

LIBERATING EDUCATION: WHAT FROM, WHAT FOR?

Editors: Igor Cvejić, Predrag Krstić,
Nataša Lacković, Olga Nikolić



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Univerzitet u Beogradu
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

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


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Igor Cvejić¹
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Emancipation and/or Education: Challenges and Frictions

We don't need no education
We don't need no thought control
No dark sarcasm in the classroom
Teachers leave them kids alone
Hey! Teachers! Leave them kids alone!
All in all it's just another brick in the wall.
All in all you're just another brick in the wall.

(Lyrics by Roger Waters, *Pink Floyd*, 1979)

The relations between emancipation, society and education have been fraught with tensions throughout history. More than 40 years ago, the release of Pink Floyd's rock opera album *The Wall* shook up the school and political landscape in Great Britain. As Rogers Waters explained in the interview for the Rolling Stone magazine in 2015, he wanted to express his own feeling of alienation (Greene 2015). It was not to “accuse” teachers of the educational shortcomings as they would always be an “easy target”. The song

1 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: cvejic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

2 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: krstic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs; prekrst66@gmail.com.

3 Educational Research, Lancaster University: n.lackovic@lancaster.ac.uk.

4 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: olganikolic111@gmail.com; olga.nikolic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

did have a significant emancipatory and education “life”. Soon after it was released, it was banned in South Africa in 1980,⁵ as it supported school boycott against racial inequities in education under apartheid.

Education may lead to emancipation, but it may also be precisely what one should emancipate oneself from. Even though we are the inheritors of the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment, never before have these been under such rigorous critical scrutiny as from various intellectual traditions of the second half of the 20th century, such as postcolonial and decolonial studies, post-structuralist thought, feminist critique, posthumanism, etc. But precisely because the classic educational emancipatory ideal appears both outdated and still current, there is a great need for rethinking the idea of emancipation, along with the role and the aim of education.

Some of the insufficiently considered issues are immediately imposed: Who is the subject of emancipation? Emancipation from what? What does emancipatory education look like in practice? Does the education that emancipates today differ from the ones before? How can we criticize ideological, normalizing, conformist functions of education and still argue its emancipatory role? What are the possible helpful tools and methods of emancipation through education, how and with what purpose should they be used? How can technology be emancipatory and what makes it anti-emancipatory? How can the relation between educators and the educated contribute to the growth of personal and social freedom? Ultimately, what does it even mean to be or to become emancipated? And doesn't setting emancipation as the main, or the most desirable goal of education already assume an unacceptable instrumentalization of education?

This volume gathers original contributions to these and other related issues and questions. The primary objective of this book is exploring the intersection of emancipation, society and education, from

5 The New York Times 1980.

critical and theoretical lenses. In making the selection, we also cared about their contemporary currency. Today's world brings with it specific challenges: e.g. new distributions of geopolitical power, the crisis of democracy, the rise of new technologies. Thus, we wanted this volume to bring a fresh perspective on the ways in which the existing educational practices should be challenged. The overall ambition is to present studies that could contribute to the ongoing discussion and debates around the role of emancipation in the 21st century, from educational perspectives.

There is a healthy body of scholarship around education and emancipation in the current literature. The schools of critical theory, critical pedagogy, poststructuralist feminism, critical race theory, and decolonial studies have especially contributed to the debate.⁶ Although the texts enclosed in this volume refer to these authors, we didn't limit ourselves to one school of thought. Instead, we decided to remain open to diverse philosophical approaches, adding fresh perspectives from several other disciplines as well, including sociology (Petkovska), pedagogy and philology (Pavlović & Ilić Rajković), and art theory (Jankov).

Even though the body of published articles and chapters is considerable, collections dealing explicitly with the relation between education and emancipation, especially those considering this topic simultaneously from a variety of theoretical perspectives, such as this one, are scarce. We believe that researchers interested in these issues can benefit from a rich collection devoted explicitly to this topic. We

6 Jacques Rancière (Rancière 1991), Walter Mignolo (Mignolo 2000; Tlostanova & Mignolo 2012), Michael Apple (Apple 2004; Apple 1982), Henry Giroux (Giroux 1983), Peter McLaren (McLaren 1997), and Gloria Ladson-Billings (Ladson-Billings 1997; Ladson-Billings & Tate IV 1995), in addition to having produced well-known classics, are still contributing new analyses, providing the main references for the contemporary debate, which is actively continued, deepened, and taken to the next level by Antonia Darder (Darder 2002), Gert Biesta (Biesta 2008; Bingham & Biesta 2010; Osberg & Biesta 2020), Stephen Ball (Grimaldi & Ball 2021; Ball 2003), and Noah De Lissovoy (De Lissovoy 2008; De Lissovoy 2015) among others. In addition, more recent notable contributions to the debate include Neil Hooley (Hooley 2020), Michel Alhadeff-Jones (Alhadeff-Jones 2018), Greg Wiggan and associates (Wiggan et al. 2014), and Chris Sarra (Sarra 2014).

hope to have shown through this collection how by asking about the relation between education and emancipation, we ask about the very purpose of education. Articles are grouped around three main themes: the relations between educators and the educated, the use of educational tools and practices in an emancipatory way, and the role of education in emancipating individuals and societies from the constraints and injustices imposed by the existing social structures.

Educators and Educated

The three chapters of this thematic whole address several challenges that arise out of the relation between students and teachers, those who are educating and those who are educated. Can the authority of teachers and the autonomy of students be reconciled? How does a more egalitarian education look like, and how can it contribute to the emancipation of students and the society as a whole? Finally, how can we become emancipatory educators of ourselves?

The first chapter of this collection, “Emotional Base of Educational Process: Beyond Care for Wellbeing” by **Igor Cvejić**, treats in the last few decades a very prominent topic of emotional investments and transfers in education. Relying on the family model and the works of Shapiro and Helm, the author finds that asymmetrical recognition of learners’ autonomy and emotions are not enough. That’s what the term ‘beyond’ from the title stands for. Mutual or joint engagement between the educator and the learner, care of all actors in the educational process, their union in recognizing each other as ‘one of us’ - these are noble and valuable suggestions that conclude this analysis of the feelings that underlie or surround education.

The chapter by **Aleksandar Milanković** “Interactive Teaching as a Component of Social Emancipation” presents interactive teaching method and argues convincingly for its vast emancipatory potential. With a background in social constructivism, teaching and

learning are here understood and practiced as processes of communication and interaction. The aim of interactive teaching is not just the transmission of knowledge, but a comprehensive personal development in partnership with others. That is why, Milanković argues, this method is suitable for developing relations between educators and the educated that are based on equality, participation, communication, dialogue, cooperation, and solidarity, rather than the hierarchy inherent in the traditional *ex catedra* teaching. When applied to subjects such as civic education, philosophy, sociology, history, literature, media, etc, this method exercises “active detection of modes of coercion, power, indoctrination, and manipulation”, motivating students to “transform, change, and improve their social surroundings”. By stressing the importance of communication between equals, the paper shows the way towards schools as true communities of learning.

Marija Velinov ventured to analyse the Stoics’ (primarily Seneca’s) relationship to education through the prism of Foucault’s understanding of Stoicism. *Stultitia*, *Askesis*, and related ancient concepts have been put to the test in their connection to listening, reading, and writing as educational practices. Emancipation emerges convincingly and inspiringly out of the discussion of the liberating claim of the ethics of the self to appropriate the truth and the becoming of the subject of truth-telling. It turns out that subjects primarily need to become independent and free of themselves – in order to become emancipated. Foucault evokes and interprets this wisdom of antiquity in an exceptional way – Velinov concludes – finding it instructive for contemporaneity as well.

Emancipation for and from the Society

The largest thematic whole consists of five chapters, exploring the complex relations of education and emancipation in the broader social context. The papers reflect the problematic status of the Enlightenment ideal, with some defending (Smajević Roljić; Nikolić), or assuming it (Šoć), and others criticizing it (Ostojić; Petkovska). The

negative effects of contemporary neocolonial and neoliberal society on education are analyzed and proposals for countering them are offered.

In the chapter “An Interpretation of the Educational Process from the Perspective of Kant’s Philosophy of History and Legal-Political Theory” **Milica Smajević Roljić** outlines Kant’s understanding of education in its appropriate social framework. One of the standard accounts of goals of education in Kant emphasizes their ethical function. Accordingly, the main goals of education should be seen in personal (moral) growth. Smajević Roljić stresses the importance of historical-political processes, more precisely, the overlapping of Kant’s understanding of history and legal-political theory with his account on education. Besides the fact that goals of education and historical processes are one and the same (according to Kant), the article reveals the dependence of possibilities of the emancipation from the state of development of society, i.e. the socio-political conditions which affect not only society as a whole, but also every individual person.

In her chapter “Emancipatory and Ideological Functions of Education”, **Olga Nikolić** traces the development of scholarly thought on emancipation through three canonical texts: Rousseau’s *Emile*, Kant’s *What is Enlightenment?* and Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. She juxtaposes the key ideas of emancipation in these texts with neoliberal ideology of education in the present day. The chapter argues that emancipation should be concerned with worthy ideals for society and education, but it can hardly eradicate ideology, which neoliberalism falls under. Emancipatory thought and action will always be critical of ideologies, striving towards an emancipatory ideal, which may or may not turn into or be abused through ideology-in-practice. The major contribution of this study is in making a conceptual distinction between *ideology* and *ideal*, in response to the critics arguing that the Enlightenment ideal had itself become ideological and had instrumentalized education.

Relying on the strong input of contemporary empirical research,

Andrija Šoć in his chapter “Deliberative Education and Quality of Deliberation: Toward a Critical Dialogue and Resolving Deep Disagreements” proposes standards that can empower deliberative education. Šoć uses empirical evidence taken from various countries to reveal problems that arise in the quality of deliberation. Against top-down approaches and building on Steiner, Šoć advocates for an optimistic bottom-up solution in education. The significance of Šoć’s account lies in the proposal of the two-dimensional approach for formulating goals and practices of deliberative education. Descriptive aspects inform us (*post-hoc*) about the quality of education and its malfunctioning. However, the description doesn’t suffice to address the question of how we can improve it through education. For this purpose, Šoć argues, it is better to combine descriptive aspects with the normative ones contained in Grice’s cooperation principle. In this way, the emancipation of citizens could be enhanced not just as a realization of the ‘dare to think’ maxim, but also in such a way that citizens will be ready to be proven wrong by the strength of a better argument.

Michel Serres is the main character of **Aleksandar Ostojic’s** chapter “Knowledge Versus Production”. And the former found a good interpreter and successor in the latter: they are both wholeheartedly opposed to the reduction of knowledge through rigorously imposed frameworks and goals, and to the measuring of education by the scale of efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, and other economic categories. The culprit is found in the discourse of methodocentrism, not only for ‘bad’ science but also for colonial and imperial politics with its single vision of emancipation. Serres’s efforts are instructive in this regard, insofar as they “open the ways to knowledge” and the “roads of discovery”. The hierarchy, norms, and reproduction of knowledge are unequivocally opposed in favour of free, divergent thinking, and a completely open dissemination of knowledge. In other words, Serres and Ostojic warn that modern knowledge nurtured in schools is rather a dogmatic suspension of knowledge than its inheritance, and advocate for alternative pathways of knowledge – oriented towards innovation.

Starting from the thesis that in the contemporary world, plagued by divisions and injustices, students' understanding of their position in the global market and the global division of geopolitical power significantly contributes to their emancipation, the paper by **Sanja Petkovska** "Decolonial Emancipation on the Postsocialist Peripheries and the Future of Critical Pedagogy" defends it by discussing the main tenets of decolonial education. First, the author traces the historical emergence of decolonial education in the context of the crisis of critical pedagogy. This is followed by an overview of the main concepts of the decolonial option in the work of Madina Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, summed up in the call for "learning to unlearn". Finally, Petkovska presents two postcolonial educational theories, by Chela Sandoval and Iveta Silova, in order to exemplify how the field of decolonial educational studies can contribute to emancipation in the classroom. Particular value of this chapter lies in calling attention to the postsocialist spaces, often neglected in this context, as being in need of decolonization and emancipation.

Educational Tools of Emancipation

This thematic whole demonstrates by means of concrete examples how educational tools (textbooks, art, technology) can on the one hand be used to emancipate, but also how they can be ideologically abused and serve as means of control.

In the chapter "Educational Technology: From Educational Anarchism to Educational Totalitarianism", **Mikhail Bukhtoyarov** and **Anna Bukhtoyarova** explore the relation between educational technology and educational ideology with regards to an ever-increasing use of technology as an educational tool. They provide a detailed and original analysis of educational ideologies on the spectrum between educational anarchism and educational totalitarianism, with respect to the use of technology in education. They focus particularly on the growing risks of the abuse of technology in the context of social change brought by the lifelong learning paradigm in education. They

observe the tendency of even the technologies originally supported by anarchist ideas to become tools of totalitarianism when implemented throughout the educational system and warn against the dangers of justifying the use of technologies to track students' personal data.

Sonja Jankov's chapter "Social Turn and Operative Realism: Two Emancipatory Methods of Contemporary Art Practices" discloses the critical potentials of novel artistic practices. Choosing to exemplify her thesis with the work of two artists, the installation *What Else Could We Talk About?* by Teresa Margolles and the long-term project *Disputed Histories* by Vahida Ramujkić, Jankov reveals emancipatory potentials of the social turn in arts and operative realism. In spite of the differences between the two approaches, the authors mentioned combine them both. By pointing out their relational character toward the world and the specific mode of knowledge production, Jankov concludes that such socially engaged artistic methods could initiate new forms of sociability that emancipates participants. What is crucial is that these artistic methods can produce perspective-shifting and critical distancing in such a way as to enable participants to take an emancipated view of the world, providing both openness to other's perspectives and the capability to approach problems from a 'global' stance.

In the final chapter of the collection, **Aleksandar Pavlović** and **Aleksandra Ilić Rajković** follow the routes of the neo-romantic discourse in educational policy from the constitution of the modern Serbian state in the second half of the nineteenth century to the breakup of communism as the official Yugoslav ideology and the rise of nationalism from the 1990s onwards. Thoroughly laid out basics and main landmarks of the Romantic-national ideas of education are compared, in this particularly striking review, with the current Serbian history readers for primary and secondary schools. The author's diagnosis concludes that we are "still far from the emancipation of pupils and the education system from the neo-romantic idea of nation and national identity". The proposed therapy is to include and respect

different sources and views on the same events in the teaching process, whereby students would be able to gain a more comprehensive view of both their own past and their neighbours' through active learning. Thus, this approach can “contribute overall to a more realistic, nuanced and reconciliatory perception of their present problems”.

The questions posed in this volume were originally shaped through discussions within the Edulab: Laboratory for Educational Strategies, a group of researchers and practitioners of education coming from the fields of philosophy, pedagogy and education studies, literary theory, art history, and political science. Edulab was formed at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, with an aim to offer a fresh theoretical perspective on education through interdisciplinary scientific research. Additionally, Edulab aims at making educational themes more present in the public and finding ways for the results of the theoretical work and public engagement to be applied in practice.

We believe that this collection contributes to these goals.

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EDUCATORS AND EDUCATED

Igor Cvejić¹

The Emotional Base of Educational Process: Beyond Care for Wellbeing

This paper starts from the presupposition that the necessity of the education of “immatures” does not rest primarily on biological or empirical reasons, but on normative ones. As argued by Tamar Schapiro (Schapiro 1999), on a recognition of moral autonomy and responsibility. This immediately opens the problem which Schapiro (Ibid.) calls a “problem of childhood”. On the one hand, autonomy is not something that (passively) happens. On the other hand, autonomy does not arise only from a set of choices and actions of immatures. Thus, the main aim of education could be overcoming the addressed problem.

In the second part of the article, I will address Schapiro’s solution, as well as criticisms of that solution. However, the central goal of this paper will be to designate essential emotional relations between the educator and the learner. First, we must consider that an educator must be capable of showing care for a learner perceived as

¹ Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: cvejic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

an autonomous agent, beyond (usually patronizing) care for wellbeing, even if this care is no more than therapeutic trust. To be more precise, an educator needs to have emotional capacities to care for that which the learner cares for, i.e. that which Bennet W. Helm calls care about an agent as such. In other words, emotional processes must include a recognition of learners' emotions. This is still not enough, because this one-sided (weak) asymmetric relation cannot explain how the educator's authority could influence learner's autonomy. In order for this to happen, educational process must involve a mutual engagement between the educator and the learner, so learners can adopt the influence of the educator's evaluations on the basis of their own autonomous evaluative perspective, without undermining their own autonomy. This is the relation we paradigmatically find in friendship. Thus, educational processes seem to have to involve (quasi-)friendship without equality. I will argue for an alternative view – to understand educational processes as joint engagements, involving mutual care between its actors, who treat each other as “one of us”.

Emotions and Normative Reasons for Education and Emancipation

The role of emotions in education could be studied for various reasons. One of them is certainly related to a motivational role emotion plays in the learning process. Positive emotions can encourage students to engage in a learning activity. However, negative emotions can also stimulate intensive positive attitude toward learning (e.g., shame for failing an exam etc.). Apart from these psychological and motivational effects, emotions can also have an impact on social cohesion, either between a teacher and his/her students or between students. Moreover, it is widely recognized that emotion influences cognitive capacities, for example, by stimulating attention and memory. What applies to students also applies to teachers. Careful research of the impact emotions have in education could help us to develop various strategies and plans and generally lead to what might be called an emotional economy in education.

For similar reasons we study the role particular emotions have in education, e.g. guilt, shame, pride, joy, fear etc. The focus here is not on general motivational or cognitive impact, but on various positive and negative impacts of a specific emotion. However, the main end of it is the development of emotional economy.

None of this will be a topic in this article. I am starting from three presuppositions that immediately explain in what way emotions are important for education. (1) The first is one of the presuppositions of relational education, that stipulate that education is above all about the relation between its actors. (2) The second presupposition is that every interpersonal relation could be explained in terms of emotions which are involved. The idea that emotions “color” interpersonal relation is not new, but this does not mean that every interpersonal relation is based on intensive emotions between the parties (like love, for example). The point is, rather, that even a relation deprived of emotions could be explained in emotional terms – as colored with indifference. The question would be: *how is the relation between actors in education emotionally colored?* This question does not require us saying anything prescriptive about these relations. (3) However, I also think that the bases of emotional relations in educational processes are normative. This means that there is a kind of commitment by those who are (intentionally) involved in educational processes, to how this relation *ought to be*. What follows from the third presupposition is that reasons for teacher/student relation cannot be articulated in merely descriptive terms but a normative one (roughly speaking, it is about rights and responsibilities). The least complicated way to address the necessity of education in the relation between adults and infants is to point out its biological reasons. We are all born without skills and knowledge required for our own preservations and we must acquire them from those who already have them – this could be a catchline of this approach indicated already in the myth of Prometheus who provided us with the understanding of fire (see Plato 1996). Even if this approach cannot explain the necessity of education (as we know it), the argu-

ment can be strengthened with the claim that we live in extraordinary complex societies and that different knowledge should be acquired to cope with the challenges of living in such societies (see Dewey 2001). In the end, it seems that this is the reason why we pack out our children to school. Of course, education does not only serve the preservation of life. Education is also about the development of skills and knowledge which could provide us some extra benefit. This benefit is very often manifested in the agreement about mutual use of other party's resources (a student pays a teacher to provide them with skills and knowledge).

All of this can only explain education in terms of the development of skills and techniques and most probably in terms of supporting infants' growing desires. However, the merely descriptive explanation cannot disclose why parents may require their children to eat vegetables even if they protest, or why a mentor may insist that a student's thesis should be changed even if the student is not satisfied with the offered solution. The question is *why do we treat someone differently and hold them responsible in a different way than we hold ourselves and others equal to us; not taking their actions seriously in the same way and as if we have a kind of paternalistic obligation toward them?* Reasons for this, as argued by Tamar Schapiro, could only ever be normative (Schapiro 1999). This means that one who has to learn is treated as someone who is lacking the kind of authority to make required decisions. Of course, this is primarily applicable to parents/child relations. Schapiro, relying on her Kantian background, argues that lacking specific moral autonomy (authority to attribute decisions to one's own will) is the constitutive reason for why we treat someone as a child and have the obligation to educate them.

The same normative model has been replicated in schools and even in higher education (the mentor/student relation). Moreover, it could be argued that the same model is applicable whenever someone is not treated as an equally dignified member of a particular community of respect (see Helm 2017), like for example in the academic community

– where the student is yet to acquire authority through education (e.g. authority to decide if a theoretical argument is sound, how refined an artwork is, how good is an architectural project or what is the best course of an educational strategy). Of course, presuming that any adult (at least hypothetically) can withdraw their consent to being a member of such society and that we are not talking about general moral autonomy, but about authority in a specific area of social engagement.

It may look like I am recklessly widening Schapiro's conception of the child to different social spheres, but it is actually the opposite. Schapiro has developed her notion of the child from Kant's political philosophy, from *The Doctrine of Right* (Schapiro 1999: 718). One of her main arguments come from Kant's distinction between pre-political and political (civic) society. The former refers to the state of nature in which individuals both need and lack the capacity to make claims about right and justice, and thus have to "pull themselves together" to express general will and form a civic society (Schapiro 1999: 728; Kant MS, AA 06: 312–3). Schapiro suggests that for precisely the same reason the "undeveloped human beings are those who have yet to achieve the requisite form of integration" (Schapiro 1999: 728). Her second main argument comes from Kant's distinction between active and passive citizens. Passive citizens, according to Kant, are those who cannot partake in public life: minors (*vel naturaliter vel civiliter*), impoverished, economically dependent, (controversially) all women etc. (Kant MS, AA 06: 314). However, passive citizenship is for Kant a deviant state, it "seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such" (Ibid.). Thus, Kant suggests that the state has a duty to help everyone to find their way up to active citizenship (Kant MS, AA 06: 326).² Schapiro argues for the twofold obligation principle in the adult/child relation: (1) obligation to help children work their way out of childhood and (2) obligation to refrain from acting in ways which hinder children's development as deliberators (Schapiro 1999: 735).

2 For an exploration of this argument in more detail see Nikolić & Cvejić 2017.

To sum it up, Schapiro claims that the main normative reason for adult/child relation is related to a specific lack of autonomy in immatures, but the same normative model (with some restrictions) applies for every situation in which education takes place. A child lacks its autonomy due to the incapacity to attribute decisions to one's own will, while adults may lack authority due to a lack of education in certain areas – what Schapiro calls “domains of discretion” (Schapiro 1999: 733–4). While Schapiro's focus is on the concept of the child, I am more interested in the normative basis of education in general.

It is worth remembering that Kant uses a metaphor of immaturity in a much wider context of societal emancipation: “Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another” (Kant WA, AA 06: 35). Immediately, Kant suggests a difference to literal immaturity: “Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but rather of resolve and courage to use it without direction from another” (Ibid.). Obviously, Kant does not think that normative reasons for education disappear once we become adults, even if our predicament changes. He does not see a solution to this in paternalistic education, but rather in hope “that the public should enlighten itself” (Ibid.).

In the previous paragraph I explained the presuppositions that define the scope of this article. I presupposed that education could be understood as a relation between actors which is (normatively) based on the care for the development of one's autonomy or authority (in the relevant matter). This could certainly exclude some educational practices which are not normative (such as the mere cramming of information or mere training), but it certainly applies to all cases where education is needed, either for gaining moral autonomy, facing the societal challenges or exercising particular social engagements. My aim is not to neglect them, but to focus on such examples of educational practices which involve normative reasons. This clarification helps to

advance further the question of how relations in education should be emotionally colored.

“The Problem of Childhood”

This (quasi) paternalistic approach to education does not come without a price. It appears that any paternalism would be *prima facie* morally wrong. Even if we could accept such paternalism, it can justify only assistance to attain the autonomy through learning and not coercion to exercise it. However, the main problem is not the alleged moral incorrectness of paternalism, but the fact that it seems to contradict its own aims. If a child is to attain autonomy, it could not do this through mere tutelage, merely by guidance, as something that just happens to them. The problem with autonomy is not just about the correctness of decisions, but about their attributability – can one identify decisions as one’s own and hold themselves responsible (Schapiro 2003: 592). Thus, autonomy cannot be acquired with a mere following of the correct decisions of the tutor, because reasons for doing it will always be external. At least partly, autonomy has to be exercised in order to be learned.

However, this will not work the other way around. Acquisition of autonomy cannot be simply the result of an action or series of actions of a person prior to acquiring it. This is because, before acquiring autonomy (or appropriate authority in the case of adult persons), one does not possess criteria for what decisions to measure as their own. Moreover, if one could acquire autonomy by mere action of one’s own, there would be no need to learn it, and no need for education. Taking this into consideration, it could be argued that a child is in a paradoxical situation if he/she is to become an adult person: he/she cannot do it either by following outside guidance or by actions of their own. This predicament Schapiro calls “the problem of childhood” (Schapiro 1999, 2003). Like the previous conclusion made by Schapiro, this paradox also has its source in Kant:

One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary *restraint* with the child's capability of exercising *freewill* —for restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright. (Kant Päd, AA 09: 453)

Schapiro sees the solution in the concept of *play*.³ She offers several characterizations of play which explains its crucial role in the development of autonomy. It is only in play, according to her, that children are able to act the part of full agents:

By engaging in play, children more or less deliberately “try on” selves to be and worlds to be in. This is because the only way a child can “have” a self is by trying one on. It is only by adopting one or another persona that children are able to act the part of full agents, to feel what it must be like to speak in their own voices and to inhabit their own worlds. [...] Play is children's form of work, for their job is to become themselves. (Schapiro 1999: 732)

The second thing important to notice is that, according to Schapiro, play is the characteristic form of child's action:

If action proper is conduct which issues from an established deliberative perspective, and if children have yet to develop such a perspective, then children are (at least across some essential domains) not in a position to act. But neither can they give up on action. As such, their only option is to play – to act the part, so to speak, of one who can act. Play is thus children's characteristic form of action; it is the form of action which is appropriate to them *qua* children. (Schapiro 1999: 732–3)

3 The notion of play has an important role in the history of education. A source of it is, again, Kant who used this concept as an aesthetic notion – with one of its main functions being precisely the harmonization of the rules of law with freedom (Kant KU, AA 05). From this discussion Schiller develops his letters on aesthetic education (Schiller 2004). Schapiro indicates that concept of play should not be seen here as an extension of Schiller's work and positions herself as “agnostic” regarding the question could her notion of play even be connected with Kant's concept (Schapiro 1999: 732).

The third important characteristic of play is its provisional status, or as Shapiro says “the status of a rehearsal or an experiment (even if it is not undertaken ‘for fun’)” (Schapiro 1999: 733). The provisional status of play justifies the modification of our reactive attitudes toward children. We do not take child’s actions seriously as we do those of adults, which is due to its experimental nature. By experimenting, children have the opportunity to introduce their own principles of action, to create their own evaluative perspective, while at the same time, they are not treated as equally responsible as adults.

Adults also have a role in this play. They have to provide children with good models of autonomy to “choose” from and help children choose from these models. This is manifested through a twofold strategy. One part of it is to exercise limited discipline (rewards and punishments) in order to regulate children’s choices:

Discipline is one way of guiding such “choices”, but in using disciplinary force, the idea should always be to act as a surrogate conscience. The pain of discipline, like that of conscience, must serve to awaken children to a sense of their own freedom and responsibility rather than to remind them of their subjection to an external authority. (Schapiro 1999: 736)

The other part of the strategy is to explain the relevant principles behind these limitations:

[...] we are to explain to children the principles behind the limits we impose on them. Moreover, to the extent they are capable of raising principled objections to those limits, we are to evaluate those objections with an open mind. (Ibid.)

These two parts, of course, interact and accompany each other in order to help children to be free to control themselves.

There are at least two problems with this strategy that I will just

briefly address. The first concern is the possibility of adults differentiating if a child's action actually has a provisional status of play. It seems that we need to know whether children are acting "playfully" or seriously in order to be able to estimate the appropriate level of accountability (Helm 2007:218). Without it we will never have a reason to hold them responsible. Schapiro's distinction between provisional and proper action does not provide us with such reasons. More important problem is to understand how are we able to intervene, especially when things are already going wrong. In other words, the problem is in how to motivate children to act from their own authority. We might correct some of children's "deviant" motivations (e.g. selfish interest) through reward/punishment mechanism. However, it is not clear how these reasons could ever be their own and not external. We might instruct children to be helpful to others, but the act would again come from selfish reasons – to receive reward and avoid punishment. If we are to explain principles of action that should be adopted, it remains unclear why children should adopt them rather than react to it negatively (e.g. "I understand it, but I simply do not care", Cf Helm 2009: 218–9).

This does not mean that we are helpless to help children develop their autonomy. Rather, it indicates that Schapiro failed to address the relationship between parents and children. This emotional relationship which implies mutual care is crucial for understanding how children can access the reasons they previously did not have.

Care for Well-Being and Care About an Agent as Such

Whatever approach to the question of necessity of education we might take, it presupposes certain relations of care. Above all, an educator cares for their protégés, or parents care for the well-being of their child. Note that this care can also be instrumental, e.g. if educator's care for pupil is merely because this is what he/she is paid for. This distinction is not important here. Even if that is the case, a teacher is expected to care for pupils as a part of their job. As the above argument shows,

care should at least partially address the development of the autonomy and authority of one who is educated. It doesn't mean that educators should be particularly emotional and oversensitive. The point is that such care is part of the normative situation. By entering the educational process, an educator has taken a duty to care about the development of those who are under their guidance. In that sense, it would not be rational for an educator not to feel the specific appropriate emotion of care in relevant situations, i.e. it would be wrong.

This care could be understood as care for well-being. It is especially the case when we talk about parents' care for their children. However, the well-being of a person can be understood in many different ways. Someone could think, for example, that well-being is a matter of understanding and adopting fairness. We could also refer to physical or economic well-being. Nevertheless, all these conceptions of well-being presuppose that educator possesses a conception of the good. This is the same conception of the good he/she should convey. A part of well-being of a person could also be their autonomy. However, if we speak about the development of autonomy, we have to go beyond mere care for the well-being and beyond the educator's conception of well-being, i.e. educator has to care about protégés as (potential) agents.

What does it mean to care about others as agents? It means that we accept that others have their own preferences, desires, focuses, their own cares and evaluative perspectives. To care about others as agents means that their objectives, also have import for me, or that I share their import and care for those things that have import for them. Thus, caring about someone as an agent means that you don't just care merely for his/her well-being, but also for the things he or she cares about. In other words, it presupposes dynamical intentionality toward someone else and his/her evaluative perspective, in relation to which we constitute our subfocuses. Practically, it means that what primarily has import to someone else, has import to me, through the fact that he/she, as a subject of import, has import for me.

When I get a paper rejected because of an undeservedly negative referee report, my anger consists in the feeling of the import of my scholarship as such impressing itself on me in the present circumstances in such a way that I am pained by the offense that rejection presents [...]. Such anger differs from the anger I would feel on behalf of a colleague I care about in similar circumstances [...]. Thus in being angry on her behalf, the pain I feel consists in part in the feeling not only of the import she (the focus) has to me but also of the import her scholarship (the subfocus) has to her, so that the rejection feels bad because of its bearing on the well-being of both her scholarship and her; in this respect my anger on her behalf differs phenomenologically from my anger at my own paper's rejection. (Helm 2009: 89)

This short excursion of explaining the different types of care could help us to understand more deeply the relation between an educator and those who are being educated. The work on developing one's autonomy presupposes care about other as agent (even if it is being just a therapeutic entitlement). It is by caring for what the student cares about that an educator affirmatively influences the development of autonomy. Educator has to be able to exercise relevant emotions related to the student's projects. For example, a mentor should care for his student's care about doing a Ph.D. in feminism and become frustrated if this project hits an obstacle – not because he cares for feminism as a topic, but because he should care for feminism as a part of his care for his student. On the contrary, if a mentor cares only for his own conception of the wellbeing of his student and, for example, imposes the topic on her, the mentoring would be mere tutelage.

Access to External Reasons

The previous argument can solve only part of the problem. Care about pupils as (at least potential) agents could save them from being exposed to the paternalistic hegemony. However, this argument cannot answer why a student should be motivated to adopt the educator's model. The whole problem comes down to the fact that rea-

sons for acting in a different way would ever be educator's reason and not their own – it would be external to them. Of course, the previous argument doesn't claim that an educator will persistently have a positive attitude towards students' desires. Students' desires could come in conflict with the educator's conception of well-being (e.g. the concept of fairness) and in that case, the educator has to find a way to influence student's valuation with his own concept, without undermining their autonomy. If these reasons are a force external to a student, then we find ourselves again in the problem of childhood.

Now it is time to introduce the second part of the relations which is normatively expected in educational process: the care of the students about the teacher, or more precisely about his/her own conception of the relevant good. One of the main assumptions of education is that teacher knows more – without it the education as we know it would make no sense. However, the teacher's knowledge or evaluations could be entirely foreign to students. Except in the case in which a student cares about what a teacher cares for. In caring about a teacher, a student should be able to care for the teacher's concepts (e.g. that of fairness) in the way the teacher cares about it and because the teacher cares about it. In doing so, the pupil doesn't need to have this concept elaborated. His/her care for fairness is just a matter of his/her commitment to teacher's care. This interpersonal relation enables students to access reasons that might seem external to them (teacher's reasons). As a part of this care, a student might get frustrated in the name of the teacher because he/she is acting unfairly even if he/she doesn't fully understand this concept. It is through these shared concerns that the student begins to adopt the teacher's model of acting, that is, to learn (Cf Helm 2009: 237).

Note that Helm's solution to the problem of childhood is very much different from Schapiro's two-pronged strategy. Motivation for adopting the educator's model is not imposed externally (through punishment or rewards), but it is rather rooted in interpersonal relations between teacher and students through their shared emotional concerns. Accord-

ing to Helm, this is the only way we can escape the problem of childhood:

[...] I have argued, through a properly paternalistic loving relationship the parent can impose rational pressure on the child so as to instill certain cares and values in her; given the shared concerns and the way in which the parent's concepts inform those concerns, such an imposition is not the result merely of external forces acting on the child but is rather a means of enabling the child's conscience, her sense of responsibility for her cares, her actions, and her identity. Moreover, it is only because reasons are at stake (rather than mere external force) that we can make sense of those having access to those reasons as being potentially responsible for the outcome. To the extent that the child's access to these reasons is essentially interpersonal, so too is the responsibility for her coming (or failing to come) to care about or value appropriate objects: that responsibility is to that extent shared between the child and the parent. (Helm 2009: 259)

Education as Joint Engagement: Final Remarks

In the previous chapters, I have presented Helm's solution to the problem of childhood, introduced by Shapiro. Helm argued for the crucial role of emotional relations between child and parent in solving the problem. It is through this emotional relation of care that educators pursue their care, not merely about imposed conception of the well-being of a child, but also about cares and projects the child has, and *vice versa*. By caring about what parents care about, children get access to reasons that would otherwise remain external to them. This is of particular importance, because if those reasons remain external, education would always remain trapped in the problem of childhood, for children would not have proper motivation to act.

In my view, this same problem can be found in educational processes. Thus, it seems that the relation of mutual care is a necessary condition for effective education (presupposing that reasons for education are normative). Of course, it is not a loving relationship like between parents and children. It might seem

that the proper description would be to understand this relationship as an asymmetric quasi-friendship type of relationship.

However, it is not only problematic to view student/teacher relation as friendship, but it could also be something impossible to achieve in large educational institutions. The first problem is that it is hard to achieve friendship with a large amount of students. The second problem is that friendship could undermine teacher's authority. The third problem is that it might seem peculiar to think that this relation could so easily influence other domains of one's life, as it happens in friendship. On the other side, it might be the case to have a problem in private life influence the educational process.

The better alternative could be to understand educational processes as joint engagements. Educational processes are, certainly, collective efforts, those in which each actor (both students and teachers) partake with their tasks. As a part of the collective body, they also share concerns about each other. This doesn't mean that they are to establish intimate identification as friends do. Rather, other actors (in the educational process) are identified as those who belong to it, as "one of us" (Cf Helm 2009). "Being one of us" presupposes certain care about others as agents, as a part of our care for the collective efforts we are in.

This interpretation makes it possible to correctly understand normativity embedded in emotional relations between students and a teacher. There is certainly no obligation for their friendship, but they have to treat each other as "one of us". Normative demands imposed by the very acknowledgment of an educational process as a collective effort, are to take care of this collective action as plural, as "ours". It is from this care that we are committed to caring about other actors of this process as "one of us". This is what constitutes the rationale of emotional relations in educational processes. These are precisely the kind of emotional relationships that are necessary to fulfill the normative role of education – the development of one's autonomy and authority.

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Interactive Teaching as a Component of Social Emancipation

Introduction

In this paper, we shall argue that interactive teaching, as a specific teaching practice with proper theoretical background, in addition to the undisputed, affirmed and demonstrated pedagogical contributions and developmental values, also has a social emancipatory *potential*. First, we shall present characteristic questions about emancipation in education, then we shall give basic clarifications about interactive teaching, its theoretical framework, and its practical aspects. In the end, we shall point out its emancipatory potential, with a few possible critical remarks to the presented thesis.

First of all, we should make a terminological clarification. In everyday language and in most cases, the meanings of *interactive* and *interactivity* are identified with the application of electronic or digital tools and devices which serve as auxiliary teaching tools, toys, games, or elements for various workshops. The word *interactive* in the context of interactive teaching has nothing to do with that meaning and that application of the term. Of course, this does not imply that within the interactive teaching practice certain interactive digital tools cannot be used, but their use or application does not by itself mean *interactivity*.

¹ Member of Edulab: Laboratory for Educational Strategies of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory: radujtesetrgovi@gmail.com.

Besides, in this paper, we shall consider education concretely, in the classroom or a university hall – in the real situation of a school as a *community of learning*. In this respect, our paper is just a theoretical introduction to possible empirical research of the implementation of interactive education in schools and of its *social* outcomes and effects that could be marked as *emancipatory*.

Education and Emancipation

In the last decades, a great deal has been written and spoken about emancipation. Numerous articles and books examine various aspects of the concept of emancipation and its kin concepts. Besides, the possibilities of social emancipation in its practical sense are numerous. Interest in the problem of emancipation in the contemporary critical theory is based on Marx's conception of original human emancipation as a value *per se* (Comminel 2019: 65-89). Different authors analyse the dialectics of the concept of emancipation, problematizing its meaning and implications in connection to the paradoxical consequences of its correlation with the concepts of power and force (Laclau 2007: 1-19).

The problem of emancipation is equally actual in education. Different authors in critical pedagogy examine and problematize the possibilities of emancipation in education in the world in which we live and work amidst the “vulgar display of power”², the world in which we are exposed to the effects of *predatory culture*, with life reduced to the relations of hunters and hunted or predators and prey, as Peter McLaren formulates it (McLaren 1995: 1-18). As it becomes clearer and clearer that we live in a world with a very high degree of control of human lives through systematic power and the distribution of a more or less disguised coercion, questions increasingly arise concerning the role of education in such conditions. Can education offer any direction towards liberation, independence, equality, autonomy, freedom – against the world of power and coercion? The questions

2 The title of Panthera's album in 1992.

are important but, at the same time, paradoxical, since education is a *systematically organized* public activity, regulated by laws and other legal acts, with a complex governing structure, with a series of ready-made systematic solutions, with clear educational strategies and policies, which are all supported, directed, and determined by the state mechanism (Hebib 2009: 14-106). The situation is the same in the case of private education, except for the difference in terms of deregulated market and a higher degree of autonomy of private capital.

When one looks at different official educational documents in Serbia, one can notice many words and phrases with an emancipatory connotation (for example – The Law on Secondary Education - *Zakon o srednjem obrazovanju i vaspitanju* 2013: 5-6). But what do they really mean in continual and long practice? Why would the state, as the main organizer and provider of finances for educational processes, promote and affirm emancipatory practices and, systematically and in prolonged periods, educate people which will always turn against the coercion and display of power, people looking to reach high degrees of equality and independence, people turned to cooperation instead of competition? Is it reasonable to expect that the system, based on the *legitimate use of force*, will nurture and educate people to strive for freedom, to live for freedom, to live outside such a system and against any force at all? Are the ideals of self-realization and overcoming alienation reasonable at all? These are just some of the typical questions that remain open and that are the sources of numerous examinations and inquiries in social theory – from sociology, through philosophy of education, to critical pedagogy.

Noah De Lissovoy formulates these problems in a general way:

The problem of education is the problem of unwinding the human body and soul from this intricate clockwork of not merely the correct and commendable but also the apparently self-evident and inevitable. It is the problem of rescuing *being* from *what is*, a *what is* that has conquered every other possibility to give itself the status of fact and truth. (De Lissovoy 2015: 75)

Numerous authors considered these problems – from Freire, Illich, Rancière, to McLaren or De Lissovoy. What is the sense, or the essence of education, if human beings, after they finish every educational cycle, acquire useful competencies but remain powerless and closed in the fields of power, exposed to different modes of subtle or brutal coercion, unequal opportunities, uneven positions, uneducated to cope with the world of force and coercion, to overcome it, to step out of the relations founded in domination? *Why still education?* Does it accomplish or establish any of the great and important aims or ideals of our civilization? Or, as the mathematician and philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead asks – where are the ideals in our contemporary education, are they here at all? (Whitehead 1967: 14, 29)

Teaching as a Communication Process

Coming back to the classroom, to the basic, concrete situation in the educational process, to teaching and learning, the crucial property of teaching is the relation between a teacher and pupils, and that relation is founded upon communication and interaction (Gudjons 1993: 156-157). Interaction is the series of mutually induced, reflexively connected, and jointly generated acts, with emphasized properties of reciprocity and circulation (Bratanić 2006: 29-38). In the process of teaching, there is more than just communication between the teacher and a pupil, there is communication between the teacher and many pupils and communication between the pupils themselves, which constitutes teaching as a complex relational phenomenon. In it, the net of relations constitutes itself on many levels simultaneously and if we take an average class consisting of 25 to 30 pupils as an example, we can create a sketch of these levels. It is important to note that the number of levels cannot be reduced to a simple sum because in the processes of interaction relations converge to create new personal and social plans and a certain aspect of group intentionality, nonreducible to a sum of individual intentions and volitions (Searle 2002: 90-105).

In addition to the interpersonality there is a dimension of intrapersonality: of processes inside individual persons, their experiences, emotions, mental states which affect relations with other persons. Moreover, besides conscious, intentional acts, which have already been marked as one of the key segments of the teaching process, in interpersonal and intrapersonal relations subconscious levels of mental life play a significant role (Bratanić 2006: 32).

In teaching, personal and professional communication overlaps. To understand the complexity of teaching as a relational phenomenon, we should bear in mind the differences between personal and professional relations (personal: without objective or material purpose, subjective, non-hierarchical, inclined toward weakening aggression - professional: with objective and material purposes, hierarchical, latently aggressive, objective) (Bratanić 2006: 33-34).

If we compare the properties of personal and professional relations, then a logical question arises: how do these differences (sometimes even radical) mutually conform, how do they become concordant, where are the accents, how do they become articulated in mutual relations of pupils and a teacher? As we stated before, the relations between the teacher and pupils are both professional and personal, but, given the institutional circumstances and differences in age, experience, and education, they are neither entirely reciprocal nor entirely equal (Bratanić 2006: 34-35). The absence of total reciprocity affects the disbalance in the distribution of subject and object positions in the teaching process, considering *a priori* distributed, assigned, and awarded social and institutional roles in the school.

The relations, communication and interaction in the teaching process are not just a form in which the process is ongoing, they are, at the same time, the content of the process, because through and by different relations and interactions pupils learn social acts, values of solidarity and group organizing, mutual appreciation, appreciation of individual

differences, self-respect and respect for other persons and personalities. A particularly important segment is also the development of the culture of dialogue, where the dialogue is not just a tool or means for a certain purpose, but a goal *per se* (Milin 2016: 50-91; Freire 2000: 87-124).

Theoretical Framework of Interactive Teaching

Interactive teaching constitutes the process of learning and education in social interactions between pupils and a teacher, not to be reduced merely to the transmission of information and knowledge, or to the cognitive adoption of curricular materials and content (Sužić 2006: 119-130; Roeders 2006:157-161). This doesn't imply that there is no transmission of information about cognitive content at all. It just means that social interaction comes to the foreground in the classroom. Interactive teaching predominantly consists of interactive methods of learning with special emphasis on methods based on certain forms of group and cooperative work, present *continuously* during an educational cycle. This is particularly important because every mode of teaching contains some interactive methods or a certain degree of interactivity, more or less represented in the process. But, in interactive teaching, the learning process is entirely impregnated with group activities and interactive methods such as team method, mosaic-method, cooperative sketching of maps, collaborative learning, collaborative scripts, group discussions and debate, guided fantasy, evocations (Pavlović Breneselović, Radulović 2014: 40-44; Roeders 2006: 161).

In interactive teaching, the process is not directed only toward the cognitive level and transmission of knowledge. The roles of subjects and objects change because pupils themselves take the role of organizers of the educational process. Learning is conceived as a multifarious and diversified activity, it develops non-linearly on many levels, and teacher's narration is reduced to a minimum, while the emphasis is on dialogical communication of all pupils (Roeders 2006: 163-164). When it comes to properties of the dialogue in interactive

teaching, considering group modes of work, the dialogue could be marked as *poli-dialogue* and the narration between different participants of the process is crisscrossed, taking place on many levels, depending on the task. Teaching materials, tasks and procedures circulate through different groups, according to certain rhythm and order, just as procedures of group formation are not static, but changeable. The teaching process is entirely oriented *toward pupils* and is centred around their activities and engagement (Roeders 2006: 157-160).

In terms of theory, interactive teaching arises from socio-constructivism, developed in the first half of the XX century but it combines various approaches in a new and refined didactical amalgam. The socio-constructivist conception of the human mind conceives the mind as a field of different intersecting processes, which are derived from social interactions – and that conception overcomes the traditional conception of the mind as an exclusively individual ability (Pavlović Breneselović, Radulović 2014: 26). That radical change in the conception of the mind is a result of many transformations in philosophy, pedagogy, and psychology. Wittgenstein formulated this concisely:

In the consideration of our problems, one of the most dangerous ideas is that we think *with* or *in our heads*. The idea of a process in the head, in a completely enclosed space, makes thinking something occult. (Wittgenstein 1974: 106)

The basic framework of socio-constructivism builds on the concept of the social formation of mind (Wertsch 1985: 209-232).

According to social constructivism, a pupil is actively engaged in a social process, rooted in a social environment, supported by socio-cultural tools. The teaching process promotes activation of the pupil's subjective experience, subjective interpretations, and formation of subjective meanings, which correlate with the objective environment. There are many interactions between the pupil and the environment, which means that social surroundings and the socio-cul-

tural context is the primary source and basis of learning (Pritchard, Woollard 2010: 2-20). *Social* constructivism, grounded in the works of Vygotsky, puts emphasis on social surroundings and processes and on the cultural context: learning is understood as a process of interactions between socio-cultural impulses and their individual internalizations and constructions in the process of co-construction (Pritchard, Woollard 2010: 2-20; Vulfolk, Hjuž, Volkap 2014: 63-133).

In social constructivism, social interaction is a crucial factor for the development of learning. Vygotsky points out that every function of child's cultural development manifests itself two times: in the first step, it manifests itself on the social, inter-psychological level, and in the second step, it manifests itself on the individual, intra-psychological level. Moreover, all higher activities have their roots in interpersonal, social relations (Pritchard, Woollard 2010: 2-20; Vulfolk, Hjuž, Volkap 2014: 63-133). Socio-cultural tools (symbols, signs, tools in the socio-cultural surroundings of an individual – artworks, textbooks, materials) also have an essential function since they mediate between social and individual abilities and activities and support the internalization process (Radulović 2017: 31-50).

The learning process is conceived in its transformative aspect. Learning induces transformations in an individual's self-understanding, in his or her beliefs and behaviour. Learning is the source of transformations of perspectives or focal points through which previous experience is observed and critically examined, both on the rational, objective, and cognitive level and the intuitive, subjective, and imaginative level (Mezirow 1991: 17-33).

A vital component of the theoretical background of interactive teaching is the theory of multiple intelligences: human intelligence is no longer conceived as a uniform ability or as a one-dimensional linear predisposition, but as ramified and divergent (Gardner 2011: ix-xv). Interactive teaching promotes diverse types of intelligence such

as interpersonal, intrapersonal, visual-spatial, or bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence, while traditional teaching puts emphasis on linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligence, with the corresponding emphasis in curricula, teaching materials, contents, and methods (narration, conversation, text, reading, calculations) (Armstrong 2006: 8-11).

Interactive teaching is grounded in the concept of human development, instead of the concept of academic achievement, with an emphasis on cooperativity and non-competitiveness in the process of teaching and learning (Armstrong 2006: 34-47). Overcoming the traditional mononarrative model of lecturing and the instrumental value of dialogue, interactive teaching is based on new explorations of language, communication, and dialogue (Freire 2000; Milin 2016). Dialogue is conceived as a multi-channelled state of communication, manifested on many levels, in many directions, with ramified narration and text, displayed in varied materials and media besides speech acts (diaries, questionnaires, notes, posters, cards, pupils' diaries and protocols, etc.).

Emancipatory Potential of Interactive Teaching

Emancipatory potential of this teaching mode clearly manifests itself in its cooperativist paradigm, group activism and its emphasis on the social dimension of learning.

If we consider basic theoretical and practical properties of interactive teaching and its practice in concrete situations in school, in the classroom, all that implies that cooperation, solidarity, group activism and communal, supportive ethos are in the foreground of interactive teaching. Even the process of preparing the exam *Interactive Teaching* at the Centre for Teacher's Education (CON), on the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade consists of student's group work: groups of students write a script, a scenario, or a synopsis for a school class lesson and then they hold a school class as a group (Pavlović Breneselović, Radulović 2014). Social cooperation is at the core

of interactive teaching. This type of teaching process promotes joint perspective and collective intentionality – and these unite every individual contribution but also unleash new values which transcend a simple sum of individual contributions (Searle 1990: 90-104; Nikolić, Cvejić 2020: 7-24). Interactive teaching implies convergence of individual and social development in the process of learning, intensifying personal relations between participants. Also, collective work has the potential to release unexpected new solutions and ideas.

Interactive teaching is very convenient for promoting pupils' activism and different civic actions or initiatives in local communities, due to its orientation toward social environment and its collective work dynamics. Interactive teaching diminishes hierarchical, vertically established roles and functions between teachers and pupils. The teacher's role is entirely cooperative, entirely supportive, pupils and teachers are equal participants in the process. Teachers slightly moderate and pedagogically motivate and enrich the process (Pavlović Breneselović, Radulović 2014: 87). This implies a completely new situation in the classroom, without hierarchical relations and authoritarianism in communication between teachers and pupils. It also implies new modes of pupil's behaviour – without revolt, hidden angst, or latent rebellion, induced by hierarchy or by an authoritarian context of classroom governing. These factors promote an egalitarian context in the classroom and, through active experience of equality and joint commitment, prepare pupils to recognize and to become sensitive to inequality, discrimination, and injustice in social relations.

Besides, if intelligence is defined as an ability to actively change conditions in human surroundings and discover new ones, interactive teaching gives a major contribution; one of its crucial points and values is motivating pupils to problematize conditions, processes, and events in their surroundings, to transform them, change them and improve them (Knežević Florić 2006: 206-207).

Collective work and pupils' cooperation in interactive teaching diminish pupils' insecurity, strengthen mutual peer support, raise motivation, and have the potential to overcome prejudices and stereotypes – with special emphasis on *the perspective of the other* (Roeders 2006: 157-193). This promotes development of empathy, solidarity, and altruism – important properties of social relations, significant for participation in the improvement of social life. In addition, interactive teaching promotes friendship, overall social orientation and connection, as well as the ability of pupils to support each other (Roeders 2006: 187-193).

Interactive teaching induces and promotes imagination and anticipation of possible situations and possible alternative outcomes of acts – one of its characteristic methods is *guided fantasy* (Pavlović Brenešević, Radulović 2014: 43; Roeders 2006: 161). If applied continuously and often, it can be useful to discover different alternatives to the given state of conditions. Imaginative and anticipative learning promote and motivate moving toward the zone of proximal development, in accordance with Vygotsky – in that process a child notices new, previously unnoticed possibilities, a child becomes *what is not yet* (Wertsch 1985: 67). Imagination and anticipation are very convenient to articulate reformistic, utopistic or messianic ideas of social change, typical for adolescence and for adolescents' inclination toward hypothetical thinking and reflecting upon different possibilities of life, in accordance with Piaget (Moshman 2009: 263-264). Adolescents' inclination toward reformistic ideas can be especially developed through collective work and in different modes of pupils' participative actions in their community.

Interactive Teaching as a Component of Social Emancipation

If we consider the duration of educational cycles – e.g., in Serbia it is eight years of elementary school, four years of secondary school and years of higher or high education – so, if we consider the processual aspect of education, its connected cycles, its intermediary phases and

periods, its slow duration and development – it is clear that every single process has to be long lasting and continuous. Short-term, sporadic actions, *ad hoc* solutions or approaches, no matter how good or important they can be, cannot produce any lasting or consistent result. Besides, every single process has to be synchronized with all other processes, as well as with the general direction of educational development. The fact is that interactive teaching is not generally applied, accepted, integrated, or represented in teaching practice in Serbia. The only subject in which it is marked as one of the main modes of teaching is civic education. But civic education is a subject with only one class per week – in other words, interactive and cooperative modes of work are *an exception* and a *sporadic practice* in the general process of teaching. Some practices reveal that interactive practice is convenient for elementary schools – like the examples of a teacher from Prijepolje, Dragan Kuveljić (Kuveljić 2019) or Predrag Starčević from Pančevo, show. But that just shows that interactive teaching is more an exception than an established mode of teaching, which leaves quite a space for potential research.

The interactionist concept of education puts social change, diminishing and eliminating indoctrination, and activism toward just social relations in the foreground (Mitrović, Radulović 2011: 148-149). If we consider that education consists of long and continuous processes – and that it cannot be claimed with total certainty that these processes lead toward achieving all educational goals upon completion – it is obvious that duration and continuity are necessary conditions for any change or transformation in education.

From all of the above it can be concluded: interactive teaching has the potential to be a component of social emancipation *under the condition* that it is applied and integrated in the teaching process *in the long term, consistently, continuously*. We can mark some important elements of emancipatory potential of interactive teaching:

1. if interactive teaching became a widespread mode of teaching, it would affect the development of social consciousness of all participants in school life. Social interactions and collective initiatives would become an integral factor of pupils' everyday behaviour. The development of social engagement consciousness and exercise in active detection of modes of coercion, power, indoctrination, or manipulation would pervade the overall teaching process. Concrete and operative actions and solutions, developed through interactive learning would lead to a realistic perspective of social activism, its impact and practical results, real possibilities, and operative and proper means of achieving the goals of social activism.
2. Durable and consistent motivation and promotion of pupils' autonomy, of their autonomous initiative and joint actions to achieve different goals would become an integral part of everyday school life. The pupils would continuously invent and practice different modes of communicating with public services, to engage in objections, petitions, appeals or initiatives. They would also perform joint analyses, interpretations of legislative documents in different discussion groups. They could give their own propositions of different legislative documents or formulations, as outcomes or products of collective work (for example, the pupils could write their version of the Constitutional Act, which could be a useful activity for a very important school subject Constitution and Civil Rights).
3. As a result, durable collective cooperative work would constitute learning as a genuine social process in which the focal point is the mediation between individuals and their social environment. It would also prepare pupils for different modes of joint actions in adulthood, through learning about different legal aspects of formal joint associations (which is already a part of the civic education curriculum in Serbia). Besides, collective cooperative work would prepare pupils for different informal modes of collective action, such as art collectives.

4. Diminishing and eliminating hierarchical barriers and institutionalized, hidden school coercion or display of power would transform the perception and the experience of school. It would also transform compulsory education into participation in the community of development and learning, developing supportive surroundings and strengthening pupils' identity and inclusion in the community of learning. It would open new space for different informal modes of education, typical for different formal and informal groups or collectives. An educational process would, in a sense, lose its property of institutional exclusivity and gain the property of collective, joint action.

5. Formative and informal evaluation, well-represented and very much developed in interactive teaching, would lead to active evaluative consciousness in pupils, and if that is applied in social life in general, it would lead to critical thinking in terms of active evaluation of social phenomena and social problems. Motivating pupils to evaluate every element of the teaching process and to express their opinion often about different elements of every class would establish a habit of evaluation and critical examination of every detail of the social environment.

Critical Remarks and Objections

Pedagogical theory and practice point out that interactive teaching can be ineffective and improper in certain circumstances. For instance, if we consider the development in the primary group, there are 'hard' structured families, in which certain rigid patterns of behaviour are imposed with no exception, which can lead to resistance toward collective work or to various prejudices about the group or about non-rigid patterns of behaviour (Roeders 2006: 173-175).

Uncertainty and unpredictability of collective work and group learning, certain "openness" and "fluidity" of non-standard methods,

no matter how important, may be a disturbing factor. In this regard, an unpredictable dynamics of groups in the classroom can lead to anxiety or confusion in teacher's or pupils' reactions (Roeders 2006: 174-175, 184-185). It is intuitively understood that there are many differences and nuances in personalities. Besides, some teachers are simply used to traditional, frontally positioned classroom.

Further, it can be claimed that interactive teaching is not suitable or convenient for every school subject. Besides, a large number of schools cannot provide ambient conditions suitable for cooperative work and even if they can, they are not interested. Certain cases seem to show that interactive teaching is often practised in elementary schools and not so much in secondary specialized schools. There are barriers in established and rigid habits due to *ex cathedra* teaching which can cause certain methodical aspects of interactive teaching to appear ridiculous, from the traditional *ex cathedra* perspective.

Further, it can be objected that teaching personnel simply can have different theoretical beliefs and conceptions, that they do not put emphasis on the social dimension of learning, that they do not consider *we-perspective* crucial or pivotal, that they think individual effort is the sole essence of learning and, consequently, see no relevance in interactive teaching.

Besides, intensifying interactive teaching could be interpreted as needless caprice or adventurism, due to necessary changes in school ambient and classroom, which are an integral part of interactive teaching – non-standard interior design, non-standard position of tables and chairs, different printed materials on the walls (Roeders 2006: 182-183).

In the end, it could be objected that none of the emancipatory potentials listed above are relevant, that they are minor and not worthy of change in the usual teaching practice.

Conclusion

What is certain is that every significant change in the classroom causes numerous changes in the learning process, in reactions and behaviour of pupils. Although it is very uncertain to predict if a widespread application of interactive teaching would bear emancipatory consequences and, in that regard, we are self-critical and restrictive, at the same time it is certain that the potentials of interactive teaching are not sufficiently exploited nor practically explored in representative research. Besides, it is certain that the group dynamics in the classroom, due to its unpredictability and uncertainty, provides the charm of adventure and journey into something new, unseen, and unknown; there are many authors who claim that education is not worthy at all if it's not an adventure, if it's not uncertain, unpredictable to a high degree, if it does not lead to true discoveries of the previously unknown (Whitehead 1967: 91-101; Atkinson 2019: 59-64; 205-226).

With all the ambiguities and possible paradoxes of the concept of emancipation (Laclau 2007: 1-19) and with possible focusing on other concepts and conceptions for understanding social changes in the processes of (questionable) constitution of more humane and more civilized society, it can be concluded that the question of the emancipatory function of education remains open for further considerations and inquiries. We hold that interactive teaching represents a very important alternative, with great potential. It can play an important role in preparing children and adolescents to face different forms of social conflicts, manipulations, and coercion and to prepare them to face, understand and overcome all the tragedy of social turmoil. It seems that social conflicts and turmoil, regresses of civilization and numerous manipulations from the centres of power are inevitable elements of social life, but education keeps vitality and potential to raise people up, above and against identifying, accepting and anaesthetized conforming with different modes of power and force.

A definition of learning as permanent, or relatively permanent, change of individual experience and behaviour, implies that education really is the domain of individual and social change. But what is the overall subject of learning in general? We find a very important answer in Alfred Whitehead's thought: it is "Life, in all its manifestations" (Whitehead 1929: 6-7). If we care about emancipation, or whatever is understood under the word – or however we name what we want to understand under that word – considering its ambiguities – we should take both learning and life more seriously in all their relevance, importance, and preciousness, but not too seriously.

It may be the case that some of the disappointing outcomes in contemporary education are the result of not taking this process seriously enough. To bring the participants of educational process the sense of relevance, of importance and of value of educational enterprise, the sense of *joint action* and *joint engagement*, the sense of joint inter-generational *adventure*, sometimes very predictable, sometimes entirely unpredictable, sometimes uncertain, with new discoveries to reveal, with new inventions to explore – it is very important, for education not to be reduced to 'positivistic' or 'techno-scientistic' acquiring of 'competencies' for this or that profession.

It is important to be constantly reminded that education means an active moral orientation and moral development, the development of social consciousness and promotion of moral values, in spite of destructive processes in society, which send and transmit ruinous messages (Roeders 2006: 147-154). No moral indifference, relativization or moral quasi-neutrality should be presented in education, primarily due to psychological and developmental reasons. Interactive teaching could be a source of *axiological culture*, endless reservoir of moral and aesthetic values, for the world of values *per se* but also for the value and relevance of the world in which we live, in which every unit of reality bears certain relevance and certain value (Whitehead 1966: 111). Education provides navigation in the world of values, it provides us with moral criteria to

understand and evaluate what is good and what is bad in our world and to create alternative circumstances. At least, to try to create them.

In the end, coming back to the classroom again, it would be important to perform different research in schools and classrooms and analyse empirical material and situations, to understand and properly evaluate the *social* effects of interactive teaching and cooperative work with pupils. It would be important to analyse and evaluate the real *social* impact of pupils' participative actions and engaged group activities in changing circumstances and improving conditions of social life both in schools and classrooms and in local communities. It would provide empirical basis, support, and corroboration for our thesis to be elaborated or to be criticized further.

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Free Yourself from Yourself: The Ethics of the Self as an Emancipatory Educational Practice

When speaking about Foucault's interpretation of Seneca, discussions are primarily related to the second and third volume of *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1990b; Foucault 1986) and the lectures at the Collège de France published as *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (Foucault 2005). It could be said that these books represent a turning point. Contrary to the original plans that Foucault presented following the publication of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, he focused on the analysis of morality, i.e., ethics in Ancient Greece and Greco-Roman culture in the first two centuries CE (Foucault 1990b: 3–13). Foucault reinterprets his previous work and realizes that both the discourse and the power were modes of engaging in what he called the games of truth and subjectivation, i.e., specific relations with the truth through which the subject itself is created (Foucault 1990b; Foucault 1990a).²

In order to grasp the connection between the truth, the subject, and ethics, it is necessary to explain their role in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault 1978), which Foucault considers the beginning of his ethical work, as well as their role in contemporary

1 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: velinovmarija@gmail.com; marija.velinov@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

2 Regarding the question of whether this is a turning point in Foucault's thought or a matter of continuity of his work which is analyzed from a new angle, see Velinov 2018.

life, which leads him to considerations to which he committed himself. Furthermore, we must also present Foucault's understanding of morality and ethics, as well as the status and function of 'Seneca' in Foucault's thinking. In the context of these discourses, Seneca is chosen as a representative of Late Stoicism, but specifically as the representative who wrote the most and left behind an abundant source from which Foucault derived his depiction of this period, as the pinnacle of what he calls the attention to or the care of oneself (Sellars 2006: 12), the height of the specific 'culture' of the self (Foucault 2005: 179).

1. Ethics

Foucault attributes specific meaning to the relationship between ethics and morality. In his opinion, every morality has three aspects (Foucault 1990b: 25, 26): the first are moral rules or laws; the second is the behaviour of those 'subjected' to this rule; and finally, the third is the way that individuals are constituted as ethical subjects of the given moral code (rules or law), i.e., the way that they conduct themselves and lead themselves to conform with the set of prescriptions. Foucault's term 'ethics' is linked to the third of these morality aspects — to the aspect of subjectivation, the aspect of constituting oneself as the moral subject of the code (O'Leary 2002: 11). This is the relation to oneself "through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents" (Foucault 1984: 351). In line with this, Foucault defined ethics as the part of morality that is related to the relation of the self to oneself (Foucault 1984: 321–352; Davidson 2005: 126). Therefore, ethics is not a collection of rules and principles, but a field of our self-constitution as subjects (O'Leary 2002: 11).

Foucault believes that it is precisely in ethics that changes in morality through history are demonstrated. Laws remain more or less unchanged, but the modes of subjectivation change. Ethics is where changes occurred in the transition from the Greco-Roman to Christian morality, not in the law, but rather in the relation of the self to itself

(Foucault 1984: 355). For example, if we look at Foucault's detailed depiction of 'sexuality' and the problems surrounding it in the first two centuries CE, we will see that the rules and codes linked to it are very similar to subsequent ones. For example, there was a rule according to which sexual relations should be practiced exclusively within wedlock. What was different, however, were the reasons why people subjected themselves to this rule (Foucault 1986). During this period there was no notion of fidelity in the sense of obligation or living according to the law, but rather the idea of life without succumbing to one's passions, where energy is preserved, where neither the spirit nor the body should be squandered (which is defined as *stultitia*), where one commands oneself, but this domination is not permitted to anyone else, etc. Foucault noted that even the writings that discuss in the greatest detail the life of spouses do not lay down rules for discerning between what is allowed and what is prohibited, but rather a way of living, or a style of relations, is suggested. Therefore, through his research, Foucault wanted to demonstrate the transformations that occurred 'under' the laws and rules, in relations toward the self and the related practices of self (Foucault 1985: 356–358). He did not want to write the history of the moral law, but of the moral subject. Foucault defined the dominant contemporary idea of the subject as being the subject of desire, i.e., the subject whose truth can be discovered in the truth of their desire, the subject that is prevalent in psychoanalysis and philosophy, but has also reinforced its place as the dominant understanding of our present (Foucault 1990b: 6).

1.1. Subject, Truth and Technologies of the Self

Over time, through his work Foucault became aware of the existence of a type of technique that allows individuals to use their own means to carry out a certain number of operations on their own body, soul, on their own thoughts or their own behaviour, with the aim of transforming themselves. Foucault calls these techniques the *technologies of the self* (Foucault 1990b: 31–32; Foucault 1988: 17–18). He turned

to exploring the techniques of the self, which entail a set of commitments to the truth: finding the truth, the obligation to be enlightened by the truth, to tell the truth. Foucault considers all this to be of crucial importance for the development as well as the transformation of the self (Foucault 1988: 18).³

For example, for Foucault the unique characteristic of modern sexuality is precisely its relation to *truth-telling*. This relation produces a given relationship to the self, as a specific game of truth that is institutionalized in the idea of confessing and speaking the truth, which spreads to legal, medical, educational, familial, and romantic relationships (Foucault 1990b: 27, 28). Expressing or confessing one's truth is most commonly linked to the *liberation* of one's hidden desire and *true* nature. However, Foucault strives to show that speaking the truth does not liberate, but rather subjugates: "And this discourse of truth finally takes effect, not in the one who receives it, but in the one from whom it is wrested" (Foucault 1978: 62).⁴ Therefore, confessing one's (hidden) truth gains certain value and becomes the basic manner of our self-construction as an individual and the basic form of relationships with others. In this way, the contemporary western man becomes a 'desiring man'— the desire that must be revealed, which must be set free and in line with which we must define ourselves as the subject of its truth. Precisely this 'desiring man' and his relationship with the

3 In one of his reinterpretations of his previous work, Foucault specifically defines games of truth as the basic thread that has existed from the beginning to the end of his research. Namely, he links the first phase of his work to the consideration of games of truth in their mutual relations (for which certain empirical sciences from the 17th and 18th centuries were used as an example), in the second phase he addresses the relation between games of truth and relations of power (through the example of punishment practices), while the third phase is linked to researching games of truth in the relation of the self to oneself and the constituting of the self as a subject (the phase in which the field of analysis is most closely tied to the history of the "desiring man") (Foucault 1990b: 6). Considering that in Foucault's philosophy the relation of the self to oneself is defined as ethics, we see that his ethical considerations are best defined in the relation of the truth to the constitution of the subject.

4 The power that the production of truth provides can be seen in the example of documentarity, which is most often considered as the proof of the truth of an event. About the analysis of documentarity as the production, and not the reception of truth, and the power over the reception and even resistance, that is, the government of others, see Velinov 2020.

truth is what led Foucault to attempt to problematize its domination, by exploring other forms of subjectivation, i.e., other forms of relationships to ourselves or other forms of ethics.

In his lectures and seminars titled *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Foucault establishes the difference between Late Stoicism and Early Christianity and indicates precisely this moment as the crucial transition or point of discontinuity (discontinuity in the way of subjugation to the rules, but continuity of the rules themselves), as a historical circumstance that will in time create the ‘desiring man’. On the other hand, in the preceding period—in the Greco-Roman culture—Foucault discovers what he would call the *art of living*.

1.2. Ethics of the Self and Care of the Self

Foucault is interested in the history of the changes and relationships to what was called *epimeleia heautou* in Greek, or *cura sui* in Latin, and translates as the “care of the self”, “attending to oneself”, “being concerned about oneself”, “the fact of attending or occupation with oneself”, “nurturing oneself”, etc (Foucault 2005).

It is necessary to bear in mind that this principle represents multiple things (Foucault 2005: 1–19). It is primarily an attitude toward oneself as well as toward others and the world. It also represents a certain form of attention and view. Caring for oneself includes redirecting one’s gaze from others and the world to oneself and attending to what we think about and what takes place in our thoughts, i.e., both exercise and meditation. Finally, *epimeleia* always also implies a certain number of actions that a person exercises on the self, by which they change, reshape, transfigure, or purify, actions through which one cares for oneself.

Etymology refers to a series of words such as *meletan*, *meletē*, *meletai*, which are often used with the verb *gymnazein*, which means to prac-

tice and train. So, much more than a spiritual attitude, this is a form of activity that is vigilant, continuous, diligent, and regular. It entails an entire set of practices and exercises such as meditation techniques, techniques of remembering past moments, techniques of testing the conscience, etc. (Foucault 2005: 81–105).

Foucault differentiates between four groups of expressions linked to the practice of caring for oneself and the ‘culture’ of the self (Foucault 2005: 81–105): some indicate acts of cognition and are related to the attention or gaze directed toward oneself—the reverse gaze to oneself (Seneca 2007a), exploring oneself; others are related to the movement of the entire existence that revolves around itself and directs or returns (Seneca 2007a)⁵ to the self—withdrawing to the self (Seneca 2007a), secluding one’s self (Seneca 2010b), descending to the greatest depths of one’s soul, gathering composure, immersing oneself in the self, settling in the self (Seneca 2007b); then there is a third group of expressions that are related to special behaviour in regard to oneself, which is behaviour of a medical type (care for oneself, treating oneself, etc.), a legal type (making demands, pointing out one’s rights, separating oneself from debts and obligations, setting oneself free) (Seneca 1918: 1,4), as well as a religious type (expressing a cult to oneself, honouring oneself, respecting oneself (Seneca 2007a), being ashamed before oneself) (Seneca 2010b; Seneca 2007a);⁶ and finally, there are expressions that indicate a certain type of permanent relation to oneself, in the form of overcoming and supremacy (having power over oneself) (Seneca 2007a), in the context of experience (enjoying oneself) (Seneca 2007b), experiencing joy in oneself (Seneca 2007a Seneca 2007b), being happy in the presence of oneself, admiring oneself (Seneca 2007a), being satisfied with oneself, etc.

5 One should be like a deity or nature, which direct their activities at the outer world, but return to themselves from all sides.

6 The link between shame and respect, on the one hand, and the aesthetics of existence, on the other, is very important. Seneca defines a life worthy of respect and a beautiful life, as the life that should serve as an example and the one that we should emulate, while defining the life that we should be ashamed of—as the ugly one.

The precept ‘to be concerned with oneself’ was even in the case of the Greeks one of the main rules of conduct and the art (skill) of life. However, this principle was overshadowed by the Delphic *principle gnothi seauton* (know yourself) (Foucault 1988: 19). Foucault believes that our philosophical tradition has disregarded the basic principle of concern with oneself and overemphasized the simple technical advice of the oracle of Delphi.⁷ In Foucault’s opinion, the relationship between the need to learn who we are, to learn our true self and the principle of concern with oneself, as the basic rule of the art of life or skill of creating a beautiful life, i.e., aesthetics of existence, was reversed at the point of transition from Greco-Roman to Christian morality. In time, this reversal has created practices of confession and admission that have become part of our everyday life. Knowledge of the self in Greco-Roman culture represents one of the consequences of concern with oneself, while in the modern world it constitutes the fundamental principle (Foucault 1988: 22).

2. Seneca

Foucault believes that the first two centuries CE represent the golden age of the culture of the self, of the cultivation of oneself, or of the care of oneself (Foucault 2005). Foucault designates the care of oneself as one of the central notions of Seneca’s philosophy (Foucault 2005). He reminds us of the beginning of Book 7 of Seneca’s work *On Benefits* (Seneca 2009: 297) in which he gives priority to the rules that guide our behaviour over issues that are related to exercising one’s intellect. Seneca believes that we should turn to matters that are related to ourselves and our behaviour, i.e., to a certain number of rules through which we can guide our actions (Foucault 2005, Seneca 1918: 88). Also, in *On the Happy Life* (Seneca 2007a) he explicitly suggests that we should withdraw to the self and pay attention to the self. Finally, Seneca starts the first letter to Lucilius, with the advice that he should

7 For more on the relation between the principle of care for oneself and knowing oneself in the context of western thinking, see Foucault 2005: 1–24.

attend to himself (Seneca 1918: 1,1).

2.1. Two Dimensions of the Generalization of the Care of the Self

Foucault detects a specific generalization of the care of the self in the 1st and 2nd centuries CE—a generalization that is manifested in two dimensions (Foucault 2005: 81–106). On the one hand, unlike Plato's link between the care of the self and certain key moments of transition into maturity (Plato 2001), the care of the self later becomes an obligation that should extend throughout one's life. It could even be said that the care of the self is linked more to maturity and old age than to the transition from adolescence to maturity.

The second difference compared to Plato's understanding of the care of the self lies in its educational function. Namely, contrary to professionally oriented education (which was primarily related to the skill of governing others), the practice of the self in the Hellenistic and Roman periods develops a certain educational and critical function of the care of the self, which is not related to preparations for any given profession. This is rather a matter of creating an individual so that they can properly endure all possible accidents, misfortunes, disgrace, and setbacks that may befall them (Foucault 2005: 81–106). Therefore, this is a matter of developing a safety mechanism, an armour, a protective layer separating one from the rest of the world, an assembly that we encounter most commonly in regard to the idea of being equipped and armed (Seneca 1918: 24,5, 61,5, 109,8; 133,28). Even though during this period there was apparently still a connection between the care of the self and education, it was now primarily linked to freeing oneself of misapprehensions and bad habits, which means that this link was more about specific corrections and liberation than traditional education related to knowledge (Foucault 2005). The practice of the self should improve, not educate, or only educate (Foucault 2005).

Considering the fact that the practice of the self took on the role of improving and correcting, it increasingly veered toward medicine (Foucault 2005). For example, at the beginning of the work *On the Tranquillity of the Mind*, Serenus addresses Seneca—whom he compares to a doctor—and asks him for a treatment for his ailment (Seneca 2007b: 112). Also, the idea of treating the soul against passion is the basic idea of the text *On Anger* (Seneca 2010b). Finally, the word *cura*—as part of the expression *cura sui* (care of the self)—can be used as care, but also as treatment, attendance, etc. (Đorđević 2004: 383). The connection to medicine further leads to the advent of the body as the subject of care and the further care of oneself is associated with the soul (self, reason), as well as with the body. Foucault primarily distinguishes this connection in Seneca’s slightly hypochondriac letters. They are full of examples of care directed at health, nutrition, discomfort, and distress (Seneca 1918: 8, 55, 57, 78; Seneca 2010b: book 2, 20,1-3; book 3, 9, 4; Seneca 2007a: 3).⁸

The second dimension of generalization of the care of the self is a particular quantitative expansion of care, which is reflected in the idea of attending to oneself as a general principle that is directed at everyone (Seneca 1918: 31,11, 47,15; Seneca 2007b: 116).⁹ It is no longer necessary to care for the self solely for the purpose of the possibility of governing others. It has now become its own goal, in a way.

This general principle should not be understood to be a universal law that everyone should abide by, but rather as a universal invitation for everyone to care for themselves. This invitation, however, can be answered by only a few—only those who have enough strength, determination, patience, courage, and resilience (Foucault 2005: 107–124;

8 In addition to letters 55, 57, and 78, we should add Letter 8, *On Anger*, which speaks about the suppression of anger with lighter food, avoiding amorous delights, and rest, as well as Section 3 of the dialogue *On the Happy Life*, where Seneca says that a person living a blessed and wise life attends to their body and its needs.

9 “Each man acquires his character for himself, but accident assigns his duties” Seneca 1918: 47,16.

Seneca 2007a), as well as those who belong to certain groups, schools, or — as in Seneca’s case — at least to some social relation (like a friendship).¹⁰ Therefore, the other is necessary in order for the practice of the self to attain the self to which it aspires (Foucault 2005: 125–148). This need for the other is based, in a way, on the fact that there is some ignorance (therefore we need a teacher), but ‘ignorance’ is based on the idea that a person — as mentioned previously — is malformed or deformed, full of flaws, trapped in dangerous habits or has an ailing soul, i.e., *doesn’t know how to live*. In addition to this, it also applies to the individual not inherently approaching virtue, morality, and righteous acts. To become good is a skill (Seneca 1918: 90,44). Therefore, the individual should not only aspire to knowledge, but to a new status of subject that is defined by a complete relationship of oneself to the self (Foucault 2005: 125–148). And to become constituted as a subject, the mediation of the other is necessary. The role that the teacher now plays is not to teach their student something, nor to demonstrate to them that they don’t know something, but to create their student, in a way, to help them change in order to constitute themselves as a subject.

2.2. *Stultitia*

In order to depict the necessity of the presence of a teacher in the practice of the self, Foucault draws attention to one of the most important notions of stoic philosophy—the notion of *stultitia*. This notion, which is sometimes translated as folly (Seneca 1918: 52,2) can at first glance be perceived as a lack of certain knowledge, however, this is a particular distress of the soul, indecisiveness (Seneca 2007b: 115), inconsistency and discontent (Seneca 1918: 52,2), and not ignorance. At the beginning of the work *On the Tranquillity of the Mind*, Seneca does not address Seneca with the desire to gain knowledge from him,

10 See: Foucault 2005. The need for the other stands in particular tension with the individuality that Seneca demands (See: Seneca 2007a), but it is important to bear in mind that this individuality is defined in its contrast to the crowd that we let make decisions for us, i.e., against the life in which we follow others, instead of ourselves, and not against friendship. For more on Seneca’s views on friendship see Seneca 1918: 3.

but to become very close to the state of being a god: to be unshaken, tranquil (Seneca 2007b: 115).

On the other hand, *stultitia* is the state of the one who has not taken the path of philosophy, someone who does not attend to oneself, who has not started exercising the practice of the self (Foucault 2005: 125–148). This is a person who is susceptible to every wind, open to the outer world, restless and not satisfied with anything. Seneca notes that persons in this state can never escape from themselves (Seneca 2007b: 117,118). Therefore, we could say that the goal of the educational practice described as such is liberation or emancipation from the self. This is not an idea of being free from the influences of others but escaping from one’s own nature.

Stultus is without aim and constantly changing their mind (Seneca 1918: 32,2).¹¹ As such the one who “veers from plan to plan” (Seneca 1918: 52,1) does not have and does not want free, absolute will—they don’t aspire toward that which is eternal. Therefore, the will of the *stultus* is not free, it is not an absolute will, they are in a way not capable of desiring properly (Foucault 2005). For their will to be free, what they desire must not be determined by an event, idea, or affection. On the other hand, in order for their will to be absolute, it must be a will for one and only one thing—they cannot desire multiple contradictory things at the same time. Finally, their will must not be indolent, full of interruptions or changes (Foucault 2005). Contrary to the state of *stultitia* — in which will is limited, relative, fragmentary, and changing — is the state whose features are free, absolute, and constant desire.

What object can be the subject of desire—freely, absolutely, and always? To what object can will be directed without any external limitation and without the desire for something else? The only object that fulfils these conditions—the only thing that is truly our own—is the self

11 Carelessness and indecision reveal an inner struggle and disagreement with oneself. Compare: Seneca 2007a.

(Foucault 2005; Seneca 2007a). Contrary to this absolute desire directed toward the self, *stultus* is the one that does not want oneself, whose will is not directed towards the self. There is a notable paradox in the escape from oneself directed precisely at the self. The development or education of subjectivity, therefore, implies liberation (not of one's nature but from it) in order to create space for the full reconstitution of the self.

The abandonment of this state—i.e., the direction of one's will toward oneself or initiation of the practice of the self, the practice of caring for oneself—cannot be achieved independently, because being in the state of *stultitia* means not wanting to leave it, not wanting to care for oneself. For this reason, Seneca says that no one is strong enough on their own to extricate themselves: “he needs a helping hand, and someone to extricate him.” (Seneca 1918: 52,2) Therefore, establishing a relationship of the self to oneself is merged with the relationships of the self to the Other (Foucault 2005: 149–168).

The role of the person that helps us extricate ourselves from the *stultus* state and start caring for ourselves is not the (classic) role of a school teacher, nor the role that the lover assumes in relation to their loved one, as is the case in Plato. Seneca's idea of the 'teacher' is linked to the particular idea of 'counsellor' that is realized within the relationship that can exist with one who is at the same time a client seeking a service from a professional philosopher, but also a friend, family member or protégé. In any case, this is an *intimate* relationship that exceeds mere professional guidance.

2.3. Turning to Oneself and Knowledge

The idea that a person must turn their gaze to themselves, to look at themselves, to always keep their eyes on themselves (the first category of expressions related to caring for oneself mentioned previously), often seems to approach the Delphian principle of 'know yourself', which

held a key position in Plato's understanding of caring for oneself. However, is the invitation to turn our gaze to ourselves the same as the invitation to constitute ourselves as the object of contemplation? Should we observe ourselves in order to discover the truth about ourselves?

Foucault believes that the principle of turning to oneself and observing oneself differs both from the Platonic idea of knowing oneself and from examining oneself which belongs to monastic spirituality (Foucault 2005: 205–228). In his opinion the gaze that we turn to ourselves is at the same time turned away from other things and precisely this turning away is the key aspect of turning to oneself. We turn the gaze away from other people and worldly things (Foucault 2005: 205–228; Seneca 1918: 17,5). Turning our gaze away from worldly things represents a complex and especially significant issue that is at the centre of Foucault's examination of the relationship between the truth and the practice of subjectivity (Foucault 2005: 229). In other words—which are closer to our topic — what is the relationship between the knowledge of things and the contemplation of oneself?

A part of the answer to this question could be that Seneca has a specific measure of usefulness: disregard knowledge and skills that are useless and inapplicable in genuine struggles in life and retain those that are easily applicable in different circumstances and that serve to treat the soul and create virtue, i.e., favour skills or arts of living (Seneca 1918: 88). However, this does not imply rejecting knowledge about nature as completely useless.¹² In that case, what comprises this knowledge's relation to the art of living?

Seneca primarily provides criticism of the vanity of knowledge, which is reflected in interest primarily directed toward collecting books rather than toward their content (Seneca 2007b: 127), as well as in the recommendation not to read too many different books, i.e., not

12 In contrast, stoic thinking links morality, logic and physics into a totality (compare: Sellars 2006: 52–54), where physics is defined as the theoretical basis for ethics, Hadot 2002.

to dissipate curiosity. One should take only a few books, study them thoroughly and only keep a certain number of proverbs from them (Seneca 2007b: 127; Seneca 1918: 2,4-5). This technique of approaching knowledge represents an *exercise in contemplation of the truth* and is based on wise proverbs that form the element of philosophical deliberation, and not the cultural field which is based on the entire knowledge (Foucault 2005). Seneca himself often practiced this exercise, most commonly extricating Epicurus' wise words (Seneca 1918: 2,5). Furthermore, Letter 88 includes a criticism of liberal skills (sciences and arts) that deals with the relationship of music, grammar, geometry, etc. to philosophy and their influence on a person. He points out that it is inconsequential to analyse whether, for example, Homer is older than Hesiod, where Odysseus had travelled, whether Penelope had recognized him, how to measure our estate, how to bridle a horse, etc.¹³ Instead, we should engage in philosophy, as the only true liberal skill that sets a person free. We should be interested in fostering virtues, because the spirit improves solely through the knowledge of good and evil. In order to engage in this, we must create space in our soul.

Despite such an attitude toward all sciences that are not philosophy in the strict sense, Seneca still wrote *Natural Questions* (Seneca 2010a), in which he engaged in describing the world — while at the same time raising the issue of why he would address topics that are so far from us. It was his intention to describe the world and figure out its causes and secrets, but he also strived to figure out the purpose of such endeavours. Considering the fact that he was already quite old and that he had wasted a lot of time, Seneca believed that it was necessary for him to attend to himself. As his life slipped away, he needed to turn his gaze to the contemplation of himself. However, when defining the area that should be disregarded for the sake of working on oneself, he found it not in nature—but in history. Instead of describing other's passions, he needed to overcome and defeat his own. Instead of researching what

13 Even though he admits the positive effects of liberal skills on mitigating anger. Seneca 2010b.

had been done, he needed to discern what should be done: overcome the faults, be calm when misfortune strikes, resist pleasure, not seek passing pleasures, and be prepared for death (Seneca 2010a: book 3,1–5).

Yet, in that case, why does Seneca engage in an extensive description of the world and its secrets? Seemingly paradoxically, the reason for these explorations is liberation from the slavery to oneself. Therefore, following the claim that the self is what one should aspire to, what should always be kept in sight, etc. we return to the idea of liberating ourselves from ourselves. However, this is not about freeing oneself from the self as such, but from a specific relationship with oneself, which is reflected in imposing excessive labour, as well as a specific relationship of obligation, i.e., a duty to oneself (Seneca 1918: 1,4–5). A person imposes on themselves certain duties from which they try to extract certain gains, such as money, fame, reputation, satisfaction, etc.—that is to say they subject themselves to something that is not themselves, something that is alien to their being (Seneca 1918: 8). Also, Seneca defines gazing at the future (the view of the *stultitia*, who must constantly live anew and desire something new) as what composes the slave’s soul (Seneca 1918: 6). This forms a relationship to the self that one should rid oneself of, and this liberation is made possible by the study of nature (Seneca 2010a: book 3,16). In what way?

By freeing ourselves from faults and flaws we elevate ourselves to the level of divine reason. This ascension is not related to some other world, but to the elevation to the highest point of this world and turning one’s gaze to the world and ourselves within it, which will enable us to discover nature’s hidden depths and secrets. It could be said that it is a type of recession considering the point where we are, a recession that will enable us to see and understand the lie and unnaturalness of everything that previously seemed good to us. Wealth, pleasures, glory, etc. now acquire their true dimension.¹⁴ Raising up to the point of

14 Compare: Seneca 2007a: 28. Here Seneca speaks of the relation between “fleeing” flaws and rising up; Seneca 2010a book 3,9–15.

view from the roof of the world enables us to dismiss all false values, but also to assess who we are, to evaluate our existence (Seneca 2010a, book 3,18). Therefore, describing nature does not only serve to extricate us from the world, but to enable us to consolidate ourselves as to where we are (Foucault 2005: 229–246). The gaze aimed at nature’s entire system allows us to accept ourselves as what we are, as a point in the general system of the universe (Foucault 2005: 229–246, Seneca 2010a: book 3,18).

Self-cognition understood in this manner does not represent knowledge of a person’s soul, it is not an analysis of the self and its secrets, which need to be studied and explained, but rather the contemplation of the self in the world, as a part of the world. In this way, while gazing at the entire world, we do not lose sight of ourselves at any moment. The virtue of the soul is based on the inclusion in the world, in the exploration of the world’s secrets—not the secrets of the soul (Foucault 2005: 229–246).

Analysing Seneca’s contemplation of the world through which the subject returns to oneself,¹⁵ Foucault points out certain characteristics of such contemplation (Foucault 2005: 278–314). We primarily observe that it is necessary for the subject to move, to withdraw from the place where it is so that it may reach it; then, the place that the subject holds allows it to simultaneously see things as they are, as well as their value in relation to the person; in this cognition we can see ourselves, comprehend ourselves within our reality, and finally, through it, the subject discovers its freedom and finds a way to exist that is inherent to perfection and happiness.¹⁶

In sum, knowledge involving these four conditions (the subject’s change of position, the evaluation of things on the basis of their reality within the *kosmos*, the possibility of the subject

15 On the relation between the idea of returning to oneself and the truth see Seneca 2007a: 5, 8.

16 Compare: Seneca 2007a.

seeing himself, and finally the subject's transfiguration through the effect of knowledge) constitutes, I believe, what could be called 'spiritual knowledge' which was gradually limited, overlaid, and finally effaced by a different mode of knowledge which could be called [...] "intellectual knowledge". (Foucault 2005: 308)

A characteristic of intellectual knowledge—as opposed to spiritual knowledge—is that it establishes the subject as another possible object of knowledge. However, Foucault wants to point out that in the moment that we are discussing, the relationship between the subject and the cognition did not have this form and could not have had it (Foucault 2005: 315–330). Namely, as we see in this description, the relationship of the subject and the cognition is unrelated to the possibility of objective cognition (of the subject). Rather, the knowledge about the world gains a specific spiritual form and a specific spiritual value for the subject. Therefore, this is a particular spiritual modalisation of the subject through the cognition of the world.

3. *Askesis* as the Practice of Truth

After depicting cognition of the world as a spiritual knowledge in its specific relation to the constitution of the subject (as the ultimate goal of the practice of the self), Foucault addresses the concept of turning to oneself and turning one's gaze to oneself in one more way. He wonders what form of practice or type of activity, by oneself on oneself, encompasses this turning, i.e., what exercise (*askesis*) of oneself on oneself is in question (Foucault 2005: 315), because just as no technique can be perfected without practice, the skill of living (*technē tou biou*) cannot be perfected without *askesis* (Foucault 1997a). This *askesis* or exercise entails creating an armour or a weapon, by means of which individual prepares for various unforeseen life events that may befall them in the future. This armament, or in Seneca's words *instructio* (building, placing in order) (Đorđević 2004: 759) should be adapted to what might befall us, precisely at the moment when it befalls us, in the event that it befalls us (Foucault 2005). Therefore, the *askesis* in ques-

tion is not self-denial, as it is commonly understood, but the constitution of the subject through given exercises that prepare them for life.

Askesis has several basic characteristics. Firstly, like (physical) exercise (Seneca 2009: 297) it consists not of learning all the possible moves and holds but learning the basic moves that we may need often, as well as practicing the moves with which we have the most problems. Being strong is not what is important, but rather not to be weaker than what may happen (Foucault 2005). Also, it consists of speeches (*logoi, decretal*) (Seneca 1918: 95,1) that represent truthful attitudes as well as acceptable principles of conduct (Foucault 2005). These are sentences that have been etched into the spirit and urge action. These material elements of reasonable speech are permanently inscribed in the subject and their actions (Seneca 1918: 50,8). They are at the same time the citadel that we retreat to and the weapons with which we defend ourselves. In a way, they are always 'at hand'. As we have mentioned before, Foucault calls this preparation *exercising contemplation of the truth*.

The *askesis* is what enables truth-telling—truth-telling addressed to the subject and also truth-telling that the subject addresses to himself—to be constituted as the subject's way of being. The *askesis* makes truth-telling a mode of being of the subject. (Foucault 2005: 327)

Askesis is the practice of truth, it is a way for the individual to connect to the truth, because – as Seneca says – blessed is the one who wants nothing more and fears nothing, but *not the one who stands beyond the truth* (Seneca 2007a).

It could be said that

[...] on the one hand *asesis* is what makes possible the acquisition of the true discourses we need in every circumstance, event, and episode of life in order to establish an adequate, full, and perfect relationship to ourselves. On the other hand, and at the same time, *asesis* is what enables us to become the subject of these true

discourses, to become the subject who tells the truth and who is transfigured by this enunciation of the truth, by this enunciation itself, precisely by the fact of telling the truth. (Foucault 2005: 332)

Accordingly, Foucault defines the purpose and aim of philosophical *askesis* as the *subjectivation through the discourse of truth* (Foucault 2005: 333). Therefore, philosophical *askesis* — *askesis* of the practice of the self —

[...] involves rejoining oneself as the end and object of a technique of life, an art of living. It involves coming together with oneself, the essential moment of which is not the objectification of the self in a true discourse, but the subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on oneself. (Foucault 2005: 333)

Foucault finds the idea of subjectivation of the discourse of truth in Seneca's work, related to knowledge, reading, writing, etc. He says that we should assimilate, make our own (*facere suum*) (Seneca 1918: 119,7) the things we know, the discourses we hear, the discourses that we recognize to be true, or which have been passed on to us as true through philosophical tradition. Therefore, the essence of philosophical *askesis* is making the truth our own and becoming the subject of enunciation of the discourse of truth. Instead of enunciating one's own, it is a matter of assimilating 'another's' or a previously enunciated truth. Therefore, precisely opposite to the customary ideas of emancipation and freedom—we reject ourselves and give in to the influence of others.

3.1. Listening, Reading, Writing

The first step—but also the permanent basis of *askesis* as the subjectivation of the discourse of truth—are all the techniques and all the activities that are related to the skills of proper listening, reading, and writing (Foucault 2005: 331–354). First of all, in order to be able to receive the discourse of truth, our listening must be proper. In order to illustrate this, Foucault illustrates Seneca's discussion of hearing

through the ambiguity of its passivity (Seneca 1918: 108; Foucault 2005: 331–354). Namely, on the one hand, it is a great advantage that our ear does not require will in order to listen, because that means that even when we are not focused or don't understand the lecture, something will always stay in our head. Considering the fact that the *logos*, which enters through the sense of hearing, acts on the soul — whether it is willing or not — even simply being present at a lecture on philosophy will benefit us. However, if we do not pay attention to what is being conveyed in the philosophical discourse, i.e., if we direct our attention to an unsuitable object or goal, we can be left without any benefit. This is why it is necessary for us to master the skill of the appropriate method of listening. This skill may contain a vow of silence, like the one in Pythagoras' school,¹⁷ but also a criticism of inappropriate behaviour during lectures. Inappropriate gestures and squirming represent the physical version of *stultitia*, as the constant restlessness of the spirit and attention, the soul that leaps from topic to topic, whose attention is constantly wandering, and which is always restless. On the other hand, philosophy should enjoy only silent adoration (Seneca 1918: 52,13). “In sum, good philosophical listening involves a necessary work of attention, of a double and forked attention.” (Foucault 2055: 351). Furthermore, the aim of actively and correctly directed listening is for us to attain the rules of action bit-by-bit, i.e., the general rules of living, based on a single sentence, claim or statement that we actively contemplate and which we completely transform, which will allow us to etch that statement into memory.¹⁸

A similar formula is transmitted further — to the rules related to reading. Namely, one should not bury oneself in a vast quantity of different works (like the *stultus*, i.e., the one whose attention cannot be occupied for very long by anything). Rather one should select not only a small number of authors and a small number of their works, but also only a certain number of their sentences that we consider useful (like

17 Compare: Seneca 1918: 52,10.

18 Compare: Seneca 1918: 108.

an athlete learning basic holds that they will most likely need) (Seneca 1918: 2,4–5). These sentences should be assimilated, and one should become their speaking subject (Foucault 2005). For example, Seneca recorded quotations by certain authors and sent them to his correspondent, with the advice that they should meditate on the given statement (Seneca 1918: 2,5, 3,6, 4,10, 7,11, 8,7–8). Therefore

[...] the object or end of philosophical reading is not to learn an author's work, and its function is not even to go more deeply into the work's doctrine. Reading basically involves—at any rate, its principal objective is—providing an opportunity for meditation. (Foucault 2005: 356)

We listen and read for the purpose of meditation.

The Latin word *meditation* (translated from the Greek word *melete*) also represents a type of exercise—exercising in thought (Foucault 2005: 356). Meditation is the exercising of making thoughts one's own, in the sense that when encountering a text, we should not engage in its meaning, its analysis, but rather just its assimilation. The goal of meditation is to convince ourselves that the thought is correct and to etch it — as truthful — in our memory, so that we may repeat it when the opportunity arises. Therefore, we transform it into the principle of action which we always have before us or at hand.

It is an appropriation that consists in ensuring that, from this true thing, we become the subject who thinks the truth, and, from this subject who thinks the truth, we become a subject who acts properly. (Foucault 2005: 357)

We are not interested in what the author wanted to say, but rather we are interested in creating a “collection” of sentences, through reading, which would then become part of ourselves. They become our rules, our principles of conduct.

Therefore, this is a matter of assimilating and reproducing knowledge that resembles school education. This is not a matter of interaction or dialogue, or contemplation or criticism, but of memorizing and reproducing.

Reading is further extended, reinforced, and reactivated through writing, which is also an element of meditation. As Seneca advises (Seneca 1918: 84,2), we should not only read nor only write, but use writing to give form to what reading has collected. Reading collects discourses that writing shapes. Thus writing, through collecting thoughts that have been read as well as one's own thoughts while reading, represents a mental exercise that stands opposite to the great lack of *stultus*, which endless reading can support (Foucault 1997a). Therefore, through reading, writing (and going back to what has been written) we assimilate the discourse of truth that we have *found as our own*. During this period, writing — as an assimilation of discourse — developed in two forms: notebooks and correspondence.

Namely, the thinkers of the time created notebooks (Greek *hupomnēmata*¹⁹), which represented a type of guide to conduct, where they wrote down quotations, fragments from books, as well as examples that they had witnessed or thinking that they had heard (Foucault 1997a). As such, they represented material for future meditations, as well as systematic collections where they accumulated arguments and means by which to struggle against weakness or to overcome difficult circumstances in life. However, they were not only reminders that were to be consulted on occasion, but rather material and a framework for exercises that should be frequently performed: reading, meditation, conversation with oneself and with others. That way, they become embedded in our soul and become part of ourselves or precisely us. One should bear in mind that these are not personal journals where they described private states of the soul, they are not “a narrative of the self,” in them, they did not write the truth of the self.

19 Accounting books, public registers, individual notebooks. Foucault 1997a.

The movement they seek to bring about is the reverse of that: the intent is not to pursue the unspeakable, nor to reveal the hidden, nor to say the unsaid, but on the contrary to capture the already-said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and for a purpose that is nothing less than the shaping of the self. (Foucault 1997a: 210–211)

The objective of the notebooks was to make the already spoken discourse a means of establishing a link between the self and oneself (Foucault 1997a: 211). By transforming — through writing — things that had been seen and heard “into tissue and blood,” the writer develops their own identity (Foucault 1997a).²⁰ This is a collection of practices through which the truth is acquired, assimilated, and transformed into a permanent principle of action. That way notebooks — having fixed the acquired elements and developed part of the past that a person can go back to, which it can withdraw to — represented a resistance to the dispersal characteristic of the *stultitia* (Foucault 1997a). Therefore, notebooks were a safe place where writers kept all the thoughts that in some way constituted them, and which they could then subsequently also share with others through correspondence.

Correspondence, through which we share discourses of truth with others, represents an interesting cultural phenomenon of Seneca’s time. This was an individual practice between two people, and accordingly had a free and flexible form that was adapted to every correspondent (Foucault 2005: 395–412). This correspondence could be called a spiritual correspondence between two subjects, in which they would exchange news of themselves, their soul and the progress that they have been making and provide advice to one another.²¹ Within

20 On this trail, one of the basic criticisms of Foucault’s interpretation of Seneca, which stems from Hadot’s analysis, is that when Seneca differentiates between pleasure and happiness (Seneca 1918: 23), he does not associate happiness with the self, but rather with the best part of oneself, which Hadot defines as reason (Hadot 1995: 207). Accordingly, it is his belief that writing cannot be linked to the creation of identity, but to the liberation from individuality and turning to the universal (reason) (Hadot 1995: 209).

21 Even though a correspondence starts between a person seeking advice and another providing advice, it cannot remain unidirectional for long. Compare Seneca 1918: 34,2, 35, 109,2.

the correspondence, the adviser uses their notebooks to help the other, but at the same time helping themselves, primarily by going back to what they had written, but also by acting upon themselves through the act of writing the letter, as well as on the person receiving it — through the act of reading. The reason for this is that writing — as Seneca notes — also includes reading what has been written, therefore becoming reactualized (Seneca 1918: 84,9–10). Seneca’s letters therefore primarily serve to guide the other, but through them Seneca also exercises himself (Seneca 1918: 7,8). In addition to this, writing letters helps the one writing them to also practice their weapons. “A commander never puts such trust in peace that he fails to prepare for a war” (Seneca 2007a: 108). The thinking that we give others also prepares ourselves for similar circumstances (Foucault 1997a). In this way reading, writing, writings notes for ourselves, correspondence, and even going back to old letters comprise a very important action of caring for oneself and others, and transforming the truth into *ethos*.²²

Conclusion

Through the analysis of the notions and practices of stoic philosophy—such as *stultitia* and *askesis*, and their relationship with the truth or speaking the truth, and the specific relation to listening, reading, and writing — we can observe that this is not a classic educational practice. However, this is a practice of educating the ethical subject that is freed of the inner and turned to the outer truth. It relies on cognition of the world (i.e. on natural sciences, which at the time were encompassed under the name *physics*), which defines us in relation to the world, but at the same time moves us from the place where we started. By leaving the state of *stultitia*, we become independent, autonomous, and prepared for life.

Ethics is therefore the conscious practice of freedom that in Antiquity relied on the fundamental imperative: the care of oneself.²³ Fou-

22 On the etho-poetical function of writing see Foucault 1997a.

23 Compare: Foucault 1997b: 285.

cault was especially drawn to the vision of the ‘culture’ of the self in the Greco-Roman world as a decision, a choice that was not imposed.²⁴ Therefore, he proposed a new ethics where the games of truth would exist without or with minimal domination.²⁵ Foucault, by his own self-understanding, was guided in this research by the fact that “our etho-poetic practices have become oriented to discovering our true or essential nature” (Rajchman 1986: 170) and that an analysis of ethics should now guide us to the separation of our ethics and self-forming practices from the obligation to tell the truth about our nature. Foucault’s philosophy would therefore offer us a choice of way of life and experiences outside of the previous knowledge or truth of oneself, and in this sense, we can claim that it sets us free or emancipates us. However, such an emancipation does not imply freedom of the influence of the other. It is clear that the other is included in such a form of education—not only as a necessary teacher, but also as a basis for developing the subject. Namely, this is precisely a matter of acquisition and assimilation of other’s thinking, through which the subject is created, while escaping oneself in a way. Taking this into account, how does the subject become emancipated? It becomes free of oneself, of one’s truth, of its speaking. The person turns to themselves in order to become free of themselves, in order to become independent of themselves, in order to become emancipated of themselves. With the help of the idea of freedom, Foucault’s descriptions of development and education of the self in a certain way become linked — precisely and only seemingly paradoxically — to the overcoming of the self.

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24 Compare: Seneca 2007a.

25 Compare: Foucault 1997b: 298, 299.

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EMANCIPATION FOR AND FROM THE SOCIETY

Milica Smajević Roljić¹

An Interpretation of the Educational Process from the Perspective of Kant's Philosophy of History and Legal-Political Theory

Introduction: Kant as an Educator and Philosopher in the Eighteenth Century

"The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection. . . . How, then, are we to seek this perfection, and from where is it to be hoped for? From nowhere else but education" (CL, AA 27: 470-471)

Kant was one of the few philosophers who wrote about education and also had a diverse teaching experience. In his long and rich teaching career, we can distinguish three major periods. First, during the 1750s, he worked as a home teacher in two families near Königsberg (Beck 1978:188). Although we do not have much knowledge

1 Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade: smajevicmilica@yahoo.com.

about this period, based on the fact that Kant maintained close social relations with these families long after he stopped teaching their children, we conclude that they were satisfied with his educational skills.

Second, in 1776, Kant became one of the greatest supporters of Basedow's experimental school in Dessau, the Philanthropin (Louden 2016: 393). Being deeply influenced by Rousseau, Basedow wanted to incorporate his ideas into the curriculum of the new school he founded. Some of the main goals of the school were to practice critical thinking and learn foreign languages through conversation and play, to separate moral education from religion, and to develop mechanical skills (Beck 1978: 189). In 1776, Basedow published an account of his school, which was designed for parents who planned to enrol their children in the Philanthropin.

Kant wrote a review of Basedow's account and openly showed enthusiasm for this new educational system. In *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum*, Kant wrote:

To each commonwealth, to each single citizen, it is infinitely important to get to know an institute in which an entirely new order of human affairs commences, and which, if it is spread quickly, must bring about such a great and such a far-sighted reform in private life as well as in civil affairs, as one by a casual glance could not easily imagine. (EP, AA 2: 448)

Although Kant argued that a radical reform of the existing education system was necessary and raised money for the work of Basedow's school, it turned out that his efforts were largely in vain. After several attempts to maintain the school, it was finally closed in 1794, and Kant pointed out that people are wrong when they think that experiments and innovations in education are unnecessary; their greatest significance is reflected in the fact that the results of experiments are often different than expected (Päd, AA 09:451).

Third, Kant worked as a university professor for forty-three years and gave lectures in various fields such as metaphysics, natural theology, logic, ethics, and anthropology. His lectures were very popular and well attended, and even students from other countries used to come to listen to them. It is well known that Kant did not take a leave of absence from work, nor did he travel or leave his country. His commitment to his university career and students was complete.

It should be recalled that Kant was born at a time when the pursuit of educational reform was already present, not only in philosophy but also in other disciplines. Locke's book *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, Rousseau's *Emile* and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* represent some of the most important attempts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to rethink both education and its role in society. It was considered that one of the main goals of education should be "the production of a moral and civic-minded citizenry" (Munzel 1999: 248), and many of Kant's claims about education confirm that he shared this vision with his predecessors and contemporaries.

Based on all the above, it could be expected that Kant left behind extensive writings dedicated to the topic of education, but that is unfortunately not the case. Although he considered education to be "the greatest and most difficult problem that can be given to the human being" (Päd, AA 09: 446), Kant left behind relatively little written testimony on the subject, which is why his works on education (*Lectures on Pedagogy*, *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum* and the "Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics" in his *Metaphysics of Morals*) are best interpreted if placed in the broader context of his philosophy. Even in the secondary literature, Kant's understanding of education is given far less space and attention than other aspects of his philosophy.

Kant's understanding of education is most often interpreted from the perspective of his ethics, where the importance of the moral development and cultivation of each individual is particularly emphasized

(Roth and Surprenant 2012: ix). The topic of this article, however, will be somewhat different. Instead of the usual analysis of one's duties to oneself and emphasizing the importance of developing one's own talents for the purpose of personal growth and education, attention will be paid to examining the phenomenon of education from the perspective of Kant's philosophy of history and legal-political theory. We will see that this perspective is very important, because it shows us that the goals of education coincide to a large extent with the goals of the historical-political process. Therefore, the first chapter of this paper will be dedicated to Kant's understanding of the philosophy of history and its relation to the theory of education. We will see that the historical and educational process takes place simultaneously and that they strive for the same goal – the establishment of a cosmopolitan community of moral and educated citizens. The second chapter will provide a brief analysis of Kant's legal-political theory, and then point out its connection with historical and educational processes. We will show that the development in the sphere of education of individuals can never be complete if, at the same time, we do not work on the development of the social system in which individuals live. In the third chapter, attention will be paid to the relationship between the Enlightenment and education. The eighteenth century was the age of Enlightenment ideas, and education was certainly one of the main ideals to be pursued.

Kant's Philosophy of History as a Basis for Understanding His Philosophy of Education

In the eighteenth century, it was considered that there was a close connection between the philosophy of education and the philosophy of history (Beck 1978: 191). This can be noticed in both Rousseau's and Kant's works. As we read Kant, we realize that his philosophy of history is a more important starting point for understanding his theory of education than, for example, his anthropology or epistemology. In his *Lectures on Pedagogy*, Kant asks: "Should we in the education of the individual imitate the course followed by the education of the human

race through its successive generations?” (Päd, AA 09: 459). Although Kant did not offer an explicit answer to this question, it is clear that the historical process is the key to understanding his theory of education. If we take even a brief look at Kant’s writings on the philosophy of history and compare them with Kant’s texts on education, we immediately realize that the interpretation of his theory of education cannot be complete without taking into account the historical perspective.

In his famous article “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”, Kant reveals to us that, in his opinion, the main goal of the historical process is the establishment of a cosmopolitan community of all people that would allow free expression of freedom of every individual, together with the freedom of all other individuals, and all in accordance with the general law (IaG, AA 08: 23). Kant makes a very similar statement when he talks about his understanding of education in the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, where he points out that “children should be educated not only with regard to the present but rather for a better condition of the human species that might be possible in the future” (Päd, AA 09: 447). The idea of a better future in which people would live in a free cosmopolitan community was omnipresent in Kant’s works.

Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” consists of nine propositions, and we will quote and briefly analyse only the first three because they are directly related to Kant’s theory of education.

When he claims in the first proposition that “*all natural predispositions of a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and purposively*” (IaG, AA 08: 18), Kant unequivocally incorporates the teleological principle into his view of the philosophy of history. He adds that an arrangement that would not progress towards the realization of its purpose would be contrary to the natural principle of purposefulness. This would imply that complete lawlessness and desolate chance reign in nature.

In the second proposition, Kant says that “*in the human being, those predispositions whose goal is the use of his reason were to develop completely only in the species, but not in the individual*” (IaG, AA 08: 19). With this statement, he emphasizes that man is fallible being who should live for many centuries in order to achieve its purpose. Since nature has determined that human life span lasts much shorter, only a few decades, it is necessary for a large number of generations to pass on their knowledge to each other, in order to achieve the natural purpose of the human species. Kant believed that an individual could make progress only as a member of the human race, through numerous trials and errors, which are inherent in man as a sensible being.

The teleological principle and the idea of the possibility of the full development of human abilities only in species are explicitly present in Kant’s *Lectures on Pedagogy*. Kant points out that education “will get better and better and each generation will move one step closer to the perfection of humanity; for behind education lies the great secret of the perfection of human nature” (Päd, AA 09: 444). He argues that progress in education and the development of man’s natural disposition can only be achieved through a number of generations that educate one another. We can never say that one individual has succeeded in achieving the ideal of education, because only the human race as a whole can strive to accomplish this task. Each generation should use the knowledge of their ancestors and move on to new achievements and knowledge.

Although man as an individual cannot fully develop independently, but only within the human species, Kant in the third proposition claims that:

[...] nature has willed that the human being should produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical arrangement of his animal existence entirely out of himself, and participate in no other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself free from instinct through his own reason. (IaG, AA 08: 20)

Each individual possesses reason and free will, which makes them capable of working on their own improvement and development of talents. Although previous generations need to pass on their knowledge to young people, when it comes to the development of reason, every human being must work independently to fulfil this task. Kant presents the same idea in his *Lectures on Pedagogy* where he claims that although a young man needs an educator to guide him, he primarily needs reason in order to develop his abilities and learn to act morally. Therefore, while educators can teach any mentally healthy person to read, write, and think critically, success in moral education depends on the individuals themselves, not on the efforts of their tutors. Education, then, can be both physical and moral, and “the idea of education which develops all the human being’s natural predispositions is indeed truthful” (Päd, AA 09: 445).

A brief analysis and comparison of the first three propositions of “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” with parts from the *Lectures on Pedagogy* showed us that the goals of the historical process largely coincide with the goals of education. However, it is interesting and useful for our current purpose to notice another important thing. Namely, Kant divided the history of the world into phases that largely coincide with the phases of an individual’s education. The earliest phase of the historical process is the so-called natural state, which characterizes life in accordance with instincts and the absence of established laws, rights, and freedoms of individuals.² In order to achieve their goals, people do not use reason, but physical strength, force, and instincts. This phase of the history of the human race corresponds to the earliest phase of a child’s education, which Kant calls nurture, and which refers primarily to feed-

2 It is important to understand that for Kant, the natural state is a hypothetical idea that helps us see the importance of the existence of basic human rights, but also the social institutions that protect them. By describing the natural state, Kant does not offer us an empirical account of the life of our ancestors in society before the creation of the state and institutionalized rights, but tries to emphasize that some values and some rights are universal and independent of the social systems we live in. However, in order to protect and ensure these rights, it is necessary to form a civil society.

ing and nurturing a child. At this stage, the child is a human being who belongs completely to nature and relies only on its instincts. When it is hungry or sleepy, it cries, and when it is happy, it laughs.

In the second phase of the history of mankind, people have left the raw natural state, but they live in societies that have not yet reached their highest potential. Although there are established laws, as well as the rights and duties of all citizens, these regulations are not always respected because the human race has not yet reached the level of morality. This period in the history of the human race corresponds to the period of children's education which Kant calls discipline, and which refers to the school years. At this stage, the child is no longer guided only by instincts, but also by its educator or professor at school. The child learns how to read, write, be obedient, do homework and organize its time. Although the schoolboy has not yet reached complete independence, he is no longer at the stage when he is guided only by nature. His mind and body are in the phase of discipline. At this stage, however, an important problem arises.

One of the biggest problems of education is how one can unite submission under lawful constraint with the capacity to use one's freedom. For constraint is necessary. How do I cultivate freedom under constraint? I shall accustom my pupil to tolerate a constraint of his freedom, and I shall at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. Without this everything is a mere mechanism, and the pupil who is released from education does not know how to use his freedom. (Päd, AA 09: 453)

In other words, the following question arises: How to unite obedience to the imposed restrictions with the child's ability to use its freedom? Kant offers two answers to this question. First, he argues that "from earliest childhood the child must be allowed to be free in all matters (except in those where it might injure himself, as, for example, when it grabs an open knife), although not in such a manner that it is in the way of other's freedom" (Päd, AA 09: 454). Second, "one must

prove to it that restraint is put on it in order that it be led to the use of its own freedom, that it is cultivated so that it may one day be free, that is, so that it need not depend on the care of others” (Päd, AA 09: 454).

Hence, in the second phase, both the child and the human race left behind a natural state, but they have not yet reached the level of morality.

The third stage of the history of the human race is the stage of genuine morality. This phase is the most difficult to explain because no experience or history can help us in accomplishing that task. A cosmopolitan society, a federation of states, perpetual peace and freedom of each individual should be realized in the future, and then the human race will achieve genuine morality. This is the final goal of the historical process. This stage in the history of mankind corresponds to the stage of children’s education which Kant calls cultivation. Unlike Rousseau, Kant believes that man is not moral by nature (Anth, AA 07: 324) and “morality is not one of the natural dispositions of the child that can be brought to actualization by training” (Beck 1978: 200). Therefore, an educator cannot make a child moral; he can only teach it discipline and basic skills. Every man has the task of developing their morality by following the principles of their reason. Neither the progress of the human race nor the development of morality in the individual can be fully explained, because both humanity and the individual will realize their full potential only in the future.

For Kant, the history of mankind has an evolutionary course. It is a history of the slow but inevitable development of human rationality (Vuković 2016: 154). Kant’s view of the historical process can also be defined as progress from nature to culture. Kant confirms this when he says in his article “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use in Practice” that the “human race is constantly advancing with respect to culture (and its natural end)” (TP, AA 08: 309). The goal of the historical process is the supremacy of morality over nature and the formation of a cosmopolitan community of all the

people of our planet. Similarly, the goal of education is the supremacy of morality, rationality, and rational principles over blind instincts and passions. Education is a means by which individuals, and then entire societies, can be enlightened and emancipated from their own intellectual immaturity. The relationship between education and the Enlightenment will be the topic of the last chapter of this article. However, before we turn to this topic, in the next section we will focus on Kant's legal-political theory and its relationship with the theory of education.

Kant's Legal-Political Theory - The Ideal of Education Cannot Be Achieved in a Lawless State

The examination conducted in the previous chapter shows us that the ultimate goal of Kant's philosophy of history largely coincides with the goal of his theory of education. The chapter before us will show that Kant set the same goal before his legal-political philosophy, especially emphasizing the importance of establishing a republican system in the state, the only one that can lead to the establishment of a federation of states, and then to a cosmopolitan community made up of all the inhabitants of our planet. Although he admits that the assumption of the inevitable progress of mankind may resemble a story from a novel (MAM, AA 08: 109), Kant believes that it is supported by the past experience of the human race and helps us to establish certain regularities in the confused sequence of historical events.

Kant divided public right into state, international and cosmopolitan right, and he paid the most attention to the former. He believed that the republican system, which is based on the principles of freedom, equality, and dependence of all citizens on the same set of laws (ZeF, AA 08: 350), is the most suitable of all systems, because it can establish institutions that would protect the rights of all individuals. Every republican state contains:

[...] three *authorities* within it, that is, the general united will consists of three persons (*trias politica*): the *sovereign authority* (sovereignty)

in the person of the legislator; the *executive authority* in the person of the ruler (in conformity to law); and the *juridical authority* (to award to each what is his in accordance with the law) in the person of the judge (*potestas legislatival, rectoria et iudicialia*). (MS, AA 06: 313)

Legislative power rests on the people and their united will and derives its legitimacy from the fact that laws apply only to individuals who have chosen them of their own free will. If a few people are allowed to prescribe laws in the state, it is always possible that injustice will be done, because that group of individuals will want a more favourable position for themselves, as is the case in the natural state. If the holders of legislative power are all citizens of the state, through their united will, then there is no fear that the laws will be unfair because no one does injustice when deciding on themselves.

These three types of authorities must be strictly separated from each other and one of them must not be allowed to interfere in or influence the affairs of the other. The legislator in the state cannot be at the same time the one to whom the executive power belongs, nor the one who judges in court disputes, because, in that case, due to conflict of interests, no form of government could perform its function impartially and under prescribed laws. Through these three types of authorities, the state achieves its autonomy. It becomes an independent and autonomous political entity, whose citizens obey only those laws that they have prescribed for themselves by the united will of all. The goal of such a constituted state is to eliminate the possibility of doing injustice and to enable the expression of freedom guaranteed by law.

Although he pays far more attention to state right than to international and cosmopolitan right, Kant points out that there is an interdependence between these three types of public right and that all three are necessary to ensure freedom, equality, peace, and a cosmopolitan community. None of the goals set before public right can be achieved until the state, as an individual, forms an alliance with other states and reaches an agreement with them on peace and mutual non-aggression.

However, if a republican system based on the principles of freedom and equality is to be achieved, Kant believes that this is possible only through a long historical process. We cannot expect that the full development of society will be achieved in one generation. Humans are rational individuals, and the development of their reason takes place gradually through the historical process of progress. With this line of argumentation, Kant makes a close connection between his legal-political philosophy and his philosophy of history. As we read Kant, it is difficult not to notice that most of his texts dealing with the philosophy of history, simultaneously deal with his legal-political theory.³ The basic postulates of state, international and cosmopolitan right are placed at the core of Kant's philosophy of history. Standing on legal-political ground allows us to decipher the direction of history, which, in Kant's opinion, is defined by the same principles that determine the formation of the republican system, and then the federation of states.

Why was this brief account of Kant's legal-political theory relevant to us in the context of examining his theory of education? Why did we draw a parallel between the philosophy of history and legal-political philosophy? The answer to both questions lies in the fact that, in Kant's view, the historical, political, and educational processes take place simultaneously. The development of human skills, the process of education, the formation of the republican system in society, the transition from the natural state to the social state, the pursuit of cosmopolitan community of all people – all these processes take place in parallel and affect each other. Although it is impossible to determine which of these processes precedes one another, it is clear that they all last for centuries and that many generations pass on their knowledge and skills to each other. We cannot expect to have educated and moral individuals in a society in which the established laws and rights of all citizens are not respected. This leads us to

3 This refers to: "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim", "Conjectural Beginning of Human History", "On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use in Practice", "The Conflict of the Faculties".

the conclusion that work on the education of future generations includes work on the development of the entire socio-political system.

Age of Enlightenment - Education as a Process of Emancipation from One's Own Immaturity

Although Kant lived in eighteenth-century Europe, which was the centre of the republican and revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment, it is important to point out that Prussia, the country in which he spent his entire life, was an absolutist monarchy. Despite the fact that Kant did not live in a state where the proclamation of new slogans and attitudes was common, he openly advocated the ideals of the Enlightenment and believed that these were at the same time in the main interest of mankind (Smajević 2020: 212). The freedom of the individual, the recognition of the rights and dignity of every human being, the necessity of freedom for personal progress through education, the formation of a strong state that allows intellectual freedom to its citizens, international cooperation, and peace – all these are the goals of the Enlightenment to which Kant himself aspired (Beck 1969:437). The goal of the Enlightenment was to create educated and moral people who use their own reason. As Louden (Robert Louden) and many others have noted, “the Age of Enlightenment was also an age of pedagogy; indeed, the very term ‘Enlightenment’ implies a process of education” (Louden 2016: 394).

At the beginning of his short article “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Kant says that one of the main culprits for the absence of enlightenment is man himself, who, as a physically mature being, is responsible for his own passivity, disinterest, and inertia (BdF, AA 08:35). Although each individual possesses reason and the ability to use it for the purpose of their own education and progress, Kant points out that most people, due to laziness, rely exclusively on the opinions and attitudes of social authorities and do not think for themselves. Kant asks all adult human beings to renounce

the passive-observational role and, using their own reason, to form their own personal attitudes. The process of advancing towards enlightenment depends primarily on the individual who is responsible for working on their own growth, education, and emancipation.

A potential ambiguity arises here: namely, it may seem that the claim that every human being should work on their own emancipation and should renounce authority is not in line with the view that we need teachers, educators, and new experimental schools. Kant advocated this second view when he supported Basedow's school and the necessity of educational reform. However, we can solve this potential problem if we remind ourselves that Kant claimed that a person needs educators in order to master skills such as reading, writing, discipline, critical thinking, and foreign languages. Kant, of course, also wrote about practical or moral education and defined it as "education by which the human being is to be formed so that he can live as a freely acting being" (Päd, AA 09: 455). However, Kant claimed that "human being is by nature not a moral being at all; he only becomes one when his reason raises itself to the concepts of duty and of law" (Päd, AA 09: 492). Morality is not a natural disposition and therefore educators cannot make a child moral through teaching, exercise, and training. They can give the child examples of morally virtuous and morally bad actions and ask it how it would act in a certain given situation. They can present options to it and make it think about what is morally right to do. Some children will know which behaviour is right and will act accordingly; some others will also know what is right but will not act accordingly, while others will think that it is better to act according to prudence than according to morality. This shows us that true morality does not depend on the educator's efforts, but on the extent to which the individual follows the principles of their reason. Since humans are not perfect and sinless beings, we cannot expect them to always act in accordance with moral principles. What we can expect and what we can hope for is that each individual tries to understand rational principles and to apply them more often when acting. Therefore, we can

conclude that every society needs educators who will pass on the skills and knowledge they have acquired to future generations, and that after acquiring basic skills, each individual is responsible for working on their own emancipation and moral progress. There is no contradiction between the need for educators and the use of one's own reason for the purpose of enlightenment and further moral education.

It would, however, be wrong to conclude that all responsibility for emancipation from the state of immaturity is placed on man as an individual who should aspire to be independent and autonomous. In the continuation of his short article, Kant emphasizes the importance of the social context, which has a unique role in the aspiration of the individual towards progress and the state of Enlightenment. If a state system does not respect the human right to freedom and equality with other citizens, then such a society does not allow an individual to work on their development and education.

Kant condemns the revolution as a potential solution to this problem and believes that it is not a legitimate means to achieve Enlightenment, because rebellion can lead to a change of government, but not to a radical change in the way of thinking in society. This second goal can be achieved only through a gradual reform of society which, in order to be justified, should be initiated and implemented by none other than the legislator himself. The sovereign must be instructed in the existing social problems, because only in that way can the constitution be improved in accordance with the ideal of the law" (Smajević 2020: 206).

Therefore, the Enlightenment aspiration for each individual to use their own reason in making decisions and to work on personal growth, emancipation and education is inseparable from the aspiration for the social system as a whole to be just and cosmopolitan. The work of enlightening individuals must at the same time be the work of enlightening the whole society.

Concluding Remarks

In this article, we have tried to emphasize the teleological dimension of Kant's theory of education and its great significance. "The human species has a *Bestimmung* (translated variously as 'destiny', 'vocation' and 'determination'), and education is a necessary means towards the achievement of this fundamental goal" (Louden 2016: 405). In order to achieve proper development of all fundamental human capacities, it is necessary for a person to be in a constant process of education and to develop their predispositions and talents. Humans require education in order to effectively exercise their freedom and autonomy. Expressed in Kant's words: "the human being can only become human through education" (Päd, AA 09: 443).

The aim of this article was to show that a correct and comprehensive understanding of Kant's conception of education requires a historical and political perspective that emphasizes the fact that human progress and development in all fields is always a long, multi-generational process. The education of the human race takes place in parallel with the progress of the human race on the historical and political level, and thus the process of education is inextricably linked to the socio-political development. The course of the historical-political movement, which at the same time represents the course of education of the human species, can be roughly defined as the progression from nature to culture. While the natural state is imbued with lawlessness and wild freedom, civic order is a huge step towards culture, education, legalized freedom, and the creation of a cosmopolitan community.

At the very end of this paper, we must not forget to ask one important question: Can Kant's understanding of education be useful to us today and how? We believe that the answer to this question is positive and that we can draw several important lessons from Kant's theory of education. First, we must understand that education is not an isolated phenomenon. If we want to work on the development of education today, in the 21st century, it is necessary to take into account

the broader picture of the society in which we live. If, for example, laws within the state system are often violated, then in parallel with the work on education, an effort must be made to improve the implementation of legal regulations in society. Progress in the field of education cannot be achieved separately from the progress of other domains of society. Second, educators can educate the individual only to a certain extent. They can teach them the basic skills necessary for a functional life, they can show them numerous examples of moral conduct, but true moral agency depends on the individuals themselves and the extent to which they follow the principles of their reason. Therefore, the full potential of education can only be realized by investing efforts to improve the social system in which we live and by working on personal progress and emancipation.

Although there is a lot of public talk about education, peace and freedom of expression, the efforts made to achieve these goals seem insufficient or perhaps even wrong. While there are a few countries that are very close to realizing these ideals, such as Norway and Denmark, most other countries in the world, especially non-European ones, face a number of problems and challenges. Extreme poverty, inaccessibility of primary education, cruel treatment of members of some social groups - all these are indicators that even in the twenty-first century, the basic needs and rights of all people on the planet have not been met (Smajević 2020: 213). Each individual should work on their own education and talent development. However, it should be emphasized that a person who struggles every day to achieve basic needs such as drinking water, food, a roof over his head and primary education, cannot be blamed for general ignorance. The biggest task is set before free and educated individuals who should make efforts to change social systems and point out the importance of education. Therefore, the main advice of this paper is that each individual should work on their own education and on improving the system in which they live, while the greatest responsibility lies with people who have already reached a certain level of education and who should be the initiators of positive changes in the future.

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Emancipatory and Ideological Functions of Education

The paper examines two conflicting societal functions of education: on the one hand, education can work to reproduce the existing power relations, indoctrinate students, and assimilate them into the existing social order, but on the other hand, it can also contribute to the emancipation of students and the society as a whole. By contrasting the emancipatory function with the ideological one, I aim to clarify the meaning of individual and social emancipation drawing on the Enlightenment tradition, locate the main ideological forces opposing emancipation in the field of education today, as well as suggest some ways in which they can be resisted.

First, I will explore the core emancipatory educational ideas of the Enlightenment based on three key texts: Rousseau's *Emile*, Kant's "What is Enlightenment?" and Paolo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Next, I will examine the ideological function of education, in particular of neoliberal education, in order to discern the main ways in which contemporary ideology works through education. Based on insights gained, I will suggest several main lines of resistance, capable of strengthening the emancipatory function of education and countering the ideological one in contemporary neoliberal societies.

1 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: olganikolic111@gmail.com; olga.nikolic@institfdt.bg.ac.rs.

In the concluding discussion, I will respond to the critics arguing that the Enlightenment ideal had itself become ideological and had instrumentalized education (Biesta 2008; Osberg & Biesta 2020), which will lead me to make the conceptual distinction between ideology and ideal. It should be noted right from the start that the relations between ideology and emancipation cannot be simplistically reduced to mere opposition. What we call ideology today often used to be emancipatory in the past, and *vice versa*, and many times we could argue that one and the same constellation of educational beliefs and practices is in some ways ideological and in some ways emancipatory at the same time.² Nevertheless, as I will maintain, there is still a clear distinction to be made between ideological and emancipatory functions of education. In order to determine more closely the meaning of emancipatory education, in the following section I will focus on the emancipatory educational ideal of the Enlightenment, as articulated by Rousseau, Kant and Freire. These authors provided some of the most remarkable philosophical visions of emancipatory education.

Emancipatory Ideal of the Enlightenment in Rousseau, Kant and Freire

In the Age of Enlightenment, education was recognized as the way to accomplish the progress of the entire humanity guided by reason, and the word ‘emancipation’ gained new meaning in line with this ideal.³

In Rousseau’s work, the main purpose of education is negative: to keep his student, Emile, away from the corrupting effects of society, in order for him to be able to enter society as a free man.

2 The history of European universities is a good example of this ambivalence, insofar as universities served both as places of critique and the production of new knowledge, as well as of the reproduction of the dominant worldview. For an excellent overview of the early history of universities and the many intertwined social and political interests that shaped it see Rüegg 1992.

3 Its earlier meaning was tied to the Roman law and the legal emancipation of children and wife from *pater familias*. In the XVI century the concept started to be used in the context of religious toleration and by the end of the XIX century it gained traction in the variety of contexts, including liberation from slavery, emancipation of women and the working class.

The main emancipatory message of *Emile* is that children should be raised to be free, which they by nature already are, their freedom being taken away from them in the course of misplaced education delivered in a society of false social values and corrupt institutions.

Rousseau contrasts freedom with dependency and tightly links it to self-sufficiency. He sees original enslavement as coming from human beings becoming too dependent on each other, losing their natural freedom in the process.⁴ Thus Rousseau's main educational aim is to preserve natural freedom as much as possible, enabling Emile to live his life as he freely chooses, for which harmonious and full development of both the physical strength and intellectual and emotional capacities is required.⁵ The fundamental maxim of Rousseau's education is thus: "The truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he pleases" (*E*: 84). For this, his Emile needs an autonomous use of reason, free from prejudice, and passions free from vice.⁶

Rousseau stresses the extreme importance of developing children's character to become neither tyrannical nor slavish (*E*: 85). Already in early childhood, children become aware of dominion and submission.⁷ Rousseau advises parents and governors to be attentive to the intention behind children's cries, immediately aiding them if the cause of their cries is a natural need, but ignoring them if they cry in order to

4 "Civil man is born, lives and dies in slavery." Rousseau 1979: 4; see also 233. This work will be cited as *E* for all subsequent references.

5 "Prepare from afar the reign of his freedom, and the use of his forces, by leaving natural habit to his body, by putting him in the condition always to be master of himself and in all things to do his will, as soon as he has one." *E*: 63; cf. 68, 84-85, 119, 184-185. Yet, Rousseau also admits that dependency is the necessary condition of social life that cannot be reversed back to the state of nature. See *E*: 193, 221.

6 "It suffices that, closed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get carried away by either the passions or the opinions of men, that he sees with his eyes, that he feels with his heart, that no authority govern him beyond that of his own reason." *E*: 255; see also 168, 171, 176, 187, 207, 213-215, 239, 267.

7 "(...) he must give orders or receive them. Thus his first ideas are those of dominion and servitude." *E*: 48. "The first tears of children are prayers. If one is not careful, they soon become orders. Children begin by getting themselves assisted, they end by getting themselves served." *E*: 66.

submit other's will to theirs. On the other hand, children should not be taught to obey commands: whatever they must do, they should recognize as flowing from the natural necessity (*E*: 89-91). It is in this way that children grow up in freedom and learn to treat others as equals.

In *Emile*, Rousseau outlines the road to individual emancipation guided by the natural course of human development. Society is mainly regarded as an obstacle to natural education and consequently to freedom. In fact, Rousseau directly contrasts the education of man for him/herself (natural education) with education for others (for citizenship).⁸ Nevertheless, he occasionally hints at the possibility of reconciliation of individual and social emancipation,⁹ ultimately to be found in the free and complete surrender of individuals to the general will, whose purpose, in turn, is to preserve and protect individual freedom by laws.¹⁰

Before reaching full maturity, Emile must travel in order to learn about the various existing governments, as well as about the ideally just social order and the rights that are the basis of its justice, the ones expounded in Rousseau's *Social Contract*. On travel, he will not only test his virtue and fidelity, but also learn about his civic duties, which he is to fulfill with a view of the ideal of society as a free association of men, and the laws appropriate to it (*E*: 459-460). Emile becomes a member of society as a free man by resisting its injustices in the name of the ideal of justice, but also by respecting his civic duties. On the one hand, even the actual imperfect governments ought to be respected insofar as they provide security and protect individual rights. On the other hand, their own imperfection enables Emile to conceptualize the ideal

8 "(...) one must choose between making a man and a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time." *E*: 39; see also 40. Rousseau sees Spartan education as the ideal of citizen education.

9 "In the republic, all of the advantages of the natural state would be united with those of the civil state, and freedom which keeps men exempt from vices would be joined to morality which raises him to virtue." *E*: 85; see also 41, 193, 253.

10 "To find a form of association that may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, joining together with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before. Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract provides the solution." *E*: 164.

and virtuously strive for it, by sacrificing his individual interest to the common interest. Thus Emile, educated solely for his own freedom, ultimately serves his country as well, by living an exemplary life of virtue (*E*: 473-474).

We see the reverberations of the same main ideas in Kant's insistence that men should neither be slaves of other's will or of outside passions, but subjects that freely submit to their own will. Men, free by nature, are in the state of subjugation when instead of using their own reason, they allow themselves to be guided in their opinions and actions by the self-proclaimed tutors. Individual emancipation for Kant is tied to the emancipation of humanity that can be achieved only gradually, under the condition that free public use of reason is allowed (Kant 2004: 6).¹¹ Everyone should be allowed to freely criticize and take a stand on public matters, especially regarding the issues of state policies and religious postulates. In this way, enlightened individuals, those who have already freed themselves from "self-imposed nonage" will spread the same spirit of freedom and rationality to others. Kant's vision of the progress of humanity should ultimately lead to universal enlightenment. Freedom of thought prepares the ground for civic freedom:

And this free thought gradually reacts back on the modes of thought of the people, and men become more and more capable of acting in freedom. At last free thought acts even on the fundamentals of government and the state finds it agreeable to treat man, who is now more than a machine, in accord with his dignity. (Kant 2004: 10)

Both for Kant and for Rousseau, emancipation has its individual and its social aspect. It is an achievement of an individual striving towards freedom and virtue, but this is truly possible only in a society based on the principles of reason, freedom and equality. Individual emancipation is necessary for the liberation of the entire society and *vice versa*.

11 See also Smajević Roljić 2021 [this volume].

With Paolo Freire, the founder of critical pedagogy, we find preserved these basic ideas of the Enlightenment. The key novelty of Freire's pedagogy is struggle: the society of equality must be fought for; it will not come of itself. Emancipation takes place in the process of this struggle. In his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, he focuses on the role of education in the struggle for emancipation, understood at the same time as the struggle for a more humane society, and against the society of domination in which both the oppressor and the oppressed are dehumanized. Thus, Freire also repeats Rousseau's idea that human beings should overcome the roles of masters and slaves, the oppressors and the oppressed, in order to achieve true freedom. The tendency, overwhelming even today, to understand the process of education as a transmission of content from teachers to students who are expected to merely adopt and reproduce it, is what Freire calls "the banking model of education" in which knowledge becomes petrified, lifeless and isolated from the world. The result is passivisation and dehumanization:

[...] it is the people themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system. For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. (Freire 2000: 72)

The knowledge that students gain in the banking model is meant to make them obedient clerks in the existent system: it insists on inessential contents and doesn't question existent norms. According to Freire's Marxist critique of education, the explanation for this lies in relations of power: dominant social groups adjust social order to their own interests and needs, representing them at the same time as universal and natural. In such an order the oppressed should be taught obedience, they should learn knowledge and skills that have value for the oppressors. Thus, the immediate interest of the privileged in the existing hierarchical order is not to entice free questioning and crit-

ical thinking, especially not among the oppressed. Furthermore, the dominant ideology is so woven into the everyday way of thinking that even well-meaning teachers often unconsciously fall into the patterns of teaching which contribute to the reproduction of the oppression:

Education as the exercise of domination stimulates the credulity of students, with the ideological intent (often not perceived by educators) of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression. (Freire 2000: 78)

The central task of Freire's emancipatory pedagogy is transformative action directed at freedom and equality for the oppressed, and in this way for the entire humanity. Instead of teaching students to adapt to the unjust world, the main task of education should be to entice students to fight for a more just world. Education should liberate students from an ideological consciousness in which the existing social relations are (falsely) represented as necessary and show them that human beings can change and create the world. In giving up that freedom and that potential, man willingly accepts unfreedom, and remains a „well-fed cog in the machine“.

Freire's emancipatory ideal demands also the change of relation between teacher and students, in the direction of more egalitarian, dialogical and problem-posing education, similar to what we find in Socartes:

Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. (Freire 2000: 80)

The three authors certainly have their share of differences, but for the present paper what brings them together matters more. Two main emancipatory messages shared by Rousseau, Kant and Freire, at

the core of the educational ideal of the Enlightenment, are that human beings should become autonomous in using their own reason, and that they should be neither masters nor slaves to each other.

Ideological Function of Education

Ideology is a concept notoriously difficult to define. Descriptive (neutral) concept of ideology and normative (negative or positive) concepts are commonly distinguished (Geuss 1981). In its neutral sense ideology is any web of meanings, beliefs and values shared by a group of people (e.g. a movement, a class, a nation) that enables them to make sense of the social world and shapes their social practices.

In the negative sense, that I use in this paper, ideology is such a web of meanings, but that is in some way illusory, false and distorted under the influence of unequal power relations in society. Thus, ideology is not merely a false representation of social reality, but a web of meanings and corresponding practices serving to maintain and justify domination, i.e. the master and slave relations. Geuss distinguishes three moments in the negative concept of ideology: the falsity of belief, the genesis under the influence of power, and the function of masking, or normalizing and naturalizing unjust and unequal relations of power (Geuss 1981: 12-22). I believe the third moment is the most decisive in attributing an ideological function to a social phenomenon. The ultimate value underlying this critical view of ideology is that human beings are equals, i.e. that their lives and freedom should be equally respected, and that they should treat each other as such. Accordingly, any view that attempts to justify the opposite of this principle should be considered false and ideological. False, because there simply is no good argument to elevate some human lives above others, as a matter of principle, and ideological, because such social systems justify the rule of some human beings over

others on these questionable grounds.¹²

I believe that it is possible to preserve the critical edge of the term “ideology”, by stressing inherent falsities, distortions and misconceptions of the ideological discourse and consciousness, as long as we accept that it is possible to distinguish between systems of beliefs that are more or less rationally and morally justified. Thus, I use the term “ideology” to designate any web of meanings, beliefs and values, along with the corresponding practices, serving to legitimate systematic domination of some over others in a society. The underlying assumption of this approach is that no domination is justified and that it should be replaced by equality, as the only way of securing freedom for all, at least in principle. It follows from delimiting the concept of ideology in this way that our personal evaluatively colored beliefs and opinions are not always necessarily ideological. Our individual perspective may only partly (to a greater or a lesser extent) overlap with one or more ideologies, but we are not inescapably trapped by this or that ideology. Moreover, not all arguments in favour of an established social order are necessarily ideological. Namely, in so far as reasons are given in favour of an existing social order that serves to promote freedom and equality against domination, these are not ideological, but they can become such if they lose touch with reality and become mere phrases. On the other hand, even egalitarian social movements can fall prey to ideological consciousness through a dogmatic, uncritical acceptance of group values.¹³

Nazi Germany gives the clearest example of ideology in its most toxic form. As other aspects of life, education too was here put under

12 Admittedly, moral dilemmas can occur that complicate the application of the principle of equality in some circumstances (e.g. whether to provide urgent medical help to a child or to an elderly patient). However, when it comes to evaluating political systems, there is simply no good argument in favour of the systematic assigning of unequal value to human lives, e.g. through discriminatory laws, especially when the discrimination is based on unchosen characteristics (race, gender, ethnicity, etc).

13 For an overview of the main ideological strategies see Eagleton 1991: 33-62.

strict control in order to ensure that it is in complete service to the state ideology. Students were indoctrinated from the earliest age in line with the completely distorted worldview of the Nazis. Teachers had to attend the Nazi teacher training camps, textbooks and curriculums were modified in line with false doctrines, children's free time was organized around participation in the Nazi youth camps. They were constantly deliberately exposed to the ideology, brainwashed into accepting racial prejudice both via the content that was taught in schools, as well as by the constant pressure to conform and the fear of punishment.¹⁴

In stark contrast to this, contemporary educational institutions readily advocate equality of opportunity for all human beings, the importance of universal education based on scientific worldview and openly call for developing critical thinking, creativity and individuality. This is exactly the reason why it is much more difficult to grasp the ideological effects of contemporary ideology of neoliberalism in the field of present-day education, which are indeed strong but skillfully obfuscated by the emancipatory discourse.

Neoliberalism reveals its ideological character when the values nominally defended by it are compared to the reality of the system that it justifies. Much has been written on the neoliberal capitalist forms of domination and subjection. We can point out overwork and lack of free time, precarious living conditions, lack of social security and health care for the lower social classes, exploitation of the peripheries of global capitalism as sources of cheap labour and spaces for outsourcing polluting industries, as well as the crisis of democracy due to the concentration of power in the hands of corrupt political and social elites, who are simply not held accountable.¹⁵ Neoliberalism has an array of strategies at disposal for representing

14 See Pine 2010.

15 "For Hayek and the neoliberals, the Führer was replaced by the figure of the entrepreneur, the embodiment of the will-to-power for the community, who must be permitted to act without being brought to rational account." Mirowski 2009: 444.

grave social inequalities as in some way justified, reasonable and/or necessary, of opening space for further exploitation and abuse of poor by the rich, and for closing off possibilities for overcoming capitalist modes of production, distribution and exchange.¹⁶

The ideological core of neoliberalism is the generalization of market relations and meanings appropriate to them to other forms of life as described already by Foucault:

First, the generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary exchanges functions in American neo-liberalism as a principle of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behavior. This means that analysis in terms of the market economy or, in other words, of supply and demand, can function as a schema which is applicable to non-economic domains. And, thanks to this analytical schema or grid of intelligibility, it will be possible to reveal in non-economic processes, relations, and behavior a number of intelligible relations which otherwise would not have appeared as such— a sort of economic analysis of the non-economic. (Foucault 2008: 243)

As noted also by Mirowski, in neoliberalism the sense of all other aspects of society is determined in relation to the market, and evaluated with respect to how it contributes to the market: citizens are primarily participants in the market and “customers of state services” (Mirowski 2009: 437), freedom is primarily the freedom of the market,¹⁷ the main purpose of the state is to preserve the free market, personality traits and behaviours are held in high regard that enable one to succeed in the market, etc.

16 For a more detailed critique of the basic theoretical assumptions of neoliberalism see Nikolić & Cvejić 2017.

17 “Freedom is not the realization of any political, human, or cultural *telos*, but rather is the positing of autonomous self-governed individuals, all coming naturally equipped with a neoclassical version of rationality and motives of ineffable self-interest, striving to improve their lot in life by engaging in market exchange. Education is consequently a consumer good, not a life-transforming experience.” (Mirowski 2009: 437)

Another contradiction worth noting is that the system that supposedly defends freedom can easily be implemented in the authoritarian governments as well, and is often threatened by democratic processes (Mirowski 2009: 436, 442-446). Also, the system that is supposedly free from being rigged, according to its theoretical defenders, can in fact increasingly be rigged by the rich elites.

What makes neoliberalism an ideology is not simply a collection of its claims, but the justification of these in terms of natural inequality of human beings as a driver of progress. It is this pseudo-evolutionary assumption that establishes the link between the meaning of free market, the nature of human beings, and the values that humanity should strive for that as a constellation of meanings gains ideological character. This justification of free market becomes naturalized and simply assumed in the process of dissemination, becoming increasingly adopted by individuals, materialized and further solidified in repeated practice. Insofar as contemporary schools foster the uncritical acceptance of these ideological suppositions, education too serves the ideological function.

When the above doctrine of the free market is applied to education, this produces a number of interconnected ideological effects, that can be classified into four categories:

1. Economization of education: the main purpose of education is defined through its contribution to economic development, which in its turn is unquestionably envisaged within the existing neoliberal capitalist framework. Responsiveness of education to contemporary needs for skilled labour becomes the crucial part of national and international educational strategies, and businesses become important stakeholders in deciding educational policies. The message to the students is that finding a well-paid job is the main purpose of their education. Although neoliberal educational policies often nominally preserve the old ideal of education for the sake of development of free and autonomous individuals, it is *de facto* re-

placed by a more urgent purpose: providing skills and qualifications for jobs and further education (that also ultimately leads to jobs). As freedom is ideologically reduced to market freedom, the autonomous subject of the Enlightenment is replaced by the figure of “an enterprising and competitive entrepreneur” (Olssen 1996: 340).

2. Marketization of education: education is seen as a market good, or rather a service provided by educational institutions to parents and students as customers and users. This is especially the case with private schools, but public educational systems adopt elements of this as well (Biesta 2004). Setting the relations of main agents in education in this way leads to a number of practices aimed at attracting customers, adapting education to their needs, and adopting management, evaluation and standardization practices taken over from business environments. All this amounts to the further corporatization of education.

3. Corporatization of education: inner organization of schools according to the model of corporate management, including constant measuring, bureaucratization, and other practices aimed at efficiency, accountability and attracting finances. These become the main determinants of what and how is to be learned, leading to the stifling of freedom and spontaneity in teaching and learning. Apple and Biesta show how these managerial practices serve more as a mechanism of “governing by numbers” than they actually improve teaching and learning processes (Apple 2004: 99-115; Biesta 2004).

4. Neoliberal subjectivities: participation of students in this kind of schooling has a number of effects on the formation of their subjectivity. Foucault was the first to note that in the process in which neoliberal forms of governmentality interpret us as human capital, a new form of self-relation emerges: we are urged to become “entrepreneurs of the self” (Foucault 2008). Imperatives of individual responsibility are enforced throughout the entire edu-

cational process. Students are forced to compete in the standardized tests, ranked according to test results on which their options for further education and employment depend. Permanent learning is encouraged because the market needs a workforce capable of constant adaptation, and creativity is desirable insofar as it can be channeled towards technological and product innovations.¹⁸ General effects of neoliberal ideology on education are such that students are drilled to fit into the existing system of inequality, filtered according to how well they fit their predetermined roles, based on the pre-given and unquestionable standards aligned with economic interests and imposed with an air of scientific objectivity. (Apple 2004) In schools driven by fulfilling the tasks set forth by management, student's educational experiences are impoverished, and there is neither time nor purpose to be found in questioning and imagining alternatives to the existing system.

In a totalizing ideological move, the original assumption that the value of education is to be measured against its contribution to the economy leads to the adoption of further standards that distinguish what is to be learned from what is not, increasingly reducing education to training for future employment and shaping personalities capable of navigating the neoliberal labour market, which ultimately amounts to perpetuating inequalities and injustices that underlie contemporary capitalism.

In other words, oppression in education does not merely function to preserve privilege; education as it in fact exists oppresses students because its central sense and purpose is domination and subjection—the subjection of bodies and minds to the tyranny of the actual.”
(De Lissovoy 2015: 77)

However, we should also note that contemporary neoliberal ed-

18 For a detailed analysis of contemporary “governmentalization of learning” see Simons & Masschelein 2008. For an analysis of most of the above-mentioned neoliberal effects on education through the concrete example of OECD's rhetoric on PISA see D'Agnese 2021.

education has many diverse effects that counteract the general trend of economization. School often still is the space for free exploration, discovering and experimenting, although this has been mostly left to the initiative of individual teachers who care about motivating students for something more than passing the test. Possibilities for escaping the ideological effects of education are many. I will point out several emancipatory tendencies that could create potential lines of resistance to the contemporary dominant ideology, that draw inspiration from the educational ideal of the Enlightenment. Clearly, questioning, problematizing, autonomous and critical thinking still turn out to be the main barriers to the effects of ideology, both in terms of individual emancipation and in terms of opening possibilities for changing existing relations of power in society.

Critical thinking can be understood in two main senses: logical and socio-critical. Logical sense involves educating thinking to be guided by reasons, to autonomously assess evidence, to be able to formulate valid and recognize invalid arguments. Socio-critical sense involves disclosing unreflected social prejudices that are considered as self-evident, social injustices and relations of power that are represented as necessary and unchangeable. Enhancing critical thinking in both of these senses is the first emancipatory trend which can empower students to use their own reason. In addition, as pointed out by Freire, critical thinking must go hand in hand with the development of the capacity for action. This trend is opposed to the contemporary apoliticalness of education: even when politics is an explicit topic in class, political action, possible role and responsibility of students in recreating and changing the social world, are usually not in the focus. To encourage students to change the world and to warn them against possible ideological and demagogical manipulations in the political sphere, to enable them to defend their own and common political interests and rights if these are under attack, is in today's context one possible line of defense of freedom. Students should be aware that they are also political subjects that have the right to demand and organize for social

change. Emancipatory education today would be the one that shows students how they can get involved in the transformation of the world together with others in the spirit of freedom and equality.

Another important dimension of this is the nurturing of equality and solidarity among students and between students and teachers, as a way of resisting the trend of competitiveness and hierarchization. Education should not give up on the important ethical message of the Enlightenment that people should be neither masters nor slaves to each other.

Finally, empowering students to think critically in the neoliberal world means encouraging them to have interests beyond technical skills needed for profession, which would certainly make them useful, but not necessarily autonomous members of society. Engaging in non-useful subjects, such as arts and humanities, is another way to emancipate oneself from the dictatorship of the market. That doesn't mean that education should completely neglect professional skills, but it does mean not giving up on another, more significant goal of education: not to produce good workers for the capitalist market, but to teach people how to be free: how to think, form values and act autonomously, with others as equal, free human beings.

Implications and Conclusion: The Difference Between Ideal and Ideology

The critical question that we should ask ourselves in conclusion is: are we merely creating a new ideology while insisting on education for freedom and equality? Is every attempt to normatively define what education should be necessarily a seed of a new ideology, instrumentalizing education and limiting free possibilities of educational becoming, especially the one drawing inspiration from the Enlightenment?

According to Biesta, Kant's assumption „of a fundamental differ-

ence between immature and mature beings“ (Biesta 2008: 170), coupled with the Marxist critique of ideology, ultimately leads to the conclusion that those who are not yet emancipated need emancipators to show them how to free themselves. They cannot do it themselves due to their condition of immaturity, being trapped by their own ideological consciousness. Thus, the inner logic of the Enlightenment presupposes an unequal relation of power between the emancipators and those who should become emancipated. (Biesta 2008: 170-172)

In another important critique, Osberg and Biesta add that the Enlightenment ideal of attaining universally valid knowledge necessarily creates inequality between those rational subjects who possess this knowledge, and students who are to be molded in accordance with the insights of the enlightened teachers, amounting to the instrumentalization of education, i.e. submitting aims of education to interests that are external to it:

[...] early forms of liberal education can be understood as the perpetuation of ideal forms of knowledge (e.g. universal truth), selfhood (e.g. rational autonomy) and culture (e.g. liberal political order) through well intentioned manipulations of the student’s psyche by the teacher or curriculum (which presents and/ or represents the ideal knowledge that must be acquired) to achieve the desired psycho-social and/ or socio-political end (liberal rationalism/humanism). (Osberg & Biesta 2020: 9)

However, history has shown that the attainment of universal knowledge on which all rational subjects could agree and build a society around is impossible, especially when applied to the world of values. Rather than to equality, the Enlightenment contributed to the hegemony of the Europocentric/Western worldview as the only valid and rational one, thus ending up as one more ideology among others.

I don’t agree with the claim that the distinction between maturity and immaturity leads to an insurmountable inequality between

those who are mature and those who are not and to the inevitable conclusion that the immature ones cannot overcome this state on their own (Biesta 2008). Rousseau's *Emile* is indeed in need of a teacher, but Kant allows that there are those who can overcome the state of immaturity on their own (although they are few)¹⁹, and Freire stresses equality between teachers and students. Thus, the Enlightenment ideal may be articulated in ways that allow for the possibility of transcending the state of immaturity and ideological consciousness by one's own powers, or together with equals. However, we should admit that in so far as the enlightened ones are understood as being in possession of the ultimate truth, this does stray towards ideology. This claim should therefore be criticized: we are all in the position of constantly overcoming our immaturities and ideological presuppositions, nobody is completely immune. We should always be wary that we might be mistaken, that we can learn from others, changing our perspective in the process.²⁰

Secondly, although history has shown that ideas of the Enlightenment can be abused, as all ideas can, going back to the original texts shows that the moment of equality as the core of this ideal is continually stressed, which I believe can still be a source of inspiration for articulating educational practices opposed to the contemporary world of domination.

Thus, I also believe that by proposing equality and freedom as the ideal to be strived for, we do not necessarily end up in another ideology. But here it all depends on the distinction between ideology and ideal. In conclusion, I will propose a distinction between ideology and social ideal that I believe to be in line with

19 "Dogmas and formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use--or rather abuse--of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting nonage. The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap over the narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free movement. That is why there are only a few men who walk firmly, and who have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds." Kant 2004: 5-6.

20 On the concept of perspective see Nikolić & Cvejić 2020.

Biesta's and Osberg's emergentist proposal (Osberg and Biesta 2020).²¹

I suggest that we should take note of the fact that historically, what started as an ideal often became an ideology: unreflected, enforced, serving to justify the existing social order, rather than to question it and possibly change it. Nevertheless, ideals keep their potential to become yet again reflected on, enlivened, given a renewed emancipatory meaning.

What distinguishes social ideal and ideology is their content, their form and their function in society.

With respect to the content, social ideals have general well-being in mind. This clearly distinguishes ideals from ideologies as being tied to particular interests of a class, nation, race, or another type of group in establishing its dominance over another group.²²

Regarding the social function, unlike ideology, ideals serve precisely not to preserve the existing order, rather, they are strivings towards a different future.

Finally, regarding the form, there is an openness and a possibility of questioning, inherent to ideals, which ideologies lack. An ideal should not be understood as a goal unquestionably set in advance, but as a vision motivating us to strive towards realizing it in a process of constant questioning of ways in which it should or could be truly realized.

21 Biesta and Osberg suggest that we should “understand education as an emergent entity that does not simply serve a purpose, but also brings with it the purpose it serves. (...) education has its own unique aesthetic qualities, like art or music, which have the power to elicit emotion and are thus affective (...).” Osberg & Biesta 2020: 2. See also: Osberg & Biesta 2020: 3-5, 7-8.

22 This is also why neoliberalism has never been an ideal. Although the economists of the Austrian School and the thought collective gathered around the Mont Pèlerin Society, aimed to perfect the entire humanity, and probably believed that they are making the world a better place, their theoretical presuppositions dogmatically cemented and justified the distinction between elite and masses, defending inequality as a natural state of humanity. Thus, their endeavours were ideological from the very beginning.

Ideals involve a different kind of meaning-giving than ideologies: an ideal is a vision towards which one may strive, actively trying to explore, construct and rethink it in the process of moving towards its fulfillment, without turning it into a dogma. Only in so far as we approach it in this way does it remain a living ideal.

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Deliberative Education and Quality of Deliberation: Toward a Critical Dialogue and Resolving Deep Disagreements

1. Introduction

In this paper, I discuss the foundations on which an effective programme of deliberative education can be built in order to help reduce political polarization and provide citizen emancipation. First, I will examine the key concept of quality of deliberation, based on the key features of deliberative democracy. Briefly, these are: freedom of participation, equality of participants in a deliberative environment and critical examination of opinions held by each of the participants. Rather than talking about it from a purely theoretical standpoint, I will discuss recent promising research on deliberation within deeply divided societies and explore why the evidence of positive deliberative transformative moments (DTMs) points toward a substantial reason for optimism. However, in exploring the benefits of current research, I will try to show that deliberative performance is, while promising, still far from satisfactory.

Namely, various problems that are usually posed as detrimental to deliberation – group polarization, exclusion of those unwilling or

1 Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade: andrija.soc@f.bg.ac.rs.

unable to rationally argue for their views, moderator bias, unbridgeable deep divisions, etc. – do become dangerous if we are willing to leave things as they are. In order to propel deliberation forward and make deliberative mechanisms truly efficacious, I will argue that we need a model of deliberative education that takes realities of the actual, not idealized, political discourse into account. Furthermore, such a model should also outline a mechanism for assessing and prescribing a cogent way to make deliberative events reflective of the key democratic values such as freedom, equality, tolerance, respect, and others. To do that, I will use two complementary elements. The first one is the index devised for determining the quality of deliberation, the DQI (Steenbergen et al 2003).² The second are the conversational maxims formulated by Grice (Grice 1989). Even though they explicitly state the conditions for genuinely productive conversations, they have thus far been rarely applied in political discourse. However, as I will try to show, in combination with the descriptive DQI, they genuinely provide a sound normative element that can lead us to formulate viable and comprehensive models of deliberation.

In the second part of the paper, I move on to discuss how such positive DTMs can be made more frequent, how deliberation could increase in quality, and why that will help restore public trust and reduce polarization. Rather than adopting any of the unfounded top-down approaches, I will claim that a bottom-up strategy of introducing deliberation through education in schools is the approach that could be successful in the future. Efficient deliberation must go beyond its commonly stated goal – a better understanding of how potential voters behave during their participation in deliberative processes. Our focus, I will claim, needs to be predominantly on the future voters.

Thus, in the third part of the paper, I try to show that deliberation will be most effective if it is first taught in schools, where students would learn how to participate in such events and learn the impor-

2 See also Steiner 2012; Steiner et al. 2017.

tance of listening to others and understanding their own views. Accomplishing that, they will be educated in a way that will make them much better equipped to approach the voting ballot with a clear idea of their preference ordering. Even though precise, detailed, and extensive research still has to be conducted, we can safely claim that deliberative education and subsequent deliberative practice will raise awareness for participation in various voting opportunities.

Throughout the paper, I will try to show that the main benefit of deliberative education consists of adopting the following elements: 1) improving interest in social, political, economic, and cultural issues of one's society, 2) reinforcing argumentative thinking and critical examination of the content provided in these areas, 3) practicing one's preference ordering and impartial discussion with peers and teachers, 4) increasing openness to hearing dissenting views. This is the way in which one can improve emancipation by effectively adopting Kant's advice to 'dare to think', but also expanding it with 'dare to be disproved by good arguments'.

2. Quality of Deliberation

If we want to understand how and why political disagreement persists and, ideally, how we might make it less prominent, we need to pay attention to how things look 'on the ground', i.e. in different deliberative events. To that end, I explore the implications of deliberative events organized recently in countries such as Colombia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Belgium. The qualitative research method used in analysing these events shows us several very important aspects of deliberation. First, it features deep disagreements between the sides that are very polarized, which reflects the current state of affairs in politics and shows how mechanisms of deliberative democracy can be applied in order to produce what Steiner calls 'positive transformative moments' (Steiner 2017), when discussion, as viewed through the lens of DQI, becomes more inclusive and more

productive. Second, it offers a detailed analysis of how concrete discussions proceed under a wide range of realistic circumstances and shows piecemeal the ways in which deliberative discussion can proceed, stall, turn more polarized or, crucially, become genuinely fruitful.

The qualitative research of deliberative processes also attempts to show under which conditions societal disagreements can subside. However, answering the question of how a deliberative event should be organized is not straightforward, but context-specific. Steiner et al. note that this is because simulating real-world conversation among citizens that live in a democratic society as equals provides a more accurate picture about how such a process functions when widely applied (Steiner 2017: 1-10). It is at this point that we arrive at the key demand that is at the root of the deliberative process itself – the demand for equality. Because the crux of the issue is how exactly a deliberative process needs to be organized in order to have a productive outcome, we have to pay close attention to whether, and to what degree, deliberators participate in the discussion as equals.

To assess this, Steiner et al. developed the DQI – discourse quality index, which measures several aspects of a discussion (Steiner 2012: 11-18). Among its parameters, the most important ones in this context are those that check for the level of participation (how often a participant speaks), whether there are interruptions, and the degree of openness toward other opinions. Following this measurement, one can examine every individual utterance (or a speech act, as Steiner calls it) and see how it contributes to the overall index. A measurement outline can be represented in the following table. For spatial convenience, the different factors were shortened. From left to right, the DQI measures the number of times a speaker was interrupted (Int.), the amount of protestations exhibited against the current speaker (Prot.), the length of a speech act (Lgt.), the responses the speaker offered to others, including the interruptions and protestations (Resp.), if the speaker listened carefully to others (List.), arguments that were offered to support the view

of a speaker (Arg.), whether the content was relevant (Cont.), whether speakers changed their opinions in the course of the event (Chang.) and whether they told personal stories to support their views (Stor.). The rows from 1-5 represent the number of speakers (it can be up to 40, or sometimes even more) and each blank field in the table is then filled with the characteristics that accurately describe each individual speech act.

DQI	Int.	Prot.	Lgt.	Resp.	List.	Arg.	Cont.	Chang.	Stor.
1									
2									
3									
4									
5									

The result is a comprehensive picture of the quality of deliberation. This is especially important since one of the advantages that deliberative democracy purports to have over procedural democracy is the opportunity to change one's preferences in light of rational arguments or compelling viewpoints.³ Thus, rather than looking solely at the end result of the discussion, seen in terms of what percentage of people mutually agree on some particular topic, by using DQI, Steiner et al. break down a deliberative process into its elementary components. One of the examples cited by Steiner concerns discussions that were organized in different countries between parties that have traditionally been engaged in violent conflicts, such as Colombia, Brazil, or Bosnia (Steiner 2012).

The following figures represent the measurement of the level and quality of participation in discussions that revolved around questions about the future of Colombia and Bosnia. Participants were divided in two groups. In Colombia, the members of the two groups were former combatants, ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerilla. In Bosnia (in Srebreni-

3 Cohen 2009. For an alternative view, see Hardin 2009: 231-246. See Fuerstein 2013.

ca, to be exact), the members were Serbs and Bosniaks, the two ethnicities that were embroiled in a fairly recent civil war. The conversation was held without a moderator. The research was qualitative, in that it primarily measured how the discussion was flowing, how participants were treating one another, how they approached the discussion, etc (Ibid.). The left-hand side of the column represents the measurement of how many participants spoke, and to what degree they did so; the right-hand side of the column measures how the participants spoke about the topic at hand – the recommendations for a more prosperous future of the two countries.⁴

Colombia:

Did not speak up at all: 34%	No justification at all: 36%
Spoke up once or twice: 30%	Justification with an illustration: 34%
Spoke up 3–10 times: 28%	Reason given, but no connection with opinion: 17%
Spoke up 11–20 times: 7%	Reason given, connection with opinion: 10%
Spoke up 21–30 times: 1%	More than one reason, connections with opinion: 3%
Total participants: 100%	Total speech acts with opinion: 100%

Bosnia:

Did not speak up at all: 18%	No justification at all: 79%
Spoke up once or twice: 7%	Justification with an illustration: 12%
Spoke up 3–10 times: 18%	Reason given, but no connection with opinion: 3%
Spoke up 11–20 times: 23%	Reason given, connection with opinion: 6%
Spoke up 21–30 times: 15%	More than one reason, connections with opinion: 3%
Spoke up 31–40 times: 10%	Total speech acts with opinion: 100%
Spoke up 41–50 times: 7%	
Spoke up 51 times or more: 2%	
Total participants: 100%	

4 Ibid.: 46-47, 75, 80. I discuss how some of the following data can help us contextualize deliberative democracy within the debate between political moralists and political realists. Here, the goal of presenting some of the same data is different in that it is more specifically tied not to the theoretical, but to the practical implications of adopting a deliberative approach to political issues. For the former approach, see esp. Šoć 2016: 931-934. See also: Šoć 2019.

As we can see from the data above, the quality of deliberation was low in both places. A significant number of participants did not speak at all. Of those who did, a large percentage either didn't speak in connection to given topics or didn't try to justify their views in any way. The figures were, perhaps predictably, much more promising in the case of Belgium or at Europolis, but are still not ideal (Steiner 2012: 48, 81).

Belgium:

Did not speak up at all: 0%	No justification at all: 18%
Spoke up once or twice: 2%	Justification with an illustration: 27%
Spoke up 3–10 times: 24%	Reason given, but no connection with opinion: 12%
Spoke up 11–20 times: 35%	Reason given, connection with opinion: 38%
Spoke up 21–30 times: 28%	More than one reason, connections with opinion: 5%
Spoke up 31–40 times: 6%	Total speech acts with opinion: 100%
Spoke up 41 or more: 5%	
Total participants: 100%	

Now, being essentially pragmatic, deliberative democracy must examine its empirical implications on concrete cases like these if it is to be effectively implemented. Even though it might seem that the results above run counter to my main proposal and seemingly vindicate political realists – reality, in a way, shows us just how far we are from our idealized epistemic goals – one would be wrong in thinking this. Rather, these results point squarely towards the way in which one can further explore and perfect deliberative processes in order to achieve a better level and quality of participation. Further explorations of these discussions, undertaken by Steiner et al, actually yield a very promising result. In their 2017 book, they explore ‘deliberative transformative moments’ (DTM), conceived as instances in which discussion is transformed from low-quality to high-quality, and *vice versa*. What does that mean exactly?

Naturally, a discussion will be of high quality if all speakers have common interests in mind, support their opinions with stories and

arguments, if they respond rationally and constructively to opposing views, if they respect their collocutors, if they actively participate in the discussion and if the discussion is constantly flowing toward finding a common ground. This is perhaps an idealized scenario since a deliberative discussion rarely satisfies these conditions throughout its duration. Still, it serves an important heuristic function. Namely, even if this or that discussion does not satisfy all, or any, of these conditions, we still know what it is that we must strive toward. Furthermore, the discussions examined so far also show us how to accomplish this. Here is where the role of DTMs becomes constructive and fruitful.

First, exploring DTMs allows us to understand which aspects of any given discussion need to be emphasized, what sort of behaviour is detrimental to purposeful and effective deliberation and what type of argument employed by a participant can further or hinder deliberative and overall democratic progress within societies. Second, DTMs help us recognize pitfalls of deliberative processes, as well as their fragility. One example of this is the situation when a discussion is transformed from high-level to low-level (a negative DTM). For instance, a participant – a former member of Colombian guerilla “did not give any useful information about these questions, neither on the process of reintegration in general. His story lacked specifics and was not related in any intelligible way to the peace process” (Steiner 2017: 56). Let us compare this to an instance of a speech act that helps positively transform the discussion. The positive DTM was brought about because a participant, Ernesto, could, as Steiner et al. observe, “show to the other participants that there are huge social and economic inequalities in Colombian society” (Steiner 2017: 43).

The two instances of DTMs, one positive and one negative, do not exhaust the list of possible reasons for such moments occurring. As Steiner et al. further report, playing a role of a deliberative leader (a person who only contributes to positive DTMs), a deliberative spoiler (someone who contributes only to negative DTMs), putting forward well-constructed rational arguments or yelling off-hand insulting re-

marks, also shifts deliberation from one level to the other. Sometimes even being silent can have a detrimental effect on a discussion (Steiner 2017: ch. 5–7).

Everything we have mentioned so far helps us understand how deliberative processes work. The upshot of the discussion about DTMs is that, for deliberation to be effective, participants need to address common issues and find common ground – something that all of them share, be it values, concerns, fears, etc. The fact that it can be effective, even sporadically, and even in the context of discussions between former members of groups that used to be at war with each other, represents an encouraging signal. Deeply divided societies are especially in need of good quality deliberation, even if enabling it is much harder than in developed democracies (Steiner 2017: ch. 1) or at institutions where participants can claim to be expert deliberators, such as Western European parliaments (Steiner et al., 2005). To find even a limited success without moderation, without prior deliberative education or experience, while conversing in the shadows of recently ended conflicts, should be a signal that an even greater success is not only a theoretical possibility, but a prospect for which we have every reason to strive.

So far, we have sketched potential advantages of deliberative democracy and outlined a type of approach to deliberation that involves breaking down deliberative processes into different components and exploring under which conditions such processes gain or lose in quality. Regardless of the presence of negative DTMs, which is to be expected at this stage, the frequency of positive DTMs in the context of low-quality deliberation does point to a road toward overcoming deep divisions. Now, someone might immediately point to several worrisome indicators. One is the set of data I already quoted. It unequivocally suggests that deliberation was of very low quality because many participants did not speak and of those who did, only a few used rational arguments in support of their views. The second potential problem is tied to the first. Here is the difference in opinion before and after deliberative events in Colombia:

	Before experiment	After experiment
(Former enemy) increases violence		
Ex-guerrillas agree	55%	69%
Ex-paramilitaries agree	75%	78%
(Former enemy) helps to make Colombia stronger country		
Ex-guerrillas disagree	40%	44%
Ex-paramilitaries disagree	66%	73%

As we can see, the outcome of the research was that both groups, though to a slightly different degree, viewed the other side more unfavourably than before the discussions took place. As Steiner notes, it is quite possible that many participants who did not deliberate, either at all, or not constructively enough, influenced the result (Steiner 2012: 174). These two facts would seem to counter the proposed value of deliberation. However, we would be wrong in thinking that. What these results show is: 1) that we are at a very early stage of conducting successful deliberative events and 2) that it is exceedingly difficult to achieve constructive results in deeply divided societies. Neither should be overly surprising. On the other hand, what does call for mild, yet firm optimism is the fact that even in the atmosphere of a lengthy and bloody conflict, former Colombian combatants did manage to achieve good quality deliberation throughout the process, and even transform the discussion from low-quality to high-quality without any moderation. The same was observed in both Brazil and Bosnia, the two equally deeply divided societies. Thus, even if discussions as such do not yield a better outcome when it comes to trusting the other side in the process, positive DTMs clearly suggest that at least *within* the discussion and *among* those who actively and constructively participated, better trust was firmly established. Moreover, when compared to the large part of deliberators who didn't actively partake, only a slight increase

in unfavourable views toward the other side should present even more of a reason for optimism. Looking at all the data in conjunction, we can extrapolate that with the increase in the quality of deliberation, and with more participants actively contributing to the discussion, the numbers could actually dramatically swing toward the two sides having a much more favourable view of each other. A question that immediately needs to be asked is how exactly something like that can be accomplished. Fortunately, here again we have a reason for being optimistic. The answer, Steiner suggests, lies in education (Steiner 2017: 255-263). In the next section, I will try to further elucidate this point.

3. Deliberation and Conversational Implicatures

In the previous part of the paper, I have discussed the DQI as a measurement of the quality of deliberative discussions. However, this measurement doesn't provide us with more than a way to reflect on existing deliberative events. Regardless of its usefulness,⁵ it cannot help us reach normative prescriptions that could help us determine how deliberative events can become more successful, which is crucial for determining the right way to set up a comprehensive programme of deliberative education. Nevertheless, it does show us the way towards the solution. The crucial element of both the DQI and the DTM is its basic measurement unit – utterance. Namely, the insistence on utterance, or a singular speech act, in the analysis of deliberative quality, helps us understand that, when the problem arises in the discussion, it is tied to the way in which the conversation between multiple interested parties becomes productive or otherwise breaks down. In order to try and establish an effective way of promoting the former and minimizing the latter through education, I want to show that we could do it through the normative application of a theory that is widely known, but heretofore little used in analysing political dis-

5 While the DQI is one of the most commonly used multifaceted quality indices, it is not the only one. See, Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007; Shaffer and Friberg-Fernros 2017; Wyss, Beste and Bächtiger 2015.

course – Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures (Grice 1989).

For Grice, conversational implicatures are “essentially connected with certain general features of discourse” (Grice 1989: 26). The term itself refers to the meaning of an uttered sentence that is not explicitly stated but is more or less clearly implicated.⁶ One of Grice’s examples is the following:

A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B; the following exchange takes place:

A: *I am out of petrol.*

B: *There is a garage round the corner.* (Grice 1989: 32)

The conversational implicature of B’s utterance, if it is to conform to what Grice calls the conversational maxims (which we will shortly specify), is that the garage that B refers to sells petrol and is open at the time of speaking.⁷ What is crucial for Grice is that these implicatures are tied to some general features of our conversations. He characterizes the said general features of discourse in the following manner:

[Our talk exchanges] are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose of direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange. (Grice 1989: 32)

Grice’s view certainly applies to a wide variety of different types of

6 Grice introduces the terms ‘implicate’ and ‘implicature’ as ‘terms of art’ in order to convey what was said, where ‘say’ again has a specific meaning. In Grice’s words: “In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered.” (Grice 1989: 26-27)

7 Aside from this illustration of implicatures, they also have additional features, such as cancellability (i.e. B can reject that he meant that the garage was open and sold petrol, and that the only content he meant to utter was the information that a garage was around the corner). However, this, and some other nuances regarding implicatures are not pertinent in the present context.

discussions, from everyday conversations about the weather, to more complex exchanges. However, the way he describes features of conversation makes it particularly applicable to the case of deliberation for several reasons. First, deliberation, more than ordinary conversation, explicitly states the common purpose of the discussion. As we have seen, the very point of deliberation is discussing a particular issue or a set of issues. Second, while deliberation does have a fixed starting point (say, the economic future of former combatants in Colombia, the terms of Britain's exit from the EU, etc.), Steiner et al. have shown the ways in which it can unfold unpredictably. While that unpredictability can sometimes yield positive DTMs, it is also at least as likely to generate negative DTMs and make a deliberative event less fruitful than it could have been. Third, one of the key characteristics of implicatures is that, as Grice puts it, they must be capable of being worked out:

To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will rely on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. (Grice 1989: 31)

All five types of data are pertinent for conversation in general and deliberative conversation specifically. In order to start bridging deep divides, other speakers must work out anything implicated by a single speaker. Clearly, Grice's view captures the details of all the key factors that are perhaps even more relevant in deliberative contexts than in many 'ordinary' contexts. Aside from the features that ordinary conversation has in common with deliberation, there are further reasons for applying a Gricean theory. To grasp them more easily, we first have to examine an important aspect of Grice's view – his cooperative principle. We said that Grice emphasizes the cooperative nature of

discourse. Grice's 'cooperative principle' is the general principle that, according to him, everyone is expected to follow in a conversation:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1989: 26)

In one sense, for everyday contexts, such a principle seems readily applicable. Every time two (or more) people start talking, they cooperate in a way that makes the unfolding of the conversation much easier. For instance, if I want to exchange a few words with my neighbour about the weather, we cooperate in so far as we both want the conversation to be fairly brief (since we are almost certainly not meteorologists), but also to convey our general sense of amicability. To accomplish that, we of course have to work together and join our conversational forces in fulfilling our purpose in that context.

However, over the years, the CI theory was criticized on various fronts. That might put our efforts to successfully apply it to deliberative contexts in doubt. After all, if the theory doesn't hold, how could it represent an effective tool for making deliberative mechanisms more efficacious? This is especially pertinent since one of the main criticisms is that Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP) works only in idealized circumstances, whereas in reality, as described by social psychology, evolutionary biology or game theory, people are not always ready to truly cooperate through conversation.⁸ Even though such a charge seems to render the CP inapplicable, to defend its use in deliberative contexts we needn't try to save it, or other aspects of Grice's view, in their entirety. Rather, the more relevant observation would be that even if Pinker and Davies are correct in that the CP doesn't hold in a wide range of contexts (and here we set aside answering the question of whether they are), it still doesn't mean that the CP cannot be applied specifically to

⁸ See Pinker 1997. For criticisms that pertain to other aspects of Grice's view, see, for instance, Davies 1989; Davies 2013.

deliberation. In fact, everything we said so far tells us that deliberative contexts are perfectly suited for this, since they share common key features with those conversational contexts that Grice initially sought to describe. In addition, even if deliberative contexts don't always feature cooperative participants, combining the Gricean approach with the DQI can help us pinpoint the problem and then try to resolve it through the interventions of a moderator, or deliberative training. Indeed, Steiner et al. showed how the DQI can track the performance of uncooperative participants (recall their concept of a deliberative spoiler – a person who almost exclusively contributes with negative DTMs). In that sense, even some of the seemingly more idealized assumptions of the CP can be firmly grounded by the DQI and the very structure of deliberative events that are intended from the start to be a fully cooperative endeavour.

Thus far, we have mentioned two reasons for applying the CP to deliberation. The first reason lies, as we have seen, in framing the conversation in a particularly suitable way for exploring it the way Grice formulates his theory. The second reason is, however, even more important, as it directly addresses one of the potential weak spots of every deliberative event – its suboptimal efficacy and the attempt to increase the amount of positive DTMs. In addition to these, there is a third reason for applying the CI, and it is arguably the strongest. Namely, the CP is especially relevant in political contexts, specifically in cases of deliberation. The stakes for participants in deliberative events are always higher than in an ordinary conversation. Revealing our preferences, generating reasons for them, or otherwise revealing personal history to further the conversation requires us to commit to what we say more tightly than in ordinary contexts. To see this more clearly, let's examine the specifics of Grice's views. His CP is supplemented with four maxims (Grice 1989: 26-27):

Maxim of Quality. Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or unjustified.

Maxim of Quantity. Be as informative as required.

Maxim of Relation. Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner. Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order.

These maxims provide a way to connect the CP to previously described deliberative situations. We have seen in the previous section that conveying what you believe to be false can lead readily to negative DTMs and can have a detrimental effect on deliberation, and this is fully captured by the first maxim. In addition, the maxim of relation fully captures one element of the conversation – the relevance of an utterance to the overall purpose of the conversation – that, if absent, almost always leads to negative DTMs or at least prevents the conversation from becoming fruitful. The same is the case with the second and fourth maxims, the absence of which stops other participants from fully benefiting from the discussion.

Now, if we remember the aspects of a conversation that are captured by the DQI, it might seem that there is some overlap, whether implicit or explicit. Let us recall that the DQI tracks the level of participation (how often a participant speaks), whether there are interruptions, and the degree of openness toward other opinions, whether participants provided reasons for their views, etc. Even though giving reasons for an opinion falls under the purview of the CP, or the second and fourth maxims, and all of these are implicitly connected with the CP, the key reason why we need a two-dimensional approach is the very way in which the DQI is constructed. Namely, it can only tell us what happened *post hoc*. Since deliberative events have shown their promise, we have seen that low participation percentages, as well as a fairly low amount of positive DTMs, require us to find a way to improve the terms of deliberation through education. On that point, the DQI is silent. It is neither an effective tool for devising a programme for deliberative education, nor was it meant to be. However, the CP and the four maxims are readily available to supplement the descriptive efficiency and comprehensiveness of the DQI. First, they are already prescriptive in kind. We can use them to elegantly formulate

normative propositions that would anchor an educational program. For instance, the normative version of the cooperative principle (CPn) would state that:

(CPn): All participants in a deliberative event ought to make their conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which they are engaged.

Similarly, all maxims could simply be expanded with the phrase ‘all participants in a deliberative event ought to...’. One might now wonder whether we need the DQI at all if Grice’s CP and maxims do all the work. The empirical results show us that the DQI is an indispensable tool for describing the conversation and diagnosing the problem in the first place. Without the DQI, the normative reformulation of the CP and the maxims might seem unnecessary or trivial, and in a sense, it would be. However, its usefulness stems from the way in which we can first see where the problem lies by analysing individual utterances using the DQI. Without it, our use of the maxims could tell us that participant A wasn’t sufficiently informative, or that they offered too much information. But the DQI tells us at which point it happened, what kinds of utterances preceded it, what were the reactions of other participants to A’s earlier utterances and how they responded both verbally and non-verbally to A’s most recent utterance. The DQI tracks all these elements piecemeal, which means that it serves as a kind of microscope under which we can observe all of the moving parts of a deliberative event that generally goes unnoticed, such as reactions from each participant, change in their stance toward a fellow participant in light of their reasons, personal stories, etc.

All of these variables are something that the CP and the maxims weren’t designed to account for. However, together the descriptive nature of the DQI and the normative reformulation of Grice’s CP and the maxims help us form a two-dimensional matrix. The descriptive dimension tracks deliberative performance against the normative

requirements, while normative requirements serve as a guide in understanding how to make particular utterances more effective. Slightly altering Grice's terminology, we can say that the DQI can use the CPn and normatively reformulated maxims to track what particular deliberational implicatures conformed to or violated the normative conversational requirements. These two approaches – the normative and the descriptive – can then function as tools to see to what degree conforming to the CPn raises positive DTMs and lowers negative DTMs. With such a tool, we can have a way to make multifaceted political reality more intelligible and devise a focused programme of deliberative education that would work toward constantly increasing positive DTMs, all the while fully embracing the realm of facts. As we can see from the first conversational maxim (or, in our context, normative deliberational maxim), insisting on truth *is* what will help us bring opposing sides together, if we insist on looking at deliberation through nuanced and detailed lens of the DQI and the CPn.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, I will try to sketch several reasons why the upshot of deliberative events organized by Steiner et al. should be viewed through a positive lens. First, even deliberative events organized in poor and war-torn countries with little history of political deliberation show us that disputed sides can be brought closer together. Moreover, with the aid of the normative tool reflected in the CPn and the maxims, we can trace a clear path toward improving the situation in places as diverse as Colombia, Brazil, Bosnia, and many others. Using a two-dimensional matrix, consisting of the descriptive DQI and the normative CP, to track and improve deliberation ought to show a realistic path to deliberative progress. The accumulation of positive DTMs might bring us closer to a consensus, or at least make it likely that participants will more easily accept opposing and (in case of subsequent voting) majority preferences.

Second, the very occurrence of positive DTMs, even in an unmoderated setting, gives us a reason for optimism. While both sides entered the discussion with beliefs they held as true, they did manage to make some concessions without giving away that assumption. With the application of an educational program anchored by the Gricean deliberational maxims and the CPn, we can reasonably expect an even greater percentage of positive DTMs.

Third, as Helene Landemore notes:

[I]t would be more useful for democratic theorists to acknowledge explicitly the complexity of the object and unite in a constructive attempt at clarifying the relation between the various properties of democracy, whether intrinsic and instrumental (or procedural and epistemic).⁹

Clearly, the empirical, bottom-up approach to deliberation accomplishes exactly this in several ways. Although political issues are multifaceted and highly diverse in nature, by exploring deliberative performances in such different countries as Brazil, which has a history of class-based problems, Colombia, which just got out of a decades-long civil war, or Belgium, Britain, and Switzerland, where there is a strong democratic background but where deep divisions on the questions of immigration, EU membership, and others are also arising, we can fully embrace the recognized complexity. Because our two-dimensional approach offers a concrete way to build towards improved performances, and because the DQI tracks those performances utterance-by-utterance, we can fully hope to see improvements in deliberative efficaciousness, insisting that there are political truths that are worth pursuing, but only while we remain open to having our minds changed or allowing better reasons for our views to crystalize during deliberative events. These are the goals around which a curriculum for deliberative education should be based and toward which it should aim.

9 Landemore 2017: 290; See also, Landemore and Page: 2015.

Now, to state this also means that epistemology can become an equal partner in forming such an educational basis. Thus, a wide range of options is open for exploring. If we are going to further elaborate on how a variety of mechanisms can be effectively applied to elucidate the nuanced nature of deliberation to students, we can explore whether democratic systems have their heir in epistocratic models proposed by Estlund or Brennan.¹⁰ In doing that, we would bring to the forefront of a deliberative programme the issues of agent reliability, strength of justification and the need for a careful method of attaining true beliefs. It is also clear that we can wonder which aspect of epistemology can be the best fit with political philosophy and how the relationship between epistemology, politics and education can be beneficial for all of these domains. If what we have said so far is indeed tenable, and if the Gricean view of our conversational practices holds and has application in politics, as I tried to show, then some form of epistemic contextualism seems to be a natural fit, as I mentioned earlier. Virtue epistemology is also among promising options and, specifically, reliabilism. After all, emphasizing the role and epistemic virtues of subjects involved in deliberation should help both political theorists and deliberating participants themselves understand the strength of their own positions, as well as the strength of the opposing ones. It can also help us further explain via our two-dimensional scheme how a successful deliberation can proceed and on what grounds it can be further improved. To do that, we would need to explore proposals such as those from Zagzebski¹¹ which lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, suffice it to say for now that, if correct, we have seen a clear path towards a fruitful cooperation between politics, epistemology, and education, increasing the prospects of formulating a complex and comprehensive view of efficacious deliberative mechanisms, making deep disagreements less deep and more readily resolvable. If we can extrapolate from the aforementioned data obtained from the empirical research, the students eager to participate in society as active citizens can be effectively taught how

10 See Estlund 1998; Brennan 2016. For a recent criticism, see Ahlstrom-Vij 2019.

11 See, for example, DeRose 1995; Sosa 2003; Zagzebski 1996.

to engage in difficult discussions with their peers and learn to accept differing viewpoints or, when the strength of supporting justification is sufficiently expressed, change their views. Thus, to recall Kant's famous phrase from the essay "An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?" (Kant 1999), they will 'dare to think', while also being ready to be proven wrong by the strength of a better argument.

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Knowledge Versus Production: Michel Serres and Idiosyncratic Roads of Education

There are numerous reasons why Michel Serres's philosophy can be interesting and significant when it comes to knowledge and education. First of all, the style and the way in which Serres approaches problems is opposed to the usual academic, but also systematic, educational, most common usage. In addition, one of Serres's main projects, that is – endeavours, was “opening the boundaries” between various forms of knowledge, such as science, philosophy, literature, mythology.² The claim that there are “passages” or “bridges” between fields of knowledge and that the boundaries that currently exist are artificially formed can be directly linked to today's education system and the division of subjects or disciplines.

Based on Serres's ideas, the first part of this paper will re-examine the notions of education and its dominant conditions. Two problems deserve special attention: 1) Separation of school subjects as well as knowledge in general, and 2) favouring technical, engineering, and scientific knowledge as a consequence of the methodocentric approach, which is paradoxically transferred to the very idea of education in gen-

1 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: ostojic.alexandar@gmail.com.

2 Serres, like Husserl, first graduated in mathematics (focusing his work on the mathematical dimension of quantum mechanics, as well as on information theories) before enrolling in philosophy studies.

eral. If we look at education through Humboldt's idea of *Bildung*, at least in the domain in which knowledge is a "purpose in itself" and education is a way of internal shaping, then the narrow specialization, the problem to which the first point refers, is completely opposite to such a concept (Cvejić & Krstić 2020: 16–17). In addition, goals such as efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity, which, among other things, were imposed on education through the aforementioned bifurcation, and whose nature is primarily economic, are opposed to the original meaning of emancipation. The second point is probably more important than the first, not only because the existence of a narrowly understood dominant methodological framework is the cause of the aforementioned problem of knowledge separation, but also because within Serres's conception of knowledge such an approach leads to teaching as an instruction, whose goal is solely the reproduction of the existing state, that is the reproduction of what is the dominant understanding of knowledge — something he sees as the complete opposite of what teaching is supposed to represent. For Serres, instruction should instead lead to discovery, and not suppress its possibilities by reproducing asymmetric power relations between the instructor and the instructed.

The problems emphasized by Serres do not remain on an abstract level. They are extremely visible within the dominant global educational policy. Such an educational approach is embodied in a clearly defined position of knowledge and the goal that a student should fulfil, as well as in a one-way 'transfer' of knowledge, based on the reproduction of served content. Such reductive 'knowledge' is then quantified through testing that strengthens the hierarchy within the education system and which is guided solely by the task of adapting 'knowledge subjects' to market needs. To show that Serres's ideas are not just an interesting postmodernist (or poststructuralist) narrative that does not communicate with empiricism and is therefore inapplicable - which is a frequent critique of Serres and like-minded thinkers - in the second part, the paper will show, on direct critiques of the neo-liberal educational model, such as those of Michael Apple, how Serres's thought

perfectly emphasizes the basic problems of the educational process, while opening the possibility for Serres's theoretical approach to be applied in practice.

Opposite to the Dominant Current – Against the Hierarchization of Knowledge

Serres will emphasize more than once how the scientific revolutions of his time³ influenced his understanding of philosophy but, more importantly, also freed his thought from “ordinary social milieus and dominant intellectual currents.” (Serres & Latour 1995: 13) The development of thought outside the canon has resulted in an effort to overcome the traditional dualism of the natural sciences and humanities. Serres's aspiration for such a synthesis, far from being just a need for originality, had a strong foundation.

Searching for a point of separation, Serres finds that the Enlightenment period was crucial: it characterized as irrational any reason that was not formed by science. Locating this ‘epistemological rupture’ within the 18th century, Serres points out that science sought to establish rule over the totality of reason, or we could add reasonability. In this regard, we highlight the following:

I maintain that there is as much reason in the works of Montaigne or Verlaine as there is in physics or biochemistry and, reciprocally, that often there is as much unreason scattered through the sciences as there is in certain dreams. Reason is statistically distributed everywhere; no one can claim exclusive rights to it. (Serres 1995: 50)

For Serres knowledge is everywhere and it develops precisely on its folds, edges, and borders. Pretensions of the ‘age of reason’ to the universality of scientific knowledge introduce a false hierarchy with-

³ Serres emphasizes three moments here: one is the transition from classical to quantum mechanics, the other is Brullion's book *Science and the Theory of Information*, and as the third moment he singles out the work of Jacques Monod *Chance and Necessity* (Serres & Latour 1995: 12-13).

in knowledge, thanks to the boundaries that are “artificially inserted” (Serres 1982: xi). Crossing points of different expressions of knowledge, i.e. edges and folds, cease to be places where knowledge develops, thus becoming an irrelevant periphery, inhabited by those who do not have adequate scientific knowledge. The classification of knowledge is not nearly as simple as it seems, and the passages between disciplines, although not easily discernible, still exist, Serres claims: “The passage is rare and narrow [...] From the sciences of man to the exact sciences, or inversely, the path does not cross a homogeneous and empty space”, but rather “follows a path that is difficult to measure” (Serres 1980: 18). Serres’s effort is not based on a desire to establish a certain, specific way in which knowledge is connected, which would therefore represent a new dominant position of learning. Instead, he realizes that translating knowledge opens up new possibilities for research, new ways and means of perceiving the world, or ways that encourage or lead to *discovery*.

To put it differently, an interest that implies parallel development of scientific, literary, and philosophical trends, as well as metaphors such as “criticism is generalized physics”, are opposed to the idea of two separate cultures - scientific and humanistic - between which no communication is possible. René Girard will also notice this, adding that: “regardless of whether knowledge is written in philosophical, scientific or literary vocabulary, it still articulates a common set of problems that transcends academic disciplines and artificial boundaries.” (as cited in: Harari & Bell 1982: xi)

These ideas are directly related to the problems of education, and probably the biggest problem that Serres points out, which is the motive for his endeavour, is the problem of *discovery*. The established hierarchy of knowledge, by its nature, reduces the possibilities of discovery, and education based on such a hierarchy narrows the possibilities of examining, thinking, and forming different views of the world (Ostojić, Nešić, Jozić 2019: 69). Such claims need to be argued for, and therefore, although we will return to education soon, it is necessary to

examine another segment on which this hierarchy rests: methodocentrism. Namely, just at the time when Serres diagnosed the epistemological rift, there was a strong tendency in the Western world to arrange life and reality through ‘certainty of facts’. The possibility of predicting the future, the universalization of mathematical and the necessity of deductive thinking, the preference or favouring of consistency over contingency, the belief that the observed phenomenon is isolated, all this undoubtedly led to the standardization of opinion, but also to a form of anthropocentrism that leaves everything non-human (based on its own judgment) beyond any discourse (Weaver & Snaza 2017: 1056).

Prigogine and Stengers will detect this approach calling it the “Laplacian dream” – they characterize it as Laplacian science – Stengers analyses the point that will precede the division of science into normative and descriptive, giving the former a greater objective value based on ‘facts’, as follows: “For this Laplacian science, a description is objective to the extent to which the observer is excluded and the description itself is made from a point lying *de jure* outside the world.” (Prigogine & Stengers 1984: 52) The experimental method will thus, for the sake of accuracy of measuring and determining specific aspects of a phenomenon, result in a reduction of the complexity of the natural world. Moreover, this separation of the observer and the observed will lead directly to methodocentrism: the belief that particular methods, formed before encountering the phenomenon, guarantee the validity of intellectual inquiry. In this regard, Stengers acknowledges that methodocentrism emerges as an effort to minimize the “risk” of intellectual investigation, but states that such a way of avoiding risk or error undoubtedly leads to “bad science” (Stengers 1997).

Serres’s metaphor of the “third man” perfectly exposes the stated problems. The figure of the *third man* is simultaneously included and excluded from dialogue, from discourse, it represents the border of understanding, it presupposes misunderstanding between the self and the other, between us and the world. But *the Third* is being brought under

the language by one constant process, as Serres explains. It is through language that *the Third* becomes the totality of the social collective that surrounds us: he is *one* and *each* and *all* and *they*. The use of language, Serres skilfully points out here, is only an indication of a far more comprehensive process of transformation of *the third*:

Metaphysically, the Third and its law found physics, while linking it to proof, by giving nature its general objectivity, as well as by making natural phenomena function outside the intention of those concerned with, and within the purview of, discourse. . . Thus the third person provides a foundation for the whole of the external real, for objectivity in its totality, unique and universal, outside any first- or second-person subject. (Serres 1997: 48)

Attaining what is supposed to be the goal of any communication also means ending it. Turning *the third*, not into the bearer of the message, into *Hermes*, into an unexplored way in which self and otherness are connected and intertwined, but into a confirmation of a predefined relationship, means that communication with knowledge is over, because it is too clear how things stand or how they 'should' stand.

Today, it is becoming increasingly clear - many like Serres rightly note this - that research must not rely on prefabricated methods that fictitiously guarantee the certainty or validity of scientific research. Rather, it is necessary to find a way to *listen to the world* in different ways. Contrary to the idea of Laplacian science, Serres offers an alternative vision of research that is not based on the separation of the observer and the observed, but quite the opposite, on their diverse intertwining:

In a different way more difficult, subtle, and complete, the life and earth sciences, henceforth put in the center of cognition, take over. They practice a more sharing, open, connected way of knowing, in which he who knows participates in the things he knows, is reborn from them, tries to speak their language, listens to their voices, respects their habitat ... is enchanted by their narratives, limits finally, through them and for them, his power and his politics. (Serres 2012: 33)

To understand the alternative offered by Serres, let us dwell a little longer on methodocentrism. In an attempt to define it more closely, we could say that it represents the belief that the pre-established method that was chosen to conduct research determines the legitimacy or truthfulness of the research. To avoid confusion, Serres's critique of methodocentrism does not mean opposing the method within particular studies if they approach problems in an established way. The point is that the belief that methods must be chosen from an existing set of 'legitimate' methods before encountering the subject of research not only leads to bad science, as Weaver and Snaza point out, "but is deeply connected to anthropocentric and colonialist politics." (Weaver & Snaza 2016: 1057) Such insights come from the very field of science itself. Physicist Karen Barad will say that there is always an "apparatus entangled with the phenomenon" (Barad 2007) – overlooking this fact closes us in the 'objective', previously established boundaries of knowledge, which significantly reduce the possibility of discovery.

The real problem for Serres is not the existence of methodocentrism, but its institutionalization, its dominance in the educational process, the dominance that shapes new minds. The school or academic mind is disciplined to think in a certain way, and the apparent or false objectivity of the dominant method is transferred to the categorization and hierarchization of knowledge, determining the value of an approach or the "necessary set of knowledge" that guarantees that the dominant method is followed, and establishes criteria on the basis of which researchers, students, and even children are quantified.⁴ This indoctrination is fundamentally reproductive in nature. In it, minds are disciplined to follow established paths, ask questions in a certain way, and ultimately *produce*, or rather exclusively *reproduce*, the meanings that the ruling paradigm imposes, meanings imposed within, but also outside of the governing curriculum. It can be noticed that this is certainly an ideological reproduction,

4 One of the most well-known examples is Baby PISA by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), again setting a dangerous relation between the economy and the education of children. A good critical reflection on this subject as a sort of introduction can be found in Pence 2016 and Purešević 2020.

of which we will talk more in the second part of this paper, when we focus on the works of Michael Apple and Martha Nussbaum. Let's stay for now on Serres and the problem of industrial reproduction of meaning.

The above-mentioned process will lead Stengers to notice how such training creates a “disconnect between the singular forms of inspiration and meaning generation” (what she calls the “necessarily fictional quality of all true science”) and the “objective form of its presentation, which rhetorically hides the work of the sciences in ‘the expression of a unanimous and impersonal consensus” (Stengers 2007: 113). The main goal of these processes is precisely the introduction of hierarchy; their motivation is always political in nature, it is always a game of power. Firmly set rules, norms, and comfort - which abolish creativity and imagination, rejecting the need for discovery - are, therefore, for Serres, nothing more than forms of intellectual terrorism:

I have passed enough of my life on warships and in lecture halls to testify before youth, which already knows, that there is no difference between the purely animal or hierarchical customs of the playground, military tactics, and academic conduct: the same terror reigns in the covered playground, in front of torpedo launchers, and on campus, this fear that can pass for the fundamental passion of intellectual workers, in the majestic shape of absolute knowledge, this phantom standing behind those who write at their table. I sense it and divine it, stinking, slimy, bestial, returning as regularly as the bell rang, opening and closing colloquia where eloquence vociferates in order to terrify speakers all around. (Serres 1997: 134)

The presumed finality, correctness, and truthfulness of a certain type of knowledge has another consequence. Namely, such a belief propagates stations or ‘points’ of knowledge that need to be reached. This again assumes that students, starting from the specific point A, which symbolizes the point of ignorance, should reach the specific and clearly defined point B which represents the point of knowledge. The problems are various: these points are always being set by the ‘ruling

paradigm' that determines them, which is outside the sphere of knowledge, that is, these positions are determined by economic parameters and market needs, which we will talk about later. Furthermore, this setting allows to set precisely defined positions of teachers and students within the educational curriculum, an asymmetric relationship in which the teacher and the student are not together within the process of education and cognition as internal shaping, nor in a relationship that mutually stimulates the discovery of the new. Education that does not lead to the discovery of the new is precisely the problem that Serres is most focused on.

Education as an Exodus – Roads of Discovery

Every learning implies a journey, a journey that brings a novelty. This is a necessary process of emancipation, which means liberation from influence, emergence from non-independence - like the one of the child. The same conclusion is related to learning and initiation of thought. The initial ideas are just a repetition of the old, "Young: old parrot" (Serres 1997: 8), as Serres would say. In that sense, in search for a new thought, education inevitably brings with it a kind of wandering, traveling, leaving the mother's womb, going into the unknown. "The voyage of children, that is the naked meaning of the Greek word *pedagogy*." (Serres 1997: 8)

Although according to Serres's understanding of education, a teacher is present as an escort or as a companion, he is not there to lead along a certain path because such a journey would not be wandering. The teacher is only there to guide you to a certain point: *pedagogos* in the original means the 'hand-leader of the child', most often it was a slave who was in charge of accompanying the child to school in ancient Greece. The child is not the master of the slave, but neither does the slave have authority over the child, they keep each other company on the part of the road they cross together, developing a friendship based on temporary equality (equal position). That

part of the road is known to the slave, but the child gets acquainted with that path again, in his own way: the slave is only an escort to the point where wandering begins. Wandering here should be understood in a specific sense, not as a loss, but as a search for the unknown.⁵

In other words, the goal of learning and the education itself should be the *discovery of new knowledge*. Such knowledge implies an adventure, which is more an exodus than an established method. Becoming yourself and being original cannot happen within the universal curriculum - in addition to imposing a certain type of discipline, any generalization of the rules, which every narrow curriculum necessarily carries with it, leads to stereotypes. The nature of stereotypes is extremely dangerous for education, and the entire curriculum represents one big stereotype, which tends to remain so. Stereotypes are fatal for at least two reasons. They allow lazy minds to stay that way because they offer ready-made, extremely simplified representations of very complex things, and precisely because of that, they are most often inaccurate. The level of generalization that comes with methodocentric approaches, but also from the educational system through the curriculum, prevents not only critical thinking but, according to Serres, also thinking itself. Reproduction of content appears as the only request, which confirms the consistent following of the given path, the only one characterized as correct. Even though the philosophy of science has pointed to the instability of facts, the possibility of scientific revolutions, significant roles of imagination in the process of scientific discovery, strict methodological, and educational approaches to a large extent tend to remain inert. By recognizing this problem, Serres points to a completely different approach, which enables children and everyone who learns to regain or establish imaginative and creative approaches to learning. This is exactly the meaning of *teaching*. The instruction is there to initiate the voyage:

The goal of instruction is the end of instruction, that is to say, invention.

5 In this sense, the etymological connection of the English *wonder* and *wander* should be borne in mind. The terms cannot be adequately translated. Besides delving into unknown lands physically, it also means movement – wandering of thoughts, wondering, questioning.

Invention is the only true intellectual act, the only act of intelligence. The rest? Copying, cheating, reproduction, laziness, convention, battle, sleep. Only discovery awakens. Only invention proves that one truly thinks what one thinks, whatever that may be. (Serres 1997: 92-93)

From this observation, Serres's critique develops in at least two directions. As we have already indicated, one direction is the problem of (im)possibility of scientific discovery, that is, discovery in general. The impossibility of including the conditions under which the discovery occurs calls into question the model that imposes a positivist scientific ideal. This is especially problematic if we have in mind the relation between imagination and scientific discovery (Ostojić 2019: 916). Besides, this ideal unjustifiably implies that there is a real or the most appropriate approach to 'objective reality' and reason, and that knowledge, like a body instrumentalized for a specific purpose by a series of repetitions, should reach that ideal of objectivity or 'pure science'. The assumption that 'pure science', as a way of relating to knowledge, is independent of ontological or ethical issues and that it is immune to the cultural and social influences within which it takes place (and which it even forms) has been seriously shaken by numerous studies in the philosophy of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Bohr, Heisenberg), as well as in sociological, philosophical or psychological approaches that, starting with Husserl, questioned the process of subjectification, i.e. the problem of how the subject is constituted in intertwinement with the world (Foucault, Latour, Strauss, Theo).

The other direction of Serres's criticism refers to the consequences that such an approach has on education. A university or a school is certainly not a place where creative, independent, and associative thinking is encouraged. Students must follow, repeat, and quote the given canon. Their success is to an almost absurd to an almost absurd degree determined by the number of repetitions of information. The task of faithfully repeating the given information before thinking about it is present from the very beginning of schooling until

its completion (despite the fact that⁶ studies speak of the shortcomings of such an approach). When Serres says: “Transcribe a single model and you are called a plagiarist, but if you copy one hundred, you are soon awarded a Ph.D.” (Serres 1997: 38) it may sound like a satirical depiction of the academy by David Lodge, but that does not make it any less true. Overthrowing the repetition of “finished and shaped” as the dominant model of education is in line with the task of abolishing final forms of knowledge. If understood in this way, Serres’s urge for discovery, or the end of instruction can be related to Rancière’s vision in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. Revealing the nature of instruction, the goal, and the conditions under which it survives, Rancière writes:

Explication is not necessary to remedy an incapacity to understand. On the contrary, that very incapacity provides the structuring fiction of the explicative conception of the world. It is the explicator who needs the incapable and not the other way around; it is he who constitutes the incapable as such. To explain something to someone is first of all to show him he cannot understand it by himself. Before being the act of the pedagogue, explication is the myth of pedagogy, the parable of a world divided into knowing minds and ignorant ones, ripe minds and immature ones, the capable and the incapable, the intelligent and the stupid. The explicator’s special trick consists of this double inaugural gesture. On the one hand, he decrees the absolute beginning: it is only now that the act of learning will begin. On the other, having thrown a veil of ignorance over everything that is to be learned, he appoints himself to the task of lifting it. (Rancière 1991: 6-7)

The classically understood explanation, which is present in classrooms, but also outside, and which Rancière is talking about, requires a predetermined terrain and predefined positions. In order for the explanation to fulfil its claim to ‘lead’ to the position of knowledge, it needs the position of ignorance, against which the imposed ‘knowledge’ would gain its legitimacy. This assumption of the initial and final position as a defined path that the ‘ignorant’ should cross is the

6 Naming just one out of many: Ammermueller 2004.

same established, limited path that for Serres it is necessary to avoid.

And yet, it seems that this idea of ‘openness’ of education, or learning process, is more of an unattainable ideal: the (im)possibility of implementation and the (in)effectiveness of such an approach are constantly emphasized. A common objection is that, although such a form of open dialogue within which knowledge is shaped is in part possible within the humanities, it is unacceptable within the natural sciences. How to teach Euclidean geometry openly, that is, without assuming the final position of knowledge, which the one being taught should reach? If we teach someone to make a car, the demands of Serres or Rancière seem not only unfeasible but also unacceptable. Nevertheless, the demand for innovation does not seek to challenge a certain type of functionality of a given form of knowledge, but to question its final determination and necessity, stimulating the one who learns to move in different, unknown paths - that is, to think. The objection must therefore be rejected because numerous models will show that knowledge that aspires to absolute universality inevitably makes a mistake, and in such cases, the relationship between the one who thinks he knows and the one who does not know is changed very quickly. Such is the case, let us not forget, with Euclidean geometry, as Bernard Riemann showed in 1859.

To remain open for becoming different, to discover; otherwise education subordinated to reproduction, which imposes the unification of thought, an endless cycle of repetition, leads to decadence, totalitarianism, a society in which knowledge ceases to move, or in Serres’s words:

When all the people of the world finally speak the same language and commune in the same message or the same norm of reason, we will descend, idiot imbeciles, lower than rats, more stupidly than lizards. The same maniacal language and science, the same repetitions of the same in all latitudes—an earth covered with screeching parrots. (Serres 1997: 124)

Educational Reproduction of Productional Order

Expressed views can certainly be placed in a postmodernist or poststructuralist narrative. However, if such a categorization aims to discredit the mentioned ideas, judging by their 'functionality', it is just a cheap trick, behind which stands the tendency of the dominant order to remain dominant, as we will show.

Precise positioning and identification of such an order, as well as the tools it uses, can be found within the numerous works of authors dealing with the sociology of knowledge or education. Even the first look at such studies shows us that the micro-plan is inseparable from the macro-plan, and the educational system is seen as a *producer of social order* in the field of social mobility. Selective tradition, selection of meanings, their exclusion, creation, reinterpretation, but also the very way in which meanings are transmitted, are the basic forces aimed at maintaining the existing structure, and they can be recognized only when the process of determining and transmitting knowledge (today educational process) is reflected on regarding its cultural, economic, and political position. As Young notes:

Those in positions of power will attempt to define what is taken as knowledge, how accessible to different groups any knowledge is, and what are accepted relationships between different knowledge areas and between those who have access to them and make them available. (Young 1971: 8)

Examining all aspects of knowledge and education through the prisms of hegemony and ideology is an inconceivable task, which has already been approached by numerous historians of education such as Feinberg, Karier, Kaestle, Katz, Bourdieu, or in a different way by Foucault. Nevertheless, all these forms of dominant structures in modern times pour over into one predominant form that was hinted at in the introduction - the needs of the market, all under the slogan of a specifically narrow understanding of economic interest that puts profit first.

The basic feature that accompanies the functioning of the ruling structure of education, which is general problem almost everywhere present, is exactly what Serres called the artificial hierarchy introduced into knowledge - the division into 'high' and 'low' status knowledge. Now, decades of uneven investment in various disciplines have led to segregation and stratification within the field of knowledge, where the highest position is occupied by technical and 'strictly scientific' knowledge present in the natural sciences. The motives for giving the highest status to technical knowledge and their connection with the educational process are validly analysed by Michael Apple in the well-known critical study *Ideology and Curriculum*. The 'benefits' of maximizing the production of scientific and technical knowledge are easily visible and are reflected in the following: it is (seemingly) non-controversial, it has a stable structure, a (supposedly) identifiable content, and most important of all, *it is testable* (Apple 2019: 37). Thus, giving the highest value to technical knowledge is directly related to the basic function of the educational process, and that is not the education of an individual - but, as Apple states - *selection*. Indeed, the classification and stratification of individuals carried out according to 'academic criteria' is incomparably easier when it comes to technical knowledge. Nevertheless, it is not just a matter of selecting according to one technical criterion, but also for one goal or purpose - those individuals are selected that will contribute to the production of the required form of knowledge. Within this process, cultural content and everything that is defined as high-status knowledge is used exclusively to perform economic classification and to provide a single resource of interest that is nothing but - economical.

As a number of economists have recently noted, the most economically important 'latent' function of school life is the selection and generation of personality attributes and normative meanings that enable one to have a supposed chance at economic rewards (Apple 2019: 41).

First, there is the reification of knowledge, and then the knowledge as a resource is exclusively used for the purpose of accessing economic

resources. This is a radical change of perspective (or reversal) that previously implied that knowledge is the main goal, and not just a means. Such a turn violates the very concepts of knowledge and education, which will be explicitly pointed out by Harry Braverman (Braverman 1975) and Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2010). At the same time, the problem is the narrow understanding of that economic interest or profit, which now obviously and openly rejects critical thinking along with other fruits of humanistic disciplines, as an unimportant and unnecessary appendix, at least when it comes to satisfying the primary interest:

A flourishing economy requires the same skills that support citizenship, and thus the proponents of what I shall call 'education for profit', or (to put it more comprehensively) 'education for economic growth', have adopted an impoverished conception of what is required to meet their own goal. (Nussbaum 2010: 10)

Having in mind what has been said, the conclusion that Serres points out justifiably imposes itself: any attempt to make a substantial change in the relationship between the status of knowledge - Serres's idea of 'equalizing' the rationality (meaningfulness) of different regions - would meet, or rather meets strong resistance. The idea of intellectual terrorism, which abolishes creativity and imagination, and which Serres talks about, is not a postmodernist phrase but a basic *modus operandi* that is imposed through the educational system by the dominant structure. At the same time, this order does not allow 'knowledge' to be viewed or valued in any other way, declaring any different approach as illegitimate (Young 1971: 34).

However, the question is, how is this delegitimization of different approaches performed? How is the notion of knowledge manipulated, and how does discrimination against different regions have its legitimacy that (seemingly) cannot be questioned?

The answers to these questions should be sought first in the values

assigned to scientific knowledge and then in the use of these values through the so-called ‘language of science’. More precisely, not only has it become a generally accepted view that scientific criteria of evaluation produce, or guarantee ‘knowledge’ over ‘subjective’ considerations offered by other approaches, but through the ‘neutral’ language of science all structural problems are redefined as differences in intelligence or ability, differences in possession or non-possession of expertise, thus shifting the focus from the economic and social causes that govern the dominant order (Apple 2019: 38).

Placing the figure of the Third as *Hermes*, as a difference that, in an infinite process of translation, over and over again releases the excess of meaning that occurs in communication between us and the world – pointing the way of an infinite learning process, and showing its transformation into a guarantor, or foundation of all objectivity (in which our relation with the totality of the world is reduced to a two-dimensional one), Serres undoubtedly points to the problem of the ‘sublime’ language of science. Science, which has the role of providing unquestionably correct principles, about which, because they are unquestionable, there must be a *consensus*.

The language in which science and technology carry the logical imperative (as well as an ideological commitment) is ideal for creating a new set of ‘meanings’, making literally a new version of the ‘sacred’ (Apple 2019: 80). Such language, according to Huebner, is

[...] the language of legitimacy, and serves to establish a person’s claim that he or she knows what he or she is doing, or that he has the right, responsibility, authority and legitimacy to do it. (Huebner 1975: 255)

Regardless of the warnings and objections, which did not come from outside, but from the very scientific field itself, such as those raised by Stengers and Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers 1997), among others, which indicate the ‘end’ of certainty, the instability of ‘facts’ and the danger of ‘objectivity’ of explanations that claim absolute validity,

science and technology created a field of values within which different 'schools of thought' are not allowed. That is, even if they are, 'objective' criteria will stand out to judge who is right and who is wrong. Such an established consensus, which is closely related to the value system of a higher economic order (Apple 2019: 79), is what is transmitted to students, to those who study within the education system - who are treated as 'ignorant' by that system.

Of course, the problem is not what is transmitted but what is not, and the rhetoric of science and its veil of neutrality indeed hide more than they communicate. All disagreements about methodology, goals, and other elements that make up the science paradigm or the scientific activity paradigm are left aside. In our schools, scientific work is tacitly always linked with accepted standards of validity and is seen and thought of as always subjected to empirical verifications with no outside influences, either personal or political. (Apple 2019: 91)

An even bigger problem within this narrative, which directly concerns Serres's views on the possibility of discovery, new thought, and the suppression of the same, is that such transfer of knowledge ignores the insight that disagreement and controversy have always been an essential fertile ground for the development of science. Science, like any opinion, develops (and has developed) precisely on its folds, edges, borders - in the encounter with the Other and the Different. Disagreement and re-examination indicate potential problems, stimulating discovery, and that is usually not what students, and society in general, are familiar with.

Ideology is circular - the stability of the existing economic (and political) structure is based on the consensus of technical and positivist knowledge, encompassing and subordinating the formal and informal curriculum, as well as cultural capital. Power and knowledge are thus again intimately and subtly connected through the roots of our common sense, through hegemony, Apple will con-

clude (Apple 2019: 104). And so, we return again to Serres’s metaphor of the “screeching parrots”: “When all the people of the world finally speak the same language and communicate the same message or the same norm of reason, we will descend, idiot imbeciles...”

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Decolonial Emancipation on the Postsocialist Peripheries and the Future of Critical Pedagogy

Introduction

The second half of the twentieth century has been named, defined, and characterized in many different ways in an attempt to denote its complexity since it signified a very turbulent, one of the most peculiar historical periods known. Without a doubt, one of the most important occurrences during the century behind us, at least when talking about critical educational theory and practice, was the rise and fall of ideas and concepts of social and progressive pedagogy. Historically, these ideas emerged mainly along with the foundation and engagements of global social movements at the peak of their power in the 1970s and shared the destiny of their consequent exhaustion and withdrawal from the forefront of the social and political scene later on. A prominent contemporary political sociologist Vukašin Pavlović claimed in his valuable thematic edited volume on global social movements that their fast rise and consequent withdrawal from the historical scene represented one of the most prominent features of the epoch, making modern social and political life without acknowledging their existence, ideas, and activities hard to imagine (Pavlović 1987). The insistence and expectation that the power of education

1 Centre for Advanced Study (CAS), Sofia: petkovska.sa@gmail.com.

should influence social and political occurrences inspired by political ideas and actions of global social movements had reached its peak by the 1980s and was followed by the subsequent weakening of the significance and influential potential of the concepts and principles of social progressive thought in general. Consequently, the relevance and potential of progressive and emancipatory ideas to influence educational theory and practice of the time dramatically decreased.

The emancipatory education as an overall pedagogical approach achieved one of its most influential clarifications and massive popularization among educational scholars after the publication of the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* written by Paulo Freire, which came out in Portuguese in 1968 and in English two years later, in 1970. Freire wrote this book during his political exile, and it was a summary of his educational stances which came out as a consequence of his involvement in the massive and highly successful Brazilian adult literacy campaigns. This book became an educational bestseller worldwide and provided the clearest, most vivid reasons for the adoption of an emancipatory educational approach by influencing other educational theorists, practitioners, researchers, and policymakers, and other actors on the global level. Not only did it signify the most authentic example of an education program grounded in progressive and emancipatory ideas, but it became close to a global, best-known ‘manifest’ of them. The most important principles of progressively and emancipatory grounded education are learning based on lived experience and the relation between teacher and learner based on equality, empathy, and solidarity. This relation between instructor and student based on empathy and equality is symbolically crucial for the contemporary critical emancipatory pedagogy since the two of them are considered to be partners in the educational process, unlike in the traditional forms of instruction implying subjugation and prolonged intellectual dependence of minors since the teacher is superior and learner inferior by default (Featherstone 2020).

The epistemological origin of the term ‘emancipation’ as popular-

ized within the Enlightenment movement implied advanced learning capability based on the full engagement of the faculties of subjects playing an active role of historical agents, skilful and capable of critical, independent judgment, freed from socially, politically, and economically enforced authorities to further contribute to the overall advancement and development of a collective (Radford 2012: 102, 109). The massive literacy campaigns were quite popular globally in developing regions after WWII and aimed at the poorest and marginalized rural people to be reached at the peripheries and skilled in basic literacy, but were particularly successful and well organized in Latin America. The unquestionable and undisputable relevance of this book is obvious since it is considered to be a 'classic' of critical educational approaches occupied mostly with the problem of inequality (Freire and Macedo 2000: 11). Unfortunately, nowadays this entire history of critical and emancipatory pedagogy is mostly revived only at thematic commemoration conferences, while poverty and (especially digital and technological) illiteracy of marginal populations of the world's peripheries has become a topic and problem whose wider importance has mostly been neglected.

The international voices of resistance striving for political liberation and improvements of the human condition in the form of social movements culminated on the global level in the worldwide protests of 1968. Challenges imposed by the new social movements on structural and intersectional social and political inequalities caused by racial, ethnic, class, gender, and other identity differences, combined with the persistent international problems of armed conflicts, ecological problems, nuclear weapons, and related issues, however, remained vivid and actual, further elaborated and continuously re-evoked in the context of the debates on decolonization and decoloniality. The issues of perpetual oppression and inequality within general social relations, reflected in classroom relations and the knowledge production system based on dominance and hierarchy, are repeatedly unzipped whenever social, cultural, and other differences escalate and produce concrete tensions. At the beginning of the 21st century, after the explanatory framework

of globalization became mainstream both in the media and in the academy, it became obvious that emancipation could not be ripped off of its international and more broadly speaking geopolitical significance as long as the strong reasons for reviving and memorizing it still existed.

These are, in a nutshell, the politically unbalanced social and intercultural positions and relations on both the micro and macro level of the global knowledge production system. Before gaining its huge wider popularity in the context of deliberations on external problems in educational theory and practice, decolonization mainly referred to concrete political and historical struggles of former colonies and colonized peoples for establishing a self-imposed regime and proclaiming national self-determination after the overthrow of colonial rule. Lately, the meaning of decolonization was enlarged and altered, adding to the recognized political system other layers of independence in social, cultural, and other domains. After providing some further conceptual clarifications related to the two crucial notions for the argument presented, decolonization and emancipation, the discussion will be continued by listing the reasons why the overall critical educational paradigm still matters so much, and not only for the archive of the history of pedagogic ideas. Finally, the discussion will be closed by illustrating this claim with the two successful attempts of its contemporary implementation.

The Nexus Between Decolonization, Emancipation and Education

It could hardly be contested that the concept of emancipation plays a central role in the global modern pedagogical and educational imaginary (Bingham and Biesta 2010: 25). On the other hand, the education system is the main terrain of implementing and testing any kind of educational philosophy, policy/politics, program, or reform. Among other things, it remained a key mechanism for the processes of cultural decolonization, mirroring the political struggle for self-determination and national liberation of the former colonies and other territories put

under a colonial rule (Freire and Macedo 2000: 29). Standing for itself, “decolonization is most easily appreciated and measured as a series of political acts, occasionally peaceful, often confrontational, and frequently militant, by which territories and countries dominated by Europeans gained their independence” (Betts 2004: 101). The modern paradigm advocated not only for self-governed national states but also for individuals equipped with self-consciousness, awareness, and capacity for critical reasoning needed to practice rights and understand legislative procedures; thus, those skills have appeared naturally quite important for newborn independent sovereign states and the populations inhabiting them. A massive public opportunity for education was the means to train the masses of people for modern governing formations and the most important invention of modern times. Inequality, on the opposite side, was the main enemy of massive schooling and all those differences coming from coloniality were insurmountable. Coloniality was at the heart of the modernity-making project as its constitutional negative aspect, representing its “dark side” (Mignolo 2000: 20).

Additionally, we should bear in mind that emancipation originally referred to the situation of “giving away ownership” or “relinquishing one’s authority over someone” mainly associated with slaves, peasants, poor, and lower-class parts of the population whose basic rights were broadly refuted and easily alienated (Bingham and Biesta 2010: 27). Emancipation as a historical process designating liberation from the colonial rule took place for most of the colonized territories between 1945 and 1975 (Rothermund 2000: 43). Its usage was from the earliest points of reference associated with intellectual maturity, education, pedagogy, instruction, learning, teaching, and similar. A gradual dismantlement of colonial rule in the former colonies initiated the process of decolonization and the awakening of social movements who were the main supporters of these processes, considered as crucial for the overall emancipation of humanity. The postcolonial scholarship, in the centre of which was the development of self-understanding of the subjugated, indigenous people coming from decolonized countries, with

Edward Said and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as the most prominent figures, was a crucial element for both educational emancipation and decolonization.

All the dramatic happenings that surrounded the struggle of decolonized people, both at home and abroad, caused a serious crisis within educational systems on the global level. The phenomenon of educational crisis refers to several interconnected problems that hit public schooling during the 1980s, to be generally described and understood as an overall disappointment with the emancipatory power of education, especially regarding its potential to assist diminishment of the social, racial, and gender inequalities and increase democratization (Coombs 1968; Zakin 2017). As Bourdieu successfully demonstrated along this line of problematization of standardized public schooling, bringing together students from different social backgrounds within educational systems, this practice is dominantly reproducing social and class stratification rather than dismantling it, while seriously undermining the emancipatory hopes invested in it (Bingham and Biesta 2010: 14). This institutional crisis historically accompanied a more general crisis of progressive thought that had evolved around the postmodern and poststructuralist authors and dominated the academic, intellectual, and political scene by the end of the twentieth century. Most of the postcolonial scholarship emerged out of the application of French critical theory and philosophy to theorizing about intellectual decolonial emancipation, and at some point, authors even concluded that “postcolonial studies are ideologically colonized” by postmodernism and that they needed to be “epistemologically decolonized” (Acheraïou 2011: 185).

Decolonization as a term was invented by a German economic scholar Moritz Julius Bonn (1873–1965) in 1930 but as we use the term today, it mostly designates “decolonization of mind”, or in other words, gaining the symbolic, epistemological, and cognitive independence from not only concrete but also symbolical colonial subjugation (Rothermund 2000: 1). Since the newly established former colonial

states continued to operate under the framework set by colonial and imperial powers, the regimes they formed were characterized as “incomplete parliamentary democracies”, while this state of their prolonged actual dependence has been designated as neo-colonialism (Rothermund 2000: 245, 251). Education systems and policies in former colonies remained based on mimicking the colonial educational forms and functioned mainly as reserved training pools for elites and native informants, offering small chances for true emancipation of pupils. The fact that postcolonial emerging countries were running their states on developmental aids and became increasingly indebted within the restrained independent economies furthermore meant that they were capable to provide formal education to local populations only with the help of former colonial power anyhow. All of this caused later persistent opposition of intellectuals in constant search for a language adequate for expressing and stating their voice and position, determined to create an alternative to the inherited colonial modernist epistemology and the developmental paradigm they were previously forcefully subjected to. Neo-colonial forms of ruling were supposed to remodel imperial rule into enduring partnership with colonial powers, while education, which initially had been mainly maintained by the colonizers, now had a role to reproduce the colonial mindset rather than to facilitate fully emancipated intellectual independence (Rothermund 2000: 245-248, 251).

Later on, even the postcolonial scholarship grounded in postmodernism and poststructuralism caused only further growing dissatisfaction of the public with its achievements, writings, and acting. In a reaction to this, a few authors from Latin America and former socialist countries emerged with an attempt of reviving critical scholarship within a new intellectual current named decolonial thinking or a “decolonial option”. Soon numerous authors started following suit, and once again, started to be criticized as ineffective, merely descriptive, too vague, and not of much use for accomplishing refined analytical scholarship and securing practical results. Within the approach advo-

cated for in this paper “decolonization is not a metaphor”, i.e. it is not a pure umbrella term under which we can put whatever is convenient while overestimating its explanatory potential, as a critique of it has stated (Tuck and Yang 2012). Furthermore, the existing tendency of turning the notion of decolonization into a mere metaphor for superficial relational, cultural, and language improvements should be opposed and prevented, since decolonization is a real struggle for the land and life of indigenous people (Tuck and Yang 2012: 1). Decolonization is also increasingly shifting on the global level into an unofficial symbolical struggle for self-definition and positioning of marginalized nations and groups of people claiming additional political rights worldwide.

The decolonial option started as an open intervention into the existing body of postcolonial critical scholarship presented probably in the most representative way in the book *Learning to Unlearn: Thinking Decoloniality* written by two prominent contemporary decolonial thinkers: Madina Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo. Although it could be noted that the approach to decolonization that they have collaboratively developed has many conceptual fallacies, their definition of decoloniality requires short recapitulation. The most important conceptual innovation Tlostanova and Mignolo inspired within the existing body of decolonial scholarship remains an attribution of a decolonial impulse to the area of former socialist countries in search for equality with the Western academic centres.

The praxis of decolonization of knowledge in this context signifies the repeated efforts invested to empower the voices of “the colonial subalterns” - in other words of those whose languages, religions, social organization, and economic production have been denied and suppressed jointly by the colonial and imperial power centres. The entire conceptual apparatus developed by Tlostanova and Mignolo epistemologically operates through several core terms. The main notion of theirs is ‘learning to unlearn’, which denotes a continual reflection on the facts we have learnt and memorized, and their per-

petual critical reconsideration from time to time. In the field of educational science, this is much better known as the approach of continuous or permanent learning. The first stage implies de-learning of all the adopted modern creeds and putting them in a postsocialist context, and a subsequent phase of re-learning implies that things learned through comprehension on a higher level, i.e. while achieving a more powerful stage of positional self-consciousness, prevents them from remaining stuck into the oppressive colonial matrix of power. Among the rest of the notions important to mention are the external and internal imperial differences, external and internal colonial differences, border thinking, border consciousness, global coloniality, pluriversality, zero-point epistemology, and the colonial wound.

The learning to unlearn strategy is starting from a motivation impulse named the 'colonial wound' coming from the feeling of subjective refusal to accept subjugation and exclusion accumulated while living under the externally imposed imperial rule and domination. However, both Tlostanova and Mignolo avoid explaining this wound by identity markers such as class origin, poor social conditions for development or some kind of disability, and mostly think it is a consequence of being put and understood as inferior from the point of view of the more advanced nations. Furthermore, they both avoid thematizing the economic aspects of oppression, mostly rejecting the communist alternative in the same way they oppose modernity and postmodernity. The main argument of both Tlostanova and Mignolo is that in principle, normatively speaking, there is a potential of epistemic equity among the peripheral spaces with the central power positions which is the developmental ideal that postsocialist places should aim at. 'Border thinking' is a peripheral epistemic response of detachment from the Western epistemology, but it is still founded on it, despite this being in the manner of opposing it. 'Global coloniality' is a state in which many peripheral structures of knowledge production have found themselves after most of the former colonies have gained independence; they simply remained dependent on all-important developmental processes. The

colonial matrix of power is divided by internal and external imperial and colonial differences: while the 'internal colonial difference' is referring to the European internal others such as Romani and Jews, the 'internal imperial difference' refers to conflicting history relations among the Western capitalist empires themselves. On the other side, 'the external imperial difference' is the difference between the entire former USSR space and the Western empires, while 'the external colonial difference' in Europe is the relation to Indians and Africans and other peoples coming from the places ruled by Europeans at certain points of history, still bearing the cultural mark of this (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012: 2-3).

The final goal of 'learning to unlearn' through constant re-learning and de-learning is to achieve a 'border consciousness' and 'pluriversality' instead of accepting the epistemological dominance of Western modernity and 'zero-point epistemology'. The zero-point epistemology is referring to an open and active negation of all the other perspectives by the hegemonic system of knowledge and those advocating it. The thought pursued by Tlostanova and Mignolo became recently quite influential mainly because it opened the floor to discuss the position of the former socialist knowledge system within the global academic structures of power, later followed by many other influential attempts to employ the concept of decolonization in the context of emancipation of the former socialist knowledge production and transmission systems and actors. With the purpose to provide additional insights, two such attempts will be summarized, distinct because they do not have the ambition to form an independent epistemological system from which the modern Western epistemological core has been extinct.

Research Methodologies for Studying Decolonial Emancipation: From Hermeneutics to Geo-Comparative Politics

The general problem with decolonization is duality in the core of this notion: it represents at the same time a theoretical and a meth-

odological notion, therefore these aspects are often mixed in usage and are hard to separate. A definition of decolonization often appears tautological, leading to sometimes confusing, contradictory, and conflicting applications across different branches of research in social sciences and humanities. In combination with emancipation, on the other hand, decolonization could simply be defined as a complex attempt of finding a scholarly way for improving the damage coming as a result of all kinds of subjugations, marginalizations and all the other inequalities certain groups are facing.

These debates on decolonization mostly remained limited to the circles of critical social science and critical pedagogy and never became central, thus the impression remained that a scientific base of decolonial emancipation in educational theory and educational research is at the same time saturated and unfinished. Speaking of educational systems' learning outcomes that could be observable and measurable, we see that trying to capture and purposely balance the socially and culturally grounded inequalities in education cannot produce solutions that can simultaneously bring standardized individual and visible collective improvements. Rather, this duality between subjective and collective level seems to bring these two dimensions into perpetual tension: the hierarchical organization of society and social relations remaining strong on the one hand, versus inequalities attributed to the differences caused by identity issues and national, gender, ethical, class, and other social predispositions with incurable consequences (Gross 2010: 9). Most of the social and political phenomena related to the concepts of decolonization and emancipation are inseparable from the attempt to find solutions for the problem of reducing inequality with the help of education and learning. Two indicative and valuable examples will be provided: firstly, the basics of Chela Sandoval's critical and emancipatory decolonial pedagogy, and secondly, the summary of the opus of a contemporary comparative and global education scholar Iveta Silova.

The best advancements of the decolonial emancipation within educa-

tion after Freire mostly occurred a few decades ago, outside of the educational theory and pedagogy strictly speaking, within the third wave of gender and women's studies. Postcolonial and third world feminism research, despite having had a notable reception in the context of former socialist states, was not of much practical use for teaching and learning problems. Although preserving emancipatory discourse and terminology while moving forward to relatively well-refined current postcolonial theory is the biggest value of emancipatory decolonial ideas born in this framework, it is outdated in terms of giving too much space to hermeneutical tradition and avoiding dealing with the challenge of social structures. Chela Sandoval in her famous book *Methodology of the Oppressed* (2000) where even the title is a rephrasing of Freire, is a great example of why even later on both emancipatory and decolonial pedagogy had to be pushed forwards. This book is anything but just one more attempt in line, it is considered as a greatly influential international attempt of pursuing decolonization by theoretical means. As Sandoval openly states, her basic assumption was to understand the "decolonial impulses as transformative effects of oppressed speech upon dominant forms of perception" (Sandoval 2000: 67). Her main level and aspects of targeting inequality was solely and explicitly only the symbolic domain of language. Sandoval took postmodern continental philosophy as her overall approach but avoided dealing with too much critical examination on how her theory might be practised in schools, by pedagogues, teachers, or even university professors. Her focus was on the inner consciousness of the individual subjects themselves, and the procedure of emancipation is understood by her to happen entirely intersubjectively, resulting in the achievement she named as the 'oppositional consciousness'.

Through the alternative apparatuses of analysis and decoding which came out of epistemological and theoretical underpinnings of postmodern globalism, it is assumed that access to a different consciousness will solve and improve social relations in real educational situations. These concrete steps did not also include the precise ac-

companying teaching method, and we could assume it could even take the form of reflexive and meditative training that does not take the shape of a collective and systematic education program and curriculum. Despite being widely popular and well known, this conceptualization of emancipatory decolonization is mainly descriptive and had little chance to significantly influence educational science and practice, because it is not easy to realize how to transfer the skill described as intersubjective quality to anyone else. Since its importance lies mainly in the field of gender studies or critical gender pedagogy, it did not affect much of the most prominent and famous critical education scholars facing the practical problems of education in the global era.

On the other hand, from a slightly different disciplinary background than humanities, is a complex outline of how to conceptualize theoretical and empirical research according to the principles of decolonial emancipation which is coming from a disciplinarily considerably different context if compared to the previous example. Professor of global and comparative higher education Iveta Silova originally comes from the former socialist spaces but has spent a considerable amount of time working for prominent American universities. Silova contributed a much more systematic and analytical methodology of implementing the decolonial approach in comparative and global education. In several of her highly influential books, she is developing a comparative educational approach for geopolitical topics that is based on the decolonial principles, since mostly she is focused on the postsocialist difference within a map of global education systems.

In comparison to Chela Sandoval, Silova does not insist on the transformative potential of decolonial emancipatory education and learning on the level of individual processes of positional self-consciousness, but rather is directly heading to the geopolitical level of structural dependence determining the overall position of the knowledge production and distribution systems in postsocialist types of governing infrastructures. The intention is to provide an additional exam-

ple of how decolonial emancipation might work in applied research based on advanced social and educational theory. It should be mentioned that one of the earliest and most important writings of Silova are the articles about rediscovering the postsocialist area in a comparative perspective in which she is counterpoising education in the post-socialist regions and in the former non-aligned regions to establish a joint research framework for marginalized and peripheral educational systems (Silova 2010: 2). Therefore, her overall goal is the decolonial emancipation of former socialist spaces by their advancement beyond their status of the periphery of the academic occurrences and beyond their marginalization in international knowledge relations.

Two important books by Silova are worth mentioning as an illustration of a well-structured and well-supported implementation of the idea of decolonial emancipation in the field of global comparative education. The first of the books to be shortly summarized is *Childhood and Schooling in (Post)Socialist Societies: Memories of Everyday Life* (2018). This book was co-edited with other internationally prominent scholars who were raised in various former socialist countries such as Latvia, Hungary, Russia, and other South-Eastern European and Euro-Asian countries. The contributions are based on the autoethnographies of the schooling experiences of the scholars, in other words, the reflections and memory narratives prepared by the authors which also put them in a comparative perspective among themselves. Most of these scholars associated with different disciplinary domains, after being raised and initially educated in some of the former socialist countries, moved to pursue prominent academic careers at globally leading universities. The main goal of these autobiographies was to provide a sufficient understanding of how it could be possible to decolonize your own experience of being subjected to an inferior position. The authors tried to avoid any kind of universalization of the experiences of childhood and schooling in former socialist countries (Silova, Piattoeva, and Millei 2018: 4-6). The autoethnographic method was chosen because it is a “powerful counter-hegemonic practice” since “the

subjects of knowing become knowing subjects who are now authorized to speak on their behalf”, on the opposite side of master narratives blind for any “politics of difference” (Young and Allen 2011: 7).

Another book prepared by Silova and colleagues *Reimagining Utopias* (Kovalchuk, Silova, Sobe and Korzh 2017) is even more important as it focuses explicitly on research dilemmas surrounding numerous attempts to understand educational change in the former socialist world and pursue relevant empirical research on it. As it has been stated in the book, some of the advanced research can easily fail to capture the essence of post-socialist experiences and realities situated within a complicated social and political context (Kovalchuk, Silova, Sobe and Korzh 2017: 2). From the perspective of junior researchers interested in former socialist spaces, it is essential to be intensively engaged in the fieldwork and to demonstrate the capacity for reflexivity. Another expectation from qualitative fieldwork researchers in the postsocialist context is the strategic use of one’s multiple identities in all kinds of negotiations (Kovalchuk, Silova, Sobe and Korzh 2017: 7).

Therefore, to remain critical, educational research in the postsocialist context shall continue to refer to social sciences and humanities, critically grounded pedagogy, and the potential for decolonial emancipation to enlarge and improve the possibilities of its application in different contexts. Educational theory and policy are always related to the contexts and not easily transferable from society to society, nor from culture to culture. What might seem impossible or contradictory in some instances is a defining point for educational research, since using reflexivity as an analytical tool and research technique comes with a great risk if not counterpoised on the other side with the structural, system, institutional or policy analyses, or some other supplementing methodologies.

Conclusions

Starting from the initial argument that education on the postsocialist peripheries should necessarily be both emancipatory and decolonial, through the definition of what decolonization means and how it could be pursued and developed in educational theory and practice, including the related disciplines, at the concluding segment it should be highlighted that the importance of emancipatory decolonization is to be understood in the context of geopolitical positioning. The main aim of emancipation and decolonization is epistemic equity to be achieved through detachment from the colonial matrix of power and less imbalanced knowledge production and distribution systems. Freire's method was a tool that helped to reflect on what it means to be put in the inferior position in the relationship of knowledge transfer (Freire and Macedo 2000: 11). The real question is what decolonial method has added to the approach of critical pedagogy, in terms of the difference between what emancipation signified before the global education crisis and what it means now.

The future of decolonial options within emancipatory progressive education is especially important concerning the weakening geopolitical position of former socialist countries and the identity crisis of many of them which could be prevented. Employing decolonial emancipation to strengthen the knowledge production and distribution of postsocialist countries might be the most important future task on the European peripheries. Decolonial emancipation should instruct postsocialist subjects to position themselves within geopolitical structures of power and raise their voice and capacities to improve their ability to stand for themselves and create their unique bodies and structures of knowledge.

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EDUCATIONAL TOOLS OF EMANCIPATION

Mikhail Bukhtoyarov¹
Anna Bukhtoyarova²

Educational Technology: From Educational Anarchism to Educational Totalitarianism

Границы ключ переломлен пополам...
The key to the border is broken in half..
Yegor Letov, 1988
(Soviet / Russian punk rock poet)

Introduction

Educational Technology, EdTech, is a rapidly growing field that integrates theoretical and applied aspects of techno-social approach to education. In the recent decade, it has become one of the major trends of the world education market, educational culture and

1 Philosophy Department, Siberian Federal University: mbukhtoyarov@sfu-kras.ru; mikebukhtoyarov@gmail.com.

2 Institute of Continuing Education, Siberian Federal University: abukhtoyarova@sfu-kras.ru; annabukhtoyarova@gmail.com.

politics, the response to the digital revolution and societal change. The development of EdTech has accelerated even more as a result of face-to-face instruction limitations caused by the COVID-19 pandemics.

As educational technology is advancing and extending throughout various contexts of human learning, there is a growing demand for conceptualization and critical analysis of EdTech through the lens of philosophy, and especially political philosophy, educational philosophy, as well as ethics.

Employing technology for education is not a new phenomenon but its comprehension has been evolving for the previous half a century. In 1977 the Association for Educational Communications and Technology defined EdTech as “a complex, integrated process involving people, procedures, ideas, devices and organization for analysing problems and devising, implementing, evaluating and managing solutions to those problems involved in all aspects of human learning” (Association for Educational Communications and Technology 1977). Thirty years later their definition became even broader and currently states that:

Educational technology is the study and ethical practice of facilitating learning and improving performance by creating, using and managing appropriate technological processes and resources. (Association for Educational Communications and Technology 2008).

Apparently, one of the major changes in the definition is the emphasis on *ethical* implementation of processes and resources that requires evaluation of their *improving* potential. This evolution of the concept reflects the growing recognition of the intrinsic ideologies that “are mobilized to shape ethics and justify internal policies and interactions” (Haase 2017: 630) within educational context.

Ideology that is generally perceived as a “framework of ideas which a community uses to define values and to make them explicit” (Lorge 1982: 86) has its particular meaning within the EdTech domain. It of-

ten assumes “inclusive ideologies embedded in the design, development and use of technology” (Amory 2007: 657). The intrinsically ideological nature of EdTech is reflected in specific features that are often defined by the architecture and design of the instructional tools or by the information ecosystem. In many cases EdTech establishes rules that can have higher impact than the interests or choices of the learning communities or individual learners, teachers and other consumers or *users* of the technology.

The concept of EdTech now engages multiple disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, pedagogy, social science, computer science, cybernetics, legal studies, management, and others that are shaping “an inherently interdisciplinary enterprise” (Spector 2015: 11). Educational technology practices involve various interested parties that influence the ways EdTech is developed, implemented, and becomes obsolete. However, the critical analysis of the socio-political role of particular educational technologies is not common.

Educational Institutions, Technology and Data

One of the hidden but most significant aspects of EdTech is the major change it brings to the traditional roles of stakeholders in education because of “the underlying challenges and issues faced by the different user groups involved in the technology implementation processes” (Chew 2018: 176). EdTech also introduces new types of stakeholders, previously unrelated to education, such as IT services, digital content providers, software companies, hardware manufacturers and vendors, governmental policy regulators, information security agencies, and other entities influencing digital ecosystems in terms of both infrastructure maintenance and process management. Corporate education and human resource management also become equipped with technology and actively develop new forms of training and assessment for the employees.

The role of educational institutions is undergoing deep transfor-

mation because of the various forms of distance learning and blended instruction throughout the curricula. Their core process is becoming sociotechnical and dependent on particular IT solutions. In addition to establishing and supporting the traditional *brick-and-mortar* instructional environment, designing, implementing, and administering the curricula, the majority of educational institutions are now responsible for the digital infrastructure with growing amounts of educational data and personal data which fall under strict regulations. Schools, universities, and other educational institutions are supposed to “prepare, license, and provide professional support for teachers, tutors, coaches, and mentors who were trained to orchestrate their coordinated activities through the use of a sophisticated technology infrastructure” (Dede 2011: 4). Educators and educational administrators become users who have access to various levels and functions of a technical system, and it transforms the roles they play in the organization.

The majority of users of an EdTech system are learners who constantly generate data. Educational data collection and analysis or *learning analytics* (LA) engage processing “data about learner and teacher activities, identifying patterns of behaviour and providing actionable information to improve learning and learning-related activities” (Maseleno et al. 2018: 1124). Therefore, anonymized services or services that do not track user activities are extremely rare in the EdTech domain where monitoring a personalized learning path is an important factor for the efficiency of educational process.

For example, *learning management systems* (LMSs) or platforms, a widespread class of EdTech entities, are based on the hierarchy of access to different parts and functions of the system (courses, content, administrative tools), and to the data generated by users. LMS platforms allow users with higher administrative rights to transform excessive data from the LMS log “into educationally relevant information” (Whitmer, Fernandes & Allen 2012). The processed data are employed by technicians, managers, and increasingly artificial intelligence for mak-

ing informed decisions at both individual and organizational levels.

The issue is that the learner is usually placed at the lowest level in the hierarchy of access to data and metadata within this environment. Digital learner's degree of freedom is determined by the designer of the platform and the permissions granted by the upper levels of the users with more privileges (course instructors, content designers, technical administrators). Moreover, the architecture and design of the vast majority of EdTech systems often intend to limit the learner's choices in order to lead him/her alongside a particular path with a number of possible variations based on the previous results. This approach is reflected in the design of contemporary EdTech systems and, as we argue, in the intrinsic ideology of the entire digital learning ecosystem.

Contemporary solutions in educational technology “involve evaluating students' likely learning profiles on applications that use big data to categorize individual learning styles and then direct appropriate learning activities to those students” (Regan 2019: 168). Continuous data collection and analysis serve as a mechanism for providing interactive and adaptive content, as well as for further development of the system itself. The more data collected from an individual learner, the better individualization can be achieved. Even the data generated from non-learning activities and non-educational data (biometric, social, psychological) can be utilized. But that raises “a range of ethical questions such as levels of visibility, aggregation, and surveillance” (Slade 2013: 1514). The data and metadata collected during the educational process become the basis for data-driven management in organizations or even on a larger scale when it comes to the regional or national systems of education.

EdTech implementation brings a new perspective on another type of stakeholder, making members of households partially responsible for the technical infrastructure of education. Technology-supported learning and teaching occur beyond the classroom regardless of their

time and place. The data collected via the educational software or services (IPs, technical characteristics of devices and software, file metadata, etc.) can become an additional source of security issues or raise ethical concerns.

Educators traditionally have a wider range of choices for decision-making than learners do. Within EdTech systems they are granted a higher level of access and administrative rights accordingly. Technology-mediated teacher-learner interaction varies from direct classroom-like experiences through web conferencing or webinars to automated ‘teacherless learning’ such as intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs) guiding “learners through each step of a problem solution by creating hints and feedback” (Kulik 2016: 43). In either case, educators shape the learning experience by providing the context and the content, but they are limited in their choices by the existing EdTech tools.

Administrators of educational institutions have the highest level of access to the data and the largest number of options for decision-making. But with the introduction of EdTech, their decisions are increasingly restricted by the intrinsic policies of the platforms and applications inherent in them by design. So, the administrators are obligated to balance between the internal institutional regulations and external EdTech protocols. Their decision-making becomes even more challenging when there is a contradiction between them. For example, many EdTech services may originate from educational and regulatory environments different from the institutional policies the administrators are required to comply with. This becomes especially critical for learning analytics data administration.

Considering that EdTech is the industry producing “commercially available digital technologies used by teachers and learners” (Mirrlees 2019: 2), educational technology developers and service providers represent a new type of stakeholders involved in the learning process. This group of stakeholders has significant control over the

design and functioning of the EdTech systems. In most cases, they also have access to the user data or metadata collection and analysis. When educational institutions rely on cloud solutions (SaaS, PaaS technologies) they become a part of larger network infrastructure of commercial or governmental companies and sources of the data. There is an ongoing public discussion on the issue that “promising cost savings and productivity efficiency, EdTech companies offer educators big data analysis by collecting and providing access to student information” (Rhoades 2020: 446) without proper ethical constraints.

EdTech developers often announce a particular *educational philosophy or learning theory* (e.g. behaviourist, cognitivist, constructivist) behind their product, especially when it comes to positioning on the educational market. They can utilize popular concepts in order to construct a desirable image for the target audience and tie the technology to social values. For instance, open-source software and openly licensed resources are often described as bringing *freedom* and *equal access* to their users, and thus *democratizing education*. Companies that develop and distribute tools for corporate training and assessment often emphasize the ideas of *control*, *tracking*, *efficiency* (including *cost efficiency* and *speed*), and *security*. Large-scale governmental projects can be promoted with the concepts of *unification*, *standardization*, and *quality assurance*, as well as *innovation*, *development*. International initiatives come with the ideas of *collaboration* and *connectedness* (Horvath et al. 2015).

Hence, we argue that the EdTech systems and solutions can be considered and classified according to the ideology they bring to the learning process.

Educational Ideologies and Technology

Ideologies have been studied from various perspectives for more than two hundred years. Though there are numerous definitions of this term, *ideology* generally represents “a set of beliefs which (i) per-

tains to abstract features of social life and (ii) is used for explaining and justifying means and ends of the collective action by (iii) some group of people” (Konarzewski 1998: 260).

Educational ideology can be broadly seen as “a set of assumptions regarding education” (Fiala 2007: 19). More specifically Le Van Canh defines *educational ideology* as a “shared body of principles and beliefs concerning the nature of knowledge, the nature of teaching and learning — including cultural assumptions about the roles of teachers and learners — and the purpose of education” (Van Canh 2004). He also stresses that the means and models of teaching rely on the ways these ideologies are implemented in a particular educational setting.

Lisa Murphy, Emmanuel Mufi and Derek Kassem define *educational ideology* as “a broad set of beliefs and opinions about the purpose and function of education and its formal arrangements, and/or about how they ought to be, held by the individual and by groups of individuals” (Murphy, Mufti & Kassem 2009: 28). They claim that educational ideologies can often be contradictory and complicated to categorize (Murphy, Mufti & Kassem 2009: 26).

All these definitions include collective *assumptions, beliefs*, and imply a shared view on how learning and teaching occur. We define *educational ideology* as a complex conceptual system that regulates epistemic, ethical, and political aspects of education through conventional social practices.

Educational ideology can be considered from both theoretical and applied perspectives. As a theoretical concept, it is “classified according to philosophical criteria” (Konarzewski 1998: 261) corresponding to particular intellectual tradition. The applied approach implies “acceptance of the structural solution” reflected in the “adjustment between education and economy” (Heintz 1965: 26). We presume that educational ideology is the basis for the ethical framework justifying choices

for policy-making in the educational context.

One of the most well-grounded taxonomies of educational ideologies was introduced by William F. O’Neil (O’Neil 1981), who divided them into conservative (fundamentalism, intellectualism, conservatism) and liberal (liberalism, libertarianism, anarchism). Though O’Neill did not attribute particular forms of instruction to the ideologies and even warned against such classification (O’Neil 1981: XVII), we can find alternatives to this approach. Ziv Lamm writes in 1986: “On the pedagogical level, decisions about the methods of educational activity (such as authoritarianism versus permissiveness, separate versus co-education of the sexes, etc.) are all ideological - dependent” (Lamm 1986).

The borderlines between *ideological* and *non-ideological* are often hard to draw because educational practices are difficult to separate from other social practices implying formal and non-formal learning. Similarly, it may be unclear when political ideology becomes educational ideology and vice versa. Education has significant potential for disseminating ideological values and political practices in the classroom and beyond, even when it claims to be apolitical. Therefore, it is often recognized as a high priority of national, regional, and local regulations. However, some instructional practices may intrinsically bear educational philosophies and ethics that are opposite to the officially declared principles.

When it comes to educational technology, its relation to the ideology can be recognized as inherent. As George Siemens, one of the founders of the connectivist learning theory said in 2016 when EdTech was already a major trend: “Our technology is our ideology” (McNeal 2016). On a very broad scale, educational technologies can become incarnated as ideological tools continuously shaping learning, teaching and management of the educational process within an organization (e.g. school, university), industry (corporate training and professional certification) or the educational system of a region, country, or even internationally.

In 2006 Kiraz and Ozdemir conducted research based on O'Neil's taxonomy to figure out the degree of acceptance of technology in education in relation to the educational ideology. The proposed classification ranges from the least accepting among those who fall into the category of educational fundamentalism, liberalism, and educational anarchism to the most accepting among those of intellectualism, conservatism, and libertarianism (Kiraz & Ozdemir 2006: 154). This drives us to the dichotomy: technopositivist educational ideologies versus technoscepticism (Njenga 2010) as an important ground for the classification of educational ideologies.

Therefore, the development of technically empowered educational practices raises the issue of educational ideology to a new level. When we are moving towards the *learning society* by employing the internationally recognized paradigm of *lifelong learning* (Edwards 1997: 183-185) the voice of educational ideologies introduced and disseminated through EdTech becomes ubiquitous, influencing other aspects of life. That is why presumably it is necessary to define which technical solutions tend to represent particular educational ideologies.

Our hypothesis states that while an educational technology can appear, be developed and promoted inside the liberal part of the spectrum of educational ideologies, serving their needs both on conceptual and on applied levels, the same technology has a very strong tendency to move towards a less liberal ideology when implemented throughout the educational system. In order to analyse educational technologies in terms of their relations to educational ideologies, we intend to employ a dichotomy of the extremes from educational anarchism to educational totalitarianism.

EdTech and Educational Anarchism

The philosophical literature on educational anarchism is quite rich: from Leo Tolstoy's *liberal education* (Tolstoy 1989) and Ivan Illich's

Deschooling Society with his claim that “we must disestablish school” (Illich 1971: 1) to contemporary educational blogs and channels celebrating the diversity of learning theories, educational practices, and technologies. It was not our goal to provide an extensive literature review on the topic, but even a brief plunge into the texts representing the phenomenon gives the impression of a highly fragmented anarchist theoretical agenda as well as countless cases that range from deinstitutionalization of learning to designing and creating *open* and *free* instructional practices, individualized curricula and instructional methods inside the existing traditional and hierarchical educational settings.

The meaning of educational anarchism can be very broad, such as “a ‘just do it’ approach to education” (Beaulier 2010: 29). However, it can also be shaped conceptually with clear and narrow characteristics. According to Eugene Matusov, contemporary educational anarchism is based on several overriding principles such as dialogue, self-organization, students’ right to control their learning, critical approach to ideas (including education), respect for non-cooperation and student agency (Matusov 2015).

With regard to EdTech, the anarchist educational ideology is closely related to the concepts of *edupunk* (Miller 2018: 4) and *connectivist learning* (Connectivism pedagogy 2017) and rooted in epistemological anarchism. Formal education rarely relies on these concepts at the institutional level and in policy-making. However, educators who design and test frontier practices, conduct experiments, implement elements of this ideology often without getting into deep philosophical analysis and conceptual evaluation. EdTech start-ups producing learner-centred technologies, the range of informal and non-formal educational initiatives and communities, and the growing domain of *edutainment* content rely on this approach, for example, some EdTech start-ups aimed at peer learning.

Signs of educational anarchism in EdTech can be traced in the

practices and tools which empower the learner and protect the learner's control over the content and learning activities, as well as over the definition of one's educational goals. It maximizes the learner's agency. The technology serves merely as a means that facilitates implementing the learner's free will.

What EdTech solutions move learning toward the educational anarchist ideological domain? Building personal learning networks, participating in self-organized cross-platform communities of learners and teachers, involvement in the practices of creating and utilization of open knowledge bases and other crowdsourced educational resources, wiki-based and torrent-based content sharing, DIY approach, open and free (non-proprietary) solutions, peer assessment and self-assessment, flexibility or lack of standardization represent the 'anarchist' domain of EdTech.

The ability to freely and openly access educational resources, including the content, the individuals and groups, technologies, and acquire knowledge and skills via a variety of practices, and having control over one's own individual learning path justifies this type of learning. But this significant individual agency comes with the limitations of the anarchist ideology. Modern EdTech is influenced by the trend of marketization and the demand for organizational functions of educational technologies. Anarchist educational ideology is hardly acceptable for complex hierarchical structures such as national educational systems or large corporate bodies.

The biggest obstacles to anarchist learning are the decline of network neutrality, segmentation of the internet, lack of platform independence, and domination of server-centric architecture of EdTech solutions. This causes the learner to lose control over personal data and limits the ability of non-participation and anonymity. The trends in EdTech starting with the second decade of the 21st century are leading the technology away from educational anarchism.

EdTech and Educational Totalitarianism

Educational totalitarianism is supposed to be an extreme opposition to educational anarchism. Although O’Neill does not use the term *educational totalitarianism* to distinguish a separate educational ideology in his taxonomy, he mentions *totalitarianism* as the form of “absolute state control over virtually all significant forms of individual behavior” (O’Neill 1981: 131). We suggest adding the concept of educational totalitarianism to the classification regarding the types of educational technology used as the means of such control. The reason for the addition of such an extreme form of educational ideology to the existing classification is the growing power and dominance of technology that has the potential to transform educational institutions on the *conservative* side of the ideological spectrum into the dystopian techno-social systems of behaviour modification and control.

O’Neill uses the term *fundamentalism* to characterize the opposition to educational anarchism (O’Neill 1981). However, any other ideology can be viewed as anti-anarchist to a certain extent because all of them project the interests of stakeholders with their political powers and support limitations of learner’s choices. That is why we argue that there is a need for introducing *educational totalitarianism* that would be the extreme point of the ideological spectrum opposite to educational anarchism. This concept emphasizes the highest level of power to limit learner’s agency, monitor and influence the educational path and control multiple aspects of learning behaviour and communication throughout the educational process and beyond.

To our knowledge, there is no commonly shared definition of *educational totalitarianism* in the research literature. But there is a concept of *totalitarian education* introduced by Thomas Woody in 1940. He specifies common principles for the totalitarian education including aristocracy, or timocracy (vs “natural right”); anti-pluralism; anti-rationalism; collectivism; activism (Woody 1940: 44-50). We consider

these principles applicable to the ideology of *educational totalitarianism*.

There is a strong opinion in the philosophical literature that the concept of totalitarianism is closely related to technology. For instance, Herbert Marcuse states that “technology serves to institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion” to the point where there is no more neutrality of technology and a “society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of techniques” (Marcuse 2013).

The critical approach has already indicated the tendency of technology to dominate the reproduction of social relations, with education being the most ubiquitous and systemic institutionalized form. James M. Van Der Laan wrote in “Education, Technology and Totalitarianism” that “technology has always equated with the exercise of power, specifically power over the natural world as well as power over human beings” (Van Der Laan 1997: 237).

We argue that the major factor that characterizes educational totalitarianism is the amount of control over learners and subsequently over other types of stakeholders leading to the limitation of their choices and resulting in extreme forms of objectivation. The more choices and behaviours are defined by the architecture of the systems, the closer this practice is to educational totalitarianism.

Signs of educational totalitarianism in EdTech are becoming visible when teacher’s functions are shifted to the authoritative classroom management model and reinforced with the help of classroom management software or even hardware for proctoring. Such technologies can automate control of environments and groups of learners, provide the tools for reinforcement and punishment, and turn the classroom and other educational settings into an educational version of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. With distance and blended educational solutions, the visibility of the authoritarian model can be less obvious, but

in the long run, they provide an even more advanced behaviour modification expanding the controlled learning environment.

More advanced and systemic forms of educational totalitarianism evolve on the level of organizational and state EdTech solutions when technology leaves the purely educational domain and becomes the means of administrative control. Such technology grants specific privileges to those who are not directly involved in learning and teaching, giving them the advantage of silent and anonymous (from the lower levels in the hierarchy point of view) monitoring and decision making.

Some elements of control that have the potential to become excessive can be found in state or corporate educational and EdTech standards, as well as in state or corporate educational institutions which transform their routines so that they meet the holistic vision of the digital environment: platform-based and platform-dependent content, proprietary software, hardware and protocols, strict security policies, tracking user activities, and hierarchical access to educational and personal data.

One more sign is either tracking or limitation of informal communications and uncontrolled social interactions in the educational environment.

The most extreme forms evolve with the utilization of imposed technologies. They are characterized by depriving the learners of control over their own data and assigning the learners a low position in the hierarchy of the EdTech system, while granting access to other more privileged groups of users, most of whom are not directly involved in educational interaction and communication. Such technologies as user tracking and excessive data collection (especially over prolonged time periods and involving biometric data), user behaviour analysis and prediction, user retention, various forms of proctoring, can be easily utilized for the purpose of social ranking within an organization,

community, or state.

This risk is increasing with the introduction of lifelong learning based on assessment systems. Gerhart Fisher argues that “lifelong learning is more than adult education and/or training — it is a mindset and a habit for people to acquire” (Fisher 2000: 3). This specific mindset may be quite open to EdTech’s presence throughout one’s lifetime. If the involvement in EdTech practices starts at an early age, it promotes the learner’s tolerance to continuous personal data collection and processing as a regular part of life.

Although lifelong learning can be applied within any educational ideology it may tend to favour continuous monitoring, insistent content suggestions and learner’s choice limitations based on previous data analysis. To become an effective tool for human resource management, lifelong learning relies on the thorough tracking of the learner’s path throughout the years. We argue that these features may reinforce the trend of educational totalitarianism.

The presence of these elements does not necessarily make education totalitarian, but they may increase the chances of moving in the direction of educational totalitarianism with every new iteration of the system. When combined they can create a dystopian picture of inhumane training by means of the machine, where learners are exploited and controlled for the good of the sociotechnical system.

In our opinion, the major factors defining whether a technology shifts from a more liberal to a more oppressive one is its mandatory use, the control over the collected data and metadata by the more powerful stakeholders, as well as the policies and technical capabilities of the data lifecycle. These factors become crucial when applied to large audiences and become a long-term systemic process. The most extreme danger of totalitarization derives from the combination of mandatory lifelong learning and a forced, uncontested technopositivist approach.

Conclusion

Educational technology of the 2020s reflects the continuum of educational ideologies ranging from educational anarchism to the most extreme educational totalitarianism. EdTech is bringing new mechanisms of learners' involvement and control. Educational ideologies behind the architecture of EdTech applications, services, and platforms, as well as the corresponding policies, need to be continuously questioned. All types of stakeholders related to EdTech should be aware of the necessity of keeping the balance of benefits and risks, and especially of the ultimate risk of transformation into the totalitarian system where individuals are divided into categories on the ground of evaluation of their previous learning experiences with less room for unrecorded trial and error.

Access to the educational data can be justified by the benefits for learning experience and in many cases it is essential for the efficient functioning and development of EdTech. However, when technology is becoming increasingly advanced and ubiquitous, comprising unconventional aspects, EdTech leaves the purely educational domain and becomes a universal yet ambivalent social and political instrument.

Educational ideologies can be applied as a framework for evaluation of EdTech tools and systems in order to explore and prevent unethical practices. We suggest that EdTech should be continuously assessed and reviewed with respect to its benefits and risks for different types of stakeholders. We also argue that it is necessary to broaden the public discussion and critical analysis of educational technologies in relation to their scale and potential for socio-political influence.

... и все идет по плану.

... and everything is going according to the plan.

Yegor Letov, 1988

(Soviet / Russian punk rock poet)

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Social Turn and Operative Realism: Two Emancipatory Methods of Contemporary Art Practices

Introduction

Art practices of the 20th and 21st century are characterised by a high degree of emancipation. Conceptual actions had 'liberated' art from institutional frames making it present in far more places than just in art galleries, *mail-art* enabled the international art scene at the time of embargo in Serbia during the first half of the 1990s, while *bio-art* practitioners combine scientific and artistic knowledge in a transdisciplinary manner. These are only a few of the numerous directions that art takes in order to connect people and engage them in new societal relations. As a result, contemporary art gains educational character which impacts how visitors/participants relate to each other and to the chosen topics. Applying the critical-analytical method, case study and content analysis, this paper focuses on two methods that contemporary artists use in their practices in order to address the social reality that surrounds them.

The first method is the *social turn* which Claire Bishop used in 2006 to refer to practices that artists carry out with various communities. We relate such practices in this paper to the sociological research method that is based on observation with participation. The

1 Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Arts, Belgrade: jankovsonja@gmail.com.

other artistic method discussed in the paper is what Nicolas Bourriaud defines as *operative realism*, that is, works of art that were created using procedures from other disciplines, so that the distinction between utilitarian and artistic functions of art installations is lost, placing a visitor within a trans-disciplinary and multi-discursive environment. Although all examples of community-engaged practices and *operative realism* can be said to have an educational aspect as they reveal certain layers of reality, the paper turns to two installations by contemporary female artists Teresa Margolles and Vahida Ramujkić,² noticing that each artist employs both the *social turn* and *operative realism* in their works, directly engaging in that way as many people as possible.

Teresa Margolles focuses on victims that have been killed as ‘collateral damage’ of organized crime or are listed as ‘missing’, on their families that live with the absence of their loved ones, and on people who are outside of borders of social care, such as sex workers. Although working in various media from photography, via sculpture to installations and performative actions, the main material she uses are physical, material traces of violent deaths, in particular the residues of victims’ blood left over at the crime scenes which she collects using forensic technology and moves afterwards into the discourse of art. Having a years-long experience of working as a state forensic pathologist, Margolles encountered a number of unidentified bodies of people that were killed in conflicts caused by organized crime or near the Mexican-USA border. Working closely with the families of claimed victims, Margolles draws attention of the wider public to the fact that the final number of victims is not even known. In this paper, we focus more closely on her installation *What Else Could We Talk About?* (*¿De qué otra cosa podríamos hablar?*) which represented Mexico at the 53rd International Art Exhibition – La Biennale di Venezia (2009).

Vahida Ramujkić is a visual artist and activist who is especially devoted to creating methodologies for collaborative learning and

2 For the more detailed biographies of the artists, please go to the end of the text.

working. She usually works from within collectives or in collaboration with participants who take part in practices that result in joint solutions. She describes her work as environmental or contextual, as “it creates conditions or situations to inspire new creative moments and transformations at the personal and social level” (Ramujkić: internet a). Concerned with the social function of art and aiming at establishing greater social equality, Ramujkić has been working through open workshops, often with refugees. In this paper, we will focus on one of her long-term projects, *Disputed Histories* (since 2006) which brought her the October Salon first prize in 2011 and was presented as an installation that employs *operative realism* in the Museum of Yugoslavia, within the exhibition *The Nineties: A Glossary of Migrations (Devedesete: rečnik migracija)* in 2019.

Both selected installations by Margolles and Ramujkić are examples of the *social turn* in art practices, but they also employ *operative realism*. For that reason, they demonstrate how contemporary art gains an engaging aspect, not only by including different communities in artistic practice, but also by leaving them open for new visitors to join and thus gain knowledge about the themes they address, or even act upon them. Before we turn to a more in-depth analysis of both installations, we will present some recent thoughts on the educational capacities of contemporary art practices and arts-based research.

Art as Means of Knowledge Production

Contemporary art practices and arts-based research practices have been in the focus of recent theoretical and empirical research that takes into account their capacity to address various social issues. Artistic practices can thematize, narrate and reflect upon various aspects of social realities, but they also have the capacity to engage viewers in activities that enable them to gain new perspectives on (un)know social problems. A lot of social issues – such as discrimination – represent complex systems that require to be addressed from political, economic,

cultural, legislative, ethical, medical, and other perspectives.

According to Newell, such complex systems are different from any other systems and are characterized by self-organizing and self-integrating or self-synthesizing. Their overall behaviours are changed by “unique behaviours at each location within the system” (Newell 2001: 9), which is to say, by minimal changes in any part of the system. For that reason, they require an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary approach, as they are too complex to be judged or solved through a single discipline. Such approaches become methods of producing new knowledge and they can also include artistic practices that can make issues more relatable to a wider audience. Both artistic practices and inter- and transdisciplinary approaches beyond them are applied as methodological means “to tackle problems in the ‘real world’” (Wilthagen et al 2018: 13), as a “thematic approach to addressing an issue that is beyond disciplinary boundaries” (Burgess and De Rosa 2009: 23).

Danielle Boutet approaches art as a *mode of knowing*, adding it to other, more established methodologies such as the scientific mode of enquiry, hermeneutic, speculative, and rational way of knowing, quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Boutet 2012: 107). Art is a *creative mode of knowing* that “does not interpret or analyse personal experience that has happened or content that is present in the mind; it creates or sets conditions for such content to emerge from an experience” (Boutet 2012: 112). The most important question, according to Boutet, is “what one can know through art” (Boutet 2012: 113). Graeme Sullivan has a similar understanding of art, arguing for the use of artistic form and arts-based research as the basis for educational inquiry. Through *seeing* and *sensing*, arts-based research creates “new opportunities to see beyond what is known,” it creates “forms from which critical options can be more clearly assessed and addressed” (Sullivan 2006: 32) and, furthermore, it helps us relate to and act on gained knowledge (Sullivan 2006: 22). For Sullivan, “art practice, in its most elemental form, is an educational act, for the in-

tent is to provoke dialogue and to initiate change” (Sullivan 2006: 33).

William Condee goes a step further and defines *critical interdisciplinarity in the arts and humanities*. Critical interdisciplinarity “draws on the previously established scholarship of critical theory by integrating approaches from the social sciences to expose tacit systems of domination and to promote greater equity” in such a way that it “transgresses disciplinary norms, undermines hegemonic structures, disrupts accepted organization of knowledge, and interrogates the purpose of these structures” (Condee 2016: 20). According to Beatriz da Costa and Kavita Philip, a collaboration of artists, activists, theoreticians, engineers, and scientists is the only way to create a “community [a]s a potentially resistant formation in the heart of postmodern transnational technospheres” (da Costa & Philip 2008: xviii). Such interdisciplinary communities, including artists, are not only capable of critically approaching complex issues from new angles, but they also have a good standpoint for approaching them internationally during longer periods of time and thus good chances of contributing to their solution.

So far, we saw that contemporary art practices can be part of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research. They enable seeing beyond what is known, they enable approaching the “real world” problems and complex issues that cannot be addressed by a single discipline. They are a specific *mode of knowing*, but also a specific method of producing and transmitting knowledge. Furthermore, they make us engage and act upon themes that maybe we would not encounter in another way. As such, art practices are educational. But there remains the question of the way in which art practices are educational. What are the methods and strategies that artists employ? How art creates conditions for new knowledge and/or actions to happen? As Graeme Sullivan pointed out in his recent study, art is educational precisely because it creates a dialogue. Art historians Claire Bishop and Nicolas Bourriaud had also come to a similar conclusion, defining two directions in contemporary art – the *social turn* and

the employment of *operative realism*, both of which create dialogues.

Relational Aspects of *Operative Realism* and the *Social Turn*

Nicolas Bourriaud has a long practice of curatorial work with art since the 1990s, having thus known it from the practical, synchronic perspective while organising and/or producing art events. He defines contemporary art as an *encounter*, as an opening to unlimited public discussion, initiated by an artist. For that reason, works of contemporary art often take the form of gatherings (round tables, socializing, forming a community, providing services) which do not result in material objects but in a new “relationship with the world” (Bourriaud 2002: 48), Contemporary art is, therefore, a *state of encounter*, a creation of special forms of sociability that enable emancipation, while “the aura of contemporary art is a free association” (Bourriaud 2002: 61). According to Bourriaud, the cultural and political programme of contemporary artworks is “*learning to inhabit the world in a better way*, [...] to actually be ways of living and models of action within the existing real” (Bourriaud 2002: 13). One of the ways in which contemporary art achieves this is *operative realism*.

Bourriaud introduced the term *operative realism* in 1992 to describe artists’ work within the framework of the actual production of goods and services. This method is related to the occupation of a gallery by temporarily changing its function into a non-artistic one (e.g. turning it into a supermarket, fitness centre) or by introducing non-artistic discourses and contents into the gallery (strippers, beggars, rats, chicken). As the artist applies procedures from other disciplines, visitors find themselves in a multi-discursive environment that enables a *new form of sociability*, “a complex form that combines a formal structure, objects made available to visitors, and the fleeting image issuing from collective behaviour” (Bourriaud 2002: 83).

Operative realism copies reality through mimicry, however, it goes beyond providing a pure representation/image of reality. It provides the possibility of using reality, and the social practice thus becomes *ready-made*, while realism as a procedure becomes an operational method. In this way, the works that use *operative realism* expose hidden mechanisms of reality and create “a new social interstice within which these experiments and these new ‘life possibilities’ appear to be possible” (Bourriaud 2002: 45). Moreover, works that copy reality through *operative realism* allow it to be viewed differently, and artists often make interventions within the copy of reality, instructing viewers in this way that it is a reality that needs to be changed.

Paul Ardenne has a similar reflection, emphasizing that “reality, as a set of facts, by its way of being and representation, is not a space known from every angle, but it is a complex set, partially unexplored: a set that has yet to be explored, visited and returned to it again, constantly confronting the context, seemingly familiar, but only seemingly” (Arden 2007: 49). Therefore, social reality is a construct that needs to be deconstructed, and, in this process, artists play a major role that is both activist and critical because artists revalue the notion of ‘society’ by creating new contacts between audiences through their works (Arden 2007:20).

Social reality is in the focus of numerous relational practices that combine artistic and social work, which are roughly classified under some of the terms such as socially engaged art, community-based art, experimental communities, dialogic art, participatory, interventionist, research-based, or collaborative art. For Claire Bishop, such practices testify to the *social turn* of artistic practices, for no matter how unpleasant, exploitative, or confusing they may seem to us, they indicate that the purpose of art is to confront us with the dark and painfully complex aspects of our society and the ways to solve them (Bishop 2006). The goal of these practices is not well-intentioned moralizing, nor is their value in educating us and pointing out the truth about the social situ-

ation, but in actually starting its solution, educating us on how to start solving social problems. As examples of such practices, Bishop lists actions in which artists trained the residents of certain settlements to make a radio show, constructed a floating abortion clinic, turned abandoned department stores into cultural centres, and so on. They also include any work that artists carry out together with minority groups such as migrants, prisoners, victims of violence, ethnic minorities, etc.

Socio-artistic practices that are realized in communities have similarities with the method of observation with participation, which is mostly used in sociology, anthropology, and ethnology. Within this research process, the researcher stays with the community s/he observes and takes part in their activities. Like the researcher, the artist takes a naturalistic approach, staying in the social environment in which certain phenomena occur, that is, s/he goes to the square, to the factory, to the strike, to the hospital, etc. and in the given reality s/he creates a work of art in interaction with the people encountered at that place. Such socio-artistic practices and research are contextual, that is, they relate to the specific context and specific community, and take into account the whole process, not only the results.

Danijela Petrović points out that inductive research in the end gives an overview of the obtained results together with the interviewed respondents in order to determine the credibility of the interpretation of the data. Such research “emphasizes understanding and reflexivity” (Petrović 2008: 4), enables a democratic process, leads to social participation and pluralism, and enables “the development of new ways of seeing and interpreting reality” (Ibid.: 6). This is exactly the similarity that an artist who works within a community shares with a researcher, and that sociological research shares with artistic practice in a community.

Operative realism and the *social turn* may seem very different, even contradictory, since the first takes place within an artistic institution, depriving it temporarily of the artistic discourse, while the other takes

place away from cultural institutions, within marginalised communities. However, these two approaches have different audience/participants as targeted users and can thus have a complementary effect on each other. What is achieved through work with communities can be presented in artistic institutions for the purpose of engaging more audience and connecting them with the addressed themes. We find such a combined approach in works by Teresa Margolles and Vahida Ramujkić who start from deep engagement with communities and later involve wider audience by applying *operative realism*.

The Social Turn and Operative Realism as Educational Methods in Art Practices of Teresa Margolles and Vahida Ramujkić

The installation *What Else Could We Talk About?* by Teresa Margolles, created for the 53rd Venice Biennale (2009), is composed of several segments within the pavilion (*Table, Flag, Cleaning, Narc-messages, Score Settling, Sounds of Death, Recovered Blood*) and several actions in public spaces across Venice (*Embassy, Jewels Promenade, Cards to Cut Up Cocaine, Embroidery, Public Intervention With a Flag, Submerged Flag, Floating Flag, Drained, Dragged Flag*). All of these elements narrate, by means of artistic and forensic practices, about thousands of people killed in crossfires in the streets of Mexico (over 5000 in 2008 alone), hundreds of which are children, often murdered in car-to-car drive-by shootings. Like in many of her previous works, Margolles used blood residues from crime scenes, as well as objects that came in contact with the bodies of the murdered, such as pieces of glass, cloth that is put on the puddle of blood in the mud that is left behind the body.

When entering the Mexican pavilion, one steps into several rooms that are seemingly completely empty. Two to three people take turns mopping the floors of these rooms every day, which constitutes the *Cleaning* segment of the installation. By introducing an activity from everyday life into artistic discourse, Margolles applies *operative realism*

and places Mexican citizens in the stereotypical role of cheap working force as they are usually seen by more developed countries. However, Margolles does not stop there. The water that is used for mopping contains the blood of murdered victims, and the people who are cleaning the floors are exactly the people who lost their family members in the crossfires of organised crime. As blood residues remain on surfaces for six months, everyone who enters those seemingly empty rooms of the Mexican pavilion literally walks on the blood of the murdered, most often women and children. By moving the blood of the victims from the crime scenes in the northern cities of Mexico to the pavilion in Venice, Margolles dislocates social reality. Each time visitors enter these rooms, the *operative* aspect of her realism takes place, and in this overlap of reality and artistic discourse a new dialogue is initiated.

The works of Teresa Margolles “produce meanings by functioning on the metonymic plane” (Banwell 2000: 46), since metonymy not only uses a part in order to represent the whole, but it also provides understanding. In the case of the installation *What Else Could We Talk About?*, it is not only the blood residue that functions as a metonym, representing the victims, but also the remaining family members who stand in place of a family that will never be whole again. Their presence creates an option of opening a dialogue, about the trauma or anything else. The very title of the installation – *What Else Could We Talk About?* – on the one hand points to the fact that after the tragic loss of family members there is nothing left to speak about, since everything else seems trivial, but, on the other hand, the title becomes an invitation to converse about a theme that is very actual and unresolved. Margolles emphasises that:

[...] this is not a strictly Mexican story, but rather is also evidence of social fluidities, cultural cataclysms and political dramas involved in globalization. The idea was to build a pavilion that would be a space of friction. (Margolles 2009: 83)

The possibility for visitors to connect to the relatives of the mur-

dered ones, gives the whole installation relational and political character. Another participatory action that enabled the connection between the relatives of the murdered victims and the visitors of the Biennale was *Embroidery* that took place at various locations in Venice during the Biennale. Using a cloth soaked in blood and mud from crime scenes as an embroidery hoop, participants were using a golden thread to sew messages used by organized crime during the act of execution. This joint, participatory action formed a new sociability, which, according to Bourriaud, is precisely the subject of relational aesthetics, that is, the 'artwork' of contemporary art.

Vahida Ramujkić's long-term project *Disputed Histories* is also carried out in participatory modes, through public lectures, workshops, and discussions, followed by published booklets³ and a growing library. The library consists of the main source material for the project which are history textbooks for primary and secondary schools across former Yugoslavia and its succeeding republics, published during the XX and XXI centuries. The project has been taking place since 2006 and its library so far contains over 300 different textbooks, which enable insight into different new narratives in place of once Yugoslav, joint and unified history of Serbians, Bosnians, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Albano-Kosovars.

The project puts a special focus on the revision and creation of multiple new historical narratives during the 1990s that would make credible the fundamentally altered social relationships between the republics that used to be parts of the same federation. These revisions

3 During the project, eight booklets have been published that contain comparative research of textbooks carried out by the artist and participants of workshops, including *Our Newest Hysteria* – research on the last 50 years of history as it is explained in textbooks from Republika Srpska, Bosnian Federation, Croatia and Serbia; *Migrations and Expulsions* – a comparative analysis of data about displacement of population during the 1990s war in Yugoslavia, based on the history textbooks of former Yugoslav states and Germany; *Private Histories* – a collection of participants' drawings and explanations of their personal histories; *Istina / Everteta* – a comparative analysis of Kosovar and Serbian history textbooks; Prefaces and Contents in the Romanian history textbooks through time (Ramujkić: internet b).

created a new socio-political subject, “an (image of a) reality according to which regressing to capitalist social relations was inevitable, and the continuation of socialist ones unimaginable” (Ramujkić 2019: 254). In order to present these differences, Ramujkić applied comparative analysis to the textbooks and organized many workshops which enabled participants of all ages and backgrounds to discuss this theme.

The workshops would begin by instructing participants to schematically draw their personal histories, including the most important moments of their lives. It would continue with analysis during which participants would realize that they remembered most of their history in relation to national history and striking events that happened (the Olympics, war, embargo, hyperinflation, etc.). The workshop would then show how people remembered the events they lived through differently from how history interprets them and that everyone can contribute to history with their own experiences. It becomes evident that “anyone, as a subject of history (historical events), is eligible to discuss and give a critical perspective on the official representations of history” (Ramujkić: internet b). Workshop in this way emphasises the importance of an individual and her/his personal history for the history as such, concluding that all of us, “actively or passively, contribute to the events happening on a larger scale, as well as to the creation or recreation of certain official narratives” (Ibid.). Throughout the workshops, sociability and participation are based on reciprocity, and participants are on the same level with the artist who thus, as in sociological research, becomes “a person who facilitates democratic agreement and the evolution of critical awareness among participants. In that way, participation gained a new meaning and became closely connected with emancipation” (Petrović 2008: 14).

The workshops took place in cities of former Yugoslavia, but also in Germany and Romania. They were usually carried out in installation sets that resembled a primary-school classroom very much. In fact, within the exhibition *The Nineties: A Glossary of Migrations* (Mu-

seum of Yugoslavia 2019), Ramujkić literally appropriates a classroom, transferring it from a school setting into the museum. Functioning at the border of utilitarian and artistic ambient, the classroom contained regular furniture, a blackboard, and other objects which make for a convincing classroom. Ramujkić adds to them teaching props that narrate about the revisions of history and not about the actual syllabi. Thus, in the classroom, one can find a puzzle-map of Yugoslavia and its republics, while above the blackboard there is no longer the portrait of former Yugoslav president Josip Broz, but a faceless portrait which indicates the empty place which was filled with different role models in different schools across former Yugoslavia. Ramujkić thus applied *operative realism* when creating the classrooms within various cultural institutions where the project was presented, but the educational method applied in those workshops and installations is much different to syllabi of elementary and higher education across territories of former Yugoslavia. This is precisely how *operative realism* creates new forms of sociability within known settings.

Ramujkić interdisciplinarily intersected the rhetoric and discourse of educational space with cultural system in order to problematize broader social topics. In this way, *Disputed Histories* is similar to critical interdisciplinarity that exposes tacit systems of domination, undermines hegemonic structures, disrupts organization of knowledge and promotes greater equity, as discussed by William Condee. It is also similar to emancipatory sociological research which “aims to develop participants’ awareness and understanding of illegitimate structural and interpersonal barriers, which prevent them from fully expressing their autonomy and freedom” (Petrović 2008: 25). Contemporary art practice thus becomes critical, educational, and emancipatory, using methods from other disciplines and even settings from other, non-artistic discourses which enable the creation of new forms of sociability.

Conclusion

Based on the given examples, we can conclude that the *social turn* and *operative realism* are creative methods used by artists in order to initiate new forms of sociability that emancipate participants, by enabling them to critically address problematic aspects of social reality.

Operative realism seemingly deprives art of any power to speak about social themes by its own means. However, being an experiment, an artistic copy of reality, it actually gives art the power to emancipate all participants whose presence becomes a part of artistic intervention. In this way, it brings them closer to the (un)known social reality or engages them in an attempt to solve problems within it. Thus, the participants in the workshops organized by Vahida Ramujkić realize that history is just one of many constructs in which traumatic events are rewritten and interpreted differently, created, or completely erased. Realizing that there are several different versions of history, the participants learn that they do not have to orient their personal histories or futures by the striking events in the history of their country. Moreover, each of their own personal histories becomes more valid, truthful, and more relevant than any official version of history, both to themselves and to the individuals close to them.

Using *operative realism*, Margolles creates the situation in which a visitor, entering the gallery, begins to walk on the blood of the 'collateral' victims of crossfire, that is, s/he begins to walk down the streets of Mexico because the gallery floor is covered with blood as much as street sidewalks. Although she didn't really move a piece of the sidewalk from Mexico and brought it to Venice, Margolles used mimicry to bring visitors of the Biennale in the same situation in which Mexican citizens are, being affected by numberless crimes and unable to act upon them. It is precisely here that the visitors come to know that their arrival connects them with the relatives of the victims, through empathy and understanding. This kind of association is also the aura of con-

temporary art, as Bourriaud defined it. This connection is a new *form of sociability* that opens conversations about trauma, about life without loved ones, either killed or missing, about the ongoing social problem.

Using *operative realism* as a complementary method to socially engaged practices, contemporary artists manage to shift social reality from its original context to the global level, pointing out that the problems that exist are not relevant for a few individuals only, but for the whole of humanity. This process also enables recognizing that the problems that exist in one community exist in other communities as well and that connections create new views on existing problems, but also new ways of approaching them.

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Biographical Appendix:

Teresa Margolles (b. 1963, Mexico) holds diplomas in forensic medicine and science of communication from Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City, and has studied art at the Direccion de Fomento a la Cultura Regional del Estado de Sinaloa, Culiacan, Mexico. While working as a forensic pathologist for the state of Mexico during the 1990s, she founded an artists' collective SEMEFO (an anagram for the Mexican coroner's office), whose members were also Arturo Angulo and Carlos Lopez. In the late 1990s, Margolles oriented her art practice independently of the collective. Her solo exhibitions took place in Kunsthalle Krems, Austria; Musée d'art de la Province de Hainaut, Charleroi, Belgium; Museo de la Solidaridad Salvador Allende, Santiago, Chile; Museo de Arte Moderno de Bogotá, Colombia; Francuski Paviljon, Zagreb, Croatia; Witte de With, Rotterdam, Netherlands; Padiglione d'Arte Contemporanea, Milan, Italy; Musée d'Art Contemporain de Montréal, Canada; Museo de la Ciudad de Querétaro, Mexico; Neuberger Museum of Art, Purchase, New York; Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Recife, Brazil; Centro de Arte Dos de Mayo, Madrid, Spain; Museo Universitario de Arte Contemporáneo (MUAC), Mexico City, Mexico; Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel, Germany; Museion, Bolzano, Italy. She received numerous awards for her work, including the Artes Mundi Prize and the Prince Claus Award for Culture and Development in 2012, as well as the special jury mention for her work at the 58th Venice Biennale in 2019. Her works are included in permanent collections of major institutions worldwide, including Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris; Tate Modern, London; Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, Washington, D.C.; Kunsthaus Zürich, Switzerland; Musée d'Art Contemporain, Montreal; Museum für Moderne Kunst, Frankfurt; Museum of Modern Art in Warsaw; Neue Nationalgalerie, Berlin.

Vahida Ramujkić (b. 1973, Belgrade) graduated from the Faculty of Fine Arts in Belgrade and has been living and working in Barcelona from 1998 to 2007, where she was one of the founders of the rotorr.org collective (Barcelona 2001-2007) that worked on the border of art, activism, and social studies. Apart from Rotor, she has been working within other collectives such as Irrational.org, transnationally, since 2012, ReEX, since 2015, Minipogon, since 2017, NoToRehabilitation, Savez antifašista Sr-

bije, 2015/16, Kuhinja bez imena, Belgrade, since 2017. She develops her work through long-term research projects, such as Disputed Histories, Documentary Embroidery, Microcultures, etc. Her work has been mainly presented in art and cultural contexts nationally and internationally, such as exhibitions, seminars, festivals, etc., but also in different kinds of academic and non-academic contexts, seminars, conferences, etc. She published several books (*Schengen with Ease; Cairo Integration Diary; Storm, Return Home and Other Terrible Stories for Children*).

Aleksandar Pavlović¹
Aleksandra Ilić Rajković²

Neo-National Romanticism in Serbian Education: Comparing Romantic- -National and Recent Serbian History Textbooks

In this paper, we argue that, paradoxically, there are striking similarities between the Serbian education and textbooks today and those from the times of Romantic nationalism in the late 19th century. Firstly, we will outline the Romantic-national concept of education as it has been in use in Serbia in the late 19th century. As we show, in the pre-WWI Serbian textbooks, pupils were taught that language is the basic and obvious proof of common origin and past, that the nation is a natural form of grouping of people, and that all those speaking the same language wish to – and should – live in their national state. We will illustrate this point by taking into consideration the History Reader for elementary schools written by Mihailo Jović, which was one of the most lasting textbooks in the Serbian educational history overall, used from 1882 all the way to 1944; for illustration purposes, we particularly focus on the depiction of Albanians and the Serbian-Albanian history in Jović's textbook.

In the second part of the paper, we compare these Romantic-na-

1 Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: pavlaleks@gmail.com, aleksandar.pavlovic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

2 Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade: avilic@f.bg.ac.rs.

tional ideas of education with the current Serbian history readers for primary and secondary school. In particular, we will examine the depiction of the 1999 NATO bombing and the 1998-1999 Serbian-Albanian conflict in Serbian history textbooks. As we argue, Serbian textbooks and, by extension, educational system, still promote a kind of neo-romantic notion of fixed national identity, patriotic education, and lack critical tones and re-examination of history and the past. Lastly, we will close our paper by emphasizing some recent examples of bridging this issue and offering a more critical, nuanced, and multifaceted view of Serbian and regional history in textbooks.

Patriotic Education

Education of students in the spirit of nationalism has a long history. The idea of nation as formative for a community and as the highest achievement in the evolution of mankind was firmly established in the nineteenth century, and scholars have for long observed that the education of the time had the function of national coherence and organization (Dewey 1916). While the Romantic-nationalist ideas affected the Serbs gradually from the early 19th century onwards, these ideas started being properly implemented in educational policy only after the full national independence was secured at the Berlin Congress of 1878. The reform of the educational system that followed in 1882 saw the introduction of mandatory education and was an integral part of that process. Given that, according to contemporary Serbian pedagogues, education in the age of nations should likewise be national, school has become one of the key factors of this form of education, as elsewhere in Europe at the time (Lowe 1999). A testimony that these ideas inspired the reformers of the school system can be found in the words of Stojan Novaković, the leading figure of the modernization and reformation of Serbian education. In line with his views expressed during the debate over the gymnasium curriculum in 1881, Novaković emphasized in his opening speech to the Main Education Council that “education is the crucial factor in the unification of Serb-

dom” (Glavni prosvetni savet 1880: 533). Reports from discussions and debates regarding curriculums and school programmes exemplify that Serbian teachers and their associations held similar views.

In the period prior to World War I, Serbian pupils were thus typically taught that language is the fundamental and obvious evidence of common origin and past, that nation is a natural way of grouping people, and that all those who speak the same language wish to and should live together in their national state. Hence, the primary task of Serbs is to fulfil their centennial legacy of liberating and uniting all of Serbdom. The development of this idea of united Serbian statehood and successes and failures in its fulfilment have been presented chiefly through history textbooks (Ilić 2010).

The most representative textbook of the time, Mihailo Jović’s *Serbian History* (*Српска историја*) amply illustrates this general framework by its depiction of the national history as the constant struggle for national liberation and unification and its emphasis on heroism and bravery. Jović thus already in the “Foreword” advised the pupils to “always be heroes like Obilić and the highwaymen Veljko” (Jović 1882: V), which corresponded perfectly with the methodical instructions of the Ministry of Education that expected from the Serbian history education to inspire “love for our nation and feelings that would strengthen the will for heroic moral actions” (Ministarstvo prosvete i crkvenih dela 1895: 863).³

In an interview for the newspaper *Vreme* in 1934, Jović himself embraced such perspective and claimed that his textbook was very successful in that respect: “All those generations that partake in recent wars learned the history of their nation from this little book of mine” (D.M. 1934: 5). His contemporary colleague Milenko Vukićević, himself a history textbook author and a Ministry of Education supervisor, wrote that “the greatest success has been achieved where children used

3 All of the quotes from Serbian sources are translated into English by the authors.

this book” (Vukićević 1898: 336).

Messages arising from the content of Jović’s texts get their full meaning only when perceived in the context of Serbian education in which national education occupied a prominent position. Regardless of whether they ended their schooling on the elementary or the secondary level, pupils acquired several messages as its integral part: that most Serbs live outside of the Serbian state borders, that the country that will gather them all is the great national goal, that national state is a natural right of every nation for which it can and should fight. In accordance with such a view, young generations were expected to fight for the liberation of the subjected parts of Serbdom and the unification in a joint state.

Written in 1882 during the aforementioned educational reform, Jović’s textbook served as the absolutely dominant history schoolbook prior to the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the Great War, and had dozens of editions. Throughout this period, the author repeatedly adjusted and revised his *Serbian History* in accordance with official curriculums and programmes. We will focus henceforth on the perceptions of Albanians in the various editions of this textbook in order to exemplify the evolution of negative perceptions during this period (for a parallel presentation of references relating to the Albanians in different editions please consult Chart 1; for a more detailed textbook analysis, see: Pavlović & Ilić Rajković 2017: 225-236).

The perceptions of the Albanians in the textbooks of Mihailo Jović		
Edition from 1882	Edition from 1886	Edition from 1894 and later
<p>“[Serbian Patriarch] Arsenije Čarnojević did not do good to the Serbs by leading this migration. Those Serbs that he took suffered a lot from the Austrians and still do, because the Austrian Emperor rules over them. Yet, it was even worse for those who stayed here in Serbia. The Turks settled the Arnauts on these empty estates, and hence nowadays a few Serbs remained in Serbia south of us (around Prizren and Peć) but all of them are Albanians, even though they were not there before.” (p. 187).</p>	<p>“One massive migration of Serbs took place in 1690. <i>Arsenije Čarnojević</i>, Serbian Patriarch, summoned the Serbs from Old Serbia and fled with them to Banat and Bačka. These migrations were bad for the Serbs, for the Serbs spread around faraway lands, and the Turks settled the Arnauts in their place, who did greater evils to the Serbs than even the Turks themselves.” (p. 91)</p>	<p>“Arsenije did not do good to the Serbs, for those that he took nowadays obey the Hungarians and Germans, while those that remained are scattered, left on their own and weakened; thus neither can we become strong, because we are small in numbers, nor can those in Bačka and Banat.” (p. 74).</p>

Chart 1 – References to the Albanians in different editions of Jović’s textbook

Present Day Serbian Textbooks

Moving to the contemporary Serbian educational system and history textbooks, the present-day goals, as declared and prescribed by the Serbian Ministry of Education and other relevant bodies (Institute for the Improvement of Education and Pedagogy – ZUOV) – are very different from those promoted in the late 19th century:

The goal of teaching history is acquiring humanistic education and developing historical consciousness; understanding historical space

and time, historical events, manifestations and processes and the role of distinguished persons; developing individual and national identity, acquiring and expanding knowledge, developing skills and forming attitudes necessary to understand the contemporary world (in the national, regional, European and global context); improving functional skills and competencies necessary for living in contemporary society (investigative skills, critical and creative thinking, ability to express and give reasons for personal attitudes, understanding multicultural-ity, advancing tolerance and culture of dialogue based on arguments).

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Cilj nastave istorije je sticanje humanističkog obrazovanja i razvijanje istorijske svesti; razumevanje istorijskog prostora i vremena, istorijskih događaja, pojava i procesa i uloge istaknutih ličnosti; razvijanje individualnog i nacionalnog identiteta; sticanje i proširivanje znanja, razvijanje veština i formiranje stavova neophodnih za razumevanje savremenog sveta (u nacionalnom, regionalnom, evropskom i globalnom okviru); unapređivanje funkcionalnih veština i kompetencija neophodnih za život u savremenom društvu (istraživačkih veština, kritičkog i kreativnog mišljenja, sposobnosti izražavanja i obrazlaganja sopstvenih stavova, razumevanja multikulturalnosti, razvijanje tolerancije i kulture argumentovanog dijaloga). (Šuica & Krstić 2005: 6)

History teaching should contribute to the understanding of historical space and time, historical events, manifestations and processes, as well as to the development of national and European identity and the spirit of tolerance among the pupils.

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Nastava istorije treba da doprinese razumevanju istorijskog prostora i vremena, istorijskih događaja, pojava i procesa, kao i razvijanju nacionalnog i evropskog identiteta i duha tolerancije kod učenika. (Svilar & Dujković 2013: 7)

However, once we move to the actual content, the picture tends to change significantly, especially when describing recent events of Serbian history such as the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the 1990s wars. To illustrate this point, we are quoting relevant passages about the interpretation of the Serbian-Albanian conflict in Kosovo from 1998-

1999 and the subsequent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in Spring 1999.

Since 2003, Serbia gradually lifted the state monopoly on textbooks, thus enabling private publishers to publish textbooks. For the purpose of our analysis, we scrutinized arguably the most popular history textbook in Serbia in the last decade or so, written for Grade 8 of elementary school by Đorđe Đurić and Momčilo Pavlović in 2010 (Đurić & Pavlović 2010) and published by the state-owned Zavod za udžbenike (Institute for Textbooks), and then compared it to the history textbooks of competing publishers Klett and Freska.

When Đurić and Pavlović describe the reasons for the Serbian-Albanian conflict and the subsequent NATO bombing, one does not see any of the declared goals of critical approach, multiculturalism, European and global identity, tolerance, understanding broader historical trends, etc:

Daily armed actions by Albanian terrorist groups, called Kosovo Liberation Army, brigandry, and conflicts with the forces of law and order, in which many civilians were killed, extremely deteriorated the situation in Kosovo. Ultimately, the Western countries, especially the USA, got involved, providing open support to the Albanians. After the failed negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris in February 1999 and the rejection from the Serbian side to sign the ultimatum on withdrawing army and police from Kosovo, the NATO aggression lasting from March 24 to June 10, 1999, followed.

Svakodnevne oružane akcije albanskih terorističkih grupa, pod nazivom Oslobođilačka vojska Kosova, razbojništava i sukobi sa snagama reda, u kojima je stradalo sve više civila, izuzetno su zaoštrili stanje na Kosovu. Konačno su se i zapadne države, posebno SAD, umešale, dajući otvorenu podršku Albancima. Posle neuspešnih pregovora u Rambujeu i Parizu i odbijanja srpske strane da potpiše ultimativne zahteve o povlačenju vojske i policije sa Kosova februara 1999. usledila je agresija NATO-a koja je trajala od 24. marta do 10.

juna 1999. godine. (Đurić & Pavlović 2010: 186)

Largely similar interpretation of events is offered by other Serbian history textbooks as well. For instance, literally the same wording is found in the textbook by Nikolić et al (2005, 283) by the same publisher, even though it has been written for the year 3 or 4 of high school and one would therefore expect that older students would benefit from a more elaborate, complex, and nuanced interpretation of these events.

History textbooks of two other major competitors do not differ significantly in their presentation of these events. *History 8* by Radojević, published by Klett, thus describes the crisis in Kosovo and the subsequent NATO bombing as follows:

The provocations of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) spilled into armed conflicts in which the international community got involved. Equally as in previous wars, the 'international community' led by the USA, provided full political and military support to the Albanian terrorists. In addition to police, military forces also took part in the conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija. After the failed negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris and the refusal of the Serbian side to succumb to an ultimatum that stipulated the withdrawal from Kosovo and Metohija and a free travel of NATO forces through Serbian territory, the NATO aggression followed suit.

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Provokacije terorističke Oslobođilačke Vojske Kosova (OVK) pretočene su u oružane sukobe u koje se uključila i međunarodna zajednica, Podjednako, kao i u prethodnim ratovima "međunarodna zajednica" koju su predvodile SAD, pružila je punu političku i vojnu podršku albanskim teroristima. U sukobima na Kosovu i Metohiji pored policije učestvovala su i vojne jedinice. Posle neuspelih pregovora u Rambujeu i Parizu i odbijanja srpske strane da pristine na ultimatum koji je predviđao povlačenje sa Kosova i Metohije i slobodan prolaz NATO preko teritorije Srbije, otpočela je agresija NATO pakta. (Radojević 2014: 290)

Again, the same wording is found in the textbook by Ljušić and Dimić for Level 8 of the elementary school of the same publisher (Ljušić & Dimić 2009: 240). Ljušić and Dimić also published their textbook for Years 3 / 4 of high school, with a typically brief and dry interpretation of the events:

The Albanians demanded secession from Serbia and, with that goal in mind, formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which constantly attacked army and police forces between 1996 and 1998. During the attacks, it enjoyed the support of the United States of America and several members of the European Union. In the negotiations between the Serbian and the Albanian side in the Rambouillet castle near Paris, which ended in March 1999, Serbia received an ultimatum demanding that she accepts an agreement by which the NATO alliance would hold the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The refusal of this ultimatum led to the beginning of air strikes of the NATO alliance members.

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 Zahtevajući izdvajanje iz Srbije, Albanci su formirali Oslobođilačku vojsku Kosova (OVK), koja je tokom 1996-1998. godine neprestano napadala vojne i policijske snage. Prilikom napada imala je političku podršku Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i više članica Evropske unije. Na pregovorima između srpske i albanske strane u dvorcu Rambuje, u okolini Pariza, završenim u martu 1999. godine, Srbiji je dat ultimatum sa zahtevom da prihvati sporazum kojim bi NATO savez zaposeo teritoriju Kosova i Metohije. Odbijanje ultimatum dovelo je do početka vazdušnog napada članica NATO-a. (Ljušić & Dimić 2013: 291)

One-sidedness and the lack of critical approach in the representation of these events by Serbian textbooks is perhaps the most evident when compared to the ways these events have been portrayed in the textbooks of Albanians in Kosovo. Thus, human rights abuses by the Serbian regime against Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s are presented in the Kosovo textbooks as massacres by the Serbian regime across Kosovo, which “[...] inspired the emergence of the UÇK to protect the people of Kosovo” (Rexhepi & Demaj 2009: 104). The Serbian textbooks do not give any evidence of these abuses, and they present

the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo as a consequence of the “robbery and confrontations of Albanian terrorist groups, declared as the Kosovo Liberation Army, with associated forces, who impacted ever more on civilians” (Đurić & Pavlović 2010: 251) but they do not provide data on the ethnicity of these civilians.

Secondly, as Shkelzen Gashi clearly showed: the textbooks of two countries present only the crimes of the ‘other side’ (Gashi 2019: 98-107). For example, the Serbian textbooks do not mention a single Albanian killed by the Serbian/Yugoslav forces during the armed conflict in Kosovo, while in the textbooks of Kosovo there is no mention of a single Serb killed by the UÇK and NATO forces during and after the armed conflict. The textbooks of Kosovo and Serbia also exaggerate the crimes of the ‘other side’ and create room for misunderstanding (Ibid.: 99-101).

The Serbian textbooks refer to a letter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), sent to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2000, which said that since the entry of NATO forces in Kosovo “...899 had been killed and 834 had been kidnapped” (Đurić & Pavlović 2010: 255) but they do not give the ethnicity of these people and the fate of those kidnapped. The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), whose headquarters are in Belgrade, notes that 1,123 Serbian civilians were killed in the period between January 1998 and December 1999, of whom 786 were killed following the entry of NATO forces (12 June 1999 – December 1999) (Kandić 2001: 3).

On the other hand, the Kosovo textbooks say that during the armed conflict in Kosovo, only in the period between January and December 1998 “[...] more than 2,000 Albanians were killed, not counting here a very large number of missing persons.” (Bajraktari, Rexhepi & Demaj 2010: 206, quoted in Gashi 2019: 99). However, also for this period, the Humanitarian Law Center’s multi-volume *Kosovo Memory Book 1998-2000* registers 1660 Albanians killed, including 678 UÇK soldiers, and

296 Serbs, including 167 members of the Yugoslav Army and the Ministry for Internal Affairs (Mišina, Tompson Popović & Kandić 2011: 457). According to the Kosovo textbooks, in the period of the NATO bombings (from 24 March to 10 June 1999) “[...] the Serbian army killed approximately 15,000 Albanians.” (Bajraktari, Rexhepi & Demaj 2010: 207 and Bicaj & Ahmeti 2005: 202, quoted in: Gashi 2019: 99). The *Kosovo Memory Book 1998 – 2000* gives the numbers of Albanian civilians killed in the period between January 1998 and December 2000, including the 78-day NATO bombing, as 7,864 in total. Therefore, the number of those killed is doubled in the Kosovo textbooks, but the sources of the data are not given.

During the 78 days of the NATO bombing of the FRY, according to the Serbian textbooks, “(...) between 1,200 and 2,500 civilians were killed” (Đurić & Pavlović 2010: 251). However, in the table given by these textbooks for the suffering of civilians from the NATO bombardment, data are provided for only 347 civilians killed. In this table, Albanian ethnicity is mentioned only for the 70 civilians killed by NATO forces near Gjakova, while for the 50 civilians killed in the village of Luzhan near Podujevo, the 20 near Peja and 87 in the village of Korisha near Prizren, there is no mention of their Albanian ethnicity. Likewise, there is no mention in the table of the attack of NATO forces on the Dubrava Prison where, according to the HLC, 112 Albanian prisoners were killed. It may be that this attack is not included in the table because only 29 of the prisoners in Dubrava Prison were killed by the NATO bombs on the 19 and 20 May 1999 while the others, again according to HLC, were executed by Serbian forces on the 21 and 23 May 1999.

On civilian casualties by NATO, the report of Human Rights Watch, based on field research, says that during the bombing of the territory of the FRY, NATO killed a minimum of 489 and a maximum of 528 innocent civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, the majority of these innocent civilians were killed in the territory of Kosovo, giving numbers of between 279 and 318 people (Gashi 2019: 101). The

number of civilians killed by NATO is therefore at least doubled in the Serbian textbooks while not being recorded at all in the textbooks of Kosovo.

Overall, Marijana Toma argues that Serbian history textbooks offer selective, insufficient, or cursory interpretation of the facts, or avoid attributing any responsibility to the representatives of the Serbian people (Toma 2015: 112), and concludes:

What is evident in almost all the textbooks [...] is the lack of objectivity in presenting the events related to the wars in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in the presentation of the war crimes that were committed and of the victims who suffered those crimes. The partiality and bias are primarily reflected in the selective choice of data, and the obvious omission or neglect of the facts and events in which the role of the Serbian people and Serbia as a state could be shown in a negative context - including, first and foremost, the facts about the sufferings of the members of other ethnic groups, and an evident effort to portray the Serbs as the only/the greatest victims among the peoples of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s wars. (Toma 2015: 100)

Event	Serbian Textbook (Đurić and Pavlović 2010)	Kosovo-Albanian Textbook (Rexhepi and Demaj, 2009)	Alternative/ Non-govern- ment Sources
Emergence of the Koso- vo Libera- tion Army	“Daily armed actions by Albanian terror- ist groups, called Kosovo Liberation Army, brigandry and conflicts with the forces of law and order, in which many civilians were killed, extremely de- teriorated the situa- tion in Kosovo.”	Massacres by the Serbian regime across Kosovo, which “[...] in- spired the emer- gence of the UÇK to protect the peo- ple of Kosovo.”	
Other nationalities’ casualties	No mention of a single Albanian killed by Serbian/ Yugoslav forces during the armed conflict in Kosovo.	No mention of a single Serb killed by the UÇK and NATO forces during and after the armed con- flict in Kosovo.	
In 1998.	No figure given	“[...] more than 2,000 Albanians were killed, not counting here a very large number of missing per- sons.”	HLC - 1660 Al- banians killed, including 678 UÇK soldiers, and 296 Serbs, including 167 Yugoslav army and police members

<p>Albanian casualties</p>	<p>No figure given</p>	<p>In the period of the NATO bombings “[...] the Serbian army killed approximately 15,000 Albanians.”</p>	<p>1998–2000, including the 78-day NATO bombing, 7,864 Albanians in total.</p>
<p>NATO civilian casualties</p>	<p>“(...) between 1,200 and 2,500 civilians were killed” (only 70 mentioned as Albanians)</p>	<p>No mention at all</p>	<p>Human Rights Watch – 489-528, out of which 279-318 in Kosovo (mostly Albanians)</p>
<p>After NATO arrived</p>	<p>“899 had been killed and 834 had been kidnapped” (no ethnicity mentioned)</p>	<p>No mention at all</p>	<p>The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) - 786 were killed following the entry of NATO forces (12 June 1999 – December 1999) (of various ethnicities).</p>

Conclusion

To sum up, our analysis illustrates that, once we move from the proclaimed goals of current Serbian education, the depiction of recent traumatic historical events in the Serbian history textbooks actually corresponds more to the early Romantic-national ideas than the contemporary ones about nourishing critical approach, various perspectives and other sides' views, and promoting more inclusive and tolerant identity(ies). After conducting a comprehensive analysis of Serbian textbooks, several Serbian and international scholars concluded that these examples are not simply isolated cases but actually a dominant perspective:

Since relations with other neighbouring nations have been presented in a similarly brutal manner, it could be said that history textbooks develop a paranoid model of historical consciousness that can provide a solid foundation for hatred and contempt towards neighbouring nations, which leaves constantly open the possibilities for further misunderstandings, conflicts and revanchism. By constructing such dimensions of historical consciousness education acquires significant mobilizing function with a delayed effect, as the capital of hatred and model of behaviour enforced in the earliest years is being passed to a future time, thereby reducing the possibility of rational confrontation with the past and present.

Budući da su na slično brutalan način predstavljeni odnosi i sa drugima susednim narodima, može se reći da udžbenici istorije razvijaju jedan paranoidan model istorijske svesti koji može dati solidnu osnovu za mržnju i prezir prema susednim narodima, čime mogućnosti za dalje nesporazume, sukobe i revanše ostaju trajno otvoreni. Konstruisanjem takvih dimenzija istorijske svesti obrazovanje dobija značajnu mobilizatorsku funkciju sa odloženim dejstvom, jer se kapital mržnje i model ponašanja nametnuti u najranijim godinama života prenose i na neko buduće vreme, čime se smanjuje mogućnost racionalnog suočavanja sa prošlošću i sadašnjošću. (Stojanović 2007: 59)

Thus, it appears that we are still far from emancipating our pupils and educational system from the neo-romantic idea about nation and national identity. One way to go has been set by an ambitious long-term Joint History project of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe from Thessaloniki, which gathered historians from all countries in the region. The project lasted since 1998, for nearly two decades. The participants sought answers to questions such as: how much do we know, and how much do we learn about the Balkan past? The solution has been found in the new approach to teaching history – multiperspective. The aim of that method is not to offer one ‘truth’, acceptable for all, about what happened in the past, but to offer information about how different representatives of their and neighbouring nations perceived their joint past (Stojanović 2005: 8). Following those methodological principles, the project produced six volumes, intended as the supplementary teaching material, of historical sources on the Ottoman Empire (Berktaj & Murgesku 2005), nations and emergence of national states (Murgesku, 2005), the Balkan Wars (Kolev & Kuluri 2005) and World War II (Erdelja 2005), The Cold War (Kuluri & Repe 2018a) and the 1990-2008 period (Kuluri & Repe 2018b).

v30.	The settling of the Turkish-Bulgarian conflict, Romanian cartoon 1913	72
IIb. Life at the Front		
III-8.	<i>From Mt. Staraco to Bitolj</i> : The diary of a conscript in the Danubian Medical Column (the Battle of Kumanovo), revealing the situation in the Serbian army	73
III-9.	The suffering of horses, described by a Turkish lieutenant	73
v31.	The transportation of wounded soldiers from Thessaloniki Port	74
III-10.	The situation of the Bulgarian army in Thrace, described by a Frenchman	74
III-11.	A Croatian doctor expresses his thoughts after a visit to the battlefield near the river Maritza	74
v32.	Czech physician, Dr. Jan Levit, in the Circle of Serbian Sisters' hospital	75
III-12.	Izzet-Fuad Pasha describing the Turkish soldiers' lack of bread	76
III-13.	Excerpt from the memoirs of a Romanian soldier	76
v33.	Greek camp outside Xanthi	76
III-14.	Excerpt from the diary of Vassilios Sourrapas, a Greek volunteer	77
III-15.	The morale in the Bulgarian army, analysed by the Bulgarian Chief of Staff, years after the war	77
III-16.	From the memoirs of a Romanian officer about crossing the special pontoon military bridge across the Danube at Corabia	77
III-17.	The meeting of Turkish and Montenegrin soldiers in Scutari after the city had surrendered	78
IIIc. The Parallel War		
III-18.	Letter from Ippokratis Papavassiliou to his wife, Alexandra	78
v34.	The ruins of Serres	79
III-19.	The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace comments upon the 'parallel' losses from the burning of villages and the exodus of people	80
III-20.	The flight of the Muslims, October 1912	80
III-21.	The Bulgarian Exarchate trying to convert Bulgarian-speaking Muslims to Christianity	80
v35.	A Bulgarian Red Cross convoy	81
III-22.	Official disapproval of violent practices by the Bulgarian General HQ	81
III-23.	The destruction caused by the war in the villages near Shkodra and peoples' agony in trying to find a 'valid' reason for their misery – An account by Mary Edith Durham	82
v36.	Poor, hungry people who invaded the garden of the Italian Consulate, Scutari	82
v37.	Bread distribution by the Bulgarians to the starving people of Adrianople	82
IIId. Behind the Front		
III-24.	Description of Belgrade by a Croatian newspaper correspondent	83
III-25.	Description of Istanbul by a French journalist	84
	A. In November 1912	84
	B. In March 1913	84
v38.	Aid distribution to the families of the soldiers mobilised in the Romanian-Bulgarian war, 1913	85
III-26.	The situation in Scutari during its siege described by an Italian journalist	85
v39.	In Cetinje – women, children and wounded soldiers	86
III-27.	'The Serbian woman'	87
III-28.	An upper-class Greek woman offers her services as a nurse and records her experience	87

Illustration of the content from *Balkanski ratovi: istorijska čitanka 3* (Kolev & Kuluri 2005: 8)

Typically, as illustrated above, these sources provide the view of the same events from various sides, including military reports, private letters from the front, newspaper articles and international reports and sources. Therefore, these collections of historical

sources can assist teachers to apply more easily contemporary methods of teaching history; likewise, they help the students to acquire a more comprehensive grasp of their and their neighbours' past through active learning, and thereby to contribute overall to more realistic, nuanced, and reconciliatory perceptions of their present problems. As we argued, putting sources such as these in use in Serbian schools and the educational system would be a step forward towards a desired critical and humanistic way of teaching and understanding history.

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