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Tomasz Kubalica

ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE. HEINRICH RICKERT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ROMAN INGARDEN

ABSTRACT

The article looks at the concept of value in Heinrich Rickert's philosophy of value and attempts a systematic study of this concept in the context of the fundamental problems in Roman Ingarden's ontology of value. The result is a systematised presentation of Rickert's notion of value and a series of conclusions concerning fundamental aspects of his philosophy of culture. The essential discrepancy that the comparison reveals concerns the formal character of Rickert's philosophy of values, which implies a great deal of openness and freedom in the understanding and implementation of values. Another fundamental difference exposed by Ingarden concerns the ontological status of values.

KEYWORDS

value, axiology,
philosophy of culture,
Rickert, Ingarden

Heinrich Rickert's Neo-Kantian philosophy of values initiated a reflection on the problem of values in philosophy. Its axiology initiated subsequent attempts, including phenomenology, a philosophical movement that emerged from Neo-Kantianism and continued to be developed by the next generation of philosophers under the somewhat arrogant slogan of a return to things themselves. This movement has, as it were, taken up the problem of value from scratch, only rarely referring to the experiences of the previous generation. An example of such a polemical reference is Roman Ingarden's 1964 text entitled *What Don't We Know About Values?* It is valuable because it not only refers to the axiology of the Baden school but also constitutes a fairly systematic summary of the reflection on the problem of values in the form of the following questions:

- “1. On what basis are the basic types and, in tandem with this, the domains of value distinguished?
2. What is the formal value structure and its relation to the value ‘has’? (to the ‘bearer’ of the value)?
3. How do values exist, if they exist at all?
4. What is the basis for the differences between values and their ‘height’, and is it possible to establish a general hierarchy between them?
5. Are there ‘autonomous’ values?
6. How about the so-called ‘objectivity’ of values?” (Ingarden 1970: 221)

Therefore, I would like to attempt to juxtapose the views of the representatives of two generations of axiology. The basis for this will be the questions and partly the reflection presented by Ingarden. Due to the limited framework of this text, the proposed approach must limit itself only to general axiology and omit – developed by Rickert – the reflection on specific axiology of such value domains as logic, aesthetics, mysticism, ethics, eroticism and religion. The analysis of these specific issues should remain for further research.

1. Types and Domains of Values

Like Ingarden, Rickert expresses himself with a distance about the philosophical system. Basically, he recognises, following Nietzsche, that when we move in philosophical thinking towards wholeness, we must be confronted with a matter that is inexhaustible in its nature and with which we can never come to an end: „Nur wo das Denken arm und dürftig wird, lässt es sich zu etwas Letztem zusammenschließen!“¹ (Rickert 1913: 295) He regards philosophical systems as an expression of an immature attitude resulting from insufficient knowledge. For Rickert as a Neo-Kantian, the theory of cognition is an expression of eternal striving, which he expresses as follows: „Wir dürfen nicht hoffen, eines Tages das Ganze unseres Wissens mit dem Ganzen der Welt restlos zur Deckung zu bringen. Hier bleiben wir immer beim Vorletzten“.² (Rickert 1913: 296) However, the world as a whole is comprehensible only within a system (Bohlken 2002: 122). In contrast to systems thinking, the individual approach cannot grasp the whole because of its viewpoint. However, Rickert is concerned with the systematic combination of different particularist perspectives, pluralism. He explicitly dissociates himself from axiological relativism and calls his position relational because it is about relationships at its core.

However, Rickert does not give up the advantages of the system and proposes an open system of values, which may sound like a *contradictio in adicto*,

¹ “Only where thinking becomes poor and meagre can it be combined into something ultimate” (all translations mine).

² “We must not hope one day to bring the whole of our knowledge entirely into line with the whole of the world. Here we always remain with the penultimate.”

but for him it is not (Bohlken 2002: 124). What matters is the way he understands openness, which he defines as follows:

Die Offenheit bezieht sich vielmehr lediglich auf die Notwendigkeit, der Unabgeschlossenheit des geschichtlichen Kulturlebens gerecht zu werden, und die eigentliche Systematik kann auf Faktoren beruhen, die alle Geschichte überragen, ohne deshalb mit ihr in Konflikt zu kommen.³ (Rickert 1913: 297)

This incompleteness is a condition immanent to culture, through which culture constantly transcends its limits. Hence, cultural values cannot be described differently than values that open up cultural life, above all towards the future. Rickert sees that “in every system, there are super-historical factors, and how they can combine with the historical ones in such a way that an open system comes into being” (Rickert 1913: 299, all translations mine).

Krijnen comments on the openness of Rickert’s value system as follows:

Aus der Verbindung von Offenheit und Geschlossenheit im System geht hervor, daß das Wertesystem keine *endliche*, sondern eine unendliche Größe ist. Jeder Wert (bzw. jedes Kulturgebiet) kann den abschließenden Grund seiner *Geltung* nur im unendlichen Gefüge des Wertganzen haben, in dem alles mit allem zusammenhängt.⁴ (Krijnen 2001: 531)

The whole can have a constitutive function about what is essential. Such an infinite value structure acts as a basis for validity, but not in the sense of negative infinity, but as an incomplete and infinite whole that contains the positive and infinite claim contained in the openness of values. On the other hand, only values are a fully completed, or closed, whole. It is only as a fully completed whole that the open system of values creates totality and functions positively as the principle of the unity and coherence of all its components.

Openness understood in such a way does not exclude the possibility of such systematisation of different domains of values that will consider this openness. Rickert refers here to Kant’s division, where four types of values are mentioned: logical, aesthetic, ethical and religious, which determine the domains of scientific, artistic, moral and religious life (metaphysical) (Rickert 1921: 346). This fourfold division does not solve the problem of the hierarchy of these values, but we will deal with this problem further on. The question we pose now is the question of the criteria of this classification of values.

It should also be taken into account that the process of value systematisation had several phases in Rickert, which correspond to the different publications

³ “Instead, openness merely refers to the need to do justice to the incompleteness of historical and cultural life. The actual systematics can derive from factors that transcend all history without coming into conflict with it.”

⁴ “The connection between openness and closedness in the system emerges that the value system is not finite but an infinite quantity. Every value (or cultural field) can only have the final ground of its validity in the infinite structure of the value whole, in which everything relates to everything else.”

of this systematisation. The first is contained in work *Vom System der Werte* (Rickert 1913) of 1913, and the second was the treatise *System der Philosophie* of 1921 and the last approach was presented by him in *Grundprobleme der Philosophie, Methodologie, Ontologie, Anthropologie* (Rickert 1934) of 1934. Rickert demonstrates the most subtle form of his systematisation of values in *System der Philosophie*, on which we will concentrate.

Rickert systematises four domains of validity: moral, aesthetic, religious and theoretical, which correspond to such transcendent values as morality, beauty, holiness and truth (Rickert 1921: 322 f.). The subject can orient himself towards them by giving his actions an ethical, aesthetic, religious and theoretical meaning, respectively, in the form of specific moral, aesthetic, religious and theoretical goods. To systematise cultural material in its specificity, Rickert uses, according to his heterothetic method, conceptual pairs: person – thing, activity – contemplation, social – anti-social, which he distinguishes based on philosophical tradition (Rickert 1921, p. 373, cf. Krijnen 2001, pp. 523–524). And so, the goods with which values can be connected to the goods of a person or a thing. The subject's relation to values can be active or contemplative and can have a social sense or not, that is, be anti-social. Thus we obtain the following combinations (Krijnen 2001: 525):

Values				
	morality	beauty	holiness	truth
type of value	social	asocial	asocial or social	asocial
subject reference	active	contemplative	contemplative or active	contemplative
good	person	thing	thing or person	thing

Rickert undertakes a value classification of the cultural world as a whole. He singles out areas of culture to which certain possible values are assigned. This classification does not have a historical form, but a systematic one. It is based on the principle of heterothesis (*Prinzip der Heterothesis*) (Rickert 1921: 353). Krijnen describes this method as follows:

Die Klassifikation hat die Form einer *vollständigen Disjunktion* der Glieder, und eine vollständige Disjunktion ist notwendig eine *korrelative* Ganzheit. Um diese korrelativen Ganzheiten zu finden, bringt Rickert erneut die *Negation* in ihrer »heuristischen« Funktion in Anschlag [...].⁵ (Krijnen 2001: 538)

Rickert's heterology works so that the negation of one does not account for the positivity of another but only for its otherness. It is not a method of knowing values but classifying them, which assumes that values are already known.

⁵ “The classification has the form of a *complete disjunction* of the links, and a complete disjunction is necessarily a *correlative* wholeness. In order to find these correlative wholes, Rickert again brings *negation* into play in its “heuristic” function [...].”

2. The Formal Structure of Values and Its “Bearer”

Rickert considers values in their historical multistage dynamics of realization and therefore distinguishes valuation alongside goods and values. In this context, however, Rickert points out to an antipsychological objection:

Wir fragen überhaupt nur nach dem »Sinn«, der den Wertungen mit Rücksicht auf Werte innwohnt, nicht nach ihrem wertindifferenten psychischen Sein, und da dieser Sinn in seiner Verschiedenheit allein durch die Verschiedenheit der Werte bestimmt wird, so muß das Prinzip der Stufenbildung, das an dem Verhalten des Subjekts zutage tritt, auch für die Stufen der Güter und Werte selbst maßgebend werden.⁶ (Rickert 1913: 301)

Rickert tries to distinguish essential stages in the dynamics of valuation, which, however, in his opinion, have nothing to do with the psychology of values. Therefore, in the subject's striving, he singles out the goal that gives meaning to the whole striving and its complete attainment will cause the striving to cease to be meaningful. Hence Rickert will consider the concept of *Voll-Endung*, which determines the ultimate direction of striving. The idea is that the striving eventually attains the state “if no gap remains in it that leads to new striving in the same direction” (Rickert 1913: 301). Every realisation of value – in general – moves towards a complete end *sensu stricto* and therefore belongs to the essence of value realisation in general, is decisive for every hierarchy of values and can thus be counted as a formal factor and not just a historical one.

These formal assumptions of development in value philosophy include: (1) any valid values, (2) any real goods to which non-real, valid values are adjacent, and (3) entities that take a judgmental stance toward values and goods. These elements determine the formal structure of value functioning (Rickert 1913: 299).

The elements mentioned above are three transcendentally necessary aspects that constitute the meaning of cultural phenomena (Bohlken 2002: 124 f.). The point is that immaterial and non-psychic values must be combined on a material substrate by an active and autonomous subject who takes a stand for specific values by realising them in goods. Rickert's basic premise is culture, the meaningful content of which can be known through the history of cultural life. In this sense, the philosophy of culture, in finding the general and formal conditions of the possibility of cultural life, is dependent on the historical sciences of culture. Eike Bohlken draws attention to the inconsistency of Rickert, who defines the process of knowing values in culture as their discovery. Values are not found or newly formed by revaluations; they are discovered and they gradually enter man's circle of history with the progress of culture (cf. Bohlken 2002: 125). However, Rickert does not understand this in the sense of Platonic

⁶ “We only ask about the ‘sense’ inherent in valuations about values, not about their value-indifferent psychic being. Since this sense in its diversity tends to determine only the diversity of values, the principle of gradual formation, which becomes apparent in the behaviour of the subject, must also become authoritative for the stages of goods and values themselves.”

realism; values do not signify real being for him but instead have a meaning similar to Kant's regulative idea. The contents of values are recognised in cultural-historical research from historical material and brought to a conclusion. Through such thinking, they acquire a pure ideal shape. It brings Rickert perhaps closer to Weber's concept of ideal types.

Any realisation of value presupposes a content to which values are brought by 'form' to make it valuable. We can think of this as a totality of content formed by values. Rickert distinguishes four possibilities for the creation of goods.

- (1) In the maximalist version, when values are combined with contents in the form of *Voll-Endung*, the infinite whole will be reconciled with the finite parts.
- (2) The minimal version, when a subject directed towards an inexhaustible totality of material achieves individual goals only as stages of development, resulting in a domain of the goods of an infinite totality, in which infinity is to be understood only negatively as unpreparedness or infinity, that is, as opposed to full finitude.
- (3) A synthesis of the first two areas is possible, and we can call it a synthesis of complete-infinite totality.
- (4) The last combination is that of non-infinite or endless particularism.

Taking time into account, Rickert distinguishes three ways in which value is realised in the form of goods:

- (1) The goods of the infinite whole (future goods) have completion in the future.
- (2) Particular goods (present goods) are fully completed in the present.
- (3) Eternal goods are realised in the realm of the transcendent.

Only the past cannot be the place of the realisation of values since it is already fully accomplished.

Rickert, however, is not concerned with creating a specific worldview of values but with an open system of values that show the necessary conditions for the possibility of realising values in human life. It is a formal approach:

[Ü]ber die Lösung der Weltanschauungsprobleme sagt uns dies System der Werte noch nichts. Unter Rangordnung war immer nur ein formales Verhältnis zu verstehen. Welches von den Gütern als höchstes oder zentrales zu gelten, von welchem Gebiet aus man zu einer Einheit der Weltanschauung vorzudringen hat, und welche inhaltlich bestimmte Stufenfolge der Werte entsteht, das bleibt in jeder Hinsicht unentschieden.⁷ (Rickert 1913: 322)

⁷ "This system of values does not yet tell us anything about the solution to the worldview problems. Ranking means only a formal relationship. Which of the goods should appear as the highest or central one, from which area one should advance to a unity of worldview, and which substantively determined sequence of levels of values arises that remains undecided in every respect."

It does not decide on the importance of personal values over material and vice versa. It does not even settle general questions about whether monism is better than pluralism, negation than affirmation. It does not answer the question of the proper procedure, whether the final stage of contemplation or action must include absolute values since both will be found in parallel side by side or all will prove transcendental. This raises the question: „wie die Zukunfts- und Gegenwartsgüter auf der persönlichen und unpersönlichen Seite sich zueinander verhalten, ob man eine mehr an der Wissenschaft oder an der Kunst, mehr an der Sittlichkeit oder an der voll-endeten persönlichen Gegenwart orientierte Weltanschauung zu bilden hat“⁸ (Rickert 1913: 323) The answer to these doubts concerns philosophy as a pure science in general, whether it can provide answers to these questions, which goes beyond the question of the value system.

However, Rickert's formalism is only one side of his philosophy of value, which stems from his research methodology based upon the transcendental principle. Krijnen emphasises that:

Jenseits von allem bloßen ‚Formalismus‘ [...] sind in Rickerts Gegenstandsmodell Form und Inhalt keine einander äußerlich entgegengesetzten Größen; sie fungieren vielmehr als Glieder des Ganzen, die wechselseitig aufeinander bezogen sind und sich gegenseitig ebenso ausschließen wie limitieren: nur gegeneinander erhalten Form und Inhalt ihre eigene Bestimmtheit – sie stellen selbst ein ‚Formverhältnis‘ dar [...].⁹ (Krijnen 2001: 528)

Hence it follows that in his value system, formality is not a disadvantage but an advantage. Formality is only one aspect of the value system that allows it to systematise every possible culture and thus remain open to different value contents.

The following relations can be discerned in Rickert's connection between goods and value forms (Krijnen 2001: 551). First, suppose the subject manifests an *Voll-Endungstendenz* with respect to an infinite totality of content as in the cognition of the totality of reality. In that case, this means that the subject does not attain complete finitude, for the totality of cognition remains an infinite task. Only an approximation is obtained, i.e., another step in producing goods, what Rickert calls infinite totality, i.e., unready and endless goods. It is fundamentally different in the case of the domain of art (infinite particularity). The subject has an ultimate tendency concerning a finite part of the infinite content, which makes possible a complete completion by the subject.

8 “How do the future and present goods on the personal and impersonal side relate to each other, whether one has to form a world view oriented more towards science or art, morality or the entirely personal present?”

9 “Beyond all mere ‘formalism’ [...], in Rickert's model of the object, form and content are not externally opposed quantities; rather, they function as links of the whole, which relate to each other reciprocally and exclude as well as limit each other: only against each other do form and content receive their own determinacy – they themselves represent a ‘form relation’ [...].”

It is even different in the case of religion (ultimate totality) when the ultimate tendency directs the subject towards the ultimate totality, which shapes the content and fulfils any aspiration to realise value.

3. Existence of Values

Roman Ingarden's thought provides a helpful systematisation of the problems of the philosophy of value and a direct polemic with the views of Heinrich Rickert. This polemic concerns the question of the existence of values. Although Rickert's answer to the question of the ontological status of values evolved, he refrained from acknowledging their real existence. This issue posed a pressing challenge to Ingarden, as he advocated a realist phenomenology, which was also a clear opposition to Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

Ingarden, referring to Plato's classical metaphysics and Max Scheler's phenomenology, considers values as ideal entities. Values, understood in this way, differ from goods as individual objects in that a value is a real or intentional "set of moments which, occurring on a certain 'good', make it not simply a thing but precisely a 'good'" (Ingarden 1970: 236). Ingarden allows for the possibility that there is no single way in which values can exist and that, for example, moral values exist differently from aesthetic or utility values. The most crucial difference is that moral values are related to the person. In contrast, aesthetic and utility values are related to objects, which affects how values exist: "The first is how the bearer of the value exists, the second is how the value is grounded in the object to which it belongs." (Ingarden 1970: 238) If the bearer is real, then the value is also real, and if the bearer is not real but, for example, intentional, then such an unreal value must be.

The dependence of the mode of existence of values on the object is best revealed concerning time: "Surely, one can agree that values can begin to belong to a certain object and that therefore a certain event occurs: the emergence of a given value or the beginning of its belonging to something. [...] We could perhaps then say that there is a process of realisation of certain values." (Ingarden 1970: 238) In this sense, for Ingarden, values are not independent of their bearers. They are derivative in being from the property of their bearer or the system of properties of several objects. Whether we are talking about the value of a human being, an object, a process, an activity or an event, the way they are realised will be different. However, the transience of the existence of the bearer of value generates problems concerning value. It should be asked what happens to the value, for example, usefulness, when its carrier is annihilated, or at least its functionality is reduced. Does this mean that the values themselves are mutable? It is important for reasons of moral responsibility. If the moral value is temporal, then it passes away. If not, then it remains. However, what about the possibility of change in the so-called forgiveness of guilt if it remains. Hence Ingarden comes to his conviction:

It seems that no form or variety of mode of existence as we know it – that is, neither ideal existence, nor real existence, nor purely intentional (heteronomous) existence – is suitable to be attributed to how at least some values, and moral values, in particular, exist, insofar as the conditions for their ‘realisation’ exist. (Ingarden 1970: 241)

If values do not exist realistically, ideally or intentionally, then perhaps they do not exist at all, as the axiology of Rickert and the Baden School assumes.

In the context of how values exist, the question of Rickert’s axiology arises. Ingarden, contrary to the Baden school of axiology, believes that

‘to be valid’, ‘to be in duty’ or to have ‘importance’ (*Geltung*) can only be if and when one exists in some way. Non-existence simply makes this impossible. Of course, one can say that values (moral values in particular) exist, but by existing, they also have this ‘validity’, relevance and so on. However, is this ‘validity’ a closer determination (if one may say so) of their existence, or is it something that is most closely related to the validity of values? (Ingarden 1970: 242)

If one assumes something non-existent, it can neither be valid or invalid, valid or invalid, have weight or not have weight. The existence of values is a necessary condition for their validity. This does not settle the question of the mode of existence since validity can be a mere determination of the existence of values and even belong to the valence of values.

In the context of the question of the ontological status of values, a fundamental difference between Rickert and Ingarden is revealed. For Rickert, values in a specific sense do not exist, while Ingarden excludes the possibility of the non-existence of values. However, Rickert’s ontology is derived from Rudolf Hermann Lotze’s, which distinguished three spheres of reality: things, events and sentences. These spheres of reality correspond to three possible ways of grasping them (predicates): existence, happening and binding. Hence, the most famous, although abbreviated, formulation of Lotze’s thesis appears: “being is, and values are valid.” Reinhardt Pester characterises the essence of Lotze’s ontology as follows: “Von einer anderen Seinsart sind für ihn [Lotze – T.K.] die Werte; sie erhalten über die Bestimmtheit der Gefühle objektiven Gehalt, sind jedoch nicht von realen Gegenständlichkeit, sondern von idealer Geltung.”¹⁰ (Pester 1997: 307) As Windelband’s PhD supervisor, Lotze strongly influenced the emergence of Baden’s philosophy of value. For Windelband, philosophy in the systematic sense is the critical science of universally valid values (Windelband 1884: 28). In this context comes Rickert, who develops Windelband’s concept of philosophy as a philosophy of values following the thesis of the primacy of practical reason in logic.

For Rickert, the problem of philosophy is the problem of the object of knowledge, which is not the reality but primarily the value (Noras 2005: 167 f.). The

¹⁰ “For him [Lotze], values are of a different kind of being; they receive objective content through the determinacy of feelings but are not of real objecthood but ideal validity.”

reality is immanent and transcendent to the subject is only the value. If cognition wants to pursue truth, then the fundamental question of its object does not appear to concern being but ought, which means the primacy of practical reason in logic. Rickert, however, is not concerned with the cognition offered by the real sciences of being but with the logical presuppositions of all cognition, which faces the fundamental dualism of being and ought, reality and value. The thesis on the primacy of practical reason was questioned by Emil Lask, a student of Rickert (Lask 1923: 347 f.). Lask attempts to combine the axiology of the Baden school with the metaphysical challenge of philosophy, i.e. the theory of two worlds – existing being and valid values and points to the non-sensible (*Nichtsinnliche*) as mediating between them. He thus broadens the understanding of the object of cognition, which is valid values and all non-sensory entities. For Rickert, the objection is so momentous that after the untimely death of his disciple, he develops his philosophy in the direction set by Lask and seeks unity in a philosophical system.

Returning to our considerations, it should be added that in the context of validity, Ingarden draws attention to two aspects of the deontic modality of value which is the ought of value:

More complicated is the matter of this Seinsollen. That certain values ‘ought’ to exist can be meaningfully spoken of in two different situations: a) when these values have not yet been ‘realised’ and b) when this has already happened. (Ingarden 1970: 242)

The oughtness of values can make sense *in futuro* and *in praeteritum*; the former is associated with unrealised values and the latter with realised values. The temporal consequences of the different types of values are also systematically analysed by Rickert, as shown in the previous paragraph.

The first sense of the ought of value in *futuro* refers to such a concretisation of the idea contained in the value in question which is not necessary but demands to be brought about; is not yet, but will be when it comes to pass. At the same time, it is not just an expectation or prognosis, but a situation that: “‘in order’ will be the man who performs this act, that he fulfils, as we say, the duty incumbent upon him. At the same time it is so that he need not fulfil it. This »duty« flows precisely from this character of »obligation« of the existence (realisation) of a given value in a given situation.” (Ingarden 1970: 243)

The second sense of the oughtness of values *in praeteritum* raises the fundamental doubt as to whether values that have already been realised can still constitute the object of oughtness: “when a value (of this type, i.e. a moral value, for example) has already been realised, already exists, its existence no longer bears any stigma that would be, as it were, equivalent to this ‘oughtness’ and in this respect, it does not differ in its existence from the existence of objects devoid of all value and therefore value-indifferent?” (Ingarden 1970: 243) In response to this question, Ingarden sees differences between the values of value-indifferent objects and the realisation of value, which is subject to evaluation: “the very effective existence of a value that ‘ought’ to be realised is, as

the fulfilment of this duty in itself, positively valuable: It is ‘good’, then, that the realisation of the value in question occurs. It is probably what Max Scheler had in mind when, as I have already mentioned, he claimed that the existence of a positive value is itself a positive value.” (Ingarden 1970: 243) For Ingarden, however, a new positive value does not come into being with the existence of a value, but “only the value of a realised value includes, as it were, the existence of a value”. This value of the existence of value has its basis both in the matter of value itself and above all in the effectiveness of its realisation: “It is not the Sollen itself that characterises, in this case, the existence of value of this type, but precisely the fulfilment of this Sollen.” (Ingarden 1970: 243) Ingarden assumes the classical conception of value, which says that the content of value already exists and must be reproduced. It is different for Rickert, for whom the value content arises concerning value.

Ingarden stresses that he is only considering particular kinds of values in general, but not particular values *in individuo*. He arrives at the following conviction:

The supposition arises that the mode of existence of values is somehow connected with various considerations, and thus with their matter, and with the type of their valence, as finally with the mode of existence of the objects to which they may belong. However, we are not able to explain these matters sufficiently and to formulate statements which are satisfactorily justified. (Ingarden 1970: 244)

Therefore, the various types of value have a different mode of existence and are not comparable. Moral values cannot be equated or compared with aesthetic or utilitarian values because their mode of existence is different; they are grounded differently in their carrier.

4. “Height” of Values

In the context of his concept of an open system of values, Rickert addresses the issue of the hierarchy of values, which is strongly linked to the problem of the height of values. He recognises that philosophy must combine historical randomness in specific value contexts to find room for the life that eludes it (Rickert 1913: 299). For Rickert, the most significant difficulty of systematics arises from the constant mutability of the matter of values; values signify development, and therefore “everything seems uncertain and changeable”. In historical development, however, everything changes except the very idea of development, which means, was “has to be considered as a premise of every development, is withdrawn from development and therefore also shows a supra-historical character” (Rickert 1913: 299).

Following Scheler that there are higher values, for example, moral values, which stand higher in the hierarchy of values than lower values, utilitarian values, generally implies that the lower ones must subordinate to the higher ones. For Rickert, however, this hierarchy does not appear as subordination. Although it considers the parameter of their height, his system of values does

not hierarchise them among themselves in a vertical way but is horizontal and rather delineates a kind of archipelago of individual kinds of values.

Compared to Scheler, Rickert outlines not so much a life as a historical perspective of values. He arranges the values prevailing in historical life and the cultural goods actually present in it by noticing “on the one hand, the various types of value, also concerning their content, stand in the unified context of a gradual sequence, and in which, on the other hand, space remains for the unfinished fullness of the historical, cultural goods” (Rickert 1913: 300). For Rickert, it is not so much the specific worldview with its constitutive values that is important, but the general theory of worldview against the background of cultural values that sets the historical perspective on the development of subjects, goods and values. It is about the system of values that forms the basis of a worldview and not the worldview itself.

According to Krijnen, in Rickert's system, it is the historical subject, not the individual spheres of culture, which is the main criterion of the hierarchy of values (Krijnen 2001: 548 f.). The individual spheres of culture are understood as fields of possible realisation of subjectivity, and therefore it is the subject that has primacy. Rickert's very justification of the hierarchical nature of values is not clear enough. He acknowledges that this hierarchical nature arises from the task of philosophy as a theory of worldview. However, he also accepts the philosophical-life justification that it is a consequence of such an interpretation of the meaning of life that integrates the whole into a single life centre. Krijnen treats the necessity of a hierarchy of values as a noetic necessity (Krijnen 2001: 548 f.). The task of philosophy is the theory of values and the doctrine of the meaning of life, that is, the position of man concerning values (the doctrine of the immanent meaning).

For Rickert, it is essential to distinguish between form and content and whole and part so that a cultural good has a form and content that is formed by a whole consisting of parts. It implies different ways of realising the cultural good, which may involve either the whole or a part of this good in different value forms (Rickert 1913: 302; 1921: 378 f.). For example, in the cognition of reality, the ultimate tendency of the subject is towards the infinite whole, which means that the finite subject does not reach this ultimate whole, which is only an infinite task. We can only arrive at cognition through approximations to the infinite totality through constantly unready goods. In the case of the domain of art, whose cultural good is an infinite particularity, the subject has an ultimate tendency concerning a finite part of the infinite content, which makes possible the full completion by the subject. In contrast, in the case of religion's ultimate totality, the ultimate tendency directs the subject towards the ultimate totality, which shapes the content and fulfils any striving for the realisation of value.

The transposition to realisation in time reflects the hierarchy of values (Krijnen 2001: 552 f.). The cognitive goods of the infinite whole are realised gradually in an infinite process, so their values have future value, and their goods are future goods. The goods of the ultimate particularity lie in the present, and the acts of achieving them have meaning only in the here and now. The goods of

the ultimate totality lie beyond the future and present of the finite subject and are therefore entirely outside time in eternity. They are eternal goods realised by acts whose meaning is determined by eternal values. In this way, the essential division of goods into immanent and transcendent goods is also outlined (Rickert 1913: 302 f.; cf. 1921: 380 f.). Immanent goods are temporal goods that can be realised in the present or future. Eternal goods, on the other hand, are transcendent.

5. “Autonomy” of Values

For Rickert, autonomy has two meanings and refers, on the one hand, to take a stand on values, but, on the other hand, also to absolute values that apply independently of human recognition (Bohlken 2002: 132). There is both the autonomy of the human will and the autonomy of absolute values. Although this understanding of value derives from Kant for Rickert, it should be noted that he extends the concept of autonomy and extends beyond ethics to several other cultural fields. In this respect, one has to agree with the experts in Kantian philosophy, Otfried Höffe and Herbert Schnädelbach, that the theory of value has virtually no counterpart in Kant’s philosophy and the recognition of the problem of value as a fundamental philosophical problem is what fundamentally distinguishes the philosophy of the Baden school from that of Kant. This heterodoxy demonstrates the originality of Baden neo-Kantianism. Although a line of development from Kant to Rickert can be discerned, his philosophy of value should be regarded as a remarkable achievement in the history of philosophy. Rickert uses an axiological interpretation of Kant’s ethics in his transcendental philosophy of culture, at the same time transferring the notion of the autonomy of the subject from ethics to other spheres of culture and thus extending the circle of absolute values (Bohlken 2002: 137). For Rickert, the subject’s autonomy does not imply the relativity of values. On the contrary, the necessary condition for the possibility of human freedom is absolute values to which the subject can relate.

In this context, it is important to clarify what is meant by absolute values. Bohlken accurately recognises that:

Die Annahme absoluter Werte ergibt sich als notwendiges Resultat der transzentalphilosophischen Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit universell verstehbarer kultureller Praktiken bzw. der diesen zugrundeliegenden Normen und Sinngebilde.¹¹ (Bohlken 2002: 153)

At the same time, Bohlken notes that this argumentation is circular since “the universality of certain norms or meaning structures is already assumed in the justification”. However, one should be careful with the charge of *petitio principii*. For the transcendental reconstruction of the “universal horizon of

¹¹ “The assumption of absolute values arises as a necessary result of transcendental philosophical reflection on the conditions of the possibility of universally comprehensible cultural practices or the norms and structures of meaning that underlie them.”

meaning" in transcendental philosophy cannot be understood as a proof in the strict sense of the existence of absolute, i.e. unconditional values. The aim of such a reconstruction is to capture the potential presuppositions of universalism by explaining in a coherent and plausible way the necessary conditions of possibility. Only a universalism so reconstructed can be compared with cultural relativism to determine which provides the better explanation.

For Rickert, autonomy is first and foremost a feature of people realising a certain kind of values:

Als Pflicht kann die Realisierung jedes Gutes auftreten, d. h. auch der wissenschaftliche und der künstlerische Mensch gehorcht freiwillig der Norm und hat einen autonomen Willen, wenn er die Wahrheit um der Wahrheit, die Schönheit um der Schönheit willen sucht, ein Umstand, der von Bedeutung für die Weltanschauungslehre ist, hier jedoch nicht weiter verfolgt werden soll.¹² (Rickert 1913: 311)

Rickert undertakes in the system the analysis concerning moral values. He acknowledges that the concept of autonomy seems too broad here since we understand morality as social morality. However, we must keep in mind that "the consciousness of duty is not only directed to the realisation of values in general but the realisation of autonomous personalities in social life" (Rickert 1913: 311). Social life entails the social expectations of its members. A person must take a conscious stance on morality, explicitly approving some and rejecting others; "if, therefore, he confronts society on his own in order to decide 'freely' about his bondage, then 'morality' arises as an autonomous recognition of what is obligatory in social life" (Rickert 1913: 312). Such an attitude can sometimes be anti-social.

The autonomy of the person understood in this way must be complemented by the social environment:

Das ganze soziale Leben muß unter den Gesichtspunkt gestellt werden, daß es die freien, autonomen Persönlichkeiten zu fördern hat, und von hier aus sind dann Verbände wie Ehe, Familie, Staat, Nation, Kulturmenschheit usw. in ihrer ethischen Bedeutung zu verstehen.¹³ (Rickert 1913: 312)

This means for Rickert that the social institutions in terms of sexual, economic, legal, political and national relations must take a form that gives persons their autonomy and personal freedom. Autonomy is thus the domain of the will of individuals pursuing values that society should meet to enable them to act freely. Rickert does not express this explicitly, but it implies that freedom becomes a fundamental social value that enables realising other values.

12 "The realisation of every good can occur as a duty, i.e. the scientific and the artistic person also voluntarily obeys the norm and has an autonomous will when he seeks truth for the sake of truth, beauty for the sake of beauty, a circumstance that is of importance for the doctrine of world views but will not continue here."

13 "The whole of social life must be placed under the aspect that it has to promote free, autonomous personalities. From here, associations such as marriage, family, state, nation, cultural humanity, etc., are to be understood in their ethical significance."

6. “Objectivity” of Values

The starting point of neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy is an unavoidable fact. This is no different for the Baden School and Rickert, for whose philosophy of culture it is above all culture as the place where validity is realised (Krijnen 2001: 495 f.). For him, culture is, on the one hand, a material given empirically and, on the other hand, an object to be comprehended philosophically through a value system. Rickert’s philosophy analyses the different types of factual claims to validity that constitute the factual material in which values are sought. Transcendental philosophy starts from this analysis and moves towards a synthesis.

The starting point of Rickert’s analyses of transcendental psychology is the subject. As Christian Krijnen notes, however, this implies neither individual nor collective subjectivity (intersubjectivity) in the way values are framed (Krijnen 2001: 499 f.). Although Rickert distinguishes between the individual or general valid values from objective values, it is essential to note that their validity is limited to a given subject or subjects and is grounded in actual real valuations. Their validity is not categorical and absolute but hypothetical and dependent; if someone does not recognise these values, they do not apply to him. Rickert, however, assumes objective values that are valid independently of their recognition by a real subject (Rickert 1921: 133 f.). The distinction between subjective and objective values translates into a distinction between personal values and cultural (civilisation, life) values.

The objectivity of values reveals Rickert’s attitude to the nature-culture opposition. For him, nature is a value-free reality. However, as part of nature, man has the task not only of existence in the natural sense but of embodying values, which is only possible because he is part of the natural world. Artificial culture consists of the embodiment of goods by man conditioned both by values and nature. Krijnen comments on this as follows:

Dieser mit dem Moment der Faktizität des Subjekts verbundene Aspekt der *Geltungsrealisierung* führt so auf einen Inbegriff notwendiger natürlicher *Bedingungen*, die das Subjekt naturaliter am Leben erhalten und damit Wertrealisierung faktisch ermöglichen.¹⁴ (Krijnen 2001: 501)

It is not even that one has to live to realise values, but at the centre is the observation that nature becomes a means to realising values for the subject. In other words, nature serves culture. Hence man’s natural life is not axiologically indifferent like nature but becomes a value that gives human life meaning.

Cultural values should be distinguished from utilitarian values, which are autonomous and apply independently of resource values; categorical values from hypothetical values:

¹⁴ “This aspect of the realisation of validity, which connects with the moment of the facticity of the subject, thus leads to an epitome of necessary natural conditions that keep the subject alive naturally and thus make value realisation factually possible.”

Wir können aber den Begriff der Autonomie auch direkt mit dem des Eigenwertes selber verbinden, und wir können dann die Eigenwerte, die mehr als bloße Lebenswerte oder Zivilisationswerte sind, als autonome Werte bezeichnen.¹⁵ (Rickert 1934: 182)

The point is that proper determination is shaped by autonomous values and is beyond whether something is helpful to live. Autonomous values cannot be wholly reduced to actual necessity but transcend their values and the values of civilisation. Rickert distinguishes dependent values from proper values, such as life and civilisational values (Rickert 1934: 182f.). Dependent values apply only subjectively and are goal-dependent. In contrast, proper values apply objectively. The difference between objective and subjective values is pragmatic and not logical.

At the centre of Rickert's reflection is the problem of the objectivity of valid values (Rickert 1921: 320 f.). Every concrete culture is a specific embodiment of values in the form of goods produced. Hence, the objective purpose of the value system must be discussed. In answering this question, it is essential to reflect that the relationship between subjective and objective validity is external since the two types of value must be related internally. Hence, starting the analysis of values with objective values is unnecessary as a starting point since their objectification is the end of the reflection on validity.

Rickert most fully addresses the objectivity of value in *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* concerning the cognitive value of truth, that is, the fundamental question of the validity and value of thought. This work is devoted to the fundamental problem of the theory of cognition, which constitutes the starting point and systematic foundation of philosophy as a whole, as well as logic, methodology and philosophy of science. Rickert confronts the challenge posed by scepticism and asks the fundamental questions: What is the object of cognition? What gives our knowledge objectivity? However, his answer is not a simple negation of scepticism, which as such, by denying the very possibility of cognition, abolishes itself. Rickert's answer is given on the grounds of transcendental philosophy and therefore explicates the presuppositions of cognition as the necessary conditions of its possibility. Hence, Rickert sees the problem of transcendence in relation to the knowing subject. This, however, implies neither relativism nor subjectivism. It is difficult to imagine anything more objective and absolute than the capture of the complete relationship between subject and object, or immanence and transcendence. If we conceive of the object as the measure of the validity of cognitive acts, then the object of all cognition is its criterion, which is the measure of objectivity of cognition. Understood in this way, the object is independent of the subject since it is thanks to the object that cognition acquires objectivity. Rickert searches for an independent criterion of cognition, which is a necessary assumption of all

¹⁵ “However, we can also connect the concept of autonomy directly with the eigenvalue itself. We can then call the eigenvalues more than mere life values or civilisation values autonomous values.”

cognition and concludes that neither the mind-independent world nor physically understood things in themselves can be such a criterion. They cannot be such a criterion because they are not transcendent yet. Only the value that gives meaning to cognition can be transcendent.

It is therefore necessary to ask what ontological status values have, in particular whether they are objective. According to Rickert, values are irreal and should be conceptually distinguished from anything real:

Die Werte selbst sind deshalb weder im Gebiete der realen Objekte noch in dem der realen Subjekte zu finden. Sie bilden ein Reich für sich, das jenseits von Subjekt und Objekt liegt, solange man bei diesen Worten nur an Realitäten denkt.¹⁶ (Rickert 2018: 229 [F 195])

Values function separately from the reality of subject and object. Goods and valuations must be conceptually distinguished from values. Goods as objective realisations of values and valuations as subjective acts relating to values do not belong to the domain of values but to that of reality.

Values understood in this way are transcendent to the subject and object, remaining immanent. This does not resolve the dualism of transcendence and immanence. Rickert is aware of this. Therefore, between the two, he postulates a realm of sense and duty that mediates between the immanent real being and the transcendent irreal object (Rickert 2018: 283 [F 247]). Both subject and object constitute an immanent real being. Without value and the meaning it creates, they would be condemned to psychophysical dualism and the problem of the “bridge”; thanks to it, the realms (*Reiche*) of the psyche and physics become a unity (Rickert 2018: 333 [F 293]). The separation of the three kingdoms and the intermediate kingdom do not, for Rickert, imply the problem of the unity, which is a primordial or pre-cognitive and pre-conceptual state (Rickert 2018: 336f. [F 296f.]).

In conclusion, it should be said that Rickert's concept of value in the philosophy of culture initiated a reflection on the problem of values in philosophy. His axiology was followed by further attempts, including phenomenology understood as a philosophical movement that emerged from neo-Kantianism, and was developed by the next generation of philosophers. This movement, as it were, took up the problem of values anew, unfortunately only rarely referring to the elaborations of the previous generation.

In response to the challenges of his time, Rickert did not wholly abandon the advantages of a system of philosophy and proposed an open system of values, which presupposes the infinite possibility of concrete realisations of values. Only as an entirely finite whole could such an open system of values encompass the whole and function positively as a principle of unity and coherence of all its components.

¹⁶ “Values themselves can therefore be found neither in the realm of real objects nor in that of real subjects. So far as one thinks about these words only in terms of realities, they form a realm of their own, beyond subject and object.”

Rickert also distinguishes essential stages in the dynamics of value realisation, which, however, in his view, have nothing to do with the psychology of values. Such value realisation can ultimately aim at encompassing the whole and therefore belongs to the essence of value realisation in general. It is also essential to any hierarchy of values and should therefore be counted as a formal factor and not merely as a historical one. In this sense, the philosophy of culture, in finding the general and formal conditions of the possibility of cultural life, is dependent on the historical sciences of culture. In this spirit, Rickert distinguishes three different ways in which values are realised in the form of goods.

Very significant in Ingarden's polemic with Rickert is the question of the mode of existence or non-existence of value. The existential modus of value is derived from the mode of existence of the bearer of value or the object to which it belongs, which is best revealed in relation to time. For Ingarden, values are not independent in relation to their bearers. They are derived in being from the property of their bearer or the property system of several objects. Against this background, Rickert develops Windelband's conception of philosophy as a philosophy of values following the thesis of the primacy of practical reason in logic (i.e. the primacy of taking a position towards values) and recognises that this does not concern the type of cognition offered by the real sciences of being but the logical premises of all cognition that express the fundamental dualism of being and ought, reality and value. Rickert, influenced by his discussion with Lask, eventually recognises that values have the status of irreducible entities, and therefore Ingarden's objection applies at best to the early phase of his philosophy.

In the context of an open value system, Rickert addresses the issue of value hierarchy, which is strongly related to the problem of the height of values. He orders the values that dominate historical life and cultural goods. Although considering the parameter of their height, his system of values does not hierarchise them among themselves firmly in a vertical way but in a horizontal way, thus delineating a kind of archipelago of individual types of values. For Rickert, it is not so much the specific worldview with its hierarchy of values that is important, but the general theory of the worldview that sets the historical perspective on the development of subjects, goods and values.

For Rickert, the subject's autonomy does not imply the relativity of values. On the contrary, he is concerned with setting limits to the possibility of human freedom, the preconditions of which are absolute values. However, his transcendental reconstruction of the universal horizon of meaning cannot be understood as a proof of absolute values. Instead, it is about grasping the hypothetical presuppositions of universalism through a coherent and plausible explanation of the necessary conditions of possibility.

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Tomas Kubalica

O problemima filozofije vrednosti: Hajnrih Rikert u poređenju sa Romanom Ingardenom

Apstrakt

Tema ovog rada jeste pojam vrednosti u filozofiji vrednosti Hajnriha Rikerta. Autor pokušava da izvede sistematsku studiju ovog pojma unutar konteksta fundamentalnih problema ontologije vrednosti u mislima Romana Ingardena. Rezultat je sistematizovana prezentacija Rikertovog pojma vrednosti kao i niz zaključaka koji se tiču temeljnih aspekata njegove filozofije kulture. Ovo poređenje otkriva suštinsku protivrečnost u formalnom karakteru Rikertove filozofije vrednosti koja implicira široku otvorenost i slobodu u razumevanju i implementaciji vrednosti. Još jedna temeljna razlika koju Ingarden razotkriva tiče se ontološkog statusa vrednosti.

Ključne reči: vrednost, aksiologija, filozofija kulture, Rikert, Ingarden