenjem - istrebljivanjem, ubijanjem, etničkim čišćenjem.

U ovom sam radu nastojao prikazati neke mogućnosti koje u današnjoj raspravi unutar društvenih znanosti, a naročito sociologije i politologije, vrlo zastupljene. Neke proizlaze iz modernih načela, neke se referiraju na postmoderne teoretičare. Ne samo na Balkanu, već širom Europe, one još uvijek stoje na klimavim nogama. Multikulturalizam je, primjerice, vjerojatno promašena ideja i pokazala se neuspješnom u integriranju manjinskih kultura unutar neke države. Ostaje i otvoreno pitanje nacije. Koliko god raspravljali i nečemu što je onkraj nacije, činjenica jest da će nacija i nacije-države još dugo ostati europska stvarnost. Možda bi rješenje segmentarnih problema trebalo tražiti upravo unutar nje.

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Miloš Perović

NACIONALIZAM I ISTORIJSKI REVIZIONIZAM KAO POSLEDICA SLOMA DRUŠTVENIH VREDNOSTI I DRUŠTVENIH NORMI

Nacionalizam je pojava koja duboko zahvata sve pore srpskog društva (a može se reći i celokupan prostor bivše SFR Jugoslavije) u poslednjih dvadeset godina. Dominantan nacionalistički ton u javnom diskursu nužno indukuje i istorijski revizionizam kao potencijalno opasan fenomen po budućnost društva. Osnovna hipoteza kojom ćemo se rukovoditi ovde jeste da je istorijski revizionizam proistekao iz preovladavajuće nacionalističke svesti društvenih elita Srbije i da je posledica nepostojanja jasnog identiteta srpskog društva i nepostojanja osnovnog konsenzusa oko pravca u kom će ići srpsko društvo u budućnosti. Nepostojanje identiteta jednog društva jasno uzrokuje nedostatak društvenih vrednosti i društvenih normi, dakle jedan institucionalni haos u kom najpokvareniji, najspretniji i najbahatiji slojevi društva mogu nametati određene, po pravilu retrogradne, vrednosti i to isključivo zarad ostvarivanja vlastitih, partikularnih interesa. Valjalo bi u proveru ove hipoteze krenuti analizom konkretnih praktičnih ostvarenja na polju istorijskog revizionizma u srpskom društvu.

2004. godine u Skupštini Republike Srbije kao najvišem zakonodavnom telu države donet je kontroverzni „Zakon o pravima boraca” kojim je kvislinški četnički pokret iz Drugog svetskog rata proglašen antifašističkim. Na osnovu ovog zakona članovi četničkog pokreta ostvaruju pravo na penziju u istom rangu kao i članovi partizanskog pokreta iz Drugog svetskog rata. Naravno, velika većina članova tadašnjeg četničkog pokreta danas nije među živima pa ova materijalna nadoknada ne predstavlja ni njima satisfakciju ni poreskim obveznicima novi namet, ali u bitnom menja dosadašnju zvaničnu verziju zbivanja u Drugom svetskom ratu na prostoru Balkana. Dodamo li ovome da je na delu i (od vlasti) prećutna normalizacija lika i dela Dimitrija Ljotića, najzloglašenijeg srpskog kvislinga iz Drugog svetskog rata, kroz neometano štampanje i distribuciju njegovih knjiga i propagandnih pamfleta fašističke Ljotićevske sadržine, onda postaje jasno da stepen istorijskog revizionizma prevazilazi okvire političke pristojnosti u kojima bi se mogla voditi debata na datu temu i da ovo predstavlja utiranje puta daljoj fašizaciji društva pod maskom aktuelne ideologije „demokratskog nacionalizma” (pojam je svojevrstan oksimoron koji ipak ne predstavlja problem aktuelnim nosiocima vlasti u Srbiji da se identifikuju sa njim zarad opstanka na vlasti).

U ovakvoj situaciji postavlja se pitanje da li parlament jedne države ima legitimitet u davanju istorijskih sudova i kakve posledice po istoriju kao nauku mogu imati ovakve revizionističke odredbe nosilaca vlasti? Ili, pak, uzroci donošenja ovakvih zakonskih akata leže u permanentnom dvodecenijskom konvertitstvu i zagovaranju istorijskog revizionizma od strane takozvane „intelektualne elite” Srbije (i „intelektualne elite” na celom eks-jugoslovenskom prostoru)? Čini se da je pravac uticaja ovih elita jedne na drugu dvosmeran i da postoji savršena simbioza u njihovom delovanju koja proističe iz zajedničkog interesa za očuvanjem društvene moći. Upravo ako razumemo poriv za očuvanjem društvene moći koju nudi pripadnost tzv. „intelektualnoj eliti”, postaje jasan fenomen konvertitstva intelektualaca naročito izražen u tzv. „bivšim socijalističkim zemljama”. Pojam konverzije (koji originalno potiče iz teologije) je vrlo širok, a ovde će

se koristiti u smislu duboke i korenite promene svetovnog idejnopolitičkog opredeljenja¹. Opšti trend u Srbiji, ali i u svim, mahom istočnoevropskim, bivšim "socijalističkim" zemljama, jeste konverzija „intelektualaca” od vatrenih marksista i čak zvaničnih režimskih ideologa „marksizma”, do vatrenih „boraca za nacionalnu stvar” i zagovor-nika nacionalizma, ili, u manjem broju slučajeva, do njihovog preobražaja u tzv. „liberalne mislioe”. Ovaj samo naizgled nagli radikalni preokret u osnovnim teorijskim i političkim shvatanjima srpskih (balkanskih) „intelektualaca”, čija je osnovna svrha zadržavanje postojećih privilegija i pozicija društvene moći, zapravo i ne predstavlja nikakav duhovni zaokret. To je ista ona vrsta državnog apartčika lojalnog svakom mogućem režimu i društvenom sistemu, koja uvek iznova opstaje na svojoj poziciji čuvara postojećeg režima, cenzora i „vrhovnog moralnog i intelektualnog autoriteta društva”. Svako suprotstavljanje takvim intelektualnim veličinama se u ovim zaostalim predistorijskim balkanskim društvima smatra izvesnom izdajom osnovnih društvenih postulata, bili oni „samoupravljanje” nekada ili, recimo, „nacionalna svest” danas. Najbolju definiciju ovog stanja intelektualne dvoličnosti ovašnjeg najamnog intelektualca dao je Milan Kangrga pojmom „švercera vlastitog života”.² Pod švercerom vlastitog života Kangrga podrazumeva upravo ovaj sloj društvenih parazita koji, nemajući druge robe, švercuje vlastitim životnim ubeđenjima radi ostvarivanja lične koristi. Kao primer takvog švercera upravo se navodi nekadašnji marksista dogmata, zapravo staljinista, a današnji profesionalni patriota i borac za nacionalnu stvar. Kako to sasvim precizno detektuje Todor Kuljić, dve su dominantne pojave u javnim istupima ovih intelektualaca: a) razumevanje sebe kao žrtve minulog totalitarnog sistema, i b) uverenost o neprekinutom kontinuitetu vlastitog svetonazora³. Ovim se oreolom žrtve pribavlja apsolutna moralna nadmoćnost konvertita i status moralnog i intelektualnog uzora koji je po pravilu nepogrešiv u svojim stavovima. Pričom o neprekinutom kontinuitetu vlastitog svetonazora odbacuje se i samo konvertitstvo. S obzirom na količinu takvih intelektualaca danas, Kuljić s pravom postavlja pitanje: „Pravo je čudo kako je socijalizam mogao opstati pola stoleća pored mnoštva tako angažovanih antitotalitarnih intelektualaca koji su mu se protivili?”⁴ Upravo iz ovih razloga smo navodeći pojmove intelektualac ili intelektualna elita ovo stavljali pod navodnike. Ako pod pojmom intelektualca podrazumevamo visoko obrazovanu osobu koja je u svakom momentu spremna na bespoštednu kritiku određenih društvenih anomalija i to s namerom da društvo u kom živi iz te argumentovane bespoštedne kritike ostvari korist ispravljajući kritikovane anomalije, onda ove švercere vlastitog života nikako ne možemo podvesti pod pojam intelektualca⁵. Preciznije određenje bilo bi inteligent ili

¹ Kuljić Todor, *Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka*, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Beograd, 2002, str. 423.

² Kangrga Milan, *Šverceri vlastitog života*, Biblioteka Feral Tribune, Kultura & Rasvjeta, Split, 2002, str. 112-127.

³ Kuljić Todor, *Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka*, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Beograd, 2002, str. 425-432.

⁴ Isto, str. 430.

⁵ „Od Dražfusove afere pojam intelektualac označava kritičara režima. Tome nasuprot, današnja kritika socijalizma od strane konvertitske inteligencije jeste nelegitimna, jer intelektualac ima pravo da osuđuje pojavu samo ako joj je svedok.”, Kuljić Todor, isto, str. 431.

poluinteligent čime bismo definisali obrazovanu osobu koja zapravo ima ulogu državnog činovnika na intelektualnim poslovima. Upravo ovaj društveni sloj pogrešno nazivan intelektualnom elitom, u sprezi sa partnerskom „političkom elitom” (opet navodnici!) permanentno proizvodi društveno dominantnu nacionalističku svest i to prevashodno zarad očuvanja postojećih pozicija društvene moći.

Pomenuta „sprega elita” se pokazala spremnom na sve zarad očuvanja postojećih privilegija, pa i na uvlačenje celokupnog srpskog društva u seriju ratova, međunarodnu izolaciju, potpuno izumiranje privrede etablirane u „samoupravnom socijalizmu” i do temelja devastirane materijalne i duhovne resurse društva na kraju 20. veka, a to se prenosi i na početak novog milenijuma. Takva turbulentna bliža istorija Srbije dovela je do potpunog sloma osnovnih društvenih vrednosti i normi i do svojevrstne identitetske dezorijentacije srpskog društva. Niti u jednom momentu nakon raspada zajedničke države SFR Jugoslavije, srpsko društvo se nije jasno opredelilo koji su to osnovni pravci razvoja društva i koji društveni sistem se ima razvijati nakon sloma tzv. „socijalizma”. Slom SFRJ i sistema tzv. „socijalizma” nije doveo do prelaza na novi ideološki obrazac na bazi društvenog dogovora, koji bi bio identitetski temelj budućeg srpskog društva. Trenutno etabliranje „divljeg” kapitalizma koji se kroz istoriju prepoznaje pojmom „prvobitna akumulacija kapitala”, je nametnuto Srbiji nužnošću globalizacijskih procesa. Jednostavno, globalizacija kapitala je toliko moćna da je po nužnosti stvari u taj proces uvukla i srpsko društvo kom nije ostavljen prostor izbora u takvim okolnostima. Dakle, kapitalizam nije stvar opredeljenja srpskog društva, on je nužnost nametnuta nezaustavljivim svetskim istorijskim procesima.

U pomenutim okolnostima postavlja se pitanje zašto je Srbija danas društvo bez jasnog identiteta i, praktično, jedino dezorijentisano evropsko društvo bez jasno određenih pravaca daljeg razvoja? Odgovor na ovo naizgled zamršeno pitanje zapravo je veoma jednostavan. Nacionalizam je ovde oduvek korišćen kao puko sredstvo za etabliranje jedinstvenog sistema „kleptokratije”! Pod kleptokratijom podrazumevamo onaj društveni oblik u kom je pljačka društvenih dobara osnovni motiv dolaska na vlast. Ova teza može izgledati radikalno, ali hajdemo je proveriti na konkretnim iskustvenim primerima. Slobodan Milošević zapravo nikada nije bio istinski nacionalist, on je nacionalizam prigrabio zarad očuvanja vlasti u momentima kada je pritisak „intelektualnih elita” za etabliranje nacionalizma bio toliki da je sve osim prihvatanja te ideologije i uvlačenja Srbije u rat sa susedima vodilo gubitku vlasti. Rat, kao skupa igračka kabinetskih ideologa nacionalizma, u simbiozi sa novom pljačkaškom elitom nastalom pod šapom Miloševića i službi bezbednosti nužno je iscrpeo srpsku privredu. Iz ratova je izašla nova „ekonomska elita” nastala na pljački srpske privrede i ratom obuhvaćenih područja. U momentu kada je Milošević svojom svojeglavom politikom počeo gubiti osnovni osećaj za realnost i time ugrozio opstanak novoformirane pljačkaške elite, dogodio se politički prevrat 5. oktobra. Ovaj prevrat iznedrio je dva lidera koji su bili u neprestanoj borbi za vlast, Đinđić kao reformatora okrenutog Zapadu i ideologiji liberalizma i Koštunicu kao tvrdog nacionalistu pod maskom nemoguće kovanice „demokratskog nacionalizma”. Đinđić koji je izašao kao pobednik iz te borbe za vlast ubrzo je postao tolika smetnja ratom formiranoj „ekonomskoj eliti” da je ubrzo i ubijen. Za novog dugoročnog vlastodržca Srbije ustoličen je Koštunica pod čijom se nacionalističkom retorikom nesmetano može nastaviti etabliranje nove

(pljačkaške) „ekonomske elite” i njenog sistema kleptokratije. Nacionalizam je garant ovoj „eliti” da Srbija još zadugo neće kročiti u evroatlantske integracije i tako prihvatiti sistem slobodnog tržišta i kolike tolike ekonomske transparentnosti kojom bi monopolski položaj ove „elite” bio bitno ugrožen. Zato postojeći društveni sistem u Srbiji označavamo pojmom kleptokratije. U takvom sistemu nacionalizam služi očuvanju *statusa quo* u srpskom društvu, što zapravo znači očuvanje stanja društvenog haosa u kom se kleptokrati najbolje osećaju i snalaze. U takvim okolnostima, u kojima nacionalizam postaje sredstvom za ostvarivanje partikularnih, ličnih interesa, istorijski revizionizam biva logičan sled događaja u etabriranju jedinstvenog sistema kleptokratije kao vladajućeg društvenog sistema. Takav društveni sistem onemogućava konstituisanje demokratskih institucija koje bi bile brana istorijskom revizionizmu kao štetnoj društvenoj pojavi.

Još jedna istorijska specifičnost Srbije onemogućava uspostavljanje demokratskih institucija. To je balkanski kult „vođe” prisutan u srpskom društvu sve do samog kraja 20. veka. Istorijski, srpsko društvo je svoj suverenitet personalizovalo u knezu, kralju, Titu, Miloševiću, već u zavisnosti od istorijskog perioda i tipa društva. Nikada se ovde državni suverenitet nije zaista ostvarivao kroz parlament, iako imamo već stogodišnje zametke parlamentarizma u Srbiji. Zato danas u odsustvu vođe i istovremenom nepostojanju izgrađenih demokratskih institucija kao moderne alternative suverenitetu vođe imamo potpun slom društvenih vrednosti i normi koji vodi identitetskoj dezorijentaciji društva. U takvim okolnostima nametanje istorijskog revizionizma „odozgo”, od strane „intelektualnih elita”, postaje u mnogome olakšano.

Ostvarivanju istorijskog revizionizma u Srbiji na ruku svakako ide i raširena pojava istorijskog revizionizma na globalnom planu nakon završetka hladnog rata. Opšti uslovi globalne prerade prošlosti su „revolucija iz 1989.”, kraj hladnog rata i proces globalizacije⁶. Dakle, istorijski revizionizam nikako nije balkanska specifičnost - on je globalni fenomen koji se pokušava realizovati kroz teorijski postulat o antitotalitarizmu. Teorije o antitotalitarizmu proističu iz dominantne epohalne svesti uslovljene kapitalističkim načinom proizvodnje koja je permanentno zastrašena radikalno levim ideologijama. U ovim okolnostima se kroz teorijski postulat o antitotalitarizmu izjednačavaju ideologije fašizma i komunizma proglašavajući se podjednako totalitarnim. Ovakav pristup postaje izuzetno opasan relativizujući istorijsku ulogu antifašizma (koji je objektivno gledano vođen sa leve u svim istorijskim trenucima borbe protiv fašizma) i njegov svetonazorski značaj u epohi kapitalizma.

Istorijski revizionizam bi mogao (kako je naglašeno na početku teksta) imati i praktične posledice u okolnostima u kojima se nalazi današnje dezorijentisano srpsko društvo. Naime, današnja Srbija je tzv. „tranziciono društvo”. Popularni termin tranzicije samo je postmoderni izraz za istorijski poznat period rane faze kapitalizma ili prvobitne akumulacije kapitala. Ovo društveno stanje odlikuje se ogromnim socijalnim raslojavanjem na već pomenutu malobrojnu „novu ekonomsku elitu” (privilegovanih 5-10 % stanovništva) i ostatak stanovništva koji živi na rubu egzistencije i koja se u postmodernom novogovoru bezazleno naziva „gubitnicima tranzicije”, a zapravo je do srži opljačkana srednja i radnička klasa Srbije. Ovakvi ekonomski odnosi koji permanen-

tno proizvode ogromnu većinu na rubu materijalne egzistencije, uz opisano odsustvo stabilnog sistema društvenih vrednosti i normi izraženih kroz postojanje čvrstih demokratskih institucija, predstavljaju klasičan primer plodnog humusa za bujanje fašističke ideologije. U tim okolnostima istorijski revizionizam koji rehabilituje fašističke ideje i pokrete iz Drugog svetskog rata se nameće kao ona ideološka matrica koja bi mogla srpsko društvo konačno okrenuti otvorenom fašizmu. Zbog ovih razloga ukazivanje na negativne strane istorijskog revizionizma danas u Srbiji može imati vrlo bitnu ulogu u borbi protiv potpunog skretanja društva u desno koje bi dokrajčilo i ovako vrlo nestabilno srpsko društvo.

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dr Dragan Đukanović

ANTIFAŠIZAM NA TLU NEKADAŠNJE JUGOSLAVIJE: KRIZA I OSPORAVANJE

Uvod

Antifašizam kao univerzalna, trajna i temeljna vrednost savremenog sveta i danas, šezdeset godina nakon završetka Drugog svetskog rata, predstavlja nastojanje naprednog dela čovečanstva da se spreči fizička likvidacija ljudi zbog njihovog etničkog porekla. On, takođe, predstavlja jedan od kamena temeljca savremene Evrope i duboko je utkan u njene osnovne vrednosti. Naime, posleratna Evropa se upravo putem jačanja antifašizma oslobodila dominacije netrpeljivosti, ekstremnog socijalnog darvinizma, ideologije „kvi i tla” i straha.

Narodnooslobodilački pokret Jugoslavije (NOP) je, kao deo globalne antifašističke koalicije u periodu od 1941. do 1945. godine, dao značajan doprinos u pobedi nad fašizmom¹, kao nesumnjivo najvećim zlom XX veka. Ovaj antifašistički pokret, predvođen Komunističkom partijom Jugoslavije i Josipom Brozom Titom, je prema ocenama brojnih istoričara bio jedan od najsnažnijih i najmasovnijih u tada porobljenoj Evropi. U jedinicama Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije (NOVJ) je tokom rata, prema procenama istoričara, poginulo oko 300 000 boraca, dok ih je gotovo 400 000 ranjeno. Jedinstveni jugoslovenski antifašistički pokret je uspeo da prevaziđe sve među-nacionalne netrpeljivosti i podele koje su došle do izražaja u okupiranoj Jugoslaviji. Stoga je ovaj višenacionalni i nadnacionalni pokret uspeo da se nametne kao jasna alternativa svim kolaboracionistima i fašistima na ovom tlu.

Prvi cilj ovog antifašističkog pokreta je bilo oslobođenje zemlje od okupatora, dok je drugi cilj bio vezan za zaustavljanje sprovođenja dva plana za stvaranje grandomanskih nacionalnih država. Naime, ustaški režim je u ratnom razdoblju uspeo da formira Veliku Hrvatsku (tzv. „Nezavisna Država Hrvatska”), koja je obuhvatala veći deo današnje Hrvatske (izuzev Istre, Baranje i središnjeg dela Dalmacije), čitavu Bosnu i Hercegovinu i Srem, a u njoj su svi nehrvati i antifašisti bili sistematski uništavani. Sa druge strane, Ravnogorski (četnički) pokret je početkom rata na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije proklamovao da mu je je cilj stvaranje Velike Srbije² koja bi obuhvatala dve trećine današnje Hrvatske, potom Bosnu i Hercegovinu, Crnu Goru i Makedoniju. Stoga je jugoslovenski antifašistički pokret, pokušavajući da suzbije ova dva ekstremno nacionalistička poduhvata, u potpunosti afirmisao Bosnu i Hercegovinu (ravnopravnu zajednicu tri naroda - Muslimana, Srba i Hrvata), kao i samobitnost crnogorskog i makedonskog naroda čija su prava na izražavanje nacionalnog identiteta bila suštinski ugrožena u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji.

¹ Videti: Vojislav Stanovčić, „Fašizam”, u: *Enciklopedija političke kulture*, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1993, str. 317-331.

² Videti: *Projekat „Homogena Srbija”* dr Stevana Moljevića, *Naš put*, Nikšić, 30. jun 1941.

Aktuelno stanje antifašizma u državama nastalim na tlu bivše Jugoslavije

U svim zemljama savremene Evrope se vrednosti i tekovine antifašizma duboko poštuju, a svaki pokušaj njegovog osporavanja ili promovisanja neonacizma i neofašizma se oštro krivično sankcioniše. Izuzetak predstavljaju države nastale na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije. Naime, u njima je uporedo sa procesom etnifikacije i izgradnje država-nacija započeo i proces relativizovanja, osporavanja i potpune marginalizacije antifašističke borbe tokom Drugog svetskog rata.

Proces revizije zvanične historiografije Drugog svetskog rata je posebno zahvatio Republiku Hrvatsku i Republiku Srbiju. U ovim državama su uporedo sa slomom jednopartijskog sistema organizovane političke partije koje su sebe označavale kao naslednike pojedinih snaga koje su podržavale fašizam, ali i onih čiji je antifašizam tokom Drugog svetskog rata bio sporan.

I pored toga što je u prvom odeljku Ustava Republike Hrvatske³ naveden kontinuitet njene savremene državnosti sa antifašističkom borbom, odnosno odlukama Zemaljskog Antifašističkog Vijeća Hrvatske (ZAVNOH), u udžbenicima istorije u ovoj zemlji su se „preko noći” pojavili novi sadržaji koji su osporavali NOP, glorifikovali saradnike okupatora i umanjivali broj srpskih, jevrejskih i romskih žrtava u tzv. „Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj”.⁴ Usledilo je potom masovno menjanje naziva ulica i trgova koji su nosili imena učesnika antifašističke borbe, ali i prenaglašavanje učešća pripadnika hrvatskog naroda i umanjivanje učešća lokalnih Srba u NOP-u.

Posebno je negirana vodeća uloga Komunističke partije Jugoslavije u antifašističkoj borbi, a veštački je konstruisan i drugi „nekomunistički antifašistički pokret” domobrani, koji je tokom rata okupljao uglavnom pristalice Hrvatske seljačke stranke Vlatka Mačeka⁵. Tokom proteklih petnaest godina u Hrvatskoj je uporedo sa rušenjem i uklanjanjem gotovo svih spomenika učesnicima NOP-a⁶, bilo i nekoliko pokušaja podizanja spomen obeležja piscu rasističkih zakona u tzv. „NDH”, Mili Budaku i ustaškom vojnom komandanu Juri Francetiću. Takođe, u mnogim hrvatskim gradovima su ulicama i trgovima davana njihova imena. U govoru koga je održao prilikom obeležavanja šezdeset godina od pobeđe nad fašizmom 7. maja 2005. godine, predsednik Republike Hrvatske Stjepan Mesić⁷ je jasno naglasio da tzv. „Nezavisna Država Hrvatska” nije bila izraz želje hrvatskog naroda, već da je on kroz učešće u partizanskom antifašističkom pokretu uspeo da konstituiše svoju današnju državu. Istom prilikom predsednik Hrvatske je istakao i nespornu vodeću ulogu Komunističke partije Jugoslavije u rukovođenju antifašističkim pokretom⁸.

3 „Ustav Republike Hrvatske”, I izvorišne osnove, *Narodne novine*, br. 56, 22. prosinac 1990.

4 U ovome je prednjačio dr Franjo Tuđman, predsednik Republike Hrvatske (1990) koji je u svojim naučnim radovima osporavao zločine koje su počinile ustaške vlasti tokom Drugog svetskog rata. U tom smislu on je umanjio i broj ubijenih Srba, Jevreja i Roma u logorima Jasenovac i Stara Gradiška. Videti: Franjo Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti: rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zločinca*, Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, Zagreb, 1990.

5 Ovaj političar je odmah nakon proglašavanja tzv. NDH pozvao pristalice svoje partije da priznaju ustaške vlasti.

6 Gotovo u svim hrvatskim gradovima uklonjena spomen obeležja učesnicima NOP-a. Štaviše, u Kumrovcu, rodnom mestu Josipa Broza - Tita, je 26. decembra 2004. godine srušena njegova bista.

7 „Govor predsjednika Republike na središnjoj proslavi obilježavanja 60. obljetnice pobjede nad fašizmom”, <http://www.predsjednik.hr/default.asp?ru=7&gl=200505070000007&sid=&jezik=1>

8 Ova izjava predsednika Mesića je izazvala buru negodovanja u redovima vladajuće Hrvatske demokratske Zajednice i ekstremno nacionalističke Hrvatske stranke prava.

U Republici Srbiji je tokom protekle decenije bilo nekoliko pokušaja da se rahabilituju nesporni saradnici okupatora u Drugom svetskom ratu - general Milan Nedić, predsednik tzv. „Vlade srpskog spasa“, i Dimitrije Ljotić, vođa fašističke organizacije Zbor⁹. U pojedinim srpskim gradovima su takođe postojale inicijative da se njihovim imenima nazovu ulice i trgovi, koje ipak nisu naišle na širu podršku javnosti. Početkom protekle decenije je, međutim, u Srbiji izneta teza o dva „srpska“ antifašistička pokreta - partizanskom i četničkom. Štaviše, čini se da je zvanična srpska historiografija to prihvatila i pored brojnih istorijskih podataka koji dokazuju povezanost četničkog pokreta sa okupatorima. Ravnogorski pokret, na čijem je čelu bio general Dragoljub - Draža Mihailović se u Srbiji naziva i prvim evropskim antifašističkim pokretom, iako je upravo njegov lider nakon završetka rata proglašen za saradnika nemačkih i italijanskih okupacionih snaga. U skladu sa takvim političkim diskursom Narodna skupština Republike Srbije je 24. decembra 2004. godine usvojila i zakon o izjednačavanju prava pripadnika NOP-a i Ravnogorskog pokreta¹⁰, a Vlada Republike Srbije je bila neposredno uključena u organizaciju proslave šezdeset četvrte godišnjice početka četničkog „ustanka“ 15. maja 2005. godine na Ravnoj Gori¹¹. U govoru prilikom obeležavanja šezdeset godina od pobede nad fašizmom 9. maja 2005. godine, predsednik Republike Srbije Boris Tadić¹² takođe je podržao tezu o postojanju dva antifašistička pokreta tokom Drugog svetskog rata.

Ono što je zajedničko u procesu istorijskog revizionizma u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj jeste naglašavanje vlastite etničke komponente unutar nekada jedinstvenog jugoslovenskog antifašističkog pokreta. Tako se u Srbiji neretko govori o učešću gotovo 90% Srba u NOP-u, dok je u Hrvatskoj vidno (pre)naglašavanje broja Hrvata. Slični pokušaji nacionalizacije antifašističkog pokreta su do izražaja došli i u Republici Sloveniji u kojoj se ističe isključivo doprinos Oslodobilačkog fronta slovenačkog naroda (Osvobodilna fronta), koji je činio samo jedan deo jugoslovenskog antifašističkog pokreta.

Pored Srbije i Hrvatske i u drugim južnoslovenskim državama bilo je značajnih pokušaja relativizacije NOP-a i rehabilitacije organizacija koje su od strane posleratnih jugoslovenskih vlasti proglašene za kolaboracionističke¹³. U Sloveniji je početkom protekle decenije propao pokušaj da se Bela garda Lea Rupnika proglasi antifašističkim pokretom. I u Bosni i Hercegovini se slično desilo sa organizacijom Mladi Musliman, i koja je na teritoriji ove države delovala tokom Drugog svetskog rata i otvoreno saradivala sa okupatorom i ustaškim režimom. U Republici Srpskoj, bosanskohercegovačkom entitetu sa srpskom većinom, danas je u javnom i političkom diskursu dominantna pozitivna uloga četničkog pokreta. Na mnogim javnim mestima se ističu

9 O kolaboracionizmu Milana Nedića i Dimitrija Ljotića videti: Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939-1945, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1992, str. 389-506.

10 „Zakon o izmenama i dopunama zakona o pravima boraca, vojnih invalida i članova njihovih porodica“, 24. decembar 2004, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 137/04.

11 Pokroviteljstvo Vlade Republike Srbije prilikom obeležavanja godišnjice ravnogorskog ustanka 2005. Godine nije naišlo na značajnija osporavanja u domaćoj javnosti. Samo su Socijalistička partija Srbije i Socijaldemokratska unija oštro osudile učešće Vlade Srbije u organizaciji ovog skupa. Sa druge strane, mnogobrojne nevladine organizacije su takođe osudile angažman državnih organa u pripremi ove manifestacije (Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Žene u crnom i Centar za ženske studije).

12 „Obeležen Dan pobede“, http://www.rts.co.yu/jedna_vest.asp?belong=&IDNews=115420.

13 To se, naravno, odnosilo i na lidere ovih organizacija.

zastave i drugi simboli ovog pokreta, a ulicama se daju imena njegovih istaknutih pripadnika. Štaviše, u Brčkom je tokom protekle decenije podignut i spomenik generalu Draži Mihailoviću¹⁴. Na to koliki je stepen negiranja NOP-a u Republici Srpskoj ukazuje i tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini donet zaključak skupštine ovog entiteta kojim su poništene odluke Zemaljskog Antifašističkog Vijeća Bosne i Hercegovine (ZAVNOBiH). Naime, navedeni zaključci Narodne skupštine Republike Srpske su pravno nevažećim proglasili sve odluke ZAVNOBiH-a, kojima je ovaj organ narodne vlasti na oslobođenoj teritoriji 25. novembra 1943. godine konstituisao Bosnu i Hercegovinu kao zajednicu tri ravnopravna naroda u sastavu federalne Jugoslavije. Slična situacija je i na prostorima sa dominantnim hrvatskim žvljem u Bosni i Hercegovini gde pojedine ulice nose imena ustaških zločinaca i na kojima se bez krivičnih sankcija ističu znamenja tzv. „NDH”. Sa druge strane, na većinski bošnjačkim područjima Bosne i Hercegovine se i dalje potencira značaj NOP-a kao jedinog antifašističkog pokreta, a svi datumi iz Narodno-oslobodilačke borbe koji se odnose na ovu državu se još uvek službeno obeležavaju.

U Crnoj Gori se poslednjih godina posredno pokušavaju rehabilitovati kako pripadnici četničkog pokreta, tako i sledbenici separatističko-kolaboracionističkih snaga tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Rehabilitacija četničkog pokreta u Crnoj Gori je posebno uočljiva u severnim krajevima ove zemlje. Ipak, 2004. godine je nakon intervencije crnogorskih vlasti propao pokušaj da se u Beranama podigne spomenik Pavlu Đurišiću, četničkom komandantu za Crnu Goru i Sandžak. U pokušaju rehabilitacije Sekule Drljevića, vođe separatističkog pokreta i predsednika samoproklamovanog Crnogorskog državnog vijeća, prednjači nevladina organizacija Dukljanska akademija nauka i umjetnosti. Istovremeno, na mnoga osporavanja je naišla odluka Skupštine Republike Crne Gore po kojoj je pesma „Oj svijetla majska zoro”¹⁵ Sekule Drljevića proglašena za državnu himnu. Važno je, međutim, istaći da je Drljević reči ove pesme napisao na ritmove stare crnogorske narodne melodije.

U Republici Makedoniji je, kao i u svim južnoslovenskim državama, došlo do pokušaja revidiranja istorijskih činjenica u vezi sa Narodnooslobodilačkom borbom i konsitutsanjem makedonske države i nacije. Prvi talas revizionizma je predstavljao pokušaj probugarskih snaga da rehabilituju ratnog lidera ekstremističke Vnutrašnje makedonske revolucionarne organizacije (VMRO) Ivana-Vanče Mihajlova. Drugi pokušaj se odnosio na rehabilitaciju albanskih balističkih jedinica koje su tokom rata bile aktivne na teritorijama današnje Zapadne Makedonije. Ipak, u preambuli Ustava Republike Makedonije¹⁶ iz 1991. godine je jasno naglašen kontinuitet njene državnosti od formiranja Antifašističkog Sbornaja Narodnog Oslobođenja Makedonije (ASNOM). avgusta 1944. godine, čime je posredno ukazano i na značaj antifašističke borbe u ovoj zemlji.

Gotovo potpuna negacija narodnooslobodilačke borbe tokom Drugog svetskog rata je danas uočljiva i na Kosovu. U ovom entitetu pod međunarodnim protektoratom se „istorijskom greškom” nazivaju odluke Antifašističkog Veća Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije (AVNOJ) kojima se Kosovo konstituiše kao autonomna oblast u sastavu

¹⁴ Štaviše, ovaj spomenik je bio objavljen na spisku zaštićenih kulturnih dobara u *Službenom listu Bosne i Hercegovine*. Nakon protesta predstavnika pre svega bošnjačkih partija, ali i brojnih nevladinih organizacija Kancelarija Visokog predstavnika za BiH je objavila daje reč o „tehničkoj grešci”.

¹⁵ Ova pesma je pod naslovom „Vječna naša Crna Goro” objavljena u okupiranom Zagrebu 1944. godine u knjizi Sekule Drljevića pod naslovom *Balkanski sukobi*.

¹⁶ „Устав на Република Македонија”, 17. ноември 1991, преамбула, у: Службен весникно Република Македонф, бр. 52/1991.

Srbije. Sa druge strane se u udžbenicima istorije ukazuje značaj tzv. „Bujanske konferencije“¹⁷ (januar 1944) na kojoj su predstavnici Narodnog odbora Kosovsko-metohijske oblasti zahtevali ujedinjenje ove pokrajine sa susednom Albanijom. Istovremeno se najčešće vrednosno neutralno govori o delovanju balista i zločinima koji su oni sproveli nad nealbanskim žvljem Kosova tokom Drugog svetskog rata.

Zaključak

Antifašizam se danas u dominantnom javnom diskursu zemalja nekadašnje Jugoslavije neretko tumači kao „komunistički“ i anahroni izraz. Ovakvo poimanje još uvek dominantne desnice u navedenim zemljama ne samo da pokušava da izjednači fašizam sa antifašizmom, već i negiranja ključnu ulogu Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i Josipa Broza - Tita kao vrhovnog komandanta Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije u oslobođenju južnoslovenskih naroda.

Jasno je i da se u zemljama nastalim na tlu bivše Jugoslavije antifašizam danas u potpunosti politički instrumentalizuje i prihvata samo onoliko koliko „odgovara vlastitoj naciji“. Sa druge strane, u zemljama regiona su osnovane brojne nevladine organizacije čiji je cilj negovanje tekovina antifašističke borbe na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije. Tako npr. u Beogradu deluje *Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji*, dok je u Sarajevu tokom protekle decenije sa istim ciljem osnovano *Udruženje građana Josip Broz - Tito*. Važno je napomenuti da su zvanične organizacije boraca antifašista iz Drugog svetskog rata tokom protekle decenije često bile zloupotrebljavane u dnevnopolitičke svrhe, pre svega u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj. Stroga one danas gube inicijativu u širenju istine o antifašističkom pokretu i promovisanju ideja antifašizma.

Može se, takođe, ukazati i na tesnu povezanost između težnji za ekskluzivnim nacionalnim i državnim suverenitetom, koje su bile osnov za izbijanje krize i ratova na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije, sa jedne, i kritike i osporavanja antifašizma i antifašističke borbe na ovim prostorima, sa druge strane. Naime, ovi pokušaji stvaranja jednonacionalnih državnih tvorevina su potpomognuti istorijskim revizionizmom, putem koga su dovođeni u pitanje, ali i opravdavani zločini počinjeni nad drugim narodima u Drugom svetskom ratu. Ovakva apologija zločina počinjenih u „ima nacije“ u razdoblju između 1941. i 1945. godine dovela je do toga da se u sukobima koji su vođeni tokom protekle decenije na ovom prostoru „opravdaju“ etnička čišćenja i „humana preseljenja“ pojedinih etničkih zajednica.

Proces revizije činjenica vezanih za Drugi svetski rat ostavlja i dublje tragove na bilateralne i multilateralne odnose između zemalja nastalih na tlu nekadašnje SFR Jugoslavije. To svedoči i otkazivanje posete predsednika Republike Hrvatske¹⁸ Stjepana Mesića maja 2005. godine nekadašnjoj državnoj zajednici SCG zbog podrške i aktivnog učešća Vlade Republike Srbije u organizaciji proslave četničkog ustanka na Ravnoj Gori.

¹⁷ Videti: Branko Petranović, „AVNOJ i Bujanska konferencija“, u: Gordana Filipović (ur.), *Kosovo - prošlost i sadašnjost*, IP „Međunarodna politika“, Beograd, 1989, str. 131-137.

¹⁸ „*Odgodene pripreme za posjet predsednika Mesića Srbiji i Crnoj Gori*“, Ured predsednika Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb, 16. svibanj 2005.

Jasnu osudu pokroviteljstva Vlade Srbije nad ovom manifestacijom je izneo i Ivo Sanader predsednik Vlade Republike Hrvatske. On je dodatno predložio da u Hrvatskom saboru bude usvojena posebna izvaja kojom bi se osudili zločini počinjeni od strane četničkih formacija na tlu današnje Hrvatske tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Sličan pokušaj usvajanja rezolucije o osudi rehabilitacije četničkog pokreta¹⁹ propao je u Domu naroda Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine 18. maja 2005. godine zbog protivljenja poslanika iz reda srpskog naroda.

Porast raznih kontroverzi i ideoloških sukoba oko karaktera i obima antifašističke borbe nesumnjivo doprinosi jačanju ekstremno nacionalističkih i neonacističkih pokreta u svim državama nastalim na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije. To, međutim, nije praćeno adekvatnim zakonskim normama kojima bi se, kao u većini država Evropske unije, sankcionisale pojave neofašizma i neonacizma. Naravno da je to, između osatalog, i jasna posledica blagog odnosa nosilaca političke vlasti u južnoslovenskim državama prema kolaboracionističkim snagama koje su delovale na teritoriji njihovih zemalja tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Oni, čini se, oštro osuđuju samo tzv. „tuđi kolaboracionizam”. Jedan od mnogobrojnih primera predstavlja činjenica da državni organi Republike Hrvatske nisu do sada osuđivali pojavu ustaških obeležja na manifestaciji obeležavanja masovnog ubistva pripadnika oružanih snaga tzv. „NDH” prilikom njihovog povlačenja u austrijskom gradu Blajburgu. Naprotiv, na ovoj manifestaciji, koja se obeležava polovinom maja svake godine, često prisustvuju i najviši predstavnici vlasti Republike Hrvatske.

Danas se u zemljama nastalim na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije antifašistička borba neretko zloupotrebljava kao prihvatljiva legitimacija u procesu približavanja Evropskoj uniji. Jasno je, međutim, da Evropska unija zahteva od država, nastalih na tlu nekadašnje Jugoslavije, da istinski poštuju i afirmišu vrednosti antifašizma. U tom smislu je potpredsednik Evropske komisije Franko Fratini (Franco Frattini) 11. maja 2005. godine poručio zemljama Zapadnog Balkana „da Evropa s posebnom pažnjom gleda na antifašizam, koji prepoznaje kao borbu za osnovna ljudska prava.”²⁰

¹⁹ Tekst ove rezolucije su predložili predstavnici bošnjačkog naroda u Domu naroda Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine.

²⁰ *Vesti Radija Slobodna Evropa, Program na južnoslovenskim jezicima (bosanskom, hrvatskom i srpskom)*, <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/article/2005/05/10/6f0a96-a5f5-47c5-92a8e8bf58b6a9cc.html>

Aleksej Kišjuhas

ISTORIJSKI REVIZIONIZAM KAO PSEUDOISTORIJA

Srbijansko društvo tokom ratova 1990-ih, ali i nakon 2000. godine nastojalo je i nastoji, pored diskontinualne budućnosti, (za)dobiti i novo sećanje. Povezivanje razumevanja prošlosti sa gorućim problemima i identitetskim krizama u sadašnjosti izrodilo je prakse i, gotovo, zvanične politike istorijskog revizionizma u Srbiji. Ovo se čini zbog ideoloških/političkih zahteva vladajućih (antikomunističkih) elita i konteksta narastajućeg nacionalizma. Značaj i snaga stvaranja novog sećanja leži u potvrđivanju ideološko-političkog puta na kojem se društvo nalazi, te u (prividnom) razjašnjenju potencijalnih paradoksa i individualnih frustracija usled tranzicionog procesa.

Srbijansku verziju pseudoistorije predstavljaju prakse istorijskog revizionizma. Revizija istorije u Srbiji poprima dva tipična oblika. Prvo, reč je o reviziji istorije koja se tiče teritorijalnosti i etnogeneze Srba, Hrvata, Albanaca, Bošnjaka i ostalih naroda. Ovaj je tip revizionizma odgovarao na zahteve za legitimacijom ratnih sukoba i karakterističan je za prvu polovinu 1990-ih godina. Drugo, reč je o reviziji istorije za vreme i nakon Drugog svetskog rata, to jest revizije uloge kvislinških režima, kolaboracionističkih (para)vojski i socijalističke vlasti po završetku rata. Ovaj tip revizionizma odgovara na zahteve desničarskih i antikomunističkih elita i klika koje dolaze na vlast nakon 2000. godine. Osim što pune medijski prostor, one zadobijaju i trajniju, fizičku formu: reč je o izmenama naziva ulica, postavljenjima spomenika i, najdrastičnije, izmenama u udžbenicima iz istorije.

Ovaj esej ima za cilj demonstraciju preplitanja i kongruencije praksi istorijskog revizionizma i pseudoistorije. Iako se ovi pojmovi ne mogu jednačiti, oni su međusobno nerazmršivo povezani. Ta se povezanost ogleda u jednakim (neepistemičkim) ciljevima tih praksi, u njihovoj metodologiji, te zajedničkim karakterističnim operativnim tehnikama i konsekvencama. U pojedinim interpretacijama, istorijski revizionizam se posmatra kao specifični tip pseudoistorije, ili se pak konkretna pseudoistorija tumači kao izdanak opštije prakse istorijske revizije. Međutim, (i) iz analitičkih razloga, plauzibilno je i heuristički plodno diferencirati ih. Istovremeno, neobično je važno naglasiti kako revizija istorije nije apriorno nenaučna i ideološko-politička praksa (dok to pseudoistorija jeste). Kumulativna ili diskontinualna izmena postojećih (istorijskih) znanja predstavlja uobičajenu naučnu praksu uvećanja ili sofistikacije korpusa naučnog znanja. U ovom eseju će biti reči jedino o praksama istorijske revizije koje su na pseudonaučnim, a ne naučnim osnovama.

Pseudoistorija

Šta je pseudoistorija? Ovu je pojavu najjednostavnije razumeti kao reviziju prošlosti zbog ličnih ili političkih zahteva sadašnjice. Reč je, dakle, o neistinitoj verziji istorijskih događaja, iznošenoj iz nenaučnih i najčešće političkih i malicioznih razloga. Pseudoistorija je selektivna po pitanju dokaza, neretko tretira mitove, legende i slično

kao doslovnu istinu, neselektivno i nekritički navodi drevne ili klasične istoričare i/ili istorijske tekstove, često je karakterišu relativističke tvrdnje o postojanju „više istina” i njen vodeći interes je neepistemički: opravdanje određene lične ili političke agende, a ne potraga za naučnom istinom. Prakse istorijskog revizionizma (u Srbiji i svuda) predstavljaju tipičnu pseudoistoriju po većini navedenih karakteristika.

Na prvom mestu, pseudoistorijske prakse su nenaučne. One svesno ignorišu kanone naučne metodologije, kao i ustanovljene fakte. Međutim, stav pseudoistorije prema (istorijskoj) nauci je ambivalentan. Pseudoistorija, naime, odbija upotrebu naučne metodologije, ali sama pretenduje na bivanje naukom. Ovo nastoji postignuti manipulacijom i medijskom promocijom, a ne podvrgavanjem metodološkim načelima.

Kao što je navedeno, značajan element pseudoistorije su lični ili politički zahtevi sadašnjice, a ne univerzalna (naučna) načela objektivnosti. Iz ovih razloga, pseudoistorijske tvrdnje su često kontroverzne i bombastične (npr. o vanzemaljskim bićima kao graditeljima egipatskih piramida), pošto svedoče o ličnoj želji za popularnošću i medijskom pažnjom. Međutim, mnogo češći razlozi bavljenja pseudostorijom su ideološke i političke pobude (npr. negaciju holokausta vrše pojedinci bliski neonacizmu).

Tipična i gotovo paradigmataska pseudoistorijska praksa jeste negacija holokausta (iz ovih razloga će i većina ilustracija pseudoistorijskih načela biti iz ove grane pseudoistorije). Ovi pseudoistorijski autori (tzv. „negacionisti”) najčešće osporavaju intencionalnost genocida nad Jevrejima, potom visoku organizovanost programa istrebljenja (tj. upotrebu gasnih komora i krematorijuma) i brojku od pet do šest miliona ubijenih Jevreja. Vodeći pseudoistorijski autori koji negiraju holokaust su Mark Veber, Dejvid Irving, Rober Forison, Ernst Cundel, Dejvid Kol i drugi. Među ostale popularne pseudoistorije spadaju i navodi iz knjiga poput „Protokoli Sionskih mudraca” i „Da Vinčijev Kod”, potom tvrdnje o Atlantidi ili one o spuštanju na Mesec misije „Apolo” kao lažnom i isceniranom. Nešto egzotičnije pseudonaučne tvrdnje tiču se tzv. „afrocentrizma” (političkog i rasističkog pokreta koji vodeće kulturne doprinose i pojedince poput Isusa i Sokrata smatra izvorno afričkim/crnačkim) ili tvrdnji o muslimanskim moreplovcima koji dospevaju do obala Amerike pre Kolumba.

Metode i tehnike

Metode i tehnike istorijskog revizionizma u Srbiji poklapaju se sa opšti(ji)m pseudoistorijskim metodama i tehnikama i ovo je osnovni izvor za njihov paralelizam koji je tema ovog eseja. Kao što je navedeno, pseudoistorija se ne koristi naučnom metodologijom pri zasnivanju sopstvenih tvrdnji. Međutim, moguće je izdvojiti niz tehnika kojima se u ubeđivanjima služi pseudoistorija i njeni proponenti. Istinska nauka ne ubeđuje niti preobraća, već dokazuje. Pa ipak, pseudoistorijska ubeđivanja i manipulativne mimikrije nauke ostvaruju zavidne uspehe pri uvećanju broja pristalica pseudoistorije. Neke od tipičnih metoda i tehnika pseudoistoričara su sledeće:

Prvo, koncentriše se na slabe tačke unutar korpusa istorijskog znanja, bez da se mnogo ističe sopstvena pozicija (npr. negacionisti holokausta ističu međusobno različite navode svedoka). Drugo, zloupotrebljavaju se greške u istorijskim navodima ili se ističu recentne potvrde donedavno kontroverznih zamisli (npr. o Vikinzima koji

dostižu tlo Severne Amerike pre Kolumba). Treće, obilno se koriste odlomci i citati van konteksta (veoma često i pojedinaca sa „suprotne” strane). Četvrto, istinske naučne debate o određenom fenomenu (npr. one između tzv. „intencionalista” i „funkcionalista” među naučnicima koji izučavaju holokaust) se pogrešno tumače kao sukob oko pitanja da li se fenomen uopšte dogodio. Peto, dokazima se pristupa selektivno: fokusira se na nepoznato, a ignoriše poznato, to jest naglašavaju se podaci koji „odgovaraju” prethodnoj zamisli, a odbacuju podaci koji se „ne uklapaju”. Šesto, ove se tvrdnje nastoje predstaviti kao strogo naučne, neutralne i objektivne - najčešće upotrebljavajući naučni žargon, akademske titule i drugo. Uzgred, sve ove prakse karakteristične su za ukupnu pseudonaučnu podkulturu, a najevidentnije su među kreacionističkim pseudonaučnim osporavanjima darvinizma i teorije evolucije.

Sve se ove manipulativne prakse mogu analitički podeliti u četiri velike grupe: (1) insistiranje na greškama u istorijskim navodima (čime se implicira da su ukupni istorijski zaključci pogrešni); (2) nekritičko citiranje (klasičnih autora, mitova i legendi, književnosti, citiranje van konteksta); (3) tvrdnje da istinske naučne debate o fenomenu znače debatu da li se fenomen uopšte odigrao; (4) selektivno i subjektivno pristupanje dokazima.

Tip mišljenja posebno karakterističan za pseudoistoriju jesu teorije zavere. Naime, pseudoistorija je tesno oslonjena o teorije zavere, pošto ove pseudonaučne zamisli služe kao delegitimacija naučne istorije i, pre svega, dokaza. Reč je o nedokazanim tvrdnjama koje se logički ne mogu pobiti (jer se dokazi takođe proglašavaju zaverom), a koje teret dokazivanja manipulativno i nelogički pomeraju ka onima koji ih osporavaju. Istorija ili pojedini istorijski događaj (poput holokausta ili zločina na Markalama u Sarajevu) se odbacuje kao zavera ili plan skovan iz političkih ciljeva. Tvrdnje teoretičara zavere, ma koliko besmislene, zadobijaju pristalice pošto počivaju na razumnoj skepsi prema institucijama i kontinuiranoj izmeni korpusa istorijskog i svakodnevnog znanja. Problem je što teorije zavere ne nude nikakve (ili nude nedovoljno čvrste) dokaze za sopstvenu tezu, što bivaju jednako slepe za dokaze koji im ne idu u prilog, i ni pod kojim uslovima ne preispituju prvobitno ubeđenje o postojanju zavere što sve čini strukturu tipičnih pseudonaučnih praksi. Samim tim, one su negacija ili antipod istinskom kritičkom i skeptičkom naučnom radu, iako se zaodevaju u oblandu naučnog istraživanja.

Sve spomenute karakteristike odnose se na istorijski revizionizam u Srbiji. Na primeru revizije uloge Milana Nedića i Dimitrija Ljotića svedoci smo gotovo svih pseudoistorijskih taktika. Citati se vade iz konteksta, uzimaju u obzir samo fakti koji idu u prilog pseudoistorijskoj tezi, eksploatišu se i zloupotrebljavaju istinske istorijske debate o ovom pitanju i tome slično. Jedan tip pseudoistorijskog mišljenja u Srbiji je posebno fantastično, sinhron sa uobičajenom pseudoistorijom: reč je o paralelizmu negacije masakra u Srebrenici ili na Markalama sa negacijom holokausta. Po već istaknutom standardnom modelu i jedni i drugi negacionisti selektivno pristupaju dokazima (fokusirajući se na dokaze koji im idu u prilog, a zanemarujući ostale), izvan konteksta i/ili selektivno citiraju pojedine zvaničnike, nastoje predstaviti svoju poziciju kao objektivnu i neutralnu i drugo.

Svakako, i sami ciljevi prakse istorijske revizije u Srbiji identični su sa tipično pseudoistorijskim ciljevima. Na primeru negacije holokausta: pošto ljudi povezuju

fašizam sa masovnim ubistvima i holokaustom, ukoliko se pobiju tvrdnje o holokaustu, fašizam bi izgubio društvenu stigmiju koju poseduje - i ovo je temeljni društveni cilj i (pred)ubedenje koje vodi prakse pseudoistoričara „negacionista”. Ukoliko dokazi ne odgovaraju ovom cilju, dokazi su ti koji se negiraju, odbacuju ili relativizuju, a ne hipoteza ili osnovna ideja. Svakako, ovo je antiteza svakom naučnom radu. Slični ciljevi vode i srbijanske negacioniste zločina tokom ratova 1990-ih i revizioniste kvislinških režima tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Ukoliko bi se pokazalo da nije bilo masovnih zločina prema civilima od strane srbijanskih (para)vojski, nacionalistička i ekspanzionistička politika Srbije predstavljala bi nešto vredno. Odnosno, ukoliko bi se izbrisao samo deo o kolaboraciji sa (stigmatizovanim) režimom Adolfa Hitlera, desničarska politika i ideologija Dimitrija Ljotića i Milana Nedića mogle bi biti predstavljane kao legitimne i istorijski pozitivne.

Kako po neepistemičkim ciljevima (propagacija određene političke agende umesto potrage za istinom), tako i spomenutim metodama i tehnikama istorijska revizija u Srbiji prati oblik tipične pseudoistorije. Po svojoj eksternoj strukturi i internim karakteristikama, srbijanski istorijski revizionizam analogan je tvrdnjama o Atlantidi ili Sokratu kao crncu iz Egipta. Međutim, bivajući u postkonfliktnom kontekstu nacionalizma i, pre svega, sa podrškom zvanične politike, većine medija, religijskih i obrazovnih institucija, ovde nije reč samo o odnosu nauke i pseudonauke. Ulog nije samo odbrana istinitog naučnog znanja, već sprečavanje formiranja lažnog sećanja koje hrani nove sukobe.

Protivljenje

Sećanja, osim što blede, mogu i da rastu. Inicijalna percepcija izbledi, ali svako prizivanje određenog slučaja zahteva rekonstrukciju sećanja. Političke elite, svesno ili ne, imaju interes da utiču na ovo sećanje. U ovome je smisao Gebelsove tvrdnje o lači koja, ponovljena dovoljno puta, postaje istina. Svakako, ona to ne postaje suštinski, već laž biva iskomunicirana kao istina u procesu društvene interakcije. Postojao je kontinent u Atlantskom okeanu, Marsovci su izgradili Keopsovu piramidu, Isus je imao devojkicu, Hrvati su u stvari Srbi, Milan Nedić i Dimitrije Ljotić nisu bili entuzijastični Hitlerovi sledbenici. Mnogi među nama poverovali su ili mogu poverovati ovim lažima iz kuhinje pseudoistorije i/ili istorijskog revizionizma. Rečima sociologa Vilijama Tomasa: ukoliko ljudi definišu situacije kao realne, one su realne u svojim posledicama. U slučaju istorijskog revizionizma u Srbiji ovih se realnih posledica imamo istinski pribojavati.

Kako se tome suprotstaviti? Pre svega, najvažnije je metodično, sistematično i kontinuirano pobijati tvrdnje pseudoistoričara nedvosmislenim dokazima. Međutim, od krucijalnog je značaja tretirati samu istoriju kao naučnu disciplinu. Istoriju je nužno posmatrati (ili ovo od nje zahtevati) kao istinsku nauku, koja nije zainteresovana jedino za imena i datume, već za ozbiljne analize i stroge metodologije. Kako znamo da se holokaust zaista dogodio? Tako što pred sobom imamo međusobno konvergirajuće dokaze, do kojih smo došli naučnim metodama. Ovo je osnovni kriterijum demarkacije između revizije koja kao cilj ima produbljenje i sofisticaciju naučnih znanja i revizije koja za cilj ima propagaciju nenaučnih, političko-ideoloških i, jednostavno, zlih misli. Potraga za dokazima vođena naučnom metodologijom onaj je kamen-međaš koji valja glasno zahtevati pred izazovima istorijske revizije i pseudoistorije.



**NATION AS A PROBLEM OR SOLUTION
HISTORICAL REVISIONISM IN SERBIA**

Published by:
Futura publikacije
Novi Sad

Editor:
Petar Atanacković

Edition:
Istraživanja

Production:
Omladinski centar CK13, Novi Sad

Realization:
New Media Center_kuda.org
Alternative Cultural Organization AKO
Center for Social Researches CSI

Translation:
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Proof Reading:
Jasmina Radojčić

Design & Prepress:
Ljubomir Babić

Printed by:
Daniel Print, Novi Sad

Print run:
500

Info:

www.ck13.org/en/nationalism_and_revisionism

Novi Sad, 2008

Project support:

Embassy of Kingdom of Netherlands, Belgrade / Ambassade van het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden, Belgrad

Fund for an Open society, Belgrade / Fond za otvoreno društvo, Beograd

NATION AS A PROBLEM OR SOLUTION



HISTORICAL REVISIONISM IN SERBIA

FUTURA publications
Novi Sad
2008

Who controls the Present, controls the Past,
Who controls the Past, controls the Future.

George Orwell

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INTRODUCTION

In Serbia in the last two decades have been series of political and social excesses, which were based on nationality and mutual non-tolerance, which had significantly defined present living environment, especially for young people. Atmosphere of tolerance of cultural, national and religion diversities, typical for Vojvodina, was drastically changed, which directly contributes the growing number of ethnic, political and religion incidents. All this changes had big influence on young population in Serbia concerning uncritical adoption of nationalistic tendencies and patterns of violent behavior. Today in Serbia, young generations are increasibly liable to adopting different kind of retrograde ideologies, being raised in the times of wars, hatred and poverty, where prejudices have become a common habit.

We are presently witnessing drastic changes in public discourse on the field of different historical and real-political topics, which is mostly result of identity crisis in contemporary Serbia. Problem of revalidation and new interpretation of close and distance Past is becoming one of the most important problems. It is well known fact that needs of political elites are representing the biggest role in phenomena of revalidation of history, because they are serving like philter for division of "useful" and "useless" history. This is very important because of other well known fact, that who controls the Present is controlling the Past and so can create the Future. Parallel existence of at least two different versions of the same historical events, rehabilitation of chetnik's movement and followers of Dimitrije Ljotić and Milan Nedić, revision of historical schoolbooks are only some parts of this phenomena, and because of that research in the way of scientific objectivity is really important and needed.

Project *Nation as a problem or solution - Historical revisionism in Serbia* is started with purpose to find answers on different questions: what's the role of nationalism in the life of contemporary Europe; what are the specific moments of nationalism on post-Yugoslav area; what's the perspective of that nationalism and especially perspectives of young generations, which was raised in environment marked by domination of prejudices, national exclusivity and intolerance? Aim of the project is also to search for answers about role of revisionist tendencies in modern Serbian society and its influence on general development of Serbia; and influence of new and different interpretation, mostly populist and falsely, on making of "new Serbian man" i.e. mostly influence on young generations.

Project is based on multidisciplinary approach to research of various aspects of different problems: nation, nationalism, their definitions and historical development, their role in contemporary Serbian society and their perspectives concerning modern globalization processes, and also to research of historical revisionism phenomena, its definitions and especially connections between historical revisionism and nationalism. It's attempt to research different problems from perspectives of young generations and

how they influence on the formation of young people's opinions, behaviors and actions. Content of this publication is a result of work of young people, mostly non-affirmed authors, members of those young generations, which experienced directly negative influence of nationalistic politics and general revision of system of values.

At the end should be mentioned that publication Nation as a problem or solution Historical revisionism in Serbia, which is result of the project, is not final product and definite end of the project. Because with this project problems of nationalism and historical revisionism are not examined to their final limits, our opinion is that content of this publication also can't be understood as our final words about the mentioned problems. Concerning this, we can conclude that publication in front of you does not represent finish of our researches, but their real beginning.

Editors

Dorđe Tomić

HOW TO DEFINE A NATION? NATIONS AND NATIONALISM AS A SUBJECT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

This paper represents a short review of the most important works on the subject of nations and nationalism. It tries to establish some basic characteristics of a nation according to the given definitions, and also to point to the key issues and theoretical approaches regarding this subject.

Keywords: nation, nationalism, theories of nationalism

Is it possible to imagine a world without the concept of a "nation"? Is it conceivable to live in a world without borders of nation-states? Can people be defined without their nationality? What would life be like without passports, i.e. without citizenship of any state? Whatever the answers to these questions may be, they point to the complexity of issues which are connected to "nations" and "nationalism".

The concepts of *nation, national identity, nation state, nationalism* are all components of an idea which has been defining the way the whole world is organized since the beginning of the nineteenth century. As an idea, but also as a historical reality, the nation and its corresponding ideology, nationalism, are today matters of great political and social importance, and represent a subject of research of different scientific disciplines.

This paper represents a short review of the most important works on the subject of nations and nationalism. Although it does not profess to be all-inclusive, it tries to determine some basic characteristics of a nation according to the given definitions, and to point to the key issues and theoretical approaches regarding this subject.

In Search of a Definition

When the works of the currently most important theoreticians of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ernest Gellner, were published in the early 1980s, it seemed that the so-called primordialist school of thought was finally overcome in the dispute over the *what, how, when and why of NATIONS*¹.

Until the beginning of the 1980s, nations and nationalism were considered to be a natural and therefore ideal way of social organization. The attempts to relate the concept of a nation to society, which is perceived as a system based on communication (Karl Deutsch) and on the principle of solidarity (Max Weber) within that system represent important definitions of a nation.

These early definitions of a nation all claim that nations exist, and that there is no other way for a society to exist but as a nation. In addition, people have to believe that they are members of that nation (Hugh Seton-Weston). A nation seen as a solidary

¹ Unlike in the case of the Anglo-Saxon terminology, the term NATIONS here does not refer to *states*. It refers here to the essence and *goal* of the ideology which tries to define a certain group of people according to some common characteristics of that group. This group can, but does not need to perceive itself as an *ethnic* group, i.e. as a group which is characterized by "ethnic" traits like a common language, kinship and common descent, Culture, customs, etc.

community which is conscious of its *common past*, but is primarily oriented to the present has to be *desired* (Ernest Renan). At the end of the eighteenth century most people or members of a "nation" in Europe were not "conscious" that they are members of their nation. This perhaps led to creating the picture of a "sleeping beauty", waiting for somebody to awaken her. In this context, nationalism is perceived as an idea which leads to "awakening" of a people or society, i.e. to establishing the natural state of a nation. Nations have always existed, and after successful "awakening" they will last forever. In this way, nationalism would represent an "alarm clock".

The idea of the "*awakening*" (*of class consciousness*) which had been realized by the French Revolution and the creation of the French nation influenced the awakening of other "nations" in Europe. Although this awakening was not fundamentally conceived of as "national", its result was the simple concept that "a nation is a state", i.e. a territory. The problem was that what can be called political nationalism occurred even in those "nations" which did not "have" a specific territory "of their own". Consequently, nationalism as an idea evolved into an idea of freedom, i.e. of liberation from the "occupation" and "manacles" of the rule of "others". It was the rule of "others" since it was not "our own", although every type of rule prior to the introduction of modern democracy could be considered a kind of "occupation". The territorial aspirations of certain nationalisms of so-called "small people" (Hroch) constituted a problem with great conflict potential. Two centuries later, "free territory" is still an issue, even though it is well-known that "only people can be free, not territories" (Sundhaussen, 2007). This conflict potential was later used as an argument for the division of nationalisms into progressive and reactionary (Hans Kohn). Progressive nationalisms are those of so-called "state-nations", i.e. of nations which already have a state occupying a certain territory, while reactionary nationalisms occur in so-called "culture-nations" (Friedrich Meinecke). Whether accidentally or not, this division has also been associated by some authors to the progressiveness of the "West" in comparison to the "East", at least in the case of Europe. The development of nationalism (progressive or not) into a political ideology eventually led to World War II crimes. Additionally, it resulted in the fact that a significant number of European "nations" have based their national tradition on expulsion of people considered not to be members of that nation from their territory.

A Nation as a Construct?

In the 1980s, nations and nationalism began to be studied as a phenomenon. The works of Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ernest Gellner marked a turning point in the way nations were seen - as a "living organism" and the ultimate goal of the history of humankind. These authors all believe that a nation as a *made-up concept* or a *construct*, and that it did not exist as such until the nineteenth century. The explanations differ as to why nations were *consciously created* and who the *participants* in this process were.

Anderson, for instance, claims that the press and so-called "printing press capitalism" enable a larger group of people to "imagine" a community, and thus they imagine their own community. In this way, they begin to identify themselves with that community and feel they are its members. Geographically distant individuals are able to communicate on "people's" language, which is also due to the fact that they share a common language. The abandonment of the so-called sacred language of the church,

which was reserved for a privileged few, and the development of the print media market have allowed a faster exchange of information and communication flow between members of a society. Gellner, on the other hand, associates nationalism with the problem of the state and society. He argues that national culture (or a national idea) was a prerequisite for the functioning of the state during the age of industrialization. Namely, in this period, national mobilization of the society through a unique culture, communication and education system represented the most efficient means of protecting the state.

The development of nationalism as an idea which has been articulated by certain elites since the end of the eighteenth century is perhaps best described by Eric Hobsbawm. He does not completely negate that a certain "proto-form" of nations (which he calls *protonationalism*) existed before modern nations. A basis for the creation of a nation in the contemporary sense of the term can be a sense of belonging to a community. However, according to Hobsbawm, this sense of belonging is not primarily based on a common language and culture, but on a sense of belonging to one political whole.

The way the so-called elites of a group of people can influence the creation of a nation is probably best described by Hroch's model of the nation-building process in the nineteenth century. Hroch identifies three phases in the creation of a nation: (A) nationalism of "educated people", (B) national movements, and (C) mass acceptance of the nation. In the first phase (A) certain young educated people come across the idea of a nation during their studies, and they start to research the national vernacular, literature, customs, etc. Upon their return² to their own country, they continue to write and publish works on "national" subjects, and gradually form small circles of so-called "patriots". Within the second phase (B), the so-called "agitation phase", groups of these patriots organize themselves into parties or associations. They publish magazines, pamphlets and start formulating clear political goals, the primary goal being to have "their own" state. The third phase is the phase of mass support for the national idea. During this (C) phase, the majority in the society accepts the national goals, and thus gives these "patriots" legitimacy. In the given historical circumstances, this phase leads to the creation of a "free" nation-state. Although incomplete in its explanations (as every individual theory), this model, originally applied to "small peoples", i.e. "oppressed" peoples who become nations in an imperialist context (in this case, Austria-Hungary), has had a significant influence on some more recent works on nationalism, too (see Bieber's study of nationalism in Serbia after 1945³).

The significance of this group of authors who belong to so-called constructivists lies in the fact that they managed to irrevocably refute the primordialist "truth about the

² In the majority of cases, these studies were conducted in a "foreign" language. Students of Slavonic origin in Austria often chose to study in Vienna or other universities in countries where German is spoken.

³ Florian Bieber: *Nationalismus in Serbien vom Tode Titos bis zum Ende der Ära Milošević. (Nacionalizam u Srbiji od smrti Tita do kraja ere Milošević)*. Beč 2005, 33-34.

Natural" concerning nations, although constructivism itself has been subject to criticism. One of the most important critics is Anthony D. Smith, who refuses the idea that a nation is a *construct* of the nineteenth century, and that a nation can be *created*, without there being a corresponding *ethnie* beforehand. Turning to arguments related to identifying oneself with the community, which is difficult to determine empirically, Smith goes so far as to claim that the ancient Greeks were conscious of "their own, Greek" ethnic group. Considering the fact that all "foreigners" who did not belong to that group or common culture were considered and called barbarians, maybe this thesis should not be dismissed out of hand.

The Theory of Nationalism?

Smith's critique of constructivism has led to a debate between constructivists and "ethnosymbolists", to which, beside Smith, George Moss also belongs. Like Smith, Moss is also interested in the role symbols and myths have in the acceptance of national ideas among large number of people. After more than twenty years, this debate has not been clearly settled in favor of either side, because each author has been dealing with various issues, only mentioning certain aspects that they criticize. The fact that different theorists organize their research in different ways and that they never have the same combination of problems they deal with disables a "metatheoretical debate"(Tambini, 1998). The study of nationalism does not pose clear questions, but revolves around several central problem groups:

1. The problem of the epoch of nations
2. The problem of the discourse content of nationalism
3. The problem of nationalism and political immobilization
4. The problem of nationalizing "the crowds"

The first problem includes the question: when does the concept of nation occur and why at that specific point in time. Possible explanations are functionalistic and refer to industrialization, modernization, better mobility and communication, processes that only in the 19th century create conditions for the development of nations. Yet, they do not explain the occurrence of nationalism in the regions where modernization preceded national ideas.

The second problem tries to explain the content of national ideas, that is the birth of a national doctrine. The key questions in this context are: (1) whether in the event of fabricating/ giving birth to/ awakening the nation, rationally chosen symbols are used, or whether there are clear, previously determined cultural features and (2) what the nationalistic discourse consists of. When it comes to the birth of nations and nationalism, the answers vary, from contextual explanations that the reason for the birth of modern nations is industrialization, to explanations that German philosophers from the 19th century served as role models in creating nationalism in other countries.

The third problem tries to explain *the elites' motifs to immobilize ever larger number of people with national ideas*. A possible answer is that it is the matter of rational choice, i.e. the matter of clear political interests of certain participants. This, on the other hand, is not the answer to the fourth problem, which is: why "the crowds" agree to be immobilized. Why does a large number of people accept such an idea and identify with it, and in what way? Possible explanations are related to the sense of belonging to a community, and the very sense of belonging can be developed or strengthened by education. Certain teachings about nations are included in education that is conceptualized by the state. There are, of course, opinions that *collective consciousness* of ethnies exists apart from education, so it can lead to so-called *collective action*. The sense of belonging to an ethnie can, therefore, lead to political nationalism. Another explanation would be that increased mobility and social communication in modern industrial societies lead to "developing the sense of belonging" to a certain nation, i.e. to so-called *cultural homogenization* (Deutsch).

The majority of the above-mentioned authors, although trying to answer most of these questions, remains consistent with emphasizing some aspects, that maybe only in combination with personal and collective identity, personal interests and other elements of "national identification" can answer the question why the concept of nation has the ability to immobilize such a large number of people, i.e. *why there are so many people ready to sacrifice themselves or even die for their country even today*. Maybe we should question certain values that people consider significant, such as honour, bravery, social acknowledgement etc. The number of works in which these processes are dealt with is too large for this work, but some authors, such as Sheff (1994), Greenfeld (1992) and Calhoun (1993, 1997), should be mentioned. Theoretical works on nationalism today are, generally, very critical of different theoretical positions. Apart from that, the works that deal with nationalism from different perspectives (Calhoun, 1993; Avineri, 1991; Yuval, 2003), as well as the works that deal with nationalism in theory, from the 20th and this century (Fenton, 2004; Kelly/Kaplan, 2001; Wilson, 2001) are interesting. Furthermore, the works that revise concepts of nation (Whitmeyer, 2002), ethnie, ethnicity (King, 2002; Eriksen, 1991), national identity (Smith, 2000; Van der Boshe, 2003) or the works that deal with relations between nationalism and religion (Rieffer, 2003), between nationalism and art (Terzić, 2007; Aberbach, 2003) or even between nationalism and communication on the Internet (Chan, 2005) are also interesting.

What is a Nation?

The question that has, after all the debates, remained without a clear answer is: *what exactly is a nation?* If we add the definitions by Hobsbawm, Anderson and Gellner to the definitions mentioned above, we will see that these definitions differ. According to Hobsbawm, a nation is every society that is large enough and whose members see themselves as members of one nation. For him, a nation is not a primordial and

changeless social unit, but it belongs to a definite, modern historical epoch. It can exist only in relation to the concept of nation-state. Gellner defines a nation in the following way: (1) people belong to the same nation if they share the same culture (meaning the same system of thinking, signs, associations, behaviour and communication). By belonging to that culture, a person belongs to that nation; (2) people belong to the same nation if they recognize and accept one another as members of the same nation. This acceptance implicates recognition of mutual rights and obligations. Finally, Anderson speaks of a nation as of an imaginary political community at the same time bordered and sovereign. This means that nations have their borders, i.e. only certain people are members of that nation, it is sovereign in relation to other nations, and it is a united community, with all the inequalities that exist within that nation.

Although there is not a single, universal definition of a nation, major characteristics of a nation, that various authors agree on, can be pointed out. For the concept of nation, these characteristics are important:

1. **COMMUNITY:** A nation is an *imaginary, united community* of people with *the sense of belonging* to that nation.

2. **EXCLUSION:** As a rule, only a definite number of people belong to a certain nation. Others do not belong to that nation.

3. **THE TIME OF CREATION:** A nation represents a modern phenomenon that exists from the end of the 18th, or the beginning of the 19th century.

4. **STATE:** The phenomenon of nation is related to a state. A nation tends towards its "own" (nation-) *state*. According to what nationalism meant in the 19th century, members of a certain nation can be free only if they have their "own" nation-state.

The characteristics on which not all authors agree are:

1. **CULTURE:** A nation represents its "own" culture. That culture may consist of: a *language, common past* and the recollection of it, symbols and a certain system of values.

2. **IDENTITY:** A nation, in a modern sense of that word, is preceded by a form of *awareness of belonging* to an ethnic or an ethnic group. Only when this "ethnic identity" does exist, can a nation be founded. National identity can be preceded by some type of political identity, i.e. awareness of the individuals that they belong to a political community or a state, that is, that they are loyal to their leader.

If we take into consideration that none of the definitions can be "true" or "false", but only *useful* or not, we can see that this group of certain characteristics of a nation is too large to be a theoretical basis for concrete research on the phenomenon of nation. That is why, using these characteristics of a nation, concrete questions can and have to be formulated. The basic questions are these:

- Are there objective characteristics of a nation and, if there are, which would those be?
- Is there a nation outside of people's *minds*?
- What are the roles of *culture* and a *state*, in regard to a nation?
- How long do nations exist? *When is a nation?*
- In which constellations are nations founded? What is the role of modernization in the birth of a nation?
- What is the relation between a nation and nationalism?

Besides these general questions, there is a large number of various questions about nations and nationalism, on both theoretical and practical level. Innumerable works about nationalism and nations are evidence for this claim.

Although some authors from the end of the 20th century claimed that nationalism is dead and that a nation, in a form that existed in the 19th century, has no future, nationalism in Europe is widespread, if not dominant, ideology in the 21st century. Despite the idea of supranational European Union as a cultural frame (not just economical), it looks like nation-states are still *repositories of freedom* for the majority of citizens. This confirms an increasing number of conservative governments in various European countries, that should protect "national interests" from globalization. Why is a nation so important even today? This question remains unanswered and maybe becomes even more significant.

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Aleksandar Trudić

A SHORT SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF NATIONALISM

Thomas Hylland Eriksen is a social anthropologist who has tackled some terminology that many twentieth century thinkers consider too taxing. Ethnicity, nationalism, multiculturalism are just one part of a larger scientific whole recorded in the corpus of anthropological (non-) scientific literature. Eriksen has shown methodological quality, rather than a quantity of data, which he used to explain the above-mentioned terms.

The central issue here is distinguishing between nations and ethnic categories in relation to states. Referring to Gellner, Eriksen states that nationalism is a modern ethnic ideology, according to which a certain social group should dominate the state. Thus, some initial problematic situations are caused - what happens with groups that cannot be completely assimilated? Eriksen finds that Gellner also admitted the existence of such groups, which continue to search for the cultural identity which corresponds to the territorial identity, with an emotional appeal to kinship ties. Why kinship ties? By means of the process of socialization and its previous internalization, the ways of satisfying specific needs are adopted. The first phases of socialization occur within the family, as the primary social group, but they also include the influences of peer and other social groups. It also should be mentioned that national identity is referred to as a construct, since its "naturalness" is untenable (Eriksen 2004:174). Eriksen says that this construct is embedded in the wide concept of culture. From a microsociological point of view, the forming of national identity starts with the first social relationships that are present in the first tenth of human life. During this period, a child's consciousness is largely within the family reality or the reality that substitutes family, in case the child's family structure is incomplete or they do not have a family at all. Politics represents a 'phenomenological recipe' which reinforces nationalist ideologies. In addition, political symbols with their denotative, connotative and emotional properties have a similar effect. The final outcome is seen in the correlation between an individual and society and vice versa.

By way of "banal nationalism" in everyday contexts (e.g. state maps on the walls of classrooms or on stamps, coins), the idea of nationalism is further strengthened. Eriksen mentions this, using Bilig's explanation of the term (for more information see Eriksen 2004:178). Vulgar "banal nationalism" could be a sign of pathological understanding of nationalism and could later take the form of extreme nationalism. Its reinforcement leads to creating conflict relations in communication, the essence of which lies in external interpretations of nationalist symbols, language and system of values. This standpoint requires some further scientific and methodological support through research on society's class structure. Nevertheless, there are some research results in the field of social psychology that dealt with the origin of ethnic stereotypes, prejudices and forms of national unity (Rot 2003:425). A synthesis of certain results allows of a conclusion that autostereotypes (mostly positive) prevail over ethnic

prejudices and stereotypes. The relativity of this statement lies within the sociocultural context of the period in which the respondents who are taken as a representative sample are questioned. Social circumstances are not constant, and are therefore under the continuous influence of political, economic, cultural and other factors. More complete insights into the place and time of origin of ethnic and national identity could be provided by anthropological, historical and political science. Social change can be effected in different ways: through the influence of the mass media, changes in international relations in states in which there is a conflict of interests, etc. One should be very cautious about scientific reductionism in determining the cause of origin of ethnic and nationalist prejudices.

In this context, it is mistaken to assume that vulgar "banal nationalism" is characteristic (only) of lower social classes, and of the categories of the poor and unemployed along the urban-rural continuum. This thesis is complicated by the constant vertical and horizontal mobility in the social structure. This, however, is not contradictory to the fact that there are some common characteristics in individual's behavior when it comes to the idea of nationality, considering individuals (groups) both as the factor of change and as an entity isolated for observation without participation.

In any case, this paper will focus more on the concept of nationalism, with Eriksen's Ethnicity and Nationalism as epistemological guidance. Ethnicity and multiculturalism will not be discussed in much detail, but will still be mentioned because of the obvious connection to nationalism. In addition, nationalism should not be regarded as an issue that does not require much attention. It is actually a very current topic in this region.

Ethnicity connotes a number of categories, starting from cultural identification of nationalities in a group, that is, in a society, with the function to integrate it into a coherent, more homogenous whole. This, on the other hand, does not connote the context in which ethnicity is apprehended. It is understood ideal-typically, which does not mean that nationalism is justified. However, nationalism depicts attitude towards the country and citizens, whereas ethnicity depicts attitude towards belonging to a certain nationality. In some societies, discrimination starts with ethnicity, beginning with the creation of one group, i.e. society, and it goes towards the ethnocentrism, the answer to imposing different lifestyles. When it comes to overlapping of cultural and territorial in a society, there might be some interlacing between these two analytical units. Because of the obvious complexity in the distinction between nationalism and ethnicity, a number of questions should and has to be posed.

One of Eriksen's examples of nationalism is Norwegian, whose integrity is found in a clear distinction of language. Together with symbols, language provides certain safety, concerning territorial borders of cultural identification and it serves as a means of creating works of national identity, especially in industrialized society which strives towards alienation, massive mobility and demographic heterogeneity. The situation is further complicating when there is a relatively cohesive group of people whose values differ from values of the majority. Original thoughts about nationalism, with heavy emphasis on, according to Eriksen, "imaginary" nation in which all people

Have equal rights under certain conditions, have taken form in accordance with development and changes on global scale. Eriksen presented an interesting study, written by Forsythe, about German nationalism before the fall of Berlin wall, with the results that indicate certain doubts about determining German identity "being a German", and with attitudes towards foreigners (Eriksen 2004:196). Incompatibility of ethnical identity (interpreted ideal-typically and culturally) and national identity (in sense of the territorial borders) is found in unstable societies, except the problems can be found outside or inside the borders, or on the both sides.

In process of homogenizing the heterogeneous population with the culture, Eriksen believes that technical means in symbolical communication have enabled that national identity be understood widely, on the one hand, and helped to distinguish between "us" and "them", on the other hand. However, conflicts between a large number of different groups within the very country are overlooked, with the same indirect means of mass communication. In inevitably complex scientific description of multicultural and multiethnic societies, Eriksen divides nationalism into ethnic and multiethnic nationalism, with mutual characteristic to determine borders of country. Mass culture, with mass media (in modern countries), understood as a consisting part of mass communication, is a channel for transmitting various information. Information about culture and national values can be interpreted differently by individuals, most often by political leaders or parties.

Another concept homogenization of mass culture (Kloskowska 2001:223), by Polish sociologist Antonina Kloskowska, explains one of many roles of different interpretations of a message which is represented in many ways, by technical means or other ways of symbolic communication. Vulgar homogenization connotes superficial, simplified interpretation of the content of a message about something highly important, not just in works of art, like in this case national identity of a society (Kloskowska 2001:224). Elite, which consists of individuals or groups of people with abilities (financial, educational, ethical, often physical) that the majority of people do not have, is trying to form public opinion, using commercials or other types of propaganda. In this eternal battle of interests the original thought about a society being a heterogeneous whole with various values is lost.

If value is defined as "a disposition that determines a wide range of behaviour and that has continuous and permanent effect" (Rot 2003:322), the emphasis can be put on disposition and it carries the content of a message that is regarded as a social consensus in a country.

Misinterpreted value of one or more groups can be very dangerous in all segments of life. Axiological dissonance (Kloskowska 2001:124) starts as *conditio sine qua non* with the above-mentioned problem in interpretation of values. Thus, we have to be careful about news reports, because journalists are prone to exaggerate and because of the spreading of negative preconceptions in cases there is not enough information

about the subject. Partial ideological structures of political programs of some parties, presented on television, are indicators of unreal lyrical depiction of future state of affairs. Rational thinking and objectivity go with the adequate interpretation of values, through an open dialogue, paying respect to different ethnic groups.

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Ana Ranitović

SURVEY OF NATIONAL IDENTITY TODAY - STUDY OF THE WEAKEST LINK

The 'National Identity' survey was conceptualized as a study of the strength of various identity dimensions, with a particular focus on national identity, among a population where it was *expected that identification with one's nationality would be weakest*. Results were gained by analyzing the attitudes of the 'progressive' youth from nine countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and two countries from the West. The different dimensions of a personality, understood as a dynamic whole consisting of various identities, proved to be a fruitful basis for investigating the influence that national borders have on the poll-takers' perception of themselves and who they are. National identities of most respondents "countries have been forged on the basis of often difficult and dramatic historical experiences, and in many cases this process is not yet finalized. As such, it can be expected that the national identity dimension is of special importance in national politics, foreign policy in particular affecting attitudes towards regional and global institutions such as the EU or NATO.

National Identity in the Post-Communism

The investigation into the foundations of national identities should be based on generalizations of attitudes expressed in the survey, but must additionally take into consideration the historical and social experiences of the surveyed countries, with a focus on their subjection to more than forty years of Communist domination and the manner in which they formed their post-communist independence. The nature of national identification differs between countries. In some cases, national identity is closely linked with the feeling of the country being a 'great European' nation due to the identification with European culture, whilst in other cases national identity is seen as related to the survival of recently acquired independence, and to be connected to national sovereignty. Sometimes it is viewed as being both. Furthermore, in many cases this independence from political subjugation of the 'oppressor' (be it the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia) is seen as synonymous with escaping to the West - as such, a much higher value is given to close identification with Europe than with the East or the Balkans.

The transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of government has been largely successful, and the basic criteria of democracy - rule of law, free and fair elections, human rights and the freedom of expression and organization, minority rights - were fulfilled in almost all countries of SEE and EE. However, the quality of democratic principles varies over time due to political parties being still highly polarized on anti-Communist and nationalist lines. Regardless of the fact that the process of political transformation is a comprising part of the post-socialist transition, the state has largely remained centralized and paternalistic where the once close link between the party and the state has been replaced by a similar relationship between the ruling elite and the public administration.

Identity Construction

Construction of contemporary national identity in South Eastern and Eastern Europe was shaped by breakaway from Communism and the consequent economic, social and political process of transition. For some the driving force was the idea of basic freedoms and democracy, while for others it was a higher standard of living and access to western goods. However, the transition period turned out to be very challenging, and in many cases imposed harsher living conditions and more insecurity than was the case during the old system. Consequently, attitudes of the populations in these countries changed, where some began to long for the predictability and order of the previous regime, while others grew suspicious of new politics and its democratic institutions.

The independence movements put a great stress on historical events and personalities, as well as national symbols and attributes, as a way of rediscovering the past with the goal of constructing an identity detached of Communism. The modern national identity is a combination of a country's selected historical past, selected experiences of the 20th century, ethnic constitution, cultural heritage and geographical position. Within this process of identity restructuring runs the process of every nation's individual identification with Europe. Although most SEE and EE countries regard themselves as European (whether or not they are members of the EU), there is a great difference between nations in relation to this. Differences run along the lines of national perception of the link between national and European identity (are they complementary or mutually exclusive?), as well as whether they see themselves as always having been part of the development of European society throughout history or were they sporadically cut off from Europe by being subject to foreign authority.

The Study

Hypothesis

On one hand, it was hypothesized that countries with a strong sense of historical belonging to Europe will recognize processes of gaining independency, democratic consolidation and maturing of nationhood as parallel and complementing the process of regaining their deserved position in Europe. However, due to the fact that globalization is a very much contradictory process, it is difficult to uniquely define the role of nationality and national identity within it. As we have stated above, national identity formulated in the early 1990s was composed by a strong identification with Europe and meant a break with Communism. On the other hand, many of these countries perceive themselves as small and vulnerable to external dominance and are therefore likely to fear a dilution of their (new) national and cultural identity.


In regards to this, it was considered important to investigate the extent to which individuals feel that their nationality, defined by (newly established) borders or culture, is important for their sense of who they are. Although this sense can be difficult to examine, in this study we have understood it as the imprint of society and its groups, institutions, organizations and conceptualizations, onto the individual. As such,

our aim was to investigate the extent to which these are deemed as important for individuals' sense of self, and to recognize the importance of nationality in relation to this. In addition, we expected the attitudes of the respondents to be inconsistent, both on an individual, national and multinational level, that is, to reflect the contradictory role of nationality and national identity today.

The Sample

Because of limited resources, the conducted study was not extensive and can be considered a pilot project for future research. In order to attempt to give an adequate answer to the question of the validity of borders today, it was decided that attitudes should be investigated among the population where *national identity and subjective closeness to nationality is expected to be weakest* - among the youth from the age of 19-29, currently working towards, or in possession of a university degree or higher, who identify themselves to be liberal or libertarian, and who are politically or socially active along those lines. As such, regardless of the breadth of the sample it was possible to draw some indicative conclusions, which could be a fruitful basis for upcoming research.

The survey was conducted on a sample 165 persons, in the indicated age range, from 11 countries - two from Western Europe, serving as a control sample - Italy and Germany, and 9 SEE and EE countries: Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Each of these countries is a case for itself, and should be analyzed as such. However, due to the similarity of objective characteristics of the poll-takers, we have given ourselves the right to draw certain generalizations from the respondents' answers taken as a whole. These generalizations may not be wholly precise, but can serve as reliable indicators of current attitudes towards the significance of nationality a glimps at attitudes of those perceived to be among those most personally distant, emotionally detached and aware of the post-modern views on the concepts of nationality, can provide us with an idea of just how important nationality is for the general population.



Data collection was performed through a semi-structured interview. Respondents were given a chance to freely and independently define the concept of a nation, and express their view of its significance. This was considered valuable, as it could then be compared to the response to closed questions linked to related issues.

The Questionnaire

Year of birth: _____

Pol: • male • female

Your nationality: _____

Please give us your explanation to the question of what is a nation and your perception of it's significance today?.

Think about the concepts of nationality, nation, nation state. Describe your Initial feelings:

- positive
- more positive then negative
- neutral
- more negative then positive
- negative

Think about how you would describe yourself. Which groups are the most important in defining who you are? Please mark the most important, second and third most important group.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Your political party, group, movement | 6. Your gender (being a man/woman) |
| 2. Your age group | 7. Your family |
| 3. Your nationality | 8. Your social class (upper, middle, lower, working) |
| 4. Your occupation | 9. Part of the country you live in |
| 5. Your religion | |

Most important group: _____

Second most important group: _____

Third most important group: _____

How close do you feel to (to feel close meaning "identifying with") :

	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
Your city/town	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Your district/country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Your country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Europe	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Indicate how important the following are for saying that a person is truly of a certain nationality. Please mark all of the given determinants.

	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important	Not important at all
To have been born in that Country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To have citizenship of That country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To have lived in that Country for long time	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To speak the language Of the country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To be of the main religion in that country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To behave according to Culture of that country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To feel like they are Of that certain nationality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To have ancestors from That country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Some people consider themselves to be fore mostly European. Others think they are first of all nationals of their country (e.g. Italian, Russian, Bosnian, etc). Please describe how you would describe the way you see yourself?

- Only European
- More European then Italian
- As European as Italian
- Only Italian

Results and Analysis

1. Please give us your explanation to the question of what is a nation and its significance today?

When asked to describe the concept of a nation in their own words, most respondents needed time and found it difficult to articulate their thoughts. Frequently the first response was *"everybody knows what a nation is"* and *"I can tell you how I read they define it"*, followed by expressing their thoughts on the matter by listing a few words that they associate with the idea of a nation. Most associations were neutral or had a positive connotation: *territory, people, culture, language, border, government, unity*. It is interesting to note that in the majority of cases, the list of words was either neutral to positive, or either wholly negative. The most common words used to express a negative view of what a nation is were *war, conflict, nationalism, boundaries between people*.

Around a third of respondents replied without giving it much thought, instantaneously reproducing various definitions of nation that they heard or read, such as those that reject the reality of a nation: *"a nation is a made up concept"*, *"it is a construct"*, *"an imaginary community of people"*, to a more functionalist way of looking at it: *"nations are a means of organizing reality"*, to cultural definitions: *"a community of people that share the same language, culture and history"*, and the rare essentialist characterization: *"people of the same descent, living on a territory they historically claimed to be theirs"*.

Regardless of what they would say initially, most respondents concluded with the words that *"it is so difficult to know what a nation is today"*, because *"everything is so dynamic, changing so fast, and with it the concept and reality of nations"* and that *"nationality and nation means different things to people living in different countries"*, since *"it's not the same if you're American, Greek, Macedonian, Palestinian"* implying that context and its political, social, economic and historical dimensions are very important, as well as *"how you are defined in the eyes of others"*, or *"a definition of a nation changes in time, and for a small country a nation is a role that its people play during a certain time, and this role is defined by the international community"*.


Many felt that although *"there are negative sides to nations such as nationalism, it can also be a good thing - it can fight the negative aspects of cultural globalization"*, and that *"nations preserve cultures and interests of small and powerless countries"*, whilst others felt that it was a *"monument of the past"* and *"slowing down integration on higher level"*, and that *"it may be hard to let go of our inherited individuality, but maybe it's better to be the same then to have wars"*.

2. Think about the concept of nationality, nation, nation state. Describe your initial feelings.


When calculated in total, from a scale of -10 (totally negative) to 10 (totally positive), nation rank sat a solid 3.6. The highest result was a 6.1, and the lowest a -3.2,

although that was the only negative result. When asked about their feelings towards the idea of a 'nation', most respondents' first thoughts were *"their own nation"*, resulting in a prevalently positive result. Respondents of countries that gained independence from Soviet domination during the nineties, highly valued nationality, pushing the total rank up. On the other hand, respondents of nations that have been faced with war and brutal conflicts were more aware of the fact that a nation *"is my nation but other nations too - and we just can't seem to live in peace"*, saying that *"after everything that has happened in Yugoslavia and that is happening in Serbia I just don't know what to think anymore"*, and that *"sure nationality is nice, but for Bosnia it came at a price too high"*.

Nevertheless, most marked the 'neutral' or 'more positive then negative' because *"nation means culture"*, and *"although I hate to admit it, my nationality is a big part of who I am - and I can't mark myself as negative!"*



3. Which groups are the most important to you when describing who you are?




From the results portrayed in the graph above, it is obvious that occupation is by far the most important area of life for most respondents, as it was marked the first most important group in 42% of all cases, while family, gender and nationality followed with a much lower 14%, 11% and 10%. However, what pushed nation up to second place, and an identity index of 17.7 was the fact that most respondents chose it for their second


most important group - 30%, while other groups were under 10%. In addition, it is important to take into account that occupation and nation were the two groups that were most often chosen among the top three most important groups by respondents occupation was among the first three in 61% of all cases, while nation was chosen 56% of the time.

Although 'crisis of the family' was not the subject of this study, it is interesting to note that family was ranked third, and marked among the three most important groups in 48% of all cases.

The following graph demonstrates how respondents of different nationalities ranked the importance of their nation in identifying who they were. It should be noted that the results significantly correspond to those of question 2. Obviously, it is important to keep in mind that if Germany and Italy were not included in the study the findings would be slightly different.




The subsequent diagram portrays the variation in ranking of the top six ranked groups in the countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina (from here on: Bosnia), Serbia and Macedonia a typically high occupation rank, with nation at the overall average. 'Part of country' was very important for citizens of Bosnia with an identity index of over 17 it



was much higher than the overall average of 7 for this particular determinant, which can be explained in light of the territorial and political arrangements in Bosnia and the corresponding organization of its population, where territory or a certain part of country is inhabited by people of a certain nationality (understood as ethnicity).



4. How close do you feel to your city, district, country and Europe?




In this question respondents were not asked to rank, but simply to mark how close they feel to territories administratively, geographically and politically marked as, from the smallest city, to largest continent. The index had a range from 0 (not close at all) to 100 (very close). City and country correspond in a similar manner to the way district and Europe do - perhaps respondents view their country to correspond to Europe in a fashion similar to the way their hometown or city of residence relates to the district it is situated in. This correspondence would have to be one of cultural significance, as the question was a very subjective one, looking into the extent to which respondents feel close to or identify with space understood as a place of meaning.


On the following graph, we have broken down the way poll-takers responded to the question on territorial closeness. Although in the overall calculation it seems that city and country, that is district and Europe, were marked similarly, a closer look shows us that it is not so. As it is shown, most respondents feel at least somewhat close to their city only 7% do not feel close at all. Although more than twice that share is the case for country (16% do not feel close at all), their overall score smatch due to the fact that more than a third of respondents feel 'very close' to their country which is considerably higher than is the case for the other three. On the other hand, 27% of all those surveyed do not feel close at all to Europe which was by far the largest share of respondents who marked 'not close at all' for any of the given territories. It is only in the case of

country that most respondents marked it to be 'very close' to them (35%), whilst for city, district and Europe most felt 'close'.





5. What is the most important determinant of nationality?




The results to the question of nationality determinants showed that respondents generally considered most of the given as, on average, relatively important. An immense 75 points on a scale from 0 to 100 were given to the subjective sense of being of a certain nationality, although followed closely by the necessity to live (or have lived for a long period of time) in the country in question. In fact, a somewhat strong correlation was found between the three top-ranked factors (to feel like it, to live in

country, to speak language) - of all those that marked 'to feel like it' as important, 72% also highly marked the other two. Closely followed the correlation between citizenship-language-living. If all four factors were taken together the relation was weaker, but not irrelevant - clearly what can be distinguished is that a civic understanding of nationality prevails, as opposed to an ethnic definition of it.

With 'to feel like it' as the strongest determinant, it may seem that the poll-takers favor individual sentiment over objective characteristics. However, that is not entirely the case. Namely, almost 80% of the respondents marked 'to feel like it' as either very or fairly important (while only 10% found it to be not at all important), yet, with it they would also mark at least two other factors as important. Although a strict consensus wasn't established, 'to feel like it' was constant, while the other two or three important determinants varied in the respondents' choices feeling a certain way was an inevitable consequence of the impact of other variables. It may be concluded then that the poll-takers felt that certain factors, when taken together, may impact the identification process of an individual and which nationality he or she feels to be of.

6. Some people think of themselves firstly as of a certain nationality, while others think of themselves firstly as European. How would you describe the way you see yourself?



Petar Atanacković

FAMILY, EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS AND THE VALUE SYSTEM IN THE PROCESS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF "NATIONAL AWARENESS" IN SERBIA

From Family toward State

Precursor and direct preparation for the development of national sentiments, loyalty to nation (nationalist awareness) and glorification of national awareness is the development of family sentiments, loyalty to family and glorification of family values. National sentiment is a direct succession of the family sentiment, and the family agenda, together with the religious agenda, form the basic mass-psychological elements of nationalism.¹ Therefore, the origin of national sentiment should be looked for in the very same family and the inner relationships, regarding that the "representations of homeland and the nation, in its subjective and emotional essence, are, in fact, representations of mother and family. In civil life, mother is a homeland of a child, the same way his family is his 'tiny nation'."²

Family could be defined as a direct or natural form of volksgeist (which precedes the other two habitual forms of appearance, civil society and the state), which is manifested in three things: in a form of its sincere concept (as a marriage), in its outer existence (as family properties and goods) and in upbringing children and dissolving the family.³ In that case, marriage would be an initiation of family, property its phenomenon and children its validation (validation of love that should be, by definition, the foundation of marriage), regarding that "in children, marital unity becomes a unity for itself, existence and phenomenon that exists by itself."⁴ We can see, from all the abovementioned, the great, almost crucial importance of upbringing children, which appears to be the primary goal of the family. In other words, family is the most productive section for class (and national) ideology and, at the same time, it is a vast field of ideological repression. This finding is completely based on the thesis of Wilhelm Reich in which "history of ideology teaches us that every social system, on conscious or unconscious level, uses its influence on children of every generation... so it could be established in a structure of people".⁵

That is the reason why protection, preservation and growth of family and family values aims to be a significant part of every political agenda based on a political right wing, whether it is a right center, conservative, nationalist or extreme right wing (fascist and Nazi) groups and organizations. As an illustration, we will give a couple of examples from Serbia, using political programs of parties: G17plus, Serbian Democratic Party (DSS) and New Serbia (NS), three political organizations which took part in government since March 2004 until today. In a political program of G17plus, which can be labeled as a right center, stands that this political party "struggles for strong family, as a *foundation of a state to come*" (cursives - P.A.). It continues that it is necessary to pass laws which should stimulate the "foundation and strengthening of family", regarding that that is "one of the priorities of a new, European Serbia."⁶ In the political program of Serbian Democratic Party family also takes a relevant place. It says that they will pay

¹ Wilhelm Reich, *Masovna psihologija fašizma*, Zagreb, 1999, p. 121.

² Ibid, p. 66.

³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Osnovne crte filozofije prava*, Sarajevo, 1989, p. 286-289.

⁴ Ibid, p. 305.

⁵ Wilhelm Reich, *Spolna revolucija*, Zagreb, 1985, p. 282.

⁶ Program G17 plus, p. 42.

special attention to family "which is the basis of the society and state" and "whenever family life and family as a whole is threatened", it is necessary to have "social care and protection."⁷ The last one is the program of New Serbia, which is much richer in information than the other two mentioned. In the very same starting point, through defining "political values" of New Serbia, almost a totalitarian feature (or totalitarian ambition at least) can be noticed, through the phrase that New Serbia is a "people's party which represents interests and expectations of people as a whole", but after only a few sentences we get the definition of a "people as a whole": it is anyone who "accepts Serbian and European folk, patriotic, culture, moral and social values" and aims for "general well being of a nation and a state."⁸ So, in many ways, program of this party is a prototype of extreme, right winged political option, though it is surprising that, among the number of phrases about national awareness ("which inspires people to struggle for prominence of their country"), culture (which is the "basis of social awareness which identifies the individual and nation") or a necessity of developing and nurturing awareness of a "unity of national being" among all Serbs in the ex-Yugoslav area, family issue is hardly stressed. In this program, we can only find that the family is "the focus group of social care in Serbia" and that "transformation of Serbia into the land of the old" should be stopped by right social politics as a means to prevent the "white plague"⁹ However, in the preface of this program there is one quite suspicious, though evasive, and almost politically decent (but still perfectly clear) phrase about "untouchability of the right to live from the conception till natural death, with possible exceptions of health and legal issues."¹⁰

Let's turn the attention to some other examples: though they come from another place and time, there is a link to current leading parties in Serbia. In the pre-election program of Adolf Hitler for presidential elections in 1932 in Germany, stands that "destruction of the family would be a destruction of every higher humanity" and that "the most important goal is to enable friends for life and work" (i.e. man and woman) "to found a family in this world", regarding that the foundation of the family is "the final goal of truly organic and logical development". According to this program, the family is "the smallest, but most precious unit that participates in state building."¹¹ A year later, after gaining power, Nazi newspaper *Angriff*, on the occasion of "mother's day" writes that, after a successful national revolution "ideas bring together again family, society, people", and through that occasion, they honor the very essence of "the German idea", and that is "the German mother". For new Germany (exactly as the new Serbia in one of the programs that we mentioned above), a concept of a mother is hard to describe, regarding that "the mother is a guardian of family life which is the source of forces that drive our people to move forward again". The German mother, as a symbol of the family

⁷ Program DSS, p. 17.

⁸ Program Nove Srbije, p. 1.

⁹ Ibid, p. 56.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 1.

¹¹ Wilhelm Reich, *Masovna psihologija fašizma*, p. 69-70.

is "one of the bearers of German folk thought."¹² Despite of the number of differences (actual or illusory) in political agendas of three political organizations and agendas of German Nazis, a unique feature can be sighted, and that is their policy toward family, which is not only a basis of society, but the "foundation" or main "foothold" of the state. At first sight it could be regarded as an unusual thesis, maybe even bizarre, but only if we neglect the importance of the family in the process of reproduction of ideology of the current (class) system. To explain: what is known as modern family emulated according to the dominant social model, or, in different words, family stands for a miniature class society. Therefore, we can easily say that family is one of the most important encouragements for a (civil) state, since it is the derivation of one, i.e. the most important section for producing a civil citizen.¹³

Dialectics of Ideological Oppression

Great importance of the family and its growth and strengthening becomes very clear to all political organizations of right wing, considering the roll it plays in the development of the concept named "national awareness", i.e. let's call it its real name, commencing and rousing national sentiments. A crucial link between family and state and a relevant link between family and national ideology can be divided in many ways. By comparing these two, a conclusion is drawn that there is a similarity of their boundaries and that it comes from the same source, that being the economic interest. The urge of the middle class family with a lot of children toward economic prosperity is a reproduction of ideology of imperialism on a state level – phrases about nations which need space and new resources for its growth sounds a lot like they are about family. Maybe this is the very reason why a petty-bourgeois is particularly suitable for accepting the imperialistic ideology. In this way the objective state imperialism is being ideologically reproduced in the subjective family imperialism¹⁴. If a step further is taken, it is possible to claim that the crisis of national states, the conflict between the national and supranational model (the example of which is the European Union), on some level corresponds to the crisis of the traditional bourgeois family. However, it is not legitimate to claim that the overcoming of the state will lead to the overcoming of the family, regarding that the overcoming of the national state does not lead to the overcoming of the state as it is, i.e. changing the form does change the essence.

Family implies certain social contents. It's most important social function lies not in its involvement in the public opinions and views, but in the production of a socially acceptable spiritual structure. Namely, family appears in the role of an assistant in building authoritarian character in children i.e. their faith in authority and tendency to be submissive to it, which becomes more obvious in the later years of their lives. The key

¹² Ibid, p. 66-67.

¹³ Ibid, p. 101.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 68.

role in the abovementioned is played by *Super-Ego*, a psychological instance which cannot be distinguished from the overall instinctive structure and character of a man produced in a family.¹⁵

Super-Ego has an immense meaning in the building of character: it is the part which deals with moral conscience, plays the important role in suppression and represents the bearer of tradition and determines the creation of ideals. Formed in the framework of a family, above all by identification with the father figure (which is based on and represents the external social authority) and internalizing father's orders and restraints, *Super-Ego* claims the moral and power attributes. In this way, by the mediation of the *Super-Ego*, external authority is turned into an internal one, and the individual acts according to the demands of social authority, not only due to fear of external punishment, but due to fear of psychological instance in himself or herself. Nevertheless, a simple threat of social sanction should not be sufficient to maintain the social system unless it was pre-determined in the psychological structure of an individual. The same way the *Super-Ego* is formed by internalizing social authorities, it also projects itself onto the carriers of external authorities in a reverse process. Attributes of the *Super-Ego* are projected onto the social authorities, which further influence the reverse projection of such projected social authorities on the *Super-Ego*. Thus, the actual external authorities avoid the possibility of rational comprehension, especially criticism, because they represent the ideal image of what the authoritarian individual desires (*Super-Ego* as the most important factor in forming of ideals), the ideal image of himself or herself, the Ideal I.¹⁶ Actually, the *Super-Ego* and the external authority should not be differentiated: the first one is the internalization of the latter and the latter contains qualities of the first one and due to this it gains efficiency. The notion of a dynamic character of the *Super-Ego* deconstructs the thesis that this instance, after being established in childhood, in the surrounding of family, remains equally important and efficient over time and that there is no need for additional impulses. On the contrary, the *Super-Ego* would completely vanish or at least change its character and content if social authorities would not keep reinforcing i.e. continuing the process of forming which began in childhood.¹⁷ In other words, significant importance of permanent ideological oppression in maintaining of the ruling system is reflected in crucial influence on the reproduction of the values of the ruling system and social authority in psychological structures of people. And family, as was shown, plays the irreplaceable role in such a process.

Thus, it can be concluded that the psychological structure of an individual, therefore *Ego* and *Super-Ego* as its parts, is formed by the dominant ideological social model, and its further reproduction in psychological structures has a crucial place in its conservation in the external world. This refers to the reproduction in psychological structures of an individual which are already being processed, and the expansion of the ideological repression on new generations i.e. through family influence on children, which was pointed out a few times in this text. This claim is unambiguously upheld by the theory of Sigmund Freud. This theory claims that the *Super-Ego* of a child is built

15 Erich Fromm, *Autoritet i porodica*, Zagreb, 1989, p. 53-54.

16 Ibid, p. 48-50.

17 Ibid, p. 51.

upon the *Super-Ego* of a parent i.e. the child is filled with the same contents and it becomes the bearer of the tradition and values of the previous generations, meaning that through the ideologies of the *Super-Ego* the past *de facto* continues to live.¹⁸ In that sense, family education has a crucial role in the process of forming of national awareness and the upbringing in the spirit of nationalism. The instigation of the "love towards the nation" is added to the nurturing of family values, family authority and loyalty towards the family, above all toward the parents; though it is hard to explain how one can express emotion towards an abstract political category. What comes next in line is the development of loyalty to the national state. This is followed by the sense of pride because the state represents the embodiment of the greatest and the most successful nation (ever). This is succeeded by the sense of loyalty toward the national leader, even toward the common artifacts such as photographs of the leader or pieces of cloth with national symbols, which almost always contain something transcendental in any case, more than the information about the material found on the label. The result of singing patriotic songs to children, telling anecdotes from the glorious past in the evenings, reading of ideological booklets under the mask of children's magazines and pointless discussions of the adults about "what needs to be done" (which is absorbed by children) is always the same, that being the appearance of a personality which is a psychological copy of their parents. If subsequent influence of the social surrounding, mainly through school education, is added (where history lessons can be seen as pre-military training; classes of national literature develop a tendency towards the myth and the mythical and religious education which instigates uncritical "opinion"), then the individual does not have too much choice or possibilities. In the end, such an individual truly begins to believe that the "national awareness inspires people to struggle for the progress of their country" simply because the "nation defines each human being as a moral, cultural and political one"¹⁹. In that case, the individual is convinced that the nation is worth living for and also, if not more, to die for.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Two Centuries of Modern Serbia

The role that the family in a class society plays in the development of the national sentiments and instigation of nationalism is in the case of Serbian society even more emphasized, especially if two past centuries of Serbian history are taken into account. Namely, this whole period is characterized by the constant struggle of the two historical tendencies, patriarchal and modern, in whose center is the relation towards Western Europe and the direction which Serbian society is going to take. The abovementioned issue becomes even more important after the claiming of national independence (1878), when Serbian political and cultural elite was confronted with two opposite solutions. On one hand, there was direction towards the internal development, economical, cultural and political modernization. On the other hand, there was focusing on liberation and uniting of the whole Serbian ethnic society, with the final goal being reestablishing of the

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 58.

¹⁹ Program Nove Srbije, p. 2.

²⁰ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije. Srpsko društvo na prelazima vekova (XIX-XXI)*, Beograd, 2006, p. 18-19.

the Westerners (Liberal and Progressive Party) who demanded thorough reform aiming at transforming an old-fashioned, patriarchal society into a modern western-like society; on the other hand there were Slavic-oriented politicians (Radical Party and few socialists) who advocated the totalitarian ideology of people's democracy "actualized through people's party, self-government and state". The antagonism of the two opposed options leads to political conflicts which mount to a real fight for life or death. In this conflict of ideologies, the modernization supporters get defeated, and their politics renounced and cast away. Simply, the state which is oriented towards economical, political and cultural progress was labeled and condemned as avoiding, even betraying, the ancestral testament of liberation and unification of Serbian people.²¹ Individual progress, freedom and well-being in Serbia were subordinated to the progress, freedom and well-being of the collectivity. The fact that the social reforms did not exclude the state expansion, which demands a particularly strong economic base and appropriate demographic potential, did not play an important role in this conflict.

By some kind of a miracle, the Serbian political elite managed to eventually fulfill its goal, and the liberation and the unification of the Serbian people were executed. It should be mentioned that the veil shrouding this accomplishment is lifted when it is taken into account that its cost was over a million human lives (the total demographic loss between the years 1912 and 1918). However, the result was not the Great Serbia, but (even greater) Yugoslavia, in which Serbia, as a wager, brings the lists of the killed in war and the ideology of the national state which is completely inappropriate and insufficient. In the new union, general instability becomes constant. The borders were not obstacles for the unification of Serbian people and their connecting with the rest of the south Slavic people. The real obstacles were the differences which came into being due to inequality of conditions for development.²² The break-down of the state in the 1941 short-term April war stood for the logical epilogue of the direction of progress of the time.

The second or "socialist" Yugoslavia was an attempt of a different course and it brought a lot of novelties, above all modernization (or at least a part of it). However, industrialization, urbanization, cultural development, immense growth of the quality of life etc, were not followed by the real change of the political culture, educational models, dominant ideological pattern etc, which certainly had serious consequences. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslavia enters the crisis which was in time emphasized even more and finally reached its culmination and resolution during the last decade of the 20th century. The result was a breakup of the state union and the series of wars with all side-effects, ranging from the increase of the death toll, general poverty, to hatred becoming the main feature of interpersonal relationships. The mentioned crisis from the seventh decade of the 20th century is directly linked to the general crisis of modernization that overtook all the Mediterranean countries. Namely,

²¹ Ibid, p. 19-23.

²² Ibid, p. 67-68.

the modernization crisis imposed the question of the direction of further development i.e. the problem of the transition from the quantitative phase of development (industrialization and urbanization) to the qualitative phase of development, the final renunciation of the rural and definite transition into the modern industrial society. Simultaneously, this crisis gains a clear political mark. Depending on the political response to the crisis, the actual crisis was either overcome or was further generated. Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and other socialist countries faced this problem. While Greece, Spain and Portugal (in different ways) abandoned their dictatorial or fascist forms of political rule and turned to the democratic system, and Italy confirmed its loyalty to democracy, in socialist countries there was no such change. The crisis became deeper and transformed into the general crisis of socialism, which reached its peak by the end of the 1980s.²³ To this challenge, the government of Yugoslavia did not respond with political reforms and instigation of political and social pluralism, but commencing the national pluralism i.e. decentralization and federal unification, which were the substitutes for democracy. This kind of solution was not adequate, but generated the crisis, which manifested as a form of destructive nationalism: as the crisis deepened, the nationalism advanced, which was, by the way, the direct product of the system. Namely, with the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation, which began to look more like a union of feudal areas than a socialist union, new values were propagated instead of supporting the idea of Yugoslavia, republic and regional nationalisms were supported; instead of a unique economic system based on egalitarianism, opposite national economic systems appeared.²⁴ The only possible solution in the given circumstances was the suggestion made at the end of the 1980s. This suggestion involved attempting to resolve the crisis of the Yugoslav society by additionally confirming the factual state, with the simultaneous transition to the democratic system. Nevertheless, the orientation of the Serbian political elite and the government, who firmly believed in "the bright future" and additionally strengthened after the "anti-bureaucratic revolution", were not in favor of this solution. The challenges of the modernization crisis were answered with the escape from modernization, refusal of the general (economic, political, etc.) reform. This answer was in total accordance with the political constant in Serbia. Simply, the unification of the Serbian people in one country became superior to social reforms and it postponed the modernization of the Serbian society at the end of the 20th century, the same way as a hundred years before.²⁵

"Feed Your Son and Send Him to the Army, for Serbia Cannot Be Still!"

Only after glancing at the main tendencies of the Serbian history in the past two centuries, can one come close to understanding the importance of the national sentiments and nationalism in the Serbian society. In circumstances where social development was almost completely neglected in favor of state expansion, dominance of the (more or less autonomous) primitive patriarchal culture was not an obstacle to the social progress, but an advantage. In such a dominant culture, the political elite

²³ Laslo Sekelj, *Jugoslavija, struktura raspadanja: ogled o uzrocima strukturne krize jugoslovenskog društva*, Beograd, 1990, p 136-137.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p 143-145.

²⁵ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, p 70.

itself sees the positive side to it. This can be paralleled to certain Russian political thinkers from the 19th century, who perceived anachronism as an advantage. On the basis of such a culture, social institutions are founded whose aims cannot be more aspiring in fact, their aim is not to reform the social circumstances, but to maintain them on the same level i.e. to conserve them. Even if their aim is to mobilize society, these institutions do not achieve this by changing the essential instances in society. In this sense, their achievements in Serbia can be perceived more clearly. Namely, all significant social institutions, the ones that are of importance in forming the personality of an individual (schools, churches, army, press, oral and written literature, etc.) are put into the service of one and the same goal: the unification of the Serbian people. The most important task was forming and maintaining national awareness i.e. instigating national sentiments. Due to this all other sentiments were repressed and neglected because everything else was insignificant before the ancestral testament: the revenge for Kosovo and the re-establishing of Dusan's empire. Therefore, the most important role in achieving this goal lay on the family.²⁶

The dominant form of family organization in Serbia is the patriarchal family of the cooperative type, which is not surprising taking into account the general backwardness of society. However, family cooperative was very frequent among the Serbs and Croats in the Habsburg monarchy (therefore in a completely different social circumstances), mostly in the region of the military borders, seldom in the provinces. Nevertheless, by the end of the 18th century, it definitely starts to disappear.²⁷ In Serbia, family cooperative continues to exist even after this period. In the 19th century it is still the predominant form of family and work community, with the collective assets and collective earning of money. This concept was opposite of the modern idea of ownership, mobile land assets and labor. The Serbian civil codex from 1844 legally sanctioned the existence of family cooperatives, but at the same time it legalized the possibility of their classification. This really legalized the process of their disintegration, which was already happening at that time.²⁸ The process of family cooperative atrophy was conditioned by the great demographic growth (called "demographic transition") which caused the changes of the family structure in society. The trend was lessening of the family by dividing it into several smaller parts or separating particular families from big cooperatives. Family cooperative, however, did not have exclusively economic, but also a social role, because its function included the promotion of a certain system of values i.e. maintaining the common moral (including religious view of life and the common law agenda). Therefore, the family cooperative represented economic, legal, ethical and spiritual basis of the Serbian pre-modern society. The dissolving of the family cooperative instigated the fear for the future of Serbian society and, more than that, of the ruling value system. This can be seen in the archives of contemporaries.²⁹ In fact, that fear was completely justified the aspiration toward re-establishing of

²⁶ Ibid, p. 65.

²⁷ *Privatni život u srpskim zemljama u osvit modernog doba*, prir. A. Fotić, Beograd, 2005, p. 760-762.

²⁸ Mari-Žanin Čalić, *Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815-1941*, Beograd, 2004, p. 36-37.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 51-53.

Dušan's empire could not be possible without family, which reproduces this imperative and also the values which primarily serve its fulfillment. However, the spiritual and social components of the family cooperative, including the primitive ethics and value system, survived its actual dissolving, and even today they influence the "structures of traditional comprehension" in the country.³⁰ Taking into account the specific interaction between country and city in the last 15 years in Serbia i.e. taking into account the effect of the so called ruralization, the effect of transference, the successful development and the mutation of rural culture (with its values, cultural models, behavioral patterns etc.) into urban areas, one must not be surprised by the "peculiar" phenomena in the modern Serbian society. Whether it is primitivism, extreme conservatism and patriarchy, xenophobia, nationalism and "last but not the least" fascism, the point is actually in the phenomenon of *longue durie*, the long-term process which is one of the constants in the historic development of Serbian society.

The values promoted by the old family cooperative in Serbia, and which are even today dominant and equally promoted in the contemporary society, can be marked as typically patriarchal. In such an environment, the man holds the superior position: father/head of the family is the *alpha male* and is in the center. Much attention is given to male children as well. Thus, in a patriarchal environment it is desirable to be born as a man, but at the same time it implies great responsibility. The holy obligation of man is "repaying the debt to his country" i.e. military service, regarding that his primary social functions are to be a *soldier* and *father*. For a young man, serving the army should represent an honor given "benignantly" by the state, but at the same time it is a test of maturity: an immature boy stepping into the army, steps out as a real man. There is a hardly concealed homosexual allusion in this, which is not unusual for the army. The relation of the Serbian society towards the military institution is best described in the custom of celebrating a young man's departure to army (the so called "seeing-off"). This custom was popular in the beginning the 20th century, in the time between two World Wars, in the period of socialism, and it is popular today. The same attitude was towards the war, because "to go to war was just like going to a wedding". The beginning of the first war (the first one in the period between 1912 and 1918) was welcomed with enthusiasm; because the opportunity for fulfilling the historic testament has finally come.³¹ Similar reactions appeared during the German attack on Yugoslavia in 1941, though the enthusiasm was quickly replaced by panic, which soon turned into general resignation. On the eve of April 6 1941 (the day when the Germans bombarded Belgrade for the first time), songs like "*Hear, my dear, Fritz is coming to Serbia, he'll stumble upon our bayonets*"³² or "*Hey, Hitler, great hero of the combat, you will meet your doom in the Balkans*"³³ were sung confidently, but only a few days later the soldiers of the defeated army were welcomed by contempt, curses and insults. One of the many thousands Serbian peasants then cried: "*Is this the way you defend a country... and fight against the enemy? No, this is not the way we fought. If my sons behaved like that, they are better off dead than to return home as cowards*"³⁴. The exhilaration for the upcoming war in 1991 existed in the majority of the Serbian society

30 Ibid, p. 56.

31 Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, p. 66.

32 S. L. Salcberger, *Drugi svetski rat*, Beograd, 1970, p. 100.

33 Košta Nikolić, *Strah i nada u Srbiji 1941-1944: svakodnevi život pod okupacijom*, Beograd, 2002, p. 19.

34 Ibid, p. 26.

when the hundreds of tanks started to the west on the highway of "Brotherhood and Unity" (the name comes from a phrase commonly used in the socialist Yugoslavia) towards Zagreb. It did not matter whether it was the beginning, middle or end of the 20th century, the pattern was the same.

Some of the permanent instances in Serbian society are: pride taken in completing military service, pity towards the people incompetent to serve the army, contempt towards the ones who evade or refuse to go to the army and fascination by the army (though these instances are weakened due to defeat in wars in the last decade of the 20th century). Family and family upbringing, as well as the influence of other social institutions, is responsible for the development of such a general atmosphere. Since early childhood, children are brought up to be warriors and avengers, to be hateful towards the *arch-enemy - the Turk, the Austrian and Fritz* (in the 1990s, a new enemy made it in the list *the American*). This was obvious to the most foreign observers and writers of travel books. From the early age, children are raised with the goal of accomplishing the abovementioned ancestral testament. This is done through various "family questions", the so-called the family catechism, which are accompanied by public catechisms, among which the most prominent was the 1888 *Catechism for the Serbian people*. Russian Slavic expert P. A. Rovinski notes an example of a "family question" which the children were taught to during his stay in Serbia (1868-1869). In this example, the child answers the father's questions: "*Who are you? A Serb. Where did the Serbian empire fall apart? In Kosovo. Who died in Kosovo? Tsar Lazar, the 9 Jugovic brothers and all Serbian heroes. Who else? Tsar Mural How did he die? He was slaughtered by Milos Obilic. How do we remember Tsar Lazar, Milos Obilic and all other Serbian heroes? Eternal glory. And Murat? Forever be damned. Who is the enemy of the Serbs? The Turks. Who else? The Germans. What do you wish for them? I will take my saber and cut the bastards!*" *The 1888 Catechism follows the same lead, but is even more explicit in some parts: "Who is the enemy of the Serbs? The biggest enemy of the Serbs is Austria. What should be done? Austria should be hated... Who is the friend of the Serbs? The only true and sure friend... is the mighty Russia. What is the duty of every Serb? To love his country and king and die for them..."*³⁵ A few public figures left behind them notes about education in the national spirit, whose guiding idea was liberation and unification of Serbs. For example, Paulina Lebl Albala notes that she was distanced from socialism by the constant talk about "international proletariat whose liberation should be acted upon" regarding that "from an early age she was fed with the idea that what should be acted upon were liberation and unification of the Serbian people"³⁶.

The contributions to creating, maintaining and transferring of the specific national idea were made in other ways as well. Oral folk literature had a great importance in the lives of people because it was a part of everyday life. Whether it was ritual songs, songs for fun or songs for glorification of heroes and ancestors, it followed all the stages of human life³⁷. Because of its presence and popularity, oral folk literature (told along with the sound of "gusle" a primitive one-string instrument) became an important medium of national propaganda: by singing about the long lost glory, bitterness of defeat in Kosovo and the weight of "five centuries of slavery under the Turks", it called to battle and revenge (of the killed heroes of Kosovo, Serbian martyrs,

³⁵ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, p. 65.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

³⁷ *Privatni život u srpskim zemljama u osvjet modernog doba*, p. 341.

Turkish tyranny or "zulum"...) and thus gave its contribution to the "development of the national awareness". Who could, in such a society, resist the repeated calling of Tsar Lazar (told through a folk singer): *who wouldn't come to the battle of Kosovo* had a far greater weight to it five or six centuries after it had (allegedly) been told.

Written literature is another story: with the uprising of romanticism in art, national inspiration gets a different formal expression, and a new category emerges - *patriotic literature*. Poets give their contribution to national mobilization by reminding of Gazimestan, pleading to "stay right here" because "the sun of the foreign sky" can never be as warm as the *Serbian sun* on the *Serbian sky* and claiming that they did not forget "what is a Serb's goal" and that they were not "carried away by the western river", at the same time taking responsibility on themselves, as "the children of this century", to take up a predestined role and accomplish the *ancestral testament*. This repentant model, the awareness of the *unpaid debt of the intelligentsia towards the people* (for the first time clearly formulated by the Russian socialist P.L. Lavrov)³⁸ was characteristic of Russian and Serbian intelligentsia of the last decades of the 19th century. Guilty conscience that went along with this idea put pressure on Serbian intellectuals and as a result had innumerable outbursts of written patriotism and merging the intelligentsia and the common people. By this, Serbian intellectuals dropped far below the level they should have been at, if they were to call themselves "the intelligentsia". The intelligentsia could not have been on a higher level than the intellectual needs of a people that created it. This presented a significant problem because of the fact that the inner impulse toward change under the Turkish government was put out, and the new impulse had to come from outside or from above, from the intelligentsia³⁹.

One of the ways of propagating the dominant ideological pattern was the press, although it is hard to talk about the influence of the press in Serbia, especially when one bears in mind that on the turn of the centuries the number of literate people was not considerable. Those who were literate could be put "under suspicion" because a number of them could not comprehend the context of the read text. Hence, professional journalism was not a frequently seen phenomenon in Serbia, regarding that various other interests (royal, political and material interests) were put above the journalism⁴⁰. What was featured in newspaper texts was offensive content, various denunciations, sensationalism, primitive and hateful language... It is well known how many disturbances and problems were created by such articles. The exchange of offenses and accusations preceded one of the most famous affairs at the end of the 19th century, the killing of the liberal from Novi Sad Miša Dimitrijević by the leader of the radical party Jaša Tomić. Serbian press was filled with various articles written in the "national spirit" with the aim of this promotion. On the eve of the Balkan wars, the Serbian press got its first "specialized" magazine, the Belgrade *Pijemont*, whose title can be connected to national agenda.

³⁸ Sava Živanov, *Rusija na prelomu veka: poslednje decenije ruskog carstva*, Beograd, 2002, p. 212.

³⁹ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, p. 73.

⁴⁰ Petar Atanacković, Milivoj Bešlin, *Senzacionalistička („žuta”) štampa u Beogradu između dva svetska rata*, Gesta, Broj 1, Novi Sad, 2006, p. 33.

What also attracts attention is the special type of press aimed at children – children and youth magazines, which appeared in Serbia in the last quarter of the 19th century. Primary goal of these magazines was indoctrination in the spirit of patriotism. The content of the vows that were expected of the youth was diverse and depended on the constant political changes. Nevertheless, the primary goal was development of national sentiments and love towards the homeland. The means that the children and youth magazines most often used was the cultivation of love towards the ruler as the embodiment of patriotism. The largest number of texts was written by the adults for children, but in time the number of texts written by children themselves becomes greater. In these, the children should have shown the knowledge they have acquired⁴¹. Besides containing a majority of texts written in the "national spirit", magazines used their covers, headers and slogans to point out the primary goal of the Serbian national agenda, the goal the "national youth" must aspire to. The magazine *Lasta*, dating from the last decade of the 19th century, had a picture of a bard playing the gusle instrument, a heraldic sign with four Ss (today, a sign of Serbian nationalists), Vidovdan (the day of the battle at Kosovo Polje), Cveti 1815 (the day when the Second Serbian Rebellion began) and the inscription *Kingdom of Serbia, Montenegro, Slavonia, Old Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Srem, Banat, Bačka* on its covers, clearly suggesting where the "lands of the Serbs" are. The 1905 magazine *Golub* had on its covers inscriptions *Cetinje, Prizren, Novi Sad, Beograd*; the 1906 magazine *Mala Srbadija* had Miloš Obilić, Vuk Karadžić, hajduk Veljko Petrović, gusle and the Bible. About the purpose of these magazines, their editorships did not have a single doubt: the editorship of the 1882 magazine *Srpče* claims that the primary goal of the magazine is education of the youth in the spirit of "nobleness and devotion to Serbia" by developing in them patriotism as "a true virtue of the real young Serbs, so that they become real and proud Serbs". The 1897 *Podmladak* explains its assignment among the youth in the form of verses: "Let her raise knights, mighty as thunders! Avengers of the Serbs, pride of their kin!" But the best of all is the 1912 *Novi Srbin*, which was, according to the words of the editorship, "intended for each young Serb, whose parents sent him to a grammar school in which professors are not Serbs and in which lessons are not taught out of Serbian books". This is because all of those children who attended "non-Serbian schools" actually "went abroad" and they have to be made up for "the things not mentioned in such schools"⁴². Of course, there were certain exceptions, like *Spomenak* dating from August 1. 1900. There was the following inscription on its cover: "1830 - 1900. And the children of Serbia, Serbian sons and daughters faithful and loyal to their king, on the occasion of seventy years of His birth, cheer from the bottom of their hearts: Long live the merciful FRANZ JOSEPH!!" ⁴³

After 1918 and the general confidence that the ancestral testament was (more or less) accomplished, the texts and the symbolism of the headers and slogans change. The slogans call for preservation and defense of the existing state; national unity of the "three tribes of the same people" is celebrated, etc. Nevertheless, the role that the magazines played stayed the same: patriotic upbringing and cultivation of love towards the ruler. The relief that was brought by the "vengeance of Serbia" during the decade of

⁴¹ Olivera Milosavljević, *Otac-genije-ljubimac: Kult vladara najtrajnijji obrazac vaspitavanja dece*, u: Srbija u Modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka (4). Žene i deca, Beograd, 2006, p. 189-190.

⁴² Ibid, p. 191-192.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 203.

wars can be obviously seen in a certain unpretentiousness that characterized the propagation of love towards the nation and the ruler in children's magazines (especially if we compare them to the ones dating from the 19th century). Magazines *Zorica* and *Dečije novine* from the 1920s, in their header kept a photo of three boys in folklore outfits of the "three tribes"; the 1924 *Otađbina* carried a sign with a two-headed eagle, the four Ss and a slogan "For king and homeland!"; and the 1940 *Nova Srbadija* had a slogan "Strong Serbs strong Yugoslavia!"⁴⁴. After 1945, the situation had not changed considerably: the pattern was the same, though its content changed a bit i.e. calls for reconstruction and defense of socialism were added. Love towards the homeland represented a positive trait even in the new conditions, the same way the old relationship towards the ruler was kept. Nevertheless, Josip Broz Tito was not the only ruler whose persona was cultivated on the pages of children's magazines: magazine *Pioniri* dating from January 1. 1946 included an article *Long Live Comrad Stalin!*, which was published on the occasion of the birthday of a man who "from early childhood to this very day spent his time in the fight for freedom and better life of the Soviet Union and the whole of mankind!"⁴⁵, in this sense, with the constant repetition of the same pattern in children's magazines from the Berlin Congress to the 14th Congress of the Communist League of Yugoslavia, it is very surprising that the similar practice was absent in children's magazines in the last decade of the 20th century. However, the absence of elegies in the honor of "president Milošević" or comics and stories which would talk about the times "when Sloba was a small boy" does not mean that the pattern has lost its power, or that education "in the spirit of nobleness and sacrifice for Serbs" and training for "avengers of Serbs" or "avengers of Kosovo" is definitely overcome.

Conclusion

Unification of the Serbian people, as the idea above all other ideas, permeated the life of the Serbian society: imposed as an imperative through education in family and school, army drills and military propaganda, inscriptions in the press, sermons and bar chats, through songs on celebrations or through literary works, this idea shaped the specific spirit of nationalism, the spirit of the soldier-warrior-avenger. This spirit has been successfully passed from generation to generation due to the fact that the pupils one day turn into teachers, and it has shaped the characteristic collective mentality, which had one and the same guiding idea a century ago, as well as today. This spirit has in every way dominated in the period which is longer than 100 years.

In the process of education in the "spirit of the national idea" and in forming of what was called the "real Serbs", family had an important role, with its authoritarian system of values. However, the ideological oppression in the family could never have been as successful if it was not followed by equally strong impulses of literally every other social institution. In this way, the problem of analyzing the ideological oppression surpasses

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 191.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 213.

the initial focus on the family organization, but at the same time confirms the importance of the family, as in the analysis itself, as in "everyday life" for the right wing political groups, but for the state in general.

It is hard to speak about the situation today in Serbian society, and, more importantly, what its perspectives are. Only a glance at the road taken is discouraging. The thing to be avoided is what Nietzsche described as the problem of historians who, looking backwards, ultimately start "*believing backwards*"⁴⁶. However, facts of the two-century experience undoubtedly prove that the major part of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century have been wasted. The same way, anything positive accomplished during the second half of the 20th century has been destroyed at the end of it. It is the first decade of the 21st century, but equally as before, a tendency towards making a clear cut (or what colloquially is called *turn a new corner*) does not exist in the Serbian society. Today, as 200, 150 or 100 years ago, Serbia is making the same mistake: in the name of something imaginary (which should start to exist in the future), but of great "national importance", the present is completely neglected. The Serbian national issue, with Kosovo as its primary symbol, is as strong a preoccupation today as it was a century ago, as it was in the time of king Milan and the time of Slobodan Milošević, from the time of the first government of Nikola Pašić to the government of Vojislav Koštunica. In the name of the well being of the national idea and its accomplishment, again symbolically connected with Kosovo and the „untying of the Kosovo knot“, solving the present problem is postponed indefinitely, for a better tomorrow. This is completely in accordance with the Serbian historic constant, in which the question of national borders, their vagueness or the vagueness of their expansion presents one of the main impediments on the road towards modernization and europeanization⁴⁷. This will continue to be so as long as *Feed your son and send him to the army* is the symbol of the value system in Serbia. In this way society is once again condemned to fall behind. However, time is against the Serbian society more than ever before. Accordingly, Serbia's retrogression will lead to its inevitable doom. And that is why the so-called change of paradigm (an overall transformation of society, completion of the process of political emancipation, guaranteeing of the dominance of the rational-modern view of the world over the mythical, almost medieval way of thinking, building of the new system of values, etc.) is the most necessary thing in this moment. In this way Serbia would avoid experiencing the truthfulness of Tocqueville's thesis that many nations fall apart before becoming aware of their own mistakes.

⁴⁶ Fridrih Niče, *Sumrak idola ili Kako se filozofira čekićem*, Novi Sad, 1999, p. 11.

⁴⁷ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, p. 65.

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Milivoj Bešlin

THE OPENING OF THE NATIONAL ISSUE IN THE STATE OF SERBIA AT THE END OF THE 1960s AND THE BEGINNING OF THE 1970s

"Forgetting, even false remembering of history, is the essential element in forming of a nation, which is the reason why the advancement of historic studies often presents danger to the national sentiments."

Ernest Renan

1. Nation, Nationalism - the Notion, Definition and Types

The number and amount of the literature about nation, nationalism and the national question does not make the work of a researcher simpler or faster¹. The abundance of definitions, interpretations, views on one of the most complex questions of the modern European history can lead more into confusion or on the wrong path than offer a clear and unambiguous answer to the "national question", which is, at least in the Balkans, the question of all questions, the nation being a value itself. Nevertheless, the explication of the concept of the nation has to be preceded by the definition of the notion *people*, as a specific, natural and social community, which came to exist on a higher level of the tribal integration in a state framework with a complete vertical stratification. In ethnic terms, the basic integrative characteristics of any people are: cultural (language, religion, folklore, way of life), political (common state or the tendency to create one) and an expressed awareness about the common origin. The next level of historical development of ethnical groups is the nation, being the highly developed ethnical community, which came to exist along with the appearance of the civil society, in a territory organized by the state and within the boundaries of the common cultural and spiritual landmarks.

Nationalism is defined by Hans Ulrich Wehler as: a system of ideas, viewpoints and doctrines which serve to mobilize and integrate bigger coherent communities (called nations), and, above all, legitimize current political policies. This phenomenon primarily featured uncritical glorification of own ethnicity whose goal was to advocate an excessive, unacceptable and self-loving patriotism². Nationalist ideology is characterized by essential exclusiveness and parochial autarchy, because, as Umberto Eco writes in the study *Eternal Fascism* "The nation looks for its own identity, only through its enemies".

¹ Erih Hobsbaum, *Nacije i nacionalizam od 1780. Program, mit, stvarnost*, Beograd, 1996. Hans Ulrich Veler, *Nacionalizam, istorija-forme-posledice*, Novi Sad, 2002. Patrick Geary, *Mit o nacijama*, Novi Sad, 2007. Ernest Gellner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 1997. Hugh Seton Watson, *Nacije i države*, Zagreb, 1980. Volfgang Šmale, *Istorija evropske ideje*, Beograd, 2003. Benedikt Anderson, *Nacija: zamišljena zajednica*, Beograd, 1998.

² Hans Ulrich Veler, *Nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 2002, 10-11.

Thanks to a leading expert for phenomena of nations and nationalisms, Ernest Gellner (1925-1995), today's popular opinion about nationalism is that it is not created by efforts of a nation, but vice versa, nation is created by nationalism³. There are no doubts about historical origins of nations – they are products of the modern industrial civilization. Nations-states of the today's world are based on ethnicity patterns, defined as "imaginary communities", which are a result of a struggle of the 19th century intellectuals and politicians, who converted national-romanticism in literature, art and history into active political programs⁴.

There are two types of European nationalisms, differentiated on the basis of its genesis and defined by experts: ethnic (kin) and territorial (state) type. In the first, basically a German type, nation is a set of individuals mutually connected with common origin, language and culture and is characterized by mythical presentations of idealized past. Second, the French-American type, determines its genesis by state affiliations, neglecting the origins. This is in accordance with the liberal-enlightened individualist values and this type is cosmopolitan in character. In this, nationalism and citizenship are synonyms, thus Renan notes that national affiliation in this case is every day's consent⁵. Nationalisms of the Balkans region, therefore Serbian as well, belongs to ethnic (kin) type. This type of nationalism is typical of recent nations and, despite the similarity of the languages and cultural kin, the line that separates the entities is drawn by religion, for which is well said to be a divider of nations, which later formed "sectarian" type of nationalism or the nationalism of the "judgment day"⁶.

2. Nationalism In Serbia - Roots and Accomplishments until 1945

Serbian nationalism, regardless of its predecessors, is the fruit of Serbian revolution which began with the 1804 rebellion against the Ottoman empire. Serbia was first, through agreements, defined as an autonomous principality under the Turkish sovereignty (the 1830 Hatisherif), and only after the 1878 Berlin Congress an independent principality and the kingdom. This enabled an uninterrupted development and uplift of national romanticism, whose fundamental aim was to gather all ethnical Serbs into a state entity. According to the famous wording of the abovementioned Gellner, "nationalism is first of all a political tenet according to which political and national unity must coincide"⁷. However, since the Karadjordje's rebels, who were the first to fail to accomplish this goal, it was hard to define what Serbian lands were, how far they spread and where the borders could be drawn.

Using the methods of accomplishing the state goal, Ilija Garašanin's Načertanije, which was an internal document of the Serbian 1844 government, intended to explain this ambiguity. According to this draft, the future Serbian state would, in the beginning, consist of the territories of the weakened Ottoman empire: Principality of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and the so-called Old Serbia (Kosovo and Macedonia)⁸. What Garašanin did on a state level, Vuk Karadžić, father of modern Ser-

3 Ernest Gellner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 1997, 83.

4 Patrick Geary, *Mit o nacijama*. Novi Sad, 2007; Benedikt Anderson, *Nacija: zamišljena zajednica*, Beograd, 1998.

5 Todor Kuljić, *Tito, sociološko-istorijska studija*, Zrenjanin, 2004, 220-221.; Čedomir Popov, *Velika Srbija*, Sremski Karlovci-Novı Sad, 2007, 21-22.

6 Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918.1*, Beograd, 1989, 7-17.

7 Ernest Gellner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad, 1997.

8 Radoš Ljušić, *Knjiga o „Načertaniju“*, Beograd, 1993. Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji*, Zagreb,

bian language and alphabet, did on a cultural-linguistic level. In his famous work "All the Serbs everywhere", written in 1836 and published in 1849, he claimed that all South Slavs who spoke in the "štokavski" dialect are Serbs. Regarding the fact that the Ilirian movement already accepted the "štokavski" dialect for the most of Croats, it was clear that they were, too, categorized as Serbs. Accordingly, all the lands inhabited by the "štokavski Serbs" were to become a part of Serbia⁹.

After gaining independence and territorial expansion in the Berlin Congress, further development of the Serbian state was burdened with a long-term historical controversy: development of the actual Serbian state and its modernization on a model of progressive western-european societies had to be done on account of basic values and nationalist goals, ideas of expansion and the territorial expansion which aim at creating the all-Serbian country¹⁰. Political subsets that emanated this ideological dichotomy were the radicals and the progressives - the first of who "saw what was beyond one's doorstep", and the second of who did not "leave the house" i.e. internationally acknowledged Serbian borders.

After the end of the unstable Obrenović period, in 1903 Serbia, conservative, military and expansive idea gains permanent dominance, and the country enters in the period of wars out of which it exits in 1918 with many lost lives but with a considerably enlarged territory and the belief that the national ideals were accomplished. Although Serbs were all under one roof in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, they were only a part of a nationally and confessionally extremely complex structure.

Yugoslavian unification was done either too late for its key elements to be joined into one nation, the same as Germans and Italians, or the union came to exist too early to comprehend and adopt the historical necessity of a finalized process of establishing three different ethnicities: Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. The newborn state was shaken by nationalisms expressed through Serbian freedom-fighting tradition and the intention to be *primus inter pares* of the south Slavic union, by which the Croatian and Slovenian dream of their own national and state emancipation was fueled. Nationalist politics of a Serbian Yugoslavia, led by Pasić, imposed a centralized "vidovdan" draft as a constitution, neglecting all the complexities of the newly created union. An attempt of the elite to legitimize the internal union of Yugoslavia failed, the same as the unitarian politics did. Under the burden of this failure, in 1939, "Banovina Hrvatska" emerged, which was a kind of Croatian *corpus separatum*. With that agreement, "the Serbian issue" took a new form which consisted of the demand for a territorial unit which would embrace "the very last Serb in Yugoslavia". Serbian cultural club becomes one of the loudest advocates of the Serbian nationalist ideas in that time. It stepped out of the cultural and deeply stepped into the national ideological field. What was openly spoken in the Serbian cultural club, was the division of Bosnia, deportation of Albanians, denationalization of Macedonians...¹¹ Accomplishment of some of these goals was interrupted by the German aggression on Yugoslavia and the mangling of the country.

⁹ Charles Jelavich, *South Slav Nationalisms*, Ohio, 1990. Čedomir Popov, *Velika Srbija*, Sremski Karlovci-Noví Sad, 2007.

¹⁰ Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, Beograd, 2006.
¹¹ u Čedomir Popov, *Velika Srbija*, Sremski Karlovci-Noví Sad, 2007.

The bearer of the Serbian nationalism, during the 1941-1945 war, was "the movement of Ravna Gora" (chetnics) which was led by general Dragoljub Mihajlović. In the main versions of their national program, chetnics aimed to restructure Yugoslavia, in which Serbs would be undisputed and dominant. The document "Homogenous Serbia", written by the lawyer from Banja Luka, the pre-war official of the Serbian cultural club, Stevan Moljević, became the most popular literature of the chetnics. In this 1941 document stands that the primary goal of the Serbs is to "create and organize a homogenous (ethnically cleansed) Serbia which would include all areas inhabited by the Serbs..."¹² According to this paper, Great Serbia in Great Yugoslavia would consist of: Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgarian Vidin and Custendil, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dubrovnik, northern Albania, northern Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Kordun, part of Slavonia, Zadar, islands, Vojvodina with Vukovar, Vinkovci and Osijek, Baranja and Hungarian Pecuj, then eastern (Romanian) Banat with Temišvar and Resice¹³.

Although started off as an anti-occupying, under the circumstances: German revenge over the civilians, genocide over the Serbs in Croatia, successful strategy of warfare of the partisans, the failure of their own "waiting strategy" and the denied support of the allies, the Movement of Ravna Gora slides into more explicit collaboration, which became completely obvious with the joined offensive of the Germans and the collaborators on the partisans and Soviet troops. Openly collaborative, inordinately expansive, vindictive over the non-Serbian civilians in eastern Bosnia, Serbian nationalism, incarnated in chetnics, was compromised for a long time, which enabled the communist winners to create a historically disputable balance with Croatian nationalism, incarnated in ustashe.

Serbian nationalism. It certainly existed in this time, but it was reduced to the diaspora, which was fed with irrational hatred and vindictiveness towards everything that was coming from Yugoslavia. Because of the fact that words from abroad never had the same influence as words from the inside of the country, these circles were not a threat for the regime nor did they influence in any way on the intellectuals in Yugoslavia.

3. Inducement of the National Issue in Serbia in the Late 1960s and In the Early 1970s

The 1960s were, without any doubt, the most provocative years for the development of the second Yugoslavia. Regardless of the very prosperous foreign policy, the profound internal crisis spread through the state, party, ideology, organization, politics, economy, society and the morale. Problems which were not solved for more than a decade, waited for solutions. A fetish of self-government was very much degenerated by bureaucracy. Because of the untouchability of self-government, societal progress was inhibited; and the distribution of social budget antagonized the relations between the republics. Fear of the free market mechanisms in economy instigated nervous reactions of the bureaucracy which was concerned for the fate of any accumulation that is

¹² M. Vesović, K. Nikolić, *Ujedinjene srpske zemlje - Ravnogorski nacionalni program*, Beograd, 1996, 190-195.

¹³ Branko Petranović, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Beograd, 1992. 380-383.

beyond state control. While the necessity for changes was gaining strength, repulsion towards initiation of these very changes and the rise of particular egotisms of the republics, naturally led to nationalism¹⁴.

In this generally Yugoslav environment, specific Serbian motives appeared, which generated the nationalist tide in the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

Plenum at the Brioni - 1966 Shift of Ranković

Dissambiguity of the elites of SKJ (Communist Union of Yugoslavia) concerning economic reforms, decentralization of the state and transformation of the Party, escalated in the midst of 1966 into an internal Party duel, which took place at the Brioni. Because of the risk that the act of relaying Rankovic would be labeled as anti-Serbian, Tito delayed the final departure¹⁵. By evading the details of the duel and its mechanisms, I would like to explain the Serbian intellectual's interpretation of it. Namely, after the war, *underground* and *frontier* Serbian nationalists regarded Rankovic with excessive intolerance because of the break of the remains of chetnics organization and catching their leader D. Mihajlović, which was done by police under the conduct of Rankovic. However in his last years of leadership, Rankovic suited only dogmatic politicians, regarding his conservatism and centralism. Because of this, he managed to gain popularity amongst conservative and centralist ideologists among Serbian nationalists. After the relay and cleansing of state apparatus by his own comrades, Rankovic gains the halo of the martyr and becomes the protector of the Serbs, which was absurd, but could be comprehended regarding the rise of liberalism, which was instigated by his replacement. The most passionate, though influential advocate of this thesis is the writer and social and political worker, Dobrica Cosic, who characterised Rankovic as a "martyr and the symbol of the nation" (Serbian nation author's remark). Cosic writes about the feelings amongst the people after June 1966: "It is a general belief that this affair (Brionis Plenum) is anti-Serbian in its motives, character, consequences... As I hear, the peasants are on Rankovic's side. They are the real people of Serbia and they mourn after him because he is the symbol of Serbia... Depression, despair, fury have consumed everything that is intelligent, honorable and dignified in Serbian people."¹⁶ Whether it is credible or not, national frustration was created, which will manifest itself much later, on Rankovic's funeral in 1983 and will be continued after the break with communism in the dawn of the 1990s, when a lot of publicistic literature appears, glorifying the carefully built myth about Rankovic. Even the authors of highschool history textbooks spent a lot of colour and paper to explain this strange phenomenon, after the changes in the October 5th 2000.

¹⁴ Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti*, Novi Sad, 2001, 384-385.

¹⁵ Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Zagreb, 1999, 489-491.

¹⁶ Dobrica Cosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951-1968)*, Beograd, 2002, 260-279.

Win of the Kardelj's Concept of Decentralized State

Since the beginning of the 1960s, two of the Tito's closest colleagues quietly developed a conflict between each other, Kardelj and Rankovic. The two of them actually represented two conflicted politics and possible concepts of the future progress. Kardelj pursued independence of the republics and persisted on the right of people for self-determination which inevitably led towards a con-federation. Rankovic, on the other hand struggled for a unified, centralized federation with Belgrade as a center and (pre)dominant roll of the Party in the societal life. Political liquidation of Rankovic marked the victory of decentralized concept, which was interpreted by nationalists as a great threat for Serbian people, whose ethnicity was falling apart into a few mini-states inside Yugoslavia. Kardelj constructed and developed his own concept and, even, left the possibility for Yugoslavia to become something else, or to completely vanish. From the viewpoint of Serbian nationalists it meant the derogation of the goal of the unique indivisible ethnic area.

Recomposing of the Federation 1967-71 Constitutional Amendments

In the period between 1967-1971 there were three packages of constitutional amendments. Observed as a whole, these amendments imposed a new and much more decentralized constitutional disposition. First two packages of amendments (amendments 1-6, ratified on April 18th 1967 and amendments 7-19, ratified on December 26th 1968) greatly limited the federation, regarding the taxes, and restructured the federal parliament which strengthened the Council of people. This council had to approve every federal law and its members were obliged to represent the parliaments of their own republics, which sent them there (some sort of imperative mandatory). A more radical package of amendments (amendments 20-42, ratified on June 30th 1971) basically changed the way of conducting Yugoslavia. On the basis of these amendments, republics gained primary sovereignty and all other authorities. Collective presidency of the state was formed as well. Finally, amendments institutionalized the demand (which was already practised) that most of the federal decisions about economic issues are ratified with the consent of the republics and the autonomous regions. The most radical measure was the right of the republics for veto. With these changes the state was pretty much confederalized, and the field was prepared for the last decomposing through the 1974 constitution.

Giving the Autonomy for the Regions

With the 1968-1971 constitutional amendments, position of the autonomous regions was crucially changed. Owing to these amendments, Kosovo and Vojvodina became constitutional elements of the federation. First significant changes happened due to

¹⁷ Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija - država koja je odumrla*, Beograd, 2003, 146.

¹⁸ Branko Petranović, Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslovenski federalizam ideje I stvarnost 2*, Beograd, 1987, 383-429.

the set of constitutional amendments, passed in December 1968. Kosovo, which was up until then called "The Autonomous Region Kosovo and Metohija", was renamed into "The Socialist Autonomous Region Kosovo". By deleting the word "Metohija" (originating from the Greek word metoh, meaning a monastery land) from the name of the region, the importance of the Slavic and orthodox elements in its history was diminished. The 18th Amendment says: "Constitutionally declared rights and obligations of the region are directly protected by the Federation"¹⁹. By this, the native Republic was actually avoided. The changes in the organization of the Party went on simultaneously with the changes in the state. In November 1968, former branches of the Communist Union of Serbia for Vojvodina and Kosovo became independent Unions of Communists of Vojvodina and Kosovo.

Ćosić's Stepping Out of the Communist Union and His Organizational and Ideological Activities

In May 1968, on the 14th plenum, Dobrica Ćosić, a writer for the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Serbia and a public official very close to Ranković, came into a direct confrontation with the Party. Openly criticizing the politics of the Communist Union in Kosovo because of the rise in anti-Serbian atmosphere, Ćosić warned (or anticipated) that in the Serbian people as well "an old historical goal and ideal could start burning again the unification of the Serbian people into one country"²⁰. His speech fiercely echoed in the public, because it was so different from anything that could have been heard up until then. The author himself soon left the Party, refused to repent and started to gather around him the dissatisfied people who thought alike. They relied upon the deep dissatisfaction of the relation of the ruling politics towards the Serbian national issue. This was the base for an alternative political platform, whose leading figure was to become Ćosić himself, who was elected president of the Serbian literary union, a leading center of nationalist opposition, in 1969. By bringing together a diverse group of intellectuals: writers, linguists, critics, artists, lawyers, economists, philosophers and historians, Ćosić created a new coalition which stood for the nationalist Serbian cultural and spiritual union, independent of the existing republic borders²¹. This was the antecedent of the wide nationalist front which is to become dominant in the 1980s.

The 1968 Albanian Demonstrations in Kosovo and the Reactivation of Albanian Nationalism.

At the very end of November 1968 (at the time of the national Albanian holiday, the Flag Day, on the 28th and the Yugoslavian Day of the Republic, on the 29th) there was an explosion of Albanian nationalism displayed through violent street demonstrations in a few Kosovo cities. The reactivation of Albanian nationalism was induced by the disassembling of Ranković's oppressive apparatus, but also by the constitutional changes that announced a considerably higher level of self-government of the Albanian majority in Kosovo. From the harsh anti-regime and anti-state slogans, a few explicit demands could be deduced: an independent university in Albanian language, the status of a republic for the region of Kosovo, and even the unification with the neighboring Albania. The government characterized the destructive demonstrations as "counter-revolutionary" and extinguished it quickly by using force. The new top people

19 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti*, Novi Sad, 2001, 407.

20 Dobrica Ćosić, *Stvarno i moguće*, Rijeka, 1982, 63.

21 Jasna Dragović Soso, *Spasioci nacije*, Beograd, 2004, 73-74.

of the Serbian Party, led by Marko Nikezić, seemed sober, not trying to hide the drama of the moment, but also not causing panic by the fear of the reaction of Serbian nationalism²².

Expansion of Nationalism in Croatia in the Time of the Mass Movement

The most intense and dramatic nationalist movement in Yugoslavia happened in Croatia from 1967 to 1971, in history also known as the *Croatian Spring* or *maspok*. Its beginning should be sought for in 1967 when the *Declaration of the Croatian literary language* was published, which asked for separation from the Serbian language and acknowledgement of Croatian as a literary language. Apart from linguistic, important motives for this movement were disapproval of the economic state of Croatia in relation to the distribution of the foreign income from the tourism on the Adriatic. In the period between the 10th meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Croatia in January 1970 (when the Croatian party leadership put itself on the head of the blooming movement, announcing that unitarianism represents much greater danger than Croatian nationalism), and student demonstrations in November 1971 (where it was sought that Croatia got its representative in the UN, its own armed forces, independent foreign policy...), this movement spread, radicalized and slipped from the grip of Party control. At the end of 1971, Tito (who previously gave his consent to the movement) stopped it by making the Croatian party leaders resign in the Serbian Karadjordjevo, on the day of the making of the first Yugoslavian state (1st December)²³. Even though Serbian *liberal* leadership tried not to respond symmetrically to the outburst of Croatian nationalism and separatism, it was impossible to avoid the effect of joined policies of the two antagonistic national ideologies, above all through ever frequent nationalist contraventions of the Serbian intelligentsia, aimed at the worry for the Serbs in Croatia.

Political Liberalization in Serbia after 1968

The new course in the Serbian Party was set by electing Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović as the president and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Serbia in 1968. They were characterized by the open advocacy for the democratic transformation of society and political relations, negation of the oppressing administrative measures, insisting on a dialogue with the people of a different opinion and their belief in the superiority of the communist ideal action. It was a Serbian attempt of a "socialism with a human face", which was to have the same outcome as the Czechoslovakian four years before, but in the given period it was to cause the widest liberalization of political life after 1945. Serbian nationalism tried to use the new circumstances for promoting their own system of values, and it mostly succeeded in this, in spite of the constant regime attacks²⁴.

²² Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*, Sarajevo, 1991, 80-85; Peđa Marković, „SDBI albanske demonstracije na Kosovu 1968” in *Istorija XX veka*, 1-2, Beograd, 1999, 169-180; Miloš Mišević, *Ko je tražio republiku*, Beograd, 1986, 207-238.

²³ Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, Zagreb, 1999; Savka Dabčević Kučar, '71. Hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, Zagreb, 1997; Miko Tripalo, *Hrvatsko proljeće*, Zagreb, 1990.

²⁴ Marko Nikezić, *Krhka srpska vetikala*, Beograd, 2003; Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*, Sarajevo, 1991; Zdravko Vuković, *Od deformacija SDB-a do maspoka i liberalizma*, Beograd, 1989; Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969-1980)*, Beograd, 2001.

Basic Program Guidelines of Nikezić's Reformists

One of the five ideas of the reformist leadership in Serbia was the policy of *being even* with the rest of the republics and getting rid of the weight of the Serbian Yugoslavia i.e. abandoning the politics that Serbia is the keeper of Yugoslavia, therefore that this republic needs a common state more than the others²⁵. For the first time since the creation of the South Slavic community, a leading political elite did not identify Serbia with Yugoslavia. When the mentioned decentralization is added to this, uneasiness and intensified activity of the Serbian nationalists becomes clearer. The same way they did not insist on Serbia defending Yugoslavia, the *liberals* discarded any idea that Serbia should be the defender of Serbs in other republics. In his speech in Sarajevo in 1970, Nikezić expressed his attitude that Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia are equal to other people who live there so that any ambition by Serbia to act as their protector would represent "pure nationalism".

Religious Motives and the Motives of the Church

Although it found *modus vivendi* with the atheist regime and relatively managed to act independently, the Serbian orthodox church was one of the strongholds of the anti-communist nationalism. In the relevant period, two events can be identified to particularly provoke the opening of the Serbian national issue. After many years of dispute and the escalation of the conflict in fall of 1966, on the official ceremony held from the 16th to 19th July 1967, the Macedonian church proclaimed itself independent. The Yugoslav government, especially the Communist Union of Macedonia, gave their full support to this act, and the official ceremony was attended by the political figures from the republic and the federation. In the official writings in the press, independence of the church was more a political success, then a religious one, as a final victory of the Macedonian sovereignty. The debatable issue of the Macedonian nation became even more irritant for Serbian nationalists, regarding the intentions for great national states which was not cultivated only by the Serbian religious nationalists, but the Greek and Bulgarian as well²⁶.

The second, conditionally speaking, religious motive was the demolishing of the Njegoš' chapel on the Lovćen mountain. Namely, on December 1968 the town hall of Cetinje decided to build the Njegoš mausoleum on Lovćen which was the old wish and should have been designed by Ivan Meštrović. On February 1969, the Board for Preservation of Cultural Monuments approved to "dismantle the chapel". The holy synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church declared that they could not agree with the demolishing of the chapel which was dedicated to holy Peter of Cetinje, comparing this act with the demolishing of that chapel during the occupation of Austria. However, township assembly of Cetinje made the decision unanimously and undisputably to build a mausoleum on a place of the chapel. Just like the church, nationalist circles in Serbia intensively disapproved of this act as well, labeling it as a sacrilege and blasphemy of the bishops grave and a continuation of "degrading the Serbs" in Montenegro and modifying the significance of the Njegoš' work.²⁷

²⁵ Slavoljub Đukić, *Slom srpskih liberala*, Beograd, 1990, 25.

²⁶ Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970*, 2, Beograd, 2002, 279-291.

²⁷ Mihailo Đurić, „Kamen razdora“, u *Umetnost* 27/28, Beograd, 1971, 186-187.

4. The Most Notable Manifestations of Opening of the Serbian Nationalists Issue In the Late 1960s and In the Early 1970s

Actual manifestations are not as important as the origins of the phenomenon and the historical context in which it appears. With some of the abovementioned, we will pay attention to some of the most exemplary and the most notable cases.

1967 *Proposition to think about* written by the few Serbian authors, was the respond to *Croatian Declaration of the name and position of the Croatian literary language*. Initiators of the *Proposition* were writers Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz and Antonije Isaković. The paper starts with complete acceptance of the demands, proposed in *Croatian Declaration*. Authors declared that they acknowledge "undisputable right" of every nation to choose its name and to control the development of its language and that, on such a basis, they approve the division of the languages expressed in the Declaration. However, after that, they exposed the rights of the Serbian language and demanded from Belgrade television to "stop to play the roll of the Yugoslav central studio without credibility and to inaugurate the Cyrillic into local programs." They also demanded "independent development of national language and literature" for the Serbs in Croatia. To sum up in a word, if the C r o a t s express their wish to regain cultural autonomy in relation to Yugoslavia, then the same rights need to be guaranteed to the Serbs in their own republic, as well²⁸. On the abovementioned 14th session of Central Committee of the communist Union of Serbia in May 1968, the historian dr Jovan Marjanović and writer Dobrica Ćosić showed considerable action of nationalism. Marjanović criticized the national politics of the Communist Union and emphasized the acknowledgement of the Muslim nation, describing that act as "pointless" and he paid special attention to the situation of the Serbian people who live outside of Serbia and their perilous situation on Kosovo. In his offset, Ćosić underlined the "intimidation and endangerment of the Serbs" on Kosovo and to his condemnation of the "Albanian irredentism" he added the "retrograde separatism" of Vojvodina secessionism.²⁹

Leading institutional stronghold of the Serbian nationalism in this period becomes almost a hundred years old Serbian Literary Society. Dobrica Ćosić was elected for its president in 1969. Political circles perceived this as an attempt of the gathering of nationalist opposition. Members of the leadership of this traditional institution, founded as support of Serbian culture, besides Ćosić, were writer Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz, painter Mića Popović, linguist Pavle Ivić, phylosophers Mihajlo Djurić and Mihajlo Marković, economist Kosta Mihajlović and historian Radovan Samardžić³⁰. It represented the anti-regime core under Ćosić's leadership whose binding element was its national agenda of "cultural and spiritual unity regardless to actual republic or a state borders"³¹ That was the essence and precursor of widely spread national movement from the 1980s.

On the 1971 annual meeting of the society Ćosić in his report, in the prime of costitutional changes in Yugoslavia actualized the problem of the Serbian cultural and spiritual unity: "The substantial and historical unity of the Serbian national culture, unity irrespective to state borders... till today were disputed only by Austria-Hungary and the Third reich."³² This was the first time, since the World War II that the issue of

²⁸ Jasna Dragović Soso, *Spasioci nacije*, Beograd, 2004,62-65.

²⁹ *Četnaestasednica CKSKS*, Beograd, 1968.

³⁰ Ljubinka Trgovčević, *Istorija SKZ*, Brograd, 1992.

³¹ Slavoljub Đukić, *Dobrica Ćosić - čbvek u svom vremenu. Razgovori sa Dobricom Ćosićem*, Beograd, 1989, 209.

³² Dobrica Ćosić, *Stvarno i moguće*. Rijeka, 1982,120.

national (state as well) becomes dominant amongst the Serbian intellectuals. For the first time in Yugoslavia, ruling communists were publicly compared and leveled with the enemies of the Serbs, which will be in the future one of the most frequent leitmotif of anti-communist practice.

Public debate about the third wave of 1971 constitutional amendments, which took place in March of the same year on a Faculty of Law in Belgrade, was one of the most prominent manifestations of concern over the endangered national unity of Serbian ethnic area³³. A number of participants of the debate, mostly lawyers and philosophers, considered that the process of decentralisation has gone too far and that it threatened the security of the country and the common market. Naming the amendments "the historical failure and a politically unbalanced scientific mess" Andrija Gams said that Serbia found itself in a position to be unjustly accused of centralistic aspirations and hegemony and that it was forced to accept the policy which was in "contradiction to its interests".³⁴ What was criticized was the expansion of rights of the regions, which were raised to the level of the constituents of the Federation. Because of this, Serbia found itself in a subordinated and unequal position in relation to other republics. Pavle Ristić wondered why Albanians were given autonomy in Serbia but not in Macedonia or Montenegro; why Vojvodina, where the majority of the population are Serbs, was given autonomy at all, but the Serbs in Croatia did not get one. Ristić anticipated that these constitutional solutions will have, as its most important consequence, "strengthening of the nationalist sentiments of the Serbs, due to the feeling of subordination and unequal treatment of their home republic", and that is why he dramatically warned that these solutions were leading towards "a gradual disintegration of the socialist Serbia into the borders which were neither ethical, national nor historical".³⁵ Most of the participants agreed with this view, and some went even further by claiming that "formation of six or eight independent countries on this land" can be expected.

Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy Mihailo Djurić went the furthest in this type of criticism. His case would draw the attention of the intellectual and political scene in that and the following year. On the already mentioned debate on the Faculty of Law, Djurić, in an unusually harshly intoned speech which was later published in the *Annals of the Faculty of Law* and in the *Student*, among many other things, said: "It should be clear that Yugoslavia today is only a geographic term, since on its land, or better, its ruins a few independent and even mutually confronted national states are being created... I have no intention of interceding in rescuing under any cost something that cannot be rescued and was not worth creating." On the other hand, the goal which should be set, according to Djurić, is the "identity and integrity" of the Serbian people, to be more precise, "its political, legal and state unification" because "borders of the current Federal Republic of Serbia are neither national nor historic borders of the Serbian people... Impropriety, randomness and unsustainability of these borders becomes obvious when they are regarded as borders of national states." In his speech, Djurić emphasized that, except in the case of Slovenia, for the rest of the existing re-

³³ One should bear in mind the time when the discussion was held, March of 1971, when the nationalist movement is at its peak.

³⁴ *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu*, issue 3, May - June 1971, 234-240.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 214-220.

public borders were inadequate, stressing that 40 percent of Serbs that lives outside of Serbia, and the Serbian citizens cannot act indifferent towards them, because they did not have the equal position in non of the other republics. In his mentioned speech, Djurić noted that the Serbs were unjustly accused for centralism and unitarianism, which was carried out after the war "only for preventing the question of national responsibility for genocide which was done to the Serbian people." In the end, Djurić instructed the Serbs to sober up from the "illusions of the past", and "to return to themselves, to start struggling in order to survive and to preserve their highly endangered national identity and integrity."³⁶ This speech was significant in many ways and represented the blueprint for the guidelines and outlines for the growing nationalism. According to Djurić, project of Yugoslavia was a failure on whose ruins a state should be established which would include all Serbian ethnic areas. It was a disambiguous anticipation or premonition of the dominant discourse at the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s as well as a premonition of the collective, or as he put it "national guilt" of the Croats for the genocide over the Serbs. Djurić underwent a prison sentence for a few months because of what he said then and on the occasion of demolishing the Njegoš chapel on Lovćen.

Another political prisoner from this period was also a representative of the oppositional anti-communist nationalism - bishop of Žica Vasilije Kostić,³⁷ whose incriminated speech in the village of Brezna in October 1971 pursued the re-establishment of the former monarchistic anthem "God of Justice" and fiercely condemned the regime for disregarding the church and Serbian traditions.³⁸

Nationalism of this period was also manifested in the two books published in 1971. The first one, *Power and Fears* by Dobrica Ćosić, was drawn from the market after the whole circulation was sold. It mostly contained his speeches and notes about culture and cultural politics. The underlying message of the book was the awareness of the colossal endangerment of the Serbian cultural and spiritual inheritance and the need for its unification.³⁹ That same year the book *Serbian people and its language* was published by a professor of linguistics Pavle Ivić from Novi Sad. The prominent linguist broke the taboos of the time in his book by claiming that "Serbian language is spoken by non-Serbs as well", and that "Dubrovnik, according to its language, has always been Serbian". Pavle Ivić's book propagated the renaming of the language from Serbo-Croatian into Serbian "if facts would show that the unity of the language cannot be maintained". By this, the linguistic "rebels" from the period of maspok got their counterparts among Serbian linguists.⁴⁰

On several occasions, during the stormy 1971, in *Jež* (with nationalist texts of Branislav Crnčević) and *Literary Newspapers* nationalism manifested itself, but it was less noticed.

After the shift of the Croatian leadership in December 1971, in all of Yugoslavia anti-nationalist rhetoric intensified, reaching the levels of hysteria, as some of the persecuted complained.⁴¹ Each republic was obliged to "clean its own mess", but the

³⁶ Ibid, 230-233.; Mihailo Đurić, *Izazov nihilizma - iskustvo razlike*, Beograd, 1997, 198-203.

³⁷ About his relationship with the authorities, see: Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970*. 1-2, Beograd, 2002.

³⁸ Radisav Celić, *Branio sam Vladiku žičkog dr Vasilija*, Kraljevo, 1995.17-24; *NIN*, issue 1085, October 24th. 1971., 20-21.

³⁹ Dobrica Ćosić, *Moć i istrepnje*, Beograd, 1971; *NIN*, issue 1097, 16.1.1972, 15.

⁴⁰ Pavle Ivić, *Srpski narod i njegov jezik*, Beograd, 1971; *NIN*, issue 1121, 2.7.1972, 32-34.

⁴¹ Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969-1980)*, Beograd, 2001, 75; 83; 122.

Serbian Central Committee and its president Nikezić and secretary Perović were put under the highest pressure by the rigid forces of the Party. Their manoeuvrable space was narrowing and *direct action* was sought.

The epilogue was the signing of their resignations and the shift of Serbian leadership in October 1972. What followed were thorough and deep cleansing in the Party, the media, economic collectives and cultural institutions, which were all perceived as the centers of opposition to the regime. Serbian nationalism was expelled into a deep undergrund, waiting for a moment to reappear in public.

Undoubtedly, Serbian nationalism did exist before the period discussed, but its manifestations were chaotic, individual, accidental and private in character. After 1966, Serbian nationalism acts more organized and foundations were made for its longterm practice. Even though it was pushed back into the underground again by the victory of the dogmatic course among the Serbian communists, the Serbian nationalism waits for the right moment to use its compatibility with the conservative state socialism. Their synergy, attained after the 8th session of the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Serbia in 1987, will give birth to a system for which methodologically precise and theoretically learned analysts still have not found an adequate name.

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Ilij Kalemaj

NATIONALISM AND KIN STATE POLICIES: IRREDENTISM IN SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

This paper seeks to analyze Serbian foreign policy with regard to their kin in neighboring states. Serbia has actively supported irredentism during the period that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, although with various degrees of success. Irredentism can be defined as "state support for annexing neighboring territories inhabited by ethnic kin" and is often based on prior actual or alleged historical possessions of a primordial territory that needs to be redeemed. It has been a persistent feature in the Balkans, used as an instrument by shrewd politicians to serve electoral purposes. It has been especially salient in Serbian politics, albeit to varying degrees, both across time and space. Irredentism is widely believed to be costly, as "any effort to (re)unify territories inhabited by ethnic kin will certainly antagonize neighboring states whose lands are sought."² Although many authors have offered different explanation of the causes that lead to irredentist politics and what influences it,³ little or no systematic attention has been given to the "societal ideas, interests and institutions," that "influence state behavior by shaping state preferences that is the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments."⁴ Hence, my question is: how do these societal ideas, interest and institutions shape foreign policy in regard to ethnic kin across the border. Second, why does this happens only at some periods, but not in others?

Literature Review

Serbian irredentism has been both selective and inconsistent⁵, and scholars have used different approaches to explain the underlying causes of it. Some of these authors have given priority to domestic factors in producing an aggressive foreign policy with regard to their kin abroad; others have emphasized external factors. V.P.Gagnon Jr. has explained Serbian aggression as part of a strategy pursued by Serb elites to maintain their positions as the internal threat to their position increases⁶. He argues

1 Stephen M. Saideman. *Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia*, Security Studies, Vol.7, No.3,1998. p.53

2 Stephen M. Saideman. *Irredentism and its absence: International Pressures versus Domestic Dynamics*, in Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *War and Peace in the Aftermath of Communism*, forthcoming.

3 See for example, Naomi Chazan (ed.), *Irredentism and International Politics*, Boulder, CO: L. Rienner publishers; London: Admantine Press, 1991; Stephen M. Saideman. *Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia*, Security Studies, Vol.7, No.3,1998; Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. London: University of California Press, 2000; Stephen M. Saideman. *Irredentism and its absence: International Pressures versus Domestic Dynamics*, in Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *War and Peace in the Aftermath of Communism*, forthcoming; Stephen M. Saideman and R. William Ayres, *Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses from the 1980s and 1990s*, The Journal of Politics, Vol.62, No.4. (Nov., 2000), p.1126-1144.

4 Andrew Moravcsik. *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, International Organization, Vol.51, No.4. (Autumn, 1997), p.514.

5 Saideman and Ayres, 56.

6 V. P. Gagnon, Jr. *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. P.87

That Milosevic and the ruling conservatives tried to redefine the interests of their supporters and opponents in ethnic terms; in order to reduce the risk of being voted out in the face of economic collapse'. To do so, they pursued a strategy of "demobilization," which Gagnon has described as "a process by which people who had previously been politically mobilized, or who were in the process of being mobilized, become silenced, marginalized, and excluded from the public realm."⁸ Gagnon thus focuses on domestic factors, taking a top-down approach by arguing that elites influence masses by leading or misleading them.

Gagnon's approach is in line with the general conventional wisdom that sees the elites as rational, calculating actors, who take advantage of their position in power to 'instrumentalize' the masses with a single goal in mind: retaining their positions, while gaining power and wealth in other ways. In this way, he believes that the Serbian elites provoked ethnic conflict as an effective way to remain in power.⁹ This view, however, fails to account for other independent variables that might have caused irredentism, such as: constituencies, third-party interventions or other societal factors. Another shortcoming of his theory is pointed out by Saideman, who while criticizing Gagnon's account of irredentism as "relatively consistent,"¹⁰ emphasizes the considerable variation in irredentist claims on the Serbian case.

In contrast, Saideman takes a bottom-up approach when he argues that constituencies influence political behavior and not vice-versa. He refers to "selectorates"¹¹ which in democratic systems are the core group of supporting voters for the political party in power. Thus, Saideman argues that are the interests of these constituencies which influence the decision-making of the elites and any open irredentist policies, are undertaken only with the consent and according to the wish of these voters. The politicians' main goal then becomes one of holding constituents from defecting.

*If hawkish constituents are threatening to defect, politicians depending upon them will become more assertive. If, instead, more dovish supporters threaten to abandon politicians, foreign policy will become more cooperative.*¹²

In another article, Saideman criticizes the 'vulnerability' theory of ethnic conflict¹³, which stresses that states that are prone to irredentist claims in their own territory are more reluctant in pursuing irredentist policies themselves. Rather, Saideman emphasizes the preeminence of the ethnic ties in determining policy-makers agendas¹⁴. These ethnic ties have in a way a primordial attachment to the constituencies, who in turn influence politicians.

7 Gagnon, 88.

8 See for a more elaborated account of this "demobilization" strategy at Gagnon's Introduction.

9 V. P. Gagnon Jr., *Ethnic nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia*, *International Security* 19, No.3 (winter 1994/95): 135-137. P.135.

10 Saideman, *Inconsistent Irredentism*, 60.

11 Saideman and Ayres, See for a more elaborated view on the concept of "selectorate," Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003. They argue, *inter alia*, that political survival is dependent on two fundamental groups, the Winning Coalition and the Selectorate, both drawn from the overall populace in a state. The Winning Coalition is a subset of the Selectorate, and the selectorate is a subset of the overall population. The Selectorate is simply those within the state that have a say in policy outcome.

12 Saideman, *Inconsistent Irredentism*, 63.

13 See among others, Jeffrey Herbst. *The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa*, *International Organization* 43 (4), 1989., p. 673-692.

14 Stephen M. Saideman. Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus *Ethnic Ties*, *International Organization* 51, 4, (Autumn 1997), p.725-726.

Saideman's argument is problematic for two main reasons. First, by simplifying the causes of irredentism and looking only at one independent variable, he falls short of providing a holistic, coherent framework of the variations that accompany irredentism. Second, by taking the constituents' views and feelings in regard to their ethnic kin across the borders, as inherently given, Saideman fails to recognize other potential intervening variables, such as the influences of different ideas or interests that might shape constituents' view.¹⁵

But despite their differences, what Gagnon and Saideman have in common is that both focus on internal reasons for the outbreak of ethnic conflict that brought an end to Yugoslavia. This excludes the possible impact that external factors, like the recognition of both Slovenia and Croatia by Germany in the early 1990s, might have had on the region, by leading to a new situation of a security dilemma. Or the large number of Serbian external minority that was put in jeopardy in the newly independent states, like Croatia, where the nationalizing policies of Tudjman might have been perceived as a threat to their very existence. Furthermore, such approaches seem to ignore the impact of powerful external actors, like diasporas, or the powerful leverage that International Organizations and third party interventions have on a country's foreign policy.

Other authors, such as Carment and Harvey, focus more on external factors and believe that the variations of coercion enforcement and use or lack of credible threats had a crucial impact on Serbian foreign policy. When the level of external coercion increased, backed by credible threats from international actors, Belgrade seemed to be less supportive of irredentist policies and at least in the official discourse, seemed to moderate its tone toward Serbian minorities abroad. They note, *inter alia*, that "Since the outbreak of the conflict in Bosnia, there was always much greater support to use air strikes as a negotiating "tool" to force the Serbs to the bargaining table."¹⁶ The authors also make the point that if it were not for NATO's intervention and coercion in Bosnia, "the stalemate could not have been broken and subsequently, the Dayton compromise, not achieved."¹⁷ Thus, they emphasize the external influences and third party interventions and believe that they are key limiting factors on a country's ethnic foreign policy.

'Social Informed' Irredentism and Foreign Intervention

What this paper argues is that Serbian irredentist foreign policy is neither the sole product of a single leader or of an oligarchic group of decision makers, nor of the 'dictate of the masses' at large, where the constituencies have the final say in politicians' actions. Rather, I seek to demonstrate, that there are many other factors that have been overlooked by the existing literature that may also have influenced the course of Serbian foreign policy. Drawing from Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism, the paper argues that the role of these societal ideas, interests and institutions are crucial in affecting the variation in irredentist foreign policy. This is because they serve as catalysts that convert popular dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs toward ethnic scapegoating. They are inextricably linked to each other;

¹⁵ Such intervening ideas and/or interests can be seen, when flows of ethnic kin refugees, driven away from their homes, went to find refuge at their homelands and to their surprise found themselves looked down and abused psychologically from their ethnic brethren, with whom they share ethnic ties. This was the case with Muslims going to Sarajevo, or Serbs going to Belgrade, or Croats going back to Zagreb.

¹⁶ Carment, David and Frank Harvey. *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence*. London: Praeger, 2001. p.30.

¹⁷ *Ibid* p.30.

since ideas and interests often create institutions, while institutions are in turn shaped by ideas and interests. In Serbian politics, the foundational societal ideas underlying Serbian foreign policy-making include the Načertanije draft of the 19th Century, outlined by the Foreign Minister at the time, Ilija Garašanin¹⁸, and the recent Memorandum of 1987 authored by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Academy is one of the main institutions that in the modern period has constantly influenced Belgrade politics with considerable success and has generally taken a more radical position on ethnic issues than the official stance. The Orthodox Church is another such institution that has greatly influenced Belgrade's decision-making, by sometimes pushing it over the edge on nationalist issues. While the interests are usually linked to groups close to power centers they only influence, without actively participating in decision-making. For the purposes of this paper, they fall broadly into two main categories: the Diasporas and the mafia groups¹⁹.

This paper argues that there are two main factors that acting in conjunction with one another, providing a powerful incentive for changes in foreign-policy and producing variation in irredentism. The first factor is the agenda-setting role that institutions and interest groups have while influencing political outcomes. Here, I draw on Liberal Intergovernmentalism assumptions to derive the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *If powerful societal actors (individuals, lobbies or institutions), shape foreign policy toward the ethnic kin abroad, they serve as catalyst of change in setting up agendas for the political leadership and policy-makers.*

Hypothesis 2: *Political elites in turn, face little choice but to oblige to the commitment that they have publicly endorsed, because failure to do so would result in betrayal of the "winning coalition" constituency.*

The second factor is an external one and has to do with the degree and commitment of foreign intervention in changing domestic agendas, by using both cooperation incentives, 'carrots', or coercive mechanisms, 'sticks'. The efficient use of these two constraining mechanisms, in turn provides powerful leverage for the political leadership in a given country to change the course of its foreign policy.

Hypothesis 3a: *If politicians are faced with 'weak' external threats or lack of strong incentives to cooperate, they are more dependent on the setting-agenda programs of powerful subsets of domestic society.*

Hypothesis 3b: *If politicians are faced with credible threats or powerful cooperation incentives, they tend to be cooperative and back down from escalating irredentist demands, even when these demands are required by influential societal groups or institutions.*

Analyzing the Serbian case study below will help us to test these hypotheses through empirical findings, by looking both at the internal and external dynamics that might have influenced variations in Serbian irredentism.

is See among others, Tim Judah. *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. p.59; Misha Glenny. *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books: 1992; Paulin Kola. *The Myth of Greater Albania*. New York: New York University Press, 2003. p.11.

19 Gagnon identifies three main groups that defected from "post-war power structures in Serbia: the mafias, the so-called "tycoons," and the special services unit of the State Security police." Gagnon, 129. I simplify this view by omitting the special services unit that differently from the other two groups; have been part of the formal governmental structures from the beginning. My interests here, lies with the groups that at least formally, have not been part of the system. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that these groups often worked in conjunction with each other and some of the underworld crime barons, used to serve in the special Units previously.

The Serbian Case: the Internal Factors

Ideas, interests and institutions, often linked inextricably with one another, often dictated the course of Serbia's irredentism by setting, shaping and influencing the political agendas of the elites. Rationalists tend to have a kind of primordial view of interests, by taking them as a given or constant. These interests arise from: *"some structural logic of a situation, usually economic, but interests can also derive from beliefs, which shape a preference, thus an interest. Interests drive preferences, which in turn drive the creation of institutions: since everyone understands that institutional arrangements influence outcomes, everyone will work to get the institutional pattern that increases their chances of victory."*²⁰

By holding interests as given and driven by materialistic as well as ideational beliefs, and how in turn they shape preferences, which may create institutions, one may argue that politicians, as rational players, are well aware of how to make use of this 'chain or reaction' to serve their own ends. Nevertheless, we might also argue that caught in such a 'societal web', politicians have little choice but to work within their domestic environment; making them subject to certain 'rules of the game'. Turning now to the Serbian case, we will look at the role of ideas, institutions and interests interchangeably²¹, as a means of testing our hypotheses.

In the case of Serbia, the role of ideas is mostly connected to the variations of Načertanije idea that has always been a feature of Serbian identity politics starting with the reign of Dušan Mugoša. As Tim Judah writes:

In the wake of the wreckage left behind by contemporary Serbian nationalism, Načertanije is a crucial link in understanding the development of the national idea. It is the document that synthesizes centuries of Serbian dreams as preserved by the church and epic poetry and formulates them into a statement of modern nationalism.

*"In the wake of the wreckage left behind by contemporary Serbian nationalism, Načertanije is a crucial link in understanding the development of the national idea. It is the document that synthesizes centuries of Serbian dreams as preserved by the church and epic poetry and formulates them into a statement of modern nationalism."*²²

In more recent times, ideas similar to Načertanije have gained prominence in Serbian politics with the notorious *Memorandum* of 1987 that served as a blueprint for Serbian nationalist politicians for years to come. The *Memorandum*, which was drafted and presented to the Serbian government in 1985, but leaked to the press only a year later, made possible the starting point from Yugoslav communism toward ever increasing rhetoric on Serbian nationalism.²³ One of the inspiring figures behind the infamous *Memorandum* of 1986 was Vasa Čubrilović, one of the oldest and more persistent Serbian nationalists.²⁴ Čubrilović, an early "conspirator in the 1914 assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand..., re-emerged as an advisor to the royal Yugoslav government, from which position he authored the 1937 official govern-

20 Peter Gourevitch. *Domestic Politics and IR*, in Handbook of IR, p.312.

21 I am making this point, because it is often hard to separate ideas such as Načertanije, Čubrilović's *Memorandum* of 1937 or the more recent memorandum of 1987 from institutions that have produced them, such as the Academy of Science or institutions that have played a prominent role in distributing them, such as The Orthodox Church.

22 Tim Judah. *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, p.59

23 Robert Stallaerts, *The Disintegration of the Yugoslav Intellectual Community, in Secession, History and the Social Sciences*. Bruno Coppetiers and Michel Huysseune eds., Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press, 2002. Retrieved from: poli.vub.ac.be/publi/orderbooks/secession/secession-05.pdf

24 Philip J. Cohen. *The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals*, in *This Time We Knew*, in Thomas Cushman and Stepan G. Meštrović (eds), New York: New York University Press, 1996, P.39-40

Merit memorandum 'The Expulsion of the Albanians', which began by citing Hitler's and Stalin's success in expelling Jews and others as examples for Serbia to emulate."²⁵ Čubrilović held several important governmental posts during Tito's Communist regime,²⁶ which is "a remarkable testimony to the moral flexibility of the communist regime." But Čubrilović was not the only distinguished member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science at the time.

Another distinguished member that was a fervent advocate of Greater Serbia is Dobriša Ćosić, who back in the 1960s was among the first to articulate the enduring pain and long suffering of the Serbian people, claiming that the "Serbs were being exploited and denigrated by other Yugoslav nationalities."²⁷ Therefore, he called for the Serbs to "rise and destroy the multi-national Yugoslav state to fulfill the old historical goal and national ideal' of a Greater Serbia."²⁸ What is especially puzzling about this kind of rhetoric, during communist period was that despite the fact that Serbs were in the highest echelons of power throughout Yugoslavia, often disproportionately to their numbers, is that prominent Serbian intellectuals, such as Čubrilović or Ćosić were not purged, persecuted and imprisoned for expressing such views in public,²⁹ although they were in stark contrast with Marxist and Communist ideology. These individuals have been persistent in their nationalist rhetoric, albeit the conditions were such that they could not get enough media coverage under the Titoist regime to make their views influential with the Serbian public. Thus, they waited until the conditions were ripe for these ideas to materialize and, in a way, to become institutionalized.

Their Memorandum "drew up a blueprint of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia that would include Serbia, Montenegro, much of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the predominantly Serb areas of Croatia, but would exclude Macedonia, Slovenia, most of Croatia, and would cede part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia as compensation."³⁰ Hence, it created a new climate and gave rise to a new societal discourse, which in turn influenced the mainstream political discourse and heavily influenced the course of policy-making in Serbia. Most importantly, it furnished a ready-made agenda to Milošević, who based his political rhetoric and future career on exactly the outline that the Memorandum provided. The Memorandum provided "a role awaiting a leader, a program awaiting an executor,"³¹ and almost a year later, Milošević would step forward to carry out the program spelled out in it. He was able to oust Stambolić, by 'ethnically outbidding' him³² and gain a strong foothold in Serbian politics because of kin-related issues that did not threaten or influence his domestic constituency directly. The interests are

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

²⁷ Quoted in Sabrina P. Ramet. *Balkan Babel*. Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002, p.19

²⁸ Quoted in Cohen, 40.

²⁹ RoyGutman argues *inter alia*, that the mere possession of a "Croatian" dictionary- rather than a "Serbo-Croatian" dictionary, was reason for imprisonment in Yugoslavia. See Roy Gutman, "Serb Author Lit Balkan Powder Keg," *Newsday*, June 28, 1992, 1.

³⁰ Saideman, 56.

³¹ Ramet, 20. Here, Ramet uses a phrase first coined by Egyptian President Nasser, to describe the opportunist goals of Milošević who found a ready made agenda to push forward his political ambitions.

³² Stambolić was the first that had argued that a "unified and strong Serbia" was a prerequisite for a strong Yugoslavia, but Milošević proved himself abler in seizing up the political opportunity for radicalizing the Nationalistic rhetoric. See Ramet, 35.

equally salient in influencing irredentist policy drives. Interests can also be closely linked to ideas and institutions that influence nationalist politics and irredentist policies. For example:

*In 1987, the memorandum was circulated worldwide to Serbian emigre communities; it mobilized their support for Serbia's national and territorial goals, which were justified by the Serbs' alleged victimization in Yugoslavia, while making no mention of the sufferings of other national groups at Serbian hands. In practical terms, the memorandum helped standardize the rhetoric by which the Serbian emigration would rally to defend Serbia once the war began.*³³

Interests are usually put forward by 'cluster groups'³⁴ within the society, who tend to view their own interests as undistinguishable from those of the state. For the purposes of this paper, I emphasize two such groups: the Diasporas and the mafia groups.³⁵ These groups provided critical support for the political elites and were usually seen as radicals and hawkish in regard of foreign policy goals. What these groups sought to gain in exchange, for all this 'service' is accommodation in the highest echelons of the society and a position of prominence in shaping the political discourse.

The Serbian Diaspora was at first latent, but in the context of Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Croatia, rose to prominence quickly, especially in the United States³⁶. Brad K Blitz gives a colorful and lively picture of the Serbian diaspora and the influence that it wanted to have, as they formed their lobby groups. Although prior to the Serb aggression in Yugoslavia, they "had little tradition of political organization," the Serbian diaspora was quick to organize itself, around the leadership of Senator Helen Delich Bentley³⁷. Blitz draws a parallel between Serbian rising irredentism and the radicalization of the diasporas' language.

*The Ultranationalist and xenophobic sentiments of Serbian leaders in Pale and Belgrade were exported to the United States through two principal carriers. The first was politicians and emissaries who traveled between North America and the former Yugoslavia. The second was the Serbian Orthodox Church. In effect, the Serbian diaspora was mobilized through similar community and institutional structures that had so successfully marshaled the Serbian public behind the nationalist agenda in Milošević's Yugoslavia.*³⁸

Another important element was the reinforcing role that pre-existing institutions, such as the Orthodox Church, had in serving to the new emerging diaspora, by blessing their activities and adding prominence to nationalistic support for Milošević's regime. Thus, "the Orthodox Church and the Serbian polity, both in the former Yugoslavia and in the diaspora, were firmly united."³⁹

The underworld crime figures and state security apparatus were often inextricably linked together during Milošević's 'reign of terror' and often proved to be challenging distinguishing the two of them. Such were for example the members of the infamous 'Zemun gang' whose leader Legija⁴⁰, is widely believed to have been the masterminder

33 Cohen, 39.

34 By this I mean groups, whose members are linked inextricably to one another and have a modus operandi that distinguishes them from the society at large.

35 The mafia groups were often part of government structures as well, as will be further argued below.

36 In my opinion, this is mostly due to the flexibilities of the lobbying opportunities that the American politician system allows and encourages.

37 Senator Bentley was at the time, the most prominent Serbian diaspora leader in the US and also the only high American politician with Serbian origin. See for more, Brad K. Blitz. "Serbia's War Lobby," in *This Time We Knew*, in Thomas Cushman and Stepan G. Meštrović (eds), New York: New York University Press, 1996. p.196

38 Ibid

39 Blitz, 202.

40 Legija is his nickname, meaning 'the Legionnaire' in English.

behind the assassination of the prime minister, Zoran Djindjić and has an arrest warrant on him, although he remains at large. This dominant criminal clan of the Serbian underworld "includes many former paramilitaries who fought for the nationalist Milosevic in the Balkan wars of Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo."⁴² They were often given "free hand in drug trafficking" from Milosevic and their illicit activities and "crimes also include kidnapping, murder, and the smuggling of cigarettes, arms, and people."⁴³ The power of these organized crime group was therefore considerable and they provided critical support for Milosević's regime, which in turn allowed them to freely pursue their interests. When Milošević, fearing the consolidation of these crime groups that in a way were restraining his authority and becoming a liability, tried to end their influence, through the use of intimidation and coercion, they shifted their loyalties and gave critical support to the opposition.⁴⁴ After the opposition came to power in 2000 and tried to meet the Western demands of submitting war criminals and fighting organized crime, these ex-military officers, turned in crime lords fiercely resisted the new governments actions, by threatening, intimidating and even killing prominent political figures, such as Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjić. Nevertheless, the new government that succeeded Djindjić tried to take decisive action against this "mighty 'war lobby' that once surrounded former president Slobodan Milošević, and which on March 12 murdered Djindjić in a desperate attempt to arrest the country's democratization and its policy of cooperation with the war crimes tribunal."⁴⁵

Foreign Intervention: 'Sticks' or 'Carrots'?

Foreign intervention can have a direct or indirect impact on the foreign policies of a country, depending on timing, interest and determination of the third parties involved. Two of the most common policy tools that states or international organizations use, are cooperative or coercion mechanisms in influencing desirable policy outcomes. These tools, commonly referred as 'carrots' and 'sticks', can provide powerful incentives for political leaders to alter their political agendas, according to the degree of benefits or threats that such tools provide. Carment and Harvey point to the effects of "coercive diplomacy," which "includes a full range of political, diplomatic, and military instruments."⁴⁶ A state may not be able to use all of these mechanisms at the same time, nevertheless: "*there are instances when, with the appropriate major power backing and organizational support, state violence has been reduced, conflict ameliorated, and crises managed. These are instances when the possibility of uncontrolled violence is sufficient for the Western powers to feel compelled to support the use of force.*"⁴⁷

⁴¹ For references to this, see, for example John Philips, "In Serbia, prime minister's slaying triggers mafia roundup," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 25, 2003. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0325/p07s02-woeu.html> (accessed April 3, 2007).

⁴² *Ibid*

⁴³ *Ibid*

⁴⁴ See among others Gagnon, 130; Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radonavic. *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*. New York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2003. pp.27-30.

⁴⁵ Bojan Dimitrijevic and Daniel Sunter, *Serbia: Red Berets Disbanded*, International War and Peace Reporting Balkans Crisis Report, March 27, 2003. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200303_418_2_eng.txt (accessed April 4, 2007).

⁴⁶ Carment and Harvey, 25.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*

This sounds like a logical argument, but one can always argue the opposite, by stressing the inability or unwillingness of the West to intervene in a timely fashion to avoid bloodshed. Before proceeding further, I want to first note the distinction between economic and military sanctions, as they are different in nature and therefore they bear different economic and political costs. Clifton Morgan and Schwebach capture this element well when they note that: "economic sanctions provide a bargaining advantage to the sanctioner by leading to a favorable outcome without having to resort to the use of force."⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the Serbian case does not follow this pattern, because the economic sanctions, most importantly those of the UN embargo, did not prove to be a strong deterrent in stopping Milošević's pursuit of a 'Greater Serbia', by supporting Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia and Croatia. This, however, does not exclude the advantage that the sanctioner enjoys, which on the other hand, might decrease, if the costs of the parties that impose such sanctions increases. The result is a bargaining game, where these sanctioners should impose strong sanctions only when "there is a fair chance that they would work."⁴⁹

There are three significant interventions into the Yugoslav conflict, as Western governments tried to prevent and punish the Serbs for their aggressive irredentist policies. One was the European Union intervention, mostly driven by Germany's strong interests in the region, which led to the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The second was the Russian intervention, which was significant, considering Russia's position in such important bodies, such as the UN Security Council. And the third such intervention came from the concerted efforts of United Nations, under the leadership of the United States, which sought to bring the conflict to an end by various means.

The Yugoslav conflict gained salience in the eyes of European foreign policy elites only in 1991, after Milošević had already radicalized his political rhetoric in his "use of ethnic identities to gain and maintain his position."⁵⁰ Milošević's language served to fuel the fears of Croatia and Slovenia, which chose to secede in June 1991.⁵¹ In their road to declaring independence from Yugoslavia, they were met with the enthusiastic support of the European Union, led by Germany.⁵² This made the Serbs increasingly suspicious of European Union in general and Germany in particular, since Germany had always been seen as having a strong bias against the Serbs and historically as the protector of Catholic Croats and Slovenes. The United States in the meantime had maintained an ambivalent position, supporting first the maintenance of the federal system, shifting only gradually toward a vocal condemnation of the Serbs and support for the newly independent republics. But even when U.S. policy had shifted toward open condemnation of Serb atrocities and Serbian state support for them, it was still reluctant to send ground troops into the conflict, which made Great Britain and France not only critical of United States' policy, but also decisions of withdrawing their troops as well.⁵³ The West's failure to act as a coherent body is well captured by Jean Baudrillard when he writes that: "The West's military inability to react to Serb aggression

⁴⁸ T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach. *Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises*, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.41, No.1. (March, 1997). P.30

⁴⁹ Ibid. For a well-argued view on the effectiveness of the use of sanctions, see Clifton Morgan and Schwebach text (reference above).

⁵⁰ Saideman, *Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts: Vulnerability Versus Ethnic Ties*, 741.

⁵¹ Ibid

⁵² Only Macedonia's paradoxically peaceful secession was met with skepticism and not recognized by the European Union, because of Greece's strong opposition of its name.

⁵³ For more on this issue, see Ramet, 214.

Equaled by its inability to put the life of a single soldier at risk."⁵⁴ Whereas the UN was committed to provide security for the people, but it still operated in "state-centric terms," under which ensuring human security meant "saving failed states."⁵⁵

Russia's position vis a vis their Serb 'protegees' was an ambivalent as well, especially in regard to the war in Bosnia, whereas in the Croatian case they proved to be more critical of the Serbs. Russia's foreign policy in this period was deeply divided between "the desire to reinforce its rewarding relationship with the West and its confessionally rooted affinity for the Serbs."⁵⁶ In this light, we may interpret both Russia's support for the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia in 1992 and the Russian parliament 1993 adoption of "a resolution calling on the government to use its Security Council veto to block any proposed U.N. military action against Bosnian Serbs."

The seeming ambivalence of the West in imposing sanctions and using strongly the language of coercion in the first stages of the war made Milošević more willing to ignore the West's rhetoric, focusing instead on domestic politics, trying to secure a strong foundation for his regime. In the meantime, the mood of Serbian elites and various segments of society were increasingly supportive of Serbian irredentist policies, inciting Milošević to pursue an aggressive policy toward Serbian nationals abroad. A critical link between the desires of powerful institutions in Serbia, such as the Orthodox Church and Serbian state-led irredentism can be seen for example, on June 28, 1989, when three main events happened simultaneously. This was six hundredth anniversary of the Serbs' defeat by the Turks at Kosovo Polje. On this date, Milošević's showed his commitment to Kosovo and Serbian 'cause' proclaiming that: "the Serbs throughout their history never conquered or exploited anybody else."⁵⁷ Also, on the same day, the Krajina Serbs raised the demand for "their autonomous province..., with the encouragement of the Serbian government."⁵⁸ On the same day the Serbian Orthodox Church issued its official national program, which echoed the 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, as well as official documents of the Communist Party and the Yugoslav state apparatus. This manifesto, known as the "Proposed Serbian Church National Program," praised Serbia's decision to unilaterally terminate the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Restating a central theme of the Academy's memorandum, the church document portrayed an aggrieved and oppressed Serbia, and it further praised Slobodan Milošević for beginning to right the alleged historical wrongs against Serbia.⁵⁹

It seems too strange to be only sheer coincidence for these three salient and disconnected events to be happening simultaneously. They look more like a concerted effort from selective subsets of the society to channel popular discontent toward aggressive politics in relation to the 'national question' and political leaders, such as

54 Jean Baudrillard. *When the West Stands In for the Dead*, in *This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia*, Thomas Cushman and Stepjan G. Meštrović (eds.), New York: New York University Press, 1996, p.87.

55 For an elaborated discussion of this issue, see Gerald Halman and Steven Ratner, *Saving Failed States*, Foreign Policy 89 (winter 1992-93): 3-20.

56 Ibid

57 Cohen, 41.

58 Ibid

59 Ibid

Milošević to make use of such ready made agendas, which he shrewdly used. In addition, the lack of international coercion, and the material support from traditional allies such as Russia⁶⁰ made Milosevic more determinant in openly pursuing his irredentist agenda undisturbed. Bogdan Denitch points out "that protests alone could not stop Serbian repression in Kosovo or aggression against Croatia and Bosnia: they were not backed up with sufficient credible threats of sanctions."⁶¹

On the other hand, when the threat of forceful intervention was backed by credible threats and strong commitment and determinacy from the international community acting in a coherent way, the Serbian leadership tended to take these threats seriously, scale down its irredentist rhetoric, and minimize its support to ethnic kin in Croatia and Bosnia. When the cost of opposing the increasing build-up of foreign intervention became unbearable, "Milošević even engaged in sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs to force them to the table."⁶² This was made possible by NATO large-scale bombing "against the communications centers of the Bosnian Serbs, which finally made it clear that the days of bluffing, were over,"⁶³ and made possible a Croatian and Bosnian counter-offensive against the Serbian troops. "NATO suffered almost no losses and could clearly bomb at will. Therefore, overblown rhetoric and posturing about defying an unjust and anti-Serbian world community was finished."⁶⁴ It clearly showed that Milošević could understand "only the language of force," as ex-U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once said.⁶⁵ This is why, air strikes were often seen as a "negotiation tool to force the Serbs to the bargaining table."⁶⁶ Saideman and Ayres make the point that international pressures matter "only when actual costs accrued. Threats by themselves were unable to 'shake' Milošević; "instead, it was the actual impact of sanctions over the course of time that wore him down."⁶⁷

Conclusion

This paper identifies the primary determinants of irredentism, by looking at it from a rather different perspective than is often the case in the existing literature. Instead of seeing irredentist foreign policies as simply instrumentalized by the political leadership as a function of primordial ties of 'selectorates', it discerns other possible factors that affected, altered or influenced policy outcomes in the Serbian case. Drawing insights from Moravscik's liberal intergovernmentalist theory and applying them here to analyze the impact of the societal factors on foreign-policy agendas, I argue that ideas, institutions and interests played an important role in shaping leaders' thinking and

60 For an estimate of Russian military help, see for example Ramet, 215.

61 Denitch, 210.

62 Saideman and Ayres, 58.

63 Bogdan Denitch. *Ethnic Nationalism: the Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1997, p.208

64 Ibid

65 Quoted in Carment and Harvey, 32.

66 Carment and Harvey, 30.

67 Saideman and Ayres, 76.

future plans. These may be caught in an intrinsic web and hence, sometimes it can be difficult telling one from the other. But in conjunction with one another, they provide strong supporting networks, which can be indispensable for political leaders. Thus, the salience of societal actors and institutions in influencing policy-making, through their material and ideational support is not only critical for the survival of a semi-dictatorial regime, as in the case of Serbia; it is often also determinant in predicting the timing of such influence. *Ergo*, it can explain not only how, but also why the interested societal parties are more willing to support certain policies, like irredentism, at certain times but not others. In exchange for this 'service' to the political elites, certain individuals, groups or institutions are rewarded by a position of eminence in the society and influence in decision-making stake.

Third party intervention may prove equally important in influencing policy outcomes and restraining aggressive intervention on behalf of the kin, as was the case with Serbia, if they show the willingness and persistence to do so.⁶⁸ Empirical findings have shown that when international community speaks with a single voice and threats are made credible, by imposing harsh sanctions, chauvinist leaders, like Milosevic, tend to understand the "language of force" and scale down their support of irredentism. However, when such threats remain largely rhetorical and lack coercive mechanisms, they fail to convince the aggressors of the resolute intent of the foreign intervention, thus enabling them to focus their concentration solely on the pursuit of their political agendas. Since the radicalization of language in the meantime, has already been in crescent⁶⁹, this leads to an 'ethnic outbidding' in internal politics, where the politicians in power, seek to retain their offices by strongly relying on societal subsets, which have the ways and means of channeling popular discontent in support of higher levels of irredentist policies as a way to come together in difficult times. Therefore, the degree and scale of foreign intervention is crucial in determining the reliance of political leaders on domestic or international agendas.

⁶⁸ Carment and James depict a clear picture of the first UN Resolution to impose the harshest economic sanctions if President Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leadership failed to accept the "Vance-Owen" plan "that would have seen Bosnia organized into a decentralized federation." But the Serbs did not take these threats seriously and were even harassing UN officials on the ground. Only when these threats persisted, instead of fading with the time, did the Serbs reconsider their position and return to the negotiation table. See for more, Carment and James, 49-51.

⁶⁹ This happens because the politicians seek to maintain power, even in face of economic deprivation and international isolation. In order to do so, they radicalize their rhetoric and label the opponents as serving foreign interest that go against their country. This in turn forces the opposition to strongly support nationalistic rhetoric as well, which basically favors the ruling elites, because they have first started it. For more on ethnic outbidding, see Aluinyand Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Politics in Plural Societies: a Theory of Democratic Instability* Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972; Donald L. Horowitz. *Ethnic Groups in conflict* London: University of California Press, 2000.

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Janus Pintarič

NATIONALISM IN SLOVENIA

A BRIEF HISTORY OF NATIONALISM IN SLOVENIA - FROM 19th CENTURY UNTIL MODERN DAY

1848 and Rise of Nationalism in Slovenia

For many Slovenian people 1848 is the year when Slovenian nation was born. This year also marks the beginning of Slovenian nationalism although some of the ideas on which Slovenian nationalism was based are from period of what is known in Slovenian history as "national awakening", which started at the end of 18th century in the age of enlightenment.

In April that year, Slovenian students in Vienna formed a political movement named »Slovenija«, later similar movements were formed in Graz, Celovec and Ljubljana. The goal of this movements was to unite Slovenian intellectuals and to present Slovenian political demands. It is also worth mentioning that in this year the term "Slovenia" was first used in political terms.

After the 1848 liberal-bourgeoisie revolution in Austria-Hungary, many nations in A-H empire saw their opportunity to gain more national freedom and independence. Slovenian intellectuals came up with the first Slovenian national-political program called "Zedinjena Slovenija" (Unified Slovenia) which claimed that Slovenians living in duchies of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola and Slovenian regions Primorska, Istra and Prekmurje should be united in »Kingdom of Slovenia« under Austria-Hungary and that Slovenian language should be treated equally as other languages.

However "Unified Slovenia" program failed, mostly because it was too foreign to bourgeoisie and more important to foreign to Slovenian peasants, who were at that time the backbone of Slovenian nation. Slovenian students in Austria and intellectuals weren't connected enough with those 2 classes of Slovenian population, also they didn't have military power to back up their demands. Slovenian politicians were divided into several different camps and didn't help to make »Unified Slovenia« possible as well.

It is important to note that Slovenian nationalism at that time was very different than nationalism in Slovenia today, it had many pan-Slavic ideas which were popular at that time as a form to oppose germanization of Slovenia which was taking place here for centuries as Slovenia was under German rule. Also Slovenians got many symbols at that time, including flag in pan-Slavic colors red, blue and white. We can say that in first part of 19th century Slovenian identity as we know it today was formed.

2nd Half of 19th Century - 1914

After Baron Alexander von Bach managed to suppress all revolutionary ideas and instituted a system of centralised control, Slovenian nationalism was more present in culture than in politics. Several organizations and movements were formed which helped to teach Slovenians about their culture and language. Most notable were so called "tabori" (literal translation "camps") which were some kind of meetings of Slovenians where they discussed different issues, most of them were about Slovenia and Slovenians. Nationalists realised that they should spread their ideas more between peasants who formed majority of Slovenian population and were also very patriotic.

WWI, SHS State, Kingdom of Yugoslavia

In WWI Slovenians were fighting for Austria-Hungarian empire, after the empire collapsed, Slovenian nationalism began to rise again based on the ideas from 19th century about united Slovenia. After WWI Slovenians fought against Austrians and freed most of the Slovenian parts of Carinthia and Styria which were under Austrian occupation and also the region of Prekmurje which was under Hungarian rule for 1000 years. Mostly due to pan-Slavic influence in Slovenian nationalism, Slovenians mostly accepted the new SHS state (the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians) and later Kingdom of Yugoslavia in which Slovenians lived together with other southern Slavs.

WWII, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, War of Independence

During WWII, Slovenians were divided into two parts, one supporting the partisan movement and others who were collaborating with occupation forces called »Domobranci« (Home guards), most of Home guards were executed after the war by communists. After the war, Slovenia was one of the republics in socialist Yugoslavia and the program of Unified Slovenia from 19th century was fulfilled to some terms, except that instead of being part of Austria, Slovenia was under Yugoslavia. In socialist Yugoslavia, nationalists were very few in numbers, but nationalistic ideas developed more and more over the years, as Yugoslavia was in crisis and the reason for its destruction were among other things also nationalisms of its nations.

Modern Day Slovenian Nationalism

Nationalism in modern day Slovenia is quite different from 19th century Slovenian nationalism and in fact has very few similarities. However it is important to note that the term *Slovenian nationalism* includes a wide range of people with different political beliefs, from ordinary right-wing patriots to neo-Nazis. While nationalism in 1848 was very pan-Slavic, most of today's nationalists here are rather against southern Slavs, since most of Slovenian immigrants come from countries of ex-Yugoslavia (many of them came during the time Slovenia was still under Yugoslavia, others came after Balkan wars). In general nationalists have a different view on Slovenian identity than Slovenians in 19th century and even in some ways different view on what is Slovenian than majority of non-nationalist Slovenians.

This is mostly due to all kinds of historical revisionism by nationalists, the most notable is claiming that ancestors of Slovenians weren't Slavic people who came to Slovenia in 6th century, but ancient tribe *Veneti* which lived here centuries before. The main reason why this theory is so popular is in my opinion that nationalists want to distance themselves from other southern Slavs and deny any common origin with immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia. The most widely accepted symbol of Slovenian nationalism is no longer red, blue and white flag, but black panther on a white field, which was a symbol of ancient Slovenian state of Carantania. This has again much to do with historical revisionism, since the official Slovenian history doesn't accept panther as a Slovenian symbol as it dates from the time when Carantania was under German rule.

There are many other kinds of historical revisionism in Slovenia too, some nationalists believe that Domobranci (Home guards) who collaborated with Germans and Italians in WWII were in fact the »good guys« who were fighting against Communist oppression and for freedom of Slovenians. This ideas are also accepted by some non-nationalists, mostly by Catholics, because the bishop Rožman in Ljubljana supported collaboration with Italians. In general, Slovenian nationalism today goes hand in hand with historical revisionism, probably more than in any other European country.

Vedran Obućina

ALTERNATIVES TO ETHNIC NATIONALISM

Introduction

Setting an alternative to ethnic nationalism always draws the question of the alternative to the nation. That is why it is questionable whether an efficient post national identity can be created within any country, and especially in the Balkans region. This paper explores several possibilities using a descriptive method. Firstly, it provides an overview of what nation and nationalism represent, as modern theorists understand them. It also explains the alternatives, derived from the theories of modernism and postmodernism, and applies them to the countries of the so-called "West Balkan Region". The paper provides two guidelines in its conclusion, which these countries should follow, but it is open for discussion.

1. The Theoretic Framework: Nation and Nationalism

The modern phenomenon of nationalism in Europe was not dependant on the civil revolutions in France and America. What is more, in the great empires of the "ancien regime", the revolutionary movements (not necessarily civil) appeared chronologically and a century later. The great revolution of 1848 led to the "awakening of the national conscience" of the peoples in the Habsburg monarchy; the young Turkish movement demolished the foundations of the Miletus Ottoman empire in 1905, and the huge Russian empire collapsed under the surges of the February and the October revolutions as late as 1917. In the regions of today's transitional countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, these national movements were not characterized solely by the notions of a civil nationalistic subversion of pre modern aristocratic regimes. The middle-class in those countries was still in its infancy.¹ There was ethnic nationalism in the core of the nationalist movement which favored ethnicity and not the principles of modernism. Within this ethnicity, for centuries there were primordial and perennial stories about the "people", known today as the "nation". According to the modern understanding, nations are a product of nationalism, and not the other way around. Nationalism serves the needs of social and political development, or "national development" in other words. Theorists of national development regard nations as territorial political communities, sovereign, with distinct borders and cohesive in their essence, that they are the primary political connection and the main object of loyalty of its citizens. Nations are the chief international players, the constructs of their citizens, and especially their leaders and intellectual elites, the sole scope of social and political development. The elements of national development vary, but all theorists agree that every element accomplishes its goal. Classic modernism perceives the nation as a modern phenomenon, created after civil revolutions and are a product of modernity. They are not rooted in history; they are a consequence of the aforementioned revolutions. Nationalism is a modern movement as well. They are manufactured products of the elite, established in communication.

¹ For instance, in the countries of the Balkans region, peasants were considered the "true" representatives of the people, and the oppressors were the foreigners living in the cities. In Croatia, a strong political movement was the Croatian Right Bloc and on its foundations a peasant's movement for national liberation opposed to German, Hungarian and Italian rulers. A nationalistic, conservative and patriarchal movement of followers of tradition and a country way of life called "ognjištar" (derived from the novel 'Ognjište' by Mile Budak) developed on these foundations.

Anthony D. Smith lists the doctrines of nationalism (Smith 2003: 191):

1. The world is naturally divided into nations, all of which have a special character and fate;
2. The nation is the source of all the political power, and loyalty to it is greater than all others;
3. If the citizens wish to be free and prosperous, they have to identify themselves with The nation and belong to it;
4. Global freedom and peace are the functions of liberation and security of all nations;
5. Nations can be liberated and realized only in their own sovereign states.

It is worth noting that most of the modern theorists easily use ethnicity and nationality interchangeably. The basic difference between these two terms is that ethnicity refers to a cultural community which does not wish to be realized in its own state, but accepts the government of the state the community is in (for instance, Laplanders in Scandinavian countries). On the other hand, a nation expresses itself in the form of a state, a national state in which it is realized. A nation always aspires towards founding its own state, if it does not already exist. There is a great division among the theorists who believe that the nation is an older term than nationalism and those who consider the nation a product of nationalism. Some, Adrian Hastings for instance, place the creation of the nation in the Middle Ages, the time when the Bible was translated into English (Hastings, 2003). Even though it is Anglo centric, this perception of the nation (*natio*) in contrast to the people or the masses (*gens*) is also characteristic of B. Anderson (Anderson, 1990) and partially to L. Greenfeld (Greenfeld, 1992), who contradict the classic theorists of modernism according to whom a nation is a product of nationalism, a movement and ideology agreed to have originated in the 18th century, after the French revolution. Regardless of later interpretations that there is civil and ethnic nationalism, the difference is in fact vague and meaningless, because the everyday European politics proved to be the same in Eastern as well as in Western Europe.² After all, in the so-called "western, political" and "eastern, genealogical" types of nationalism (the typology which was produced by Hans Kohn after WWII, (Kohn, 1955) a strong primordial code is present, full of ethno symbolism developed by Anthony Smith in his classic (Smith, 2003). In the end, any member of a European nation, west European or east European, is preordained by race (white), religion (Christian), and even ethnicity (Breton, but French; English, but Briton). Citizenship and nationality do not, apparently, make a person a member of a nation, even in "civil" nationalism which should not be based on ethnicity. It should be noted that nationalism is possible in its entirety only with the manifestation of liberalism and establishment of democracy. Although it seems incomprehensible, nationalism is the main agitator of modern revolutions and the destroyer of old aristocratic regimes through the whole 18th century, and even today. The year of 1990 itself, can be seen as a nationalist revolution with a purpose of liberation of the peoples³ and a re-construction of a nation.⁴

² A significant increase of the extreme right wing in Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, but also in Greece, Poland and Slovenia, proves this claim.

³ *Gens*, but primarily the liberation from the class system, because class, and especially the working class, was most important in communist countries.

⁴ *Gens*, but primarily the liberation from the class system, because class, and especially the working class, was Most important in communist countries.

The question whether the nation is a modern phenomenon or not, may occupy political and social scientists, but the nationalists themselves readily provide the answer. According to them, the nation is primeval. The theory of politics maintains its tendencies towards a nation-state, a phenomenon which governs the world today. In practice, however, one's own ethnic or national tradition is extremely important, it is rooted and primordial and has a historic role, ever more historic than that of the neighboring peoples. That is perennialism, the idea that the nation is everlasting, that it originates from the dawn of history and that it is not much different from ethnicity. According to that theory, the nation is primordial, which could in one version mean that the members of the nation are biologically related, that there is a national blood even, or in a milder version, that they are connected by race, language, religion and customs without much division (the nationalists use the variables for ethnic and religious segregation). Besides, according to perennialists, the nation is primeval, rooted, organic, seamless, national, founded in the origins. This leads to exclusion, to revisionism of historic goals and desires that are interpreted as "higher, national" goals. This also leads to secessionism, internal struggles, and in Europe, there were many international conflicts and terrorism acts originating from these problems. As such, it is not ready for cooperation which is especially emphasized in the European Union, usually seen as a "union of nations". Revolutions are given birth in blood, but prosperity is given birth by evolution. Therefore, this kind of flourishing nationalism needs an alternative.

2. Alternatives to Ethnic Nationalism in the Balkans

Alternative digressions from the primordial and perennial conception of nationalism founded on ethnic exclusion would improve the political, social and cultural situation in the transitional countries of Europe. As genealogical nationalism is present in these countries, the alternatives have to be developed from the ethnicity itself, and not from somewhere else. As these countries rarely have an ethnically homogenous population, other possible governing solutions should be researched in order to neutralize the negative consequences of ethnic nationalism. These models could be consociate democracy, federalism, multiculturalism, intercultural and trans-cultural models of the culture policies of countries, supranationalism as promoted by the European Union, and other post national constellations.

Perennial nationalism, related to ethno symbolism rooted in music, customs and every day life, is present to a great extent in the countries in the Balkans, as in other European countries of „new democracy”.⁵ Having that in mind, approaches to reconciliation and cessation of revisionist, separatist and nationalist aspirations are very difficult to realize. Nevertheless, there is much room for alternate possibilities. They originate from the fact that nationalism is always hostile towards the nearest neighboring countries. The question of the alternative to violent nationalism springs right there, in the neighboring countries. That is also the point of the Canadian multiculturalist W. Kymlicka who talks about „soft-nation” building (Kymlicka, 2003), a model that considers the official culture non-ethnic, and for which it conditions groups for political selfdefinition and looks for intelligent, but difficult compromises between neighbors or territorially interconnected ethnic communities. In the Balkans, the situati-

⁵ Especially in Poland, a country practically without a leftist oriented party, and every attempt of representing socialist ideals, is obstructed by the Polish Constitution which strictly prohibits communist parties. Communitarism is in Poland, on the other hand, especially strong, but incorporated into right-wing and even extremely right-wing parties, and into the Catholic Church which resists liberalization, even the guidelines Provided by the Vatican.

ation ended in ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the moral obligation of a person towards others decreases proportionally as the distance between them increases.

The alternatives which I will briefly explain, and apply in this paper to the region of former Yugoslavia, are brought together in the following groups: cosmopolitanism, approaches to cultural diversity, the division of power, postnational constellations and liberal nationalism.

a) Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism may be best defined by its relation towards universalism and nationalism (Beck, 2006). A universalistic approach acknowledges and develops universal standards through which it will apply a unique approach to all. Nationalism, on the other hand, realizes unity solely within the nation. Cosmopolitanism differs in that the diversities in thought, co-existence and activities become a maxim, equally turned towards itself as towards the outside. The differences are not annihilated, or placed in hierarchies, but accepted and appraised. A cosmopolitan theorist will dismiss the nation as a unique natural circle. He will claim that we should accept the chance to develop the ability to empathize with others and the readiness for understanding what is different. In the sense of national, ethno diversity is created as a value. The basic idea of the theorist, Berlin, is that even God himself cannot choose the best form of life because there are no supra values, such as diversity and order, which could be used for accessing the completeness of values the society realizes. The values embodied in every society exhaust the justification we have for the form of life. The faults of a global supra government are numerous and cosmopolitanism still exists only in theory from Kant to Nussbaum. However, another, monetary cosmopolitanism is already embodied in globalization. Exactly to what extent are the countries in the Balkans prepared for cosmopolitan ideas? Not very much. The most common defense from the cosmopolitan alternative is that it will favor all the other cultures to the detriment of the ethno national. The states of the Balkans presented a "unique" opportunity either to live in our own culture which is defined by your national-ethnic background or to choose the cosmopolitan culture, but not in your country. That is why today, there are so many authors, artists and social scientists who mainly live away from their homelands (for instance, Metvejević in Croatia). Subsequently, there is the problem of marking cosmopolitanism as McDonaldisation of society. Although we could ask ourselves what are Debrecen and Austrian sausages doing on Christmas fairs or, in order to be provocative, the kebab all around the Balkans, the fact remains that cosmopolitanism is not easily realized within national borders.

b) Approaches to Cultural Diversity

Include the cultural politics of the country. Even though it remains within the ethno national boundaries, the directives of state politics are not national, and the only thing which stays national is the language as a means of communication. So here we have multiculturalism which marks an obligation in defining the politics, measures and initiatives by which it is enabled for other cultures to develop on the same or neighboring territory with other cultures within one country.

Multiculturalism includes the new minorities⁶ and autochthonous minorities, and denotes the process of exchange of cultural values and achievements, or in other words, the relationship between the major (national) culture towards the minority cultures. Multiculturalism stems from the claim that the cultures which make up a community are already defined, and because of that it is necessary to develop a context in which it will voluntarily fit in. Because of this static viewpoint, this approach represents the principles of reductive functionalism and that is one of the reasons for its slow demise in the European countries.

Interculturalism defines the potential inter-relations and emphasizes the mutual influence of various cultures within one country, but also on the international scale. It tends to overpower cultural relativism and reductive functionalism and is much deeper and a more complex process than multiculturalism.

Then there is trans-culturalism, a process which within globalization poses the question of the European identity and European values, and the establishment of the European cultural market (the spirit of Europe), while pluriculturalism marks the plurality of ownership, the plurality of the market and the political plurality. In the basis of the last approach, there is a specific cultural holism founded on the traditional European definition of the state as a citizens state, on the philosophical and political science's meditations on totalitarianism and the importance of establishing a non-profit sector, or in other words, a civilian society.

The countries in the Balkans, like Croatia and Montenegro, have in some way started searching for the ancient "spirit of Europe". The question of the Bosnian Muslim's religion was put on the side, and the real question is how will the autochthonous European Muslims feel in an exclusive Christian club. The approaches to cultural diversity have paused on the "cleansing" of the native language from foreign words, on negating of whole groups of peoples and names like in Macedonia and Montenegro and a strive to explain co-existence as parallel existence of cultures, rather than their interconnectedness. Joining the European and Atlantic integrations and competing in European values is stressed at the same time. It would be interesting to mention at this point several studies conducted in the late 80s of the 20th century in Yugoslavia about ethnic tolerance, which is a precondition for the approaches to cultural diversity. According to the theory of ethnic competition and a primordial concept of the identity (Hannan, 1984), the elements of industrialization strengthen ethnic identification and mobilization and simulate ethnic non-tolerance. Tolerance of various ethnic, religious and linguistic groups would be highest in the most highly diversified areas. In former Yugoslavia, that meant the regions with most tolerance were Bosnia, Vojvodina and Croatia. The study detected the least tolerance on Kosovo, in Macedonia and Slovenia. Montenegro and Serbia were somewhere in between. The results after the war have shown that the tolerance levels dropped in those places where the differences of the population were largest, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the republic with the highest tolerance levels, experienced the most horrible war atrocities. It seems that heterogeneity stimulates both tolerance and confrontation. Insufficient resources mobilize grouping of nationalities and awaken the nationalistic primordial and perennial feeling.

C) Division of Power

Consociate democracy, federalism and autonomies are among more efficient solutions for the problem of segments in plural societies. The foundation of consociate democracy is cooperation between elites. Four characteristics are especially prominent

⁶ A term for emigrants

(Lijphart, 1980): (1) A large coalition which is consisted of political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society and which provides the executive reign, (2) the existence of veto in order to protect the vital interests of the minorities, (3) proportionality as the founding precondition for political representation, selection of state officials, public funds allocation and other, (4) a high level of independence and autonomy in decision making regarding the internal politics. Consociate democracy, which is established by the so called "cartel elite", is a serene social context in which each segment has its own vote. Lijphart list Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland as classical examples. Although he lists them in the same framework, the models differ from each other, so we have proportional, concordant, confederate and other models. The absence of strong opposition was reproached, as well as the neglect of individual equality for the benefit of equality of the segments, and as Nordlinger points out, there is a strong influence of the structural elite. Also, there can be slowness in decision making of a large coalition, decision obstruction by veto, and autonomy could threaten with secession and cause a threat to the territorial integrity of the country.

The elements of consociate democracy have been implemented with more or less success in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. And while comparatively Macedonia has recorded progress within only a few years, Bosnia and Herzegovina can still barely achieve consensus between segments, if that. The reason for this state is very simple. The efficiency of that social system depends on the elites which have to commence the politics of accommodation, i.e. the politics of adjusting and harmonization of their own politics with the politics of other elites. Compulsive consociate establishment, imposed from above, can not exist to the full extent even in long terms if there is no political willingness of the domestic elites to do everything possible in order to make it exist in its entirety.

d) Post National Constellations

Can be found in the identity change. Anderson says that the notion of national identity is a "moral substitute" for national character (Anderson, 1991): "The narrower conception of identity fits this role very well, suggesting a more intimate, idealizing connection than with most of connections of everyday customs". There is extensive and somewhat confusing literature about the issues of identity. Post national constellations encompass supranational, post national or trans-cultural identity (Vrcan, 2006). They are realized through imagination which induces thinking about alternatives to the existing order from the standpoint of bloody experience in history, but also experience of the fall of communism and (non-)sustainability of the social state in socio-democratic projects. Thus we have a post national constellation within the globalization process which simply destroys the national state or at least traditional institutional arrangements of the state-nation such as its own foreign affairs, currency or economic politics. By looking for post national cultural identity, we can find it in the supranational regional community such as the European Union, but as there are those who declare themselves to be Europeans because they are Christians, a new-construed cultural identity comes to existence, based on ethics of responsibility, which would not find its fulfillment in the past but by construing of the future. Beck is on the same track with his vision of a cosmopolitan Europe. An extremely radical version is expressed by civilian-social groups which strive to limit the national sovereignty and speak about "invention of new democratic methods of prevention of the poisonous fruits of democracy".

Supranational identity somehow seems possible, especially when we have European Union in mind. We are all European and we are members of the club of the countries. However, I will cut down such reckoning in its root. Supranational identity requires loyalty to the citizen state, and will be achieved only when citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina start calling themselves Bosnians and Herzegovinians, regardless of ethnic background. We can see how difficult and uncertain that process is on the example of the situation in Belgium. For now Switzerland is the only one in Europe who has fully accomplished, but the circumstances are completely different.

e) Liberal Nationalism

The question is whether there is such a form of nationalism at all. Couture says that forming of a nation is dedicated to the freedoms and rights which are usually present in liberal, constitutional democracies. They provide democratic liberties and equal rights to their members. But, what is nationalistic about that liberal nationalism? Obviously members share or want to share joint culture, language, history, the perception about themselves, institutions and some joint projects for their society, including the project of ensuring and realizing the political sovereignty. The solidarity which ties the members of that society unites love toward righteousness and toward the state. From that standpoint, ethno national solidarity is much easier, but the liberal perception of righteousness does not include only ethnic groups, but all citizens. That would bring us closer to the French ideal of the civil nationalism (which exists only in theory) i.e. Habermas' syntagma of "constitutional patriotism", loyalty toward constitutional structure of state, which has little or no connection with nationalism.

Conclusion

The state at the moment in the region of West Balkans does not give much hope that the majority of above listed alternatives could actually be implemented in practice. This is especially true about cosmopolitanism, which is even in the most developed postindustrial countries still hazy. Looking for supranational identity within state borders is possible only through integration with Europe, but it is important to specify under which conditions and what kind of Europe. Supranational identity in the sense of the Swiss model is very difficult to achieve. In the light of all above listed, it is important for the countries of the West Balkans that they persist in Euro-integration, because that provides legal regulations imposed by Brussels which will not repeat the mistake of premature inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria that easily. On the other hand, it is important for these countries that they implement the forms and elements of consociate democracy. It has to be accepted from below, not imposed from above. Macedonia could serve as an example, because that is a country in which it was the majority that demanded that power is divided with the minority and it created mechanisms which, despite some flaws, provide a peaceful coexistence of two ethnic, religious, lingual and cultural communities. Such division of power between elites carries its dangers, but in essence it is the principle (and that mainly means temporary solution, in no sense permanent⁷) which prevents revisionisms, secessionisms, attacks at the state sovereignty and jeopardy to lives and health of the citizens of the

⁷ Consociate democracy is not a permanent solution. It is more of an auxiliary means to provide a peaceful and successful coexistence in plural societies. The end of consociate systems is, in that sense, a good sign. Whether it is a vertical or horizontal division, sub regional territorialism, European or other cultural circle, this is one of the ways in which conflict can be prevented. There are alternatives in the Balkans, but those would be Outburst of additional intolerance and conflict.

country, among other, their own ethnic group. This last discourse has proved to be horrifying in the last outburst of nationalism, that nationalism which strives to solve the issue of "the others" by one and only solution by whipping out, killing, ethnic cleansing.

I tried to show in this paper some of the possibilities which are very prominent in present discussions in social sciences, especially sociology and political science. Some of them stem from modern principles, some refer to the postmodern theorists. They are still standing on very shaky legs, not only in the Balkan region but throughout Europe. Multiculturalism is, for example, probably a failed idea and it proved to be unsuccessful in integration of minority cultures in certain states. The issue of nation remains open as well. No matter how long we discuss about the notion of nation, the fact is that nation and nation-states will continue to be the reality of Europe for a long time. Maybe the solution to the segmented problems should be looked for exactly inside of it.

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Miloš Perović

NATIONALISM AND HISTORICAL REVISIONISM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE COLLAPSE OF SOCIAL VALUES AND SOCIAL NORMS

Nationalism has taken hold of every pore of the Serbian society (it could even be said of the whole territory of former SFR of Yugoslavia) in the last twenty years. The dominant nationalistic tone in public discourse also indicates the historical revisionism as a potentially dangerous phenomenon for the future of the society. The main hypothesis which we will hold to here is that the historical revisionism has evolved from the prevailing nationalistic conscience of the social elite in Serbia and that it is the consequence of the lack of a clear identity of the Serbian society and the lack of a basic consensus regarding the direction in which the Serbian society is heading. The lack of identity in a society clearly causes the lack of social values and social norms, that is an institutional chaos in which the most corrupt, the most clever and the most arrogant layers of society can set specific, by rule retrograde, values which are meant exclusively for the realization of their own particular interests. It would be proper to approach the evaluation of this hypothesis through analyzing specific practical realizations in the field of historical revisionism in the Serbian society.

In the year 2004 a controversial "Law about the rights of fighters" was brought in the highest legislative body, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia. With this law the quisling Chetnik movement in the Second World War was marked antifascist. According to this law the members of the Chetnik movement receive the right to receive a pension in the same rank as members of the Partisan movement in the Second World War. Of course, most of the members of the Chetnik movement are not among the living today, therefore this compensation does provide satisfaction for them, nor does it create a new imposition to the tax payers, but it significantly changes the official version of the occurrences in the Second World War in the Balkan region. If we add to this that the normalization (which is a secret kept by the government) of the character and works of Dimitrije Ljotic, the most ill-famed Serbian quisling from the Second World War, is in action through the unrestricted printing and distribution of his books and advertising pamphlets of fascist and Ljotic-like content, it becomes clear that the level of historical revisionism goes beyond the frames of political decency in the boundaries of which a debate on the given topic could be held and that this represents paving the way toward the further movement toward fascism of the society under the mask of the current ideology of "democratic nationalism" (the term is an oxymoron in itself which still does not represent a problem to the current government leaders in Serbia in identifying with it with the purpose of holding power).

In this situation the question which is posed is whether the parliament of a country is legitimate in making historical judgment and what kinds of consequences can history as a science experience because of these revisionist points of the governmental leaders? Or, can the causes of creating these legal acts be the permanent conversion that lasted for two decades and the so called "intellectual elite" of Serbia advocating historical revisionism (and the "intellectual elite" on the territory of the whole ex Yugoslavia)? It seems that the influence that these elites have on each other is a two way influence and that there is a perfect commensalism in their actions which stems from their mutual interest in maintaining their social power. If we understand the impulse for maintaining social power which is offered for those who are part of the so called "intellectual elite", the phenomenon of the conversion of intellectuals becomes very clear and it is especially obvious in so called ex "socialistic" countries. The term

conversion (which originally comes from theology) is very broad, but here it will be used in the sense of a deep and radical change of the lay ideological-political orientation.¹ The general trend in Serbia, and also in all eastern European, ex "socialistic" countries, is the conversion of "intellectuals" from fired up Marxists and even official ideologists of the "Marxist" regime to fired up "fighters for the national thing" and upholders of nationalism, or, in fewer cases, to their transformation into so called liberal thinkers. This only seemingly rash, radical movement in the theoretical and political understanding of Serbian (Balkan) "intellectuals" whose sole purpose is to keep current privileges and positions of social power, does not really represent any kind of spiritual turning point. It is the same kind of state mechanical man loyal to every possible regime and social system, which always and repeatedly stays in its position of keeper of the current regime, censorship and "the highest moral and intellectual authority of the society". Any opposition to these intellectual powers is, in these stagnant, prehistoric Balkan societies considered a kind of betrayal of the basic social postulates, if they are sometimes "self-commandment" or, for example, "national conscience" today. The best definition of this state of intellectual duplicity of today's short-term intellectual was given by Milan Kangrga with the term "smuggler of your own life".² What Kangrga refers to with this term is precisely this layer of social parasites who, because of the lack of other merchandise, smuggle and sell their own life beliefs because of personal gain. As an example of such a smuggler a once Marxist dogmatist, actually Stalinist and today's professional patriot and fighter for the national cause is given. As Todor Kuljic carefully detects, there are two dominant occurrences when these intellectuals appear in public: a. viewing themselves as a victim of the bygone totalitarian system and b. being convinced in the unbreakable continuity of their Weltanschauung.³ With this halo of the victim absolute moral superiority of the convert and the status of moral and intellectual model which is, by rule, unmistakable in its beliefs it achieved. With the story of the unbreakable continuity of their Weltanschauung, conversion itself is rejected. Considering the vast number such intellectuals today, Kuljic rightly poses the following question: "It is a true miracle that socialism was able to survive for half a century besides so many highly involved anti-totalitarian intellectuals who apposed it?"⁴ Precisely for these reasons we put the terms intellectual and intellectual elite under quotation marks when mentioning them. If, by the term intellectual, we mean a highly educated person who is ready at any given moment to dishonestly criticize social anomalies with the intention that the society in which they live will be able to get some use out of that substantiated, dishonest criticism by correcting the criticized anomalies, then all smugglers of their own lives could in no situation be described by the term 'intellectuals'⁵. More specifically we could use the terms 'intelligence' or 'half-intelligence' with which we would define an

1 Kuljić Todor, *Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka*, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Beograd, 2002, p. 423.

2 Kangrga Milan, *Šverceri vlastitog života*, Biblioteka Feral Tribune, Kultura & Rasvjeta, Split, 2002, p. 112-127.

3 Kuljić Todor, *Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka*, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, Beograd, 2002, p. 425-432.

4 Ibid, p. 430.

5 "Since Dreyfus' affair, the term intellectual means a critic of the regime. On the other hand, today's criticism of socialism by converted intelligence is illegitimate, because an intellectual has the right to judge an occurrence only if they witness it", Ibid, p. 431.

educated person who actually has the role of a state officer of intellectual affairs. Precisely this layer of society wrongfully called the intellectual elite, in collusion with its partner "the political elite" (quotation marks again!) permanently produces a socially dominant nationalistic conscience and does so principally to keep the current positions of social power.

The abovementioned "collusion of elites" has proved prepared to do anything in order to keep the current privileges, even to put the whole Serbian society through a series of wars, international isolation, complete destruction of agriculture established in "self-ruled socialism" and to the complete foundation of devastating material and spiritual resources of the society at the end of the 20th century, and that is even transmitted onto the beginning of the new millennium. Such a turbulent recent history of Serbia led to a complete breakdown of fundamental social values and norms and to a specific identity disorientation of the Serbian society. Not at one single moment after the fall of the joint country of SFR of Yugoslavia did the Serbian society clearly decide in which directions should society develop and which social system should be developed after the fall of the so called socialism. The collapse of SFR Yugoslavia and the so called socialist system has not led to the shift into a new ideological pattern based on a social agreement, which would be an identity base for the future Serbian society. At the moment, the establishment of a "wild" capitalism which has been known through history as "the first accumulation of capitalism" has been imposed on Serbia because of the necessity of globalization processes. Simply, the globalization of capitalism is so powerful that, because of the urgency of the issue, it has sucked the Serbian society, which has not been given place to think in such an environment, in. Therefore, capitalism is not a choice of the Serbian society, it is a necessity imposed with unstoppable world historical processes.

In the mentioned circumstances, the question which is posed is why is Serbia today a society without a clear identity and, practically, the only disoriented European society without clear directions for further development? The answer to this seemingly complicated question is actually very simple. Nationalism has always been used here as a mere tool for establishing the unique system of "kleptocracy"! With the term 'kleptocracy' we mean that social form in which the robbery of social goods is the main motive of being in authority. This thesis might seem radical, but let us test it on specific examples based on experience. Slobodan Milosevic was never really a true nationalist; he seized nationalism in order to stay in power in the moments when the pressure of the "intellectual elite" to establish nationalism was so great that, besides accepting this ideology and dragging Serbia into war, it was leading towards the loss of power. War, as an expensive toy of the cabinet ideologists of nationalism joined with the new robbing elite which was created under the instructions of Milosevic and the security service has significantly run down the Serbian economy. After the war a new "economic elite" emerged which arose through robbing the Serbian economy and was affected areas. At the moment when Milosevic, with his own politic started to loose the basic sense of reality and so endangered the survival of the newly-formed robbing elite, there was a political revolution on October 5th. This revolution had to do with the two leaders who were in constant battle for power, Djindjic as a reformist turned toward the West and the ideology of liberalism and Kostunica as a firm nationalist under the mast of the impossible coinage of "democratic nationalism". Djindjic, who came out as the winner of the battle for power, in short time became such an imposition to the war-formed "economy elite" that he was also shortly murdered. Kostunica was appointed as the new, long term authority keeper of Serbia under whose nationalistic rhetoric the estab-

lishment of the new (robbing) "economic elite" and its system of kleptocracy could continue without interference. Nationalism is the guarantee to this "elite" that Serbia will not, for a long time, enter the Euro-Atlantic integration and so accept the system of the free market and more or less economic transparency with which the position of monopoly of this "elite" would be significantly endangered. This is why we mark the current social system in Serbia with the term 'kleptocracy'. In that system, nationalism serves for keeping the status quo in Serbian society, which actually means keeping the state of social chaos in which the kleptocrats feel and act the best. In these circumstances, in which nationalism becomes the tool for satisfying particular, personal interests, historical revisionism is the natural following event in establishing a unique system of kleptocracy as the ruling social system. That kind of social system blocks the creation of democratic institutions which would be the dam for historical revisionism as a harmful social phenomenon.

There is another thing that is specific for the history of Serbia which blocks the creation of democratic institutions. That is the Balkan "cult of leader" present in the Serbian society until the end of the 20th century. Historically, the Serbian society personalized its sovereignty through princes, kings, Tito, Milosevic, depending on the historical period and type of society. It has never really happened that social sovereignty was realized through the parliament, even though we already have two 100-years-old embryos of parliament in Serbia. This is why today, with the lack of a leader and established democratic institutions as a modern alternative of sovereignty of a leader, we have a complete downfall of social values and norms which leads to an identical disorientation of society. In these situations the imposition of historical revisionism "from the bottom", by the "intellectual elite", becomes much easier.

The realization of historical revisionism in Serbia by hand is certainly progressing and it is a widespread phenomenon on a global plan after the end of the cold war. The main conditions of global processing of history are "the revolution of 1989", the end of the cold war and the process of globalization. Therefore, historical revisionism is in no way specific for only the Balkans it is a global phenomenon which is trying to be materialized through theoretical postulates of anti-totalitarianism. Theories about anti-totalitarianism come from the dominant epoch-making conscience conditioned with the capitalistic way of production which is permanently intimidated by radically left ideologies. In these situations it is through theoretical postulates of anti-totalitarianism that ideologies of fascism and communism are equalized claiming to be equally totalitarian. This approach becomes extremely dangerous because it makes the historical role of anti-fascism (which is, when viewed objectively, lead by the left side in all historical moments of battle against fascism) and its word importance in the era of capitalism relative.

Historical revisionism could have (as it was pointed out at the beginning of the text) practical consequences in the environment where the current, disoriented Serbian society is. Namely, today's Serbia is a so called transitional society. The popular term of 'transition' is simply a postmodern term for the historically known period of early phase of capitalism or the first accumulation of capitalism. This social state is characterized by great social separation of layers into the abovementioned "new economic elite" (the privileged 5-10% of the population) and the rest of the population which lives on the verge of existence and which is called, by the postmodern newspeak, "losers of transition", but is actually the robbed-to-the-bone and working class of

Serbia. These economic relationships which permanently produce a greater majority at the verge of material existence, with the described lack of a stable system of social values and norms expressed through the existence of firm democratic institutions, represents the classic example of fertile humus for the growth of a fascist ideology. In such circumstances of historical revisionism which encourages fascist ideas and movements from the Second World War is imposed as the ideological matrix which could finally turn toward open fascism. For this reason pointing out the negative sides of historical revisionism today in Serbia and play a very important role in the battle against the complete turning of the society to the right, which would devastate the already unstable Serbian society.

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dr Dragan Djukanovic

ANTI-FASCISM IN THE AREA OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE CRISIS AND DISPUTES

Introduction

Anti-fascism, as a universal, permanent and fundamental value of the modern world and today, sixty years after the end of the Second World War, it represents the intention of the advanced portion of humankind to stop the physical liquidation of people because of their ethnic background. It also represents one of the foundation stones of modern Europe and it is deeply rooted into its fundamental values. Namely, Europe after the war, precisely through the strengthening of anti-fascism, was freed from the dominating dislike, extreme social Darwinism, the ideology of "blood and bottom".

The National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia (Narodnooslobodilački pokret - NOP), as part of the global antifascist coalition in the period between 1941 and 1945, greatly contributed to the victory over fascism¹, as undoubtedly the greatest evil of the 20th century. This antifascist movement, led by the Communist party of Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito, was, according to the opinion of numerous historians, one of the strongest and most massive in at the time enslaved Europe. During the war, in the troops of the national liberation army of Yugoslavia (Narodnooslobodilačka Vojska Jugoslavije - NOVJ), according to the estimates of historians, around 300,000 fighters were killed, while almost 400,000 were injured. The uniquely Yugoslavian antifascist movement was able to surpass all of the international dislikes and divisions which became emphasized in the enslaved Yugoslavia. Therefore this multinational and above-national movement was able to inflict itself as a clear alternative to all collaborationists and fascists of that area.

The first goal of the antifascist movement was to free the country of the occupying forces, while the second goal was connected with stopping the plan of the creation of megalomaniac national countries from being fulfilled. Namely, the Ustashe regime was able to, during the period of war, form Great Croatia (so called the Independent Country of Croatia), which occupied the larger area of today's Croatia (except Istra, Baranja and the middle part of Dalmacija), the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Srem, and in this area all non-Croats and antifascists were systematically destroyed. On the other hand, the Ravna Gora movement (Chetniks) at the beginning of the war on the area of former Yugoslavia proclaimed that its goal is creating a Great Serbia² which would occupy two thirds of Croatia at the time, then Bosnia and Herzegovina (a community with the equal rights of three nations the Muslims, Serbs and Croats), as well as giving rights to the Montenegrin and Macedonian people, whose rights for expressing their national identity were substantially disadvantaged in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

¹ Vojislav Stanovčić, „Fašizam“, u: *Enciklopedija političke kulture*, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1993, p. 317-331.

² *Projekat „Homogena Srbija“* dr Stevana Moljevića, *Naš put*, Nikšić, June 30th 1941.

The Current State of Antifascism in Countries on the Area of Former Yugoslavia

In all countries of modern Europe the values and achievements of antifascism are deeply respected, and all attempts to argue it or promote neo-Nazism and neo-Fascism are strongly penalized. However, the countries on the area of former Yugoslavia are an exception. Namely, in them, parallel with the process of ethnic cleansing and the creation of country-nations the process of relativism, challenging and complete marginalizing of the antifascist battle during the Second World War has also been started.

The process of revising the official historiography of the Second World War has especially spread in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia. In all countries, together with the fall of the one-party system, political parties which marked themselves as heirs of individual powers which supported fascism and those whose anti-fascism during the Second World War could be argued.

Besides the fact that, in the first chapter of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia³, the continuity of its modern statehood with antifascist battle, that is the decision of the Country Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Croatia (Croatian: Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Hrvatske - ZAVNOH) are noted, in history books "all of a sudden" in this country new contents appeared which were the opposite of the National liberation movement, glorified allies of the occupying forces and reduced the number of Serbian, Jewish and Romany victims in the so called Independent Country of Croatia⁴. What followed then was the massive changing of names of streets and squares which were named after people involved in the antifascist battle, but also overemphasizing the involvement of the members of the Croatian nation and reducing the involvement of local Serbs in the National liberation movement.

What was especially negated was the leading role of the communist party of Yugoslavia in the antifascist battle, and also, in an artificial way, another "non-communist, antifascist movement" was created - home guard, which, during the war, brought together mostly members of the Croatian rural party led by Vlatko Maček⁵. During the past fifteen years in Croatia, alongside ruining and removing practically all memorials to those involved in the National Liberation Movement⁶, there have been a couple attempts of raising monuments for the writer of racist laws in the so called NDC, Mila Budak and to the Ustashi army commander Juro Francetić. Also, in many Croatian cities streets and squares were named after them. In the speech which he gave for the 60th anniversary of victory over fascism on May 7th, 2005, president of the republic of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić⁷ clearly pointed out that the so called Independent Country of Croatia was not the fulfillment of the Croatian people's wish, but the he, through the involvement in the partisan antifascist movement, was able to constitute his county as it is today. At the same occasion the president of Croatia pointed out and unarguably leading role of the Communist party of Yugoslavia in the leadership of the antifascist movement.⁸

³ „Constitution of the Republic of Croatia“, I Izvorišne osnove, *Narodne novine*, issue 56, December 22nd 1990
⁴ Dr Franjo Tuđman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti: rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlošilja*, Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, Zagreb, 1990.

⁵ This politician, right after the so called Independent Country of Croatia was announced, called the members of his party to claim the Ustashi government.

⁶ Practically in all Croatian cities monuments to those involved in the NLM have been removed. Moreover, in Kumrovac, the hometown of Josip Broz Tito, on December 26th, 2004 his half length portrait was torn down.

⁷ „Govor predsjednika Republike na središnjoj proslavi obilježavanja 60. obljetnice pobjede nad fašizmom“, <http://www.predsjednik.hr/default.asp?ru=7&gl=200505070000007&sid=&jezik=1>.

⁸ This statement by president Mesić caused great disagreement in the ruling Croatian democrat community and the extremely nationalist Croatian party of rights.

There have been a couple attempts in the Republic of Serbia in the past decade to rehabilitate those who are unarguably associated with the occupying forces in the Second World War – general Milan Nedić, the president of the so-called Government of Serbian salvation and Dimitrije Ljotić, the leader of the fascist organization Zbor.⁹ In certain Serbian cities there have also been initiatives to name streets and squares after them, but they have not been greatly supported by the public. At the beginning of the previous decade, however, in Serbia a thesis about two “Serbian” antifascist movements was brought up – the partisan and the Chetnik movement. Moreover, it seems like the official Serbian historiography accepted this despite the numerous historical data which prove the connection of the Chetnik movement with the occupying powers. The Ravnogora movement, at the head of which was general Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, is in Serbia called the first European antifascist movement, even though it was precisely its leader who was announced as an associate of the German and Italian occupying forces after the war. In accordance with such a political discourse, the National Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, on December 24th, 2004, passed a law about equalizing the rights of the member of the NLP and the Ravna Gora movement¹⁰, and the government of the Republic of Serbia was indirectly involved in the organizing of the 64th anniversary since the beginning of the Chetnik “uprising” on May 15th, 2005 on Ravna Gora¹¹. In the speech during the celebration of the 60th anniversary since the victory over fascism which was held on May 9th, 2005, the president of the Republic of Serbia, Boris Tadić also supported the thesis about the existence of two antifascist movements during the Second World War.¹²

What the process of historical revisionism in Serbia and Croatia have in common is emphasizing personal ethnic components inside the formerly unique Yugoslavian antifascist movement. This is why, in Serbia, it is rarely spoken about the involvement of almost 90% of Serbs in the National Liberation Movement, while in Croatia the number of Croats involved is obviously (over)exaggerated. Similar attempts of the nationalization of the antifascist movement came to the surface in the Republic of Slovenia as well, where they specifically emphasize the contribution to the Freedom front of the Slovenian people (*Osvobodilna fronta*), which was only one part of the Yugoslavian antifascist movement.

Besides Serbia and Croatia, there have been significant attempts of the relativization of the NLM and rehabilitating organization which the Yugoslavian authorities announced to be collaborative¹³ in other South-Slav countries. In Slovenia, at the beginning of the previous decade, the attempt to call the White Guard of Leo Rupnik an antifascist movement failed. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina something similar happened with the organization of Young Muslims, which acted on the territory of this country during the Second World War and openly worked with the occupying forces and the Ustashi regime. In the Republic of Srpska, an area in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority of Serbs today is in the public and political discourse the dominant role of the Chetnik movement. In many public places there are flags and other symbols of this movement

9 On the collaborationism between Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić see: Branko Petranović *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939-1945*, Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, Beograd, 1992, p. 389-506.

10 “Zakon o izmenama i dopunama zakona o pravima boraca, vojnih invalida i članova njihovih porodica”, 24. decembar 2004, *Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije*, issue 137/04.

11 The sponsors of the government of the Republic of Serbia during the celebration of the anniversary of the Ravna Gora uprising in 2005 did not face any significant opposition by the public. It was only the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Social-democratic union who strongly opposed the involvement of the Serbian government in organizing such a gathering. On the other hand, many nongovernmental organizations also strongly condemned the involvement of members of the government in the preparation of this manifestation (The Helsinki committee of human rights in Serbia, Women in black and the Center for women studies).

12 „Obelježjen Dan pobeđen”, http://www.rts.co.yu/jedna_vest.asp?belong=&IDNews=115420.

13 This, of course, was also true for the leaders of these organizations.

placed, and streets are named after its obvious members. Moreover, in Brčko, during the last century, a monument was built for Dragoljub - Draža Mihailović.¹⁴ What demonstrates the most how large the degree of negating the NLM in the Republic of Srpska is the conclusion brought during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the parliament of this area by which all decisions brought by the Country Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian: Zemaljsko Antifašističko Vijeće Narodnog Oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine - ZAVNOBiH) were abolished. Namely, the mentioned decisions brought by the National Parliament of the Republic of Srpska have legally been nullified all of the decisions of ZAVNOBiH, with which this organ of national government, on a free territory on November 25th 1943 constituted Bosnia and Herzegovina as a community of three nations with equal rights as being part of the federation of Yugoslavia. There is a similar situation in areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina with dominantly Croatian people, where certain streets carry the names of Ustashi war criminals and where, without any legal restrictions, the achievements of the so called Independent Country of Croatia are praised. On the other hand, in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the majority of Bosnians the importance of the NLM as an antifascist movement is still emphasized, and all dates of the national-liberation battle which are related to this country are still officially recognized.

In Montenegro, in last years, indirectly the members of the Chetnik movement have been trying to rehabilitate themselves, as well as the followers of the separatist-collaborative forces during the Second World War. The rehabilitation of the Chetnik movement in Montenegro is especially noticeable in the northern parts of this country however, after the Montenegrin government intervened, the attempt to set a monument for Pavle Djurisić, the Chetnik commander for Montenegro and Sandžak, in Berane in the year 2004 was unsuccessful. Who pioneered the attempt to rehabilitate Sekula Drljević, the leader of the separatist movement and the president of the self-proclaimed Montenegrin state council, was a nongovernmental organization The Dukljan academy of science and art. At the same time, the decision made by the Parliament of the Republic of Montenegro faced disapproval. According to it the song "Oh, bright May dawn"¹⁵ by Sekula Drljević was appointed the country's national anthem. It is important, however, to point out that Drljević wrote the words to this song to the rhythm of an old Montenegrin folk melody.

In the republic of Macedonia, like in all south Slavic countries, there was an attempt to revise historical facts regarding the National Liberation movement and constituting a Macedonian country and nation. The first wave of revisionism was an attempt by pro-Bulgarian forces to rehabilitate a war leader of the extreme Macedonian revolutionary organization (VMRO), Ivan - Vanče Mihajlov. The second attempt was about rehabilitating Albanian ballistic troops which were active on the territory of today's Macedonia during the war. Still, in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia¹⁶ from 1991, the continuity of its statehood since the formation of the Antifascist Sobranj of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNLM) on August 2nd, 1944 is clearly pointed out, with which the importance of the antifascist battle in this country is directly demonstrated.

The almost complete denial of the National Liberation battle during the Second World War is noticeable today also in Kosovo. In this entity, under the international protectorate, the decisions of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko Veće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije - AVNOJ) by which

¹⁴ Moreover, this monument was published on the list of protected cultural establishments in the *Official Bulletin of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. After the protests of primarily the Bosniak parties, but also many NGOs the office of the High representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina published that it was all a „technical mistake“.

¹⁵ This song was published in occupied Zagreb in 1944 in Sekula Drljević's book titled *Balkan Confrontations*. The title of the song was "Our Eternal Montenegro".

¹⁶ „Устав на Република Македонија“, 17. ноември 1991, преамбула, у: Службен вестник на Република Македонија, бр. 52/1991.

Kosovo is constituted as an autonomous area which is part of Serbia are called "historical mistakes". On the other hand, in history books, the importance of the so called Bujan Conference¹⁷ (January 1944) is pointed out, at which the representatives of the National board of the Kosovo and Metohija area demanded the union of this province with the neighboring Albania. At the same time, it is usually spoken about the actions of the ballistics and crimes which they committed over the non-Albanian population of Kosovo during the Second World War in a neutral way.

Conclusion

Anti-fascism today, in the dominant public discourse of the countries of former Yugoslavia, is often interpreted as a "communist" or anachronistic expression. This kind of understanding of a still dominant Right in the mentioned countries is not only an attempt to equalize fascist with anti-fascism, but also denying the key role of the Communist party of Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito as the high commander of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the liberation of the South-Slav people.

It is also clear that, in the countries which were formed on the former Yugoslavia territory, anti-fascism today is completely changing into an instrument of politics and it is accepting only what is "acceptable to one's own nation". On the other hand, in the countries of this region, many non-governmental organizations whole goal is to preserve the achievements of the antifascist battle on the former Yugoslavia land have been formed. For example, in Belgrade a *Group of the Truth of the Antifascist National Liberation Battle in Yugoslavia* is operating, while in Sarajevo, with the same purpose, the *Association of Civilians "Josip Broz Tito"* was founded. It is important to stress that the official organizations of the antifascist fighters from the Second World War have, during the last decade, often been abused for daily political purposes, primarily in Serbia and Croatia. For this reason they today loose the initiative in spreading the truth of the antifascist movement and promoting the idea of anti-fascism.

What can also be pointed out is the close connection between the aspiration for exclusive national and state sovereignty, which were the basis for the appearance of a crisis and wars on the area of former Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and criticism and dispute about anti-fascism and the antifascist battle on this area, on the other hand. Namely, these attempts of creating single-national state constructions are supported with historical revisionism, through which the crimes committed over other nations during the Second World War are questioned, but also justified. This kind of apologia of crimes committed "in the name of the nation" in the period between 1941 and 1945 led to the situation that in the confrontations that took place during the last decade on this area, ethnic cleansing and "human movements" of certain ethnic communities were "justified".

The process of revising facts related to the Second World War leaves even deeper marks on the bilateral and multilateral relationships between the countries formed on the area of former Yugoslavia. What proves this fact is also the cancellation of the visit of the president of the republic of Croatia Stjepan Mesić¹⁸ in May 2005 to the former state community between Serbia and Montenegro because of the support and active involvement of the government of the Republic of Serbia in the organization of the celebration of the Chetnik uprising on Ravna Gora. A clear condemnation of the supervi-

¹⁷ See: Branko Petranović, „AVNOJ / Bujanska konferencija“, u: Gordana Filipović(ur.), *Kosovo - prošlost i sadašnjost*, IP „Međunarodna politika“, Beograd, 1989 p. 131137.

¹⁸ *"Odgođene pripreme za posjet predsjednika Mesića Srbiji i Crnoj Gori"*, Ured predsjednika Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb, May 16th 2005

sion of this manifestation by the government of Serbia was expressed by Ivo Sanader, the president of the government of the Republic of Croatia. He also suggested that a special statement be placed in the Croatian assembly by which all crimes committed by the Chetnik formation of the area of today's Croatia during the Second World War be condemned. A similar attempt of assimilating the resolution about the condemnation of the rehabilitation of the Chetnik movement¹⁹ fell through in the Home of the people of the Parliamentary convention of Bosnia and Herzegovina on May 18th, 2005 because of the opposition those sent by the Serbian people.

The growth of various controversies and ideological confrontations over the character and size of the antifascist battle undoubtedly contributes to the strengthening of the extremely nationalistic and neo-Nazi movements in all countries which were formed on the area of former Yugoslavia. That, however, was not followed by adequate law norms by which, like in most countries part of the European Union, the appearance of neo-fascism and neo-Nazism would be sanctioned. This is of course, among other things, a clear consequence of the mild relationship of the keepers of the political power in south-Slav countries towards the collaborative powers which acted on the territories of their countries during the Second World War. They seem to strongly condemn only the so called collaboration of others. One of the many examples is the fact that the state governmental body of the Republic of Croatia has not, up to now, condemned the appearance of Ustashi symbols on the manifestations held in remembrance of the mass murder of the members of the armed forces of the so called Independent Country of Croatia during their withdrawal in the Austrian city of Bleiburg. On the contrary often even the highest representatives of the government of the Republic of Croatia attend this manifestation which is held at middle of May every year.

Today, in the countries formed on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the antifascist battle is often misused as an acceptable authorization in the process of getting closer the European Union. It is clear, however, that the Union demands that the countries formed on the territory of former Yugoslavia truly respect and affirm the values of anti-fascism. In that sense the vice-president of the Committee of the European Union, Franco Frattini, on May 11th 2005 said to the countries of the West Balkans "that Europe views fascism with special attention, which recognizes it as a battle of basic human rights".²⁰

is The text of this resolution was proposed by the representatives of the Bosnian people in the Home of the People of the Parliamentary convention of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

²⁰ *Vesti Radija Slobodna Evropa, Program na južnoslovenskim jezicima (bosanskom, hrvatskom i srpskom)*, <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/article/2005/05/10/6f0a9ab6-a5f5-47c5-92a8-e8bf58b6a9cc.html>

Aleksej Kišjuhas

HISTORICAL REVISIONISM AS PSEUDO-HISTORY

During the wars in the 1990s, Serbian society tried to obtain a new memory, apart from a discontinuous future, and such attempts have been present since 2000, too. Associating the understanding of the past with burning issues and identity crises of the present led to historical revisionism becoming a common practice and, almost, official politics. This is due to the ideological/political requirements of the ruling (anti-communist) elite and the context of growing nationalism. The importance and strength of creating a new memory lies in confirming the ideological-political path which society chose to follow. Additionally, it aids in the (seeming) clarification of potential paradoxes and individual frustrations that the transition process causes.

The Serbian version of pseudo-history is embodied in the practice of historical revisionism. The revision of history in Serbia takes two typical forms. First, there is the revision of the history concerning territoriality and ethnogenesis of Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Bosniaks, and other nations. This type of revisionism responded to the need for legitimizing the military conflict, and is characteristic of the first half of the 1990s. The second type is the revision of the history during and after World War Two, i.e. the revision of the role of the quisling regimes, collaborationist (para)military forces, and socialist government after the war. This type of revisionism responds to the needs of the right-wing and anti-communist elites and cliques who came to power after the year 2000. Besides occupying the media, they have been taking a more durable, physical form: by way of changing street names, erecting monuments, and most drastically, changing the information in history textbooks.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the intermingling and congruence of the practice of historical revisionism and pseudo-history. Although these two concepts cannot be equated, they are inextricably linked. This connection is due to the same (non-epistemic) goals they both have, their methodology, and their common characteristic operational techniques and consequences. According to some interpretations, historical revisionism is considered as a specific type of pseudo-history. On the other hand, concrete pseudo-history is sometimes interpreted as a product of a more general practice of historical revisionism. However, (also) for analytical reasons, it is plausible and heuristically fertile to differentiate between them. At the same time, it is extremely important to emphasize that historical revisionism is not a priori non-scientific and ideological-political (while pseudo-history is). Cumulative or discontinuous changes to the existing (historical) knowledge represent common scientific practice of enlarging or sophisticating the corpus of scientific knowledge. This paper will discuss only practices of historical revisionism that have pseudo-scientific basis.

Pseudohistory

What is pseudo-history? This phenomenon is easiest to understand as the revision of the past because of the personal or political requirements of the present time. It refers, thus, to a false version of historical events, created for non-scientific and most frequently political and malicious reasons. Pseudo-history is selective about the evidence, often treating myths, legends and such as literal truth. Furthermore, ancient

or classical historians and/or historical texts are quoted non-selectively and uncritically. Pseudo-history is also often characterized by relativist claims about the existence of "multiple truths". Its guiding interest is non-epistemic: it is finding justification for a certain personal or political agenda, rather than searching for scientific truth. The practices of historical revisionism (in Serbia as in all other countries) represent typical pseudo-history, according to the majority of the mentioned characteristics.

First of all, pseudo-historical practices are non-scientific. They consciously ignore the canons of scientific methodology, as well as the established facts. Nonetheless, pseudo-history has an ambivalent attitude towards (historical) science. It rejects the use of scientific methodology, but at the same time purports to be a science. Its means of achieving the status of a science are manipulation and media promotion, not adhering to methodological principles.

As it has already been mentioned, pseudo-history is characterized by personal or political requirements of the present time as opposed to universal (scientific) principles of objectivity. Consequently, pseudo-historical claims are frequently controversial and bombastic (for example about alien builders of the Egyptian pyramids), and they are a product of a personal wish for popularity and media attention. However, the practice of pseudo-history is more often driven by ideological and political motives (for example, the Holocaust is negated by individuals who are close to neo-Nazism).

A typical and almost paradigmatic pseudo-historical practice is the negation of the Holocaust (therefore, most of the illustrations of pseudo-historical principles will be taken from this branch of pseudo-history). These pseudo-historians (so-called "negationists") most frequently deny that the genocide of Jews was planned, that there was a highly organized extermination program (involving the use of gas chambers and crematoria), and that the number of killed Jews is between five and six million. The prominent pseudo-historians who negate the Holocaust are Mark Weber, David Irving, Robert Faurisson, Ernst Zündel, David Cole, etc. Other examples of popular pseudo-history include segments from the books like "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and "The Da Vinci Code", and claims about Atlantis or that the Apollo Moon landings were faked. There are also some more exotic claims like those connected to so-called "Afrocentrism" (a political and racist movement, which considers main cultural contributions and figures such as Jesus or Socrates to be inherently African/black), or those which contend that Muslim seafarers reached the Americas before Columbus.

Methods and Techniques

The methods and techniques of historical revisionism in Serbia correspond to the (more) general methods and techniques of pseudo-history. This is the main cause of the parallelism which is the topic of this paper. As it has already been stated, pseudo-historical claims have no basis in scientific methodology. However, it is possible to identify a number of techniques which are used by pseudo-history and its proponents as a means of convincing people that their claims are true. Genuine science neither convinces nor converts, but proves. Nevertheless, pseudo-historical convincing techniques and manipulative mimicry of science have been very successful in increasing the number of supporters of pseudo-history. Some of the typical methods and techniques of pseudo-historians are as following:

First, focus is placed on weak points within the corpus of historical knowledge, while

the standpoint taken about the issue in question is not overly stressed (e.g. Holocaust negationists point to mutually different statements of witnesses). Second, inaccuracies in historical records are misused, and recent confirmations of what used to be controversial ideas are emphasized (e.g. about Vikings reaching the shores of North America before Columbus). Third, sections and quotations that are taken out of context are extensively used (also very often of those who have opposing views). Fourth, genuine scientific debates on a certain phenomenon (e.g. debates about the Holocaust between so-called intentionalists and functionalists) are misinterpreted as arguments about whether the phenomenon in question ever happened. Fifth, evidence is approached selectively: focus is placed on the unknown, while the known facts are ignored, i.e. the data that "serves the purpose" of the original idea is stressed, while the data that does not "fit" is rejected. Sixth, there are attempts to present these claims as strictly scientific, neutral and objective most frequently by way of using scientific jargon, academic titles, etc. Incidentally, all these practices are characteristic of the whole pseudo-scientific subculture, and are most evident in the creationist pseudo-scientific rejections of Darwinism and the theory of evolution.

All these manipulations can analytically be divided into four large groups: (1) insisting on errors in historical accounts (implicating that overall historical conclusions are wrong); (2) uncritical quoting (classical authors, myths and legends, literature, quoting without a context); (3) claims that scientific debates about a certain phenomenon imply that the debate is about whether the phenomenon has actually happened at all; (4) a selective and subjective approach to evidence.

A way of thinking that is typical in pseudo-history are conspiracy theories. Namely, pseudo-history heavily depends on conspiracy theories, since these pseudo-scientific concepts serve as delegitimation of history and, above all, delegitimation of evidence. Those are unproven claims that cannot be disproved logically (the evidence are also proclaimed to be conspiracy) and the burden of proof is manipulatively and illogically shifted to those who litigate them. History, or certain historical events (such as the Holocaust or Markale massacres) are rejected as conspiracies or plans with political aims. The claims of conspiracy theorists, as senseless as they may be, are gaining more and more followers, since they are based on reasonable doubts towards institutions and continuous changes of historical and everyday knowledge. The problem with conspiracy theories is that they offer no (or no satisfying) evidence for their own thesis. They are blind for evidence that does not suit them and under no circumstances do they question their belief that there is a conspiracy. All of this is typical for pseudo-scientific practice. Therefore, they are a negation or an antipode of sceptical scientific work, although they are disguised as scientific research.

All the characteristics mentioned above refer to the historical revisionism in Serbia. We witnessed almost all pseudo-historian tactics in the examples of Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić. There are quotations out of context and only facts that suit pseudo-historian thesis are taken into account, real historical debates about the issues are being exploited and misused. The type of pseudo-historian thinking in Serbia is especially fantastically synchronous with usual pseudo-history: the similarity between the negation of the Srebrenica massacre or Markale massacres with the negation of the Holocaust. According to the already mentioned standard model, both kinds of "negationists" approach the evidence selectively (focusing on evidence that suits them and neglecting the rest of it), out of context and/or quote selectively some officials, trying to represent their position as objective and neutral.

Of course, the very aims of the historical revisionism in Serbia are identical to typically pseudo-historian aims. In the example of negation of the Holocaust: since people connect fascism with mass murders and the Holocaust, if the claims about the Holocaust were disproved, fascism would lose its social stigma. This is the basic social aim and (pre)conception that leads pseudo-historian "negationists". If evidence does not fit this aim, the evidence is what is denied, discarded or relativized, not the hypothesis or the basic idea. Of course, this is the antithesis of scientific work. Similar aims guide Serbian negationists of the crimes in the 1990's war and revisionists of the quisling regimes during the World War II. If there was evidence that there were no crimes against civilians by Serbian paramilitary organizations, nationalistic and expansionist politics in Serbia would represent something valuable. That is, if only the part about the collaboration with (stigmatized) regime of Adolf Hitler were erased, right-wing politics and ideology of Dimitrije Ljotić and Milan Nedić could be represented as legitimate and historically positive.

By non-epistemic aims (propagation of a certain political agenda instead of search for truth) and by already mentioned methods and techniques, historical revisionism in Serbia follows the example of pseudo-history. The external structure and internal characteristics of Serbian historical revisionism is analogous to claims about Atlantis or claims that Socrates was a black man from Egypt. However, since this is the post conflict context of nationalism, and, above all, supported by the official politics, the media, religious and educational institutions, this is not just the case of relation between science and pseudo-science. It is not only the matter of defending scientific knowledge, but also of preventing the development of false memory that breeds new conflicts.

Opposing

Memories, apart from the fact that they fade, can also expand. Initial perception fades, but every recollection demands the reconstruction of memories. Political elite, consciously or not, takes an interest in influencing this memory. This is the meaning of Goebbels' claim about a lie that, repeated a number of times, becomes a truth. Certainly, it does not become truth in its essence, but a lie is being communicated as a truth in a process of social interaction. There was a continent in the Atlantic Ocean, the Great Pyramid of Giza was built by Martians, Jesus had a girlfriend, Croats are actually Serbs, Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić were not enthusiastic Hitler's followers. Many among us have or could have believed this lies from the kitchen of pseudo-history and/or historical revisionism. To quote William Thomas, a sociologist: " If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." In the case of historical revisionism in Serbia, these consequences are to be truly feared.

How to oppose this? First of all, it is essential that all the claims of the pseudo-historians be methodically, systematically and continuously rebutted. However, it is crucial that history is treated as a scientific discipline. History should be viewed as (or it should be demanded from history to be) a true science, not only interested in names and dates, but also in detailed analysis and strict methodologies. How do we know that the Holocaust has actually happened? We have mutually convergent proofs, which we acquired scientifically. This is the main criterion in demarcation between the revision which has the aim to deepen and to refine scientific knowledge and the revision which has the aim to propagate non-scientific, politically ideological and, simply, malevolent thoughts. Search for evidence, led by scientific methodology, is what should be demanded in challenges posed by historical revisionism and pseudo-history.



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CIP - Каталогизacija u publikaciji
Библиотека Матице српске, Нови Сад

323.1(497.11)(082)

NACIJA kao problem ili rešenje : Istorijski revizionizam
u Srbiji / [urednik Petar Atanacković ; prevod Igor Aćimović
... [et al.]. - 1. izd. - Novi Sad : Futura publikacije,
2008 (Novi Sad : Daniel print). - 206 str. ; 21 cm. -
(Edicija Istraživanja)

Nasl. str. prištampanog prevoda: Nation as a problem or solution. - Tiraž 500. - Bibliografija.

ISBN 978-86-7188-094-7

a) Национализам - Србија - Зборници b) Срби - Национална
свест - Зборници

COBBIS.SR-ID 229858311

