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HERMENEUTICS OF RECOLLECTION: GADAMER AND RICOEUR¹

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the notion of recollection in Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur's thought, in the context of time distance as "obstacles" towards understanding the past. Particular attention is paid to the understanding the phenomenon of "Death" as a time gap between the past and the present. In connection with this problem, we find efforts of philosophical hermeneutics on the one hand and historicism on the other. Differences between historicism and hermeneutics can be outlined in relation to the role that memory plays in the process of understanding in Gadamer and Ricoeur. What does Death mean in terms of understanding for history, and what for hermeneutics? How can we understand temporal distance? Is it possible and necessary to overcome it? What is the role of recollection and how does it participate in understanding? – these are some of the main issues that will be addressed in the text. Finally, the task of the text is to offer the meaning and significance of the hermeneutics of recollection in relation to the mentioned questions, through the interaction of the thoughts of the two authors.

KEYWORDS

recollection, Death, temporal distance, representation, presence, understanding

Introduction

At the very beginning, it is necessary to determine, at least the provisional framework, within which this paper will develop. Namely, while Gadamer's notion of recollection will be examined with regard to *Truth and Method*, and related texts in which he refers to memory or *historically effected consciousness*, the main motive for including Ricoeur in the analysis is Ricoeur's text which was (having in mind the occasion) symptomatically entitled *Temporal distance and Death in History*, and which was published in the collection *Gadamer's*

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century, published in the year of Gadamer's death in 2002. Ricoeur's analysis of the phenomenon of *Death*, and in connection with it, the notion of recollection, that we find in focus in the mentioned article are extremely useful for understanding of Gadamer's approach. The intention of the paper is to show how the hermeneutics of memory is an adequate answer to the problem of temporal distance which arises due to the death of another, and to argue to what extent this is a novelty in relation to the tradition of understanding these phenomena.

When it comes to recollection and understanding, there are two places in *Truth and Method* that are of major importance for us. These are: the "Transformation into structure and total mediation" and "Analysis of historically effected consciousness". While in the first, Gadamer speaks about the nature of recollection, distinguishing, through conversation with Plato and Aristotle, two types of the same, the second is focused on historically effected consciousness, and the way the present is burdened with the past, that is, the way the past lives in present through consciousness. The analysis of both chapters should show their connection – the way in which recollection enables the understanding of the past as the present within historically effected consciousness. Thus, in contrast to the tradition that sees recognition as its primary function, recollection also appears as an active understanding of becoming, as a *historical alterity*, in which reconstruction is rejected in favor of manifesting historical effect in the present.

Before we conclude the analysis by returning to Gadamer, we will move on to Ricoeur's approach to the problem of *Death* and recollection in history, which adequately builds on the mentioned motives. For Ricoeur, Death is not the ultimate horizon against which life is determined, so Death as an absence must be transformed into a presence, which will enable active recollection to release a living effect within the historically effected consciousness. In order to more adequately present the meaning of recollection to which Gadamer and Ricoeur refer to, the paper will also rely on Deleuze and his lines on recognition from *Difference and Repetition*.

Transformation, Representation and Recognition

The chapter "Transformation into structure and total mediation" in *Truth and Method* Gadamer begins with an explanation of the freedom of the game. Namely, the game ceases to be exclusively a representational act of the player, separating from him, it becomes a pure phenomenon (*Erscheinung*). "It has the character of a work, of an *ergon* and not only of *energeia*. In this sense, I call it a structure (*Gebilde*)" (Gadamer 2004: 110). Nevertheless, this separation or autonomy of the game still points to representation. Although when Gadamer talk about structure he means the work of art, in its core it's about the analysis of transformation. Question is: what changes during the transformation, and what remains the same? Something that *was* is re-presented, that is, it appears in the present, in the way it *is now*. The question that arises now is: by recognizing what *it was*, do we recognize what *it is now*, or is it that by seeing

what it *is now*, we can recognize what it *was*. It is not easy to answer because the setting itself does not stand on a safe ground. The inner dialectic of transformation lies in the fact that although something that changes must retain something by which change can be recognized – something that is therefore the same, transformation also means *difference*, change as a whole – something that was is no longer, because it became *other*. Transformation into structure, means that what *once was, is no longer*, and what *is now*, is undoubtedly in its truth (Gadamer 2004: 111).

However, it is necessary to put this dialectic aside for a moment, because in order to answer the question, it is necessary to re-illuminate the connection between change as a phenomenon and the subject who initiates the change. That is why the break between the game and the player that Gadamer insists on is important. The example he gives is acting, entering another identity, another character. The one who enters into the act, wants to make a discontinuity with the existing identity. In the eyes of other observers, he wants to be something else. Of course, we cannot talk about change here, but rather about disguise – the change that is imposed on the audience, keeps the inner continuity of the one who wants to present the change. But, “...to start from subjectivity here is to miss the point” (Gadamer 2004: 111). Because the moment we introduce the question of the “meaning” of the act itself, the player must be removed from the analysis. In the act itself as *Erscheinung* there is something which no longer *permits* adequate comparison with so far *existing reality*, there is no comparison which would give an ultimate measure. Gadamer refers here to the example of a child who plays from Aristotle’s Poetics: a child who plays by imitating, thus performing a kind of *mimesis* by changing his clothes, is not doing that because it wants for us to recognize what is behind that performance, behind the *presentation*, that is, child does not want to be recognized in what *it was*. On the contrary, the meaning of the act is to confirm itself in what *it is*, to recognize what is being imitated, what *is now* (Gadamer 2004: 112). This motif, obviously dear to Gadamer, can also be found in *The Beginning of the philosophy* (Gadamer 2001: 17–18). The meaning that connects both of these motives is the virtuality of the act – the child is surrendering (*Überantwortung*) itself to play, and in that indulgence the *representation* becomes an *event*, which does not mean repeating the old, but actualizing the new on one of many possible ways – virtual.

That it is representation at stake, can only be determined by recognition, by recognizing something that reappears. And so we are again at the beginning of a dialectical problem from earlier. Recognition is a feature of recollection, understanding that we have in perception what we already knew before, that is, to perceive something again (experience, learn) – from there it follows again and again that the basis of representation as repetition is the *sameness*. It takes knowledge of something to be able to imitate it, it takes recollection – knowledge of something that was before, in order to be able to recognize. To sum up, it takes something that *was*, to be able to return to *presence*, to be able to be *re-presented*.

What has been said should by no means be understood as the only kind of relationship between what *was* and what *is*. Likewise, for Gadamer, the role of recollection can not in any case be reduced to recognition, and recognition is not just the knowledge of something we already knew. Recognizing always means knowing “more than is already familiar”. For this claim, Gadamer will offer at least two basic interpretations, and it is necessary to look at both of them. At first, we have a Platonic myth on which Platonism is based, which can be found in *Phaedo* and in *Meno* (Plato: 1963), and to which Plato refers in order to legitimize his theory of knowledge, and to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist (Ostojić 2021: 266). According to that myth, everything is already in the soul, that is, in the memory, but not in a clear way (we do not have clear knowledge about it). Recognition is thus the recognition of the essence, that is, the act in which the *Truth* or *logos* stands out from the contingent and changing circumstances that are related to its appearance. To know more in such a representation, in this case, means to be able to remove everything that is accidental in this new appearance. Recognition in this way forces the mind to better understand what is already in the memory. What Gadamer wants to underline here is that “Imitation and representation are not merely a repetition, a copy, but knowledge of the essence” (Gadamer 2004: 114). Understanding is thus a kind of recollection, but recognition is not just a return to the old actuality, but a completely new actualization of the Truth. Although it manages not to reduce the representation to “already seen”, this interpretation is strained to the extent that it neglects the ontological difference between the original and the copy that we find in Plato, as well as his critique of *mimesis*. Of course, Gadamer is aware of that, and in order to show the desired point that goes in favor of his notion of *understanding*, the argumentation turns to Aristotle.

Although Aristotle does not deal with the problem of hermeneutics, and especially not in the historical context of understanding (understanding of the past), Aristotle’s considerations presented in *Nicomachean ethics* are of particular importance for Gadamer’s notion of understanding. The reason for this is that in Aristotle’s ethics, unlike metaphysics, the notion of good does not represent an independent generality, as is the case with Plato’s Ideas. On the contrary, the knowledge of good depends on the current situation, that is, on action in *now* (Aristotle 2000: 1095a). Criticizing Plato, Aristotle shows that the basis of moral knowledge is striving (*orexis*), which develops into a fixed demeanor (*hexis*). Now it is only a step from moving from moral cognition to cognition. That transition will be completed with Heidegger and his explication of the ontological connection between *Dasein* and understanding. For Gadamer’s conception of recollection and understanding highly important is Heidegger’s claim, that understanding itself is what we most fundamentally are, including our being inseparable from the *other Dasein* (*Mitsein*) (Heidegger 1962: 149–168). Cognition, or in this case re-cognition implies “*being-in-the-world*”. So, when it comes to recollection, thanks to which we recognize the representation, the emphasis is no longer on what something *was*, but on its current actualization, which is related to the active act of understanding.

However, with Gadamer, as we have already mentioned, understanding must not remain tied to the activity of the subject, it must be considered as a pure phenomenon. Thus, with Gadamer, the experience of understanding is an *event*, and in that way the truth of the past does not exist without its actualization in that event, in the present act of understanding. “The birth of experience as an event over which no one has control and which is not even determined by the particular weight of this or that observation, but in which everything is coordinated in a way that is ultimately incomprehensible” (Gadamer 2004: 347). Thus, cognition as well as recognition happen through recollection, but they are no longer subordinated to the *Truth of the past* – of *that which was*. The Truth of *what was* is not in the historical fact, but in the active act of understanding that is happening in what is *now*. On the other hand, recollection is indispensable and necessary in the process of understanding, because *what was*, is already always included in *what is now*. Because of this connection made by recollection, that past is not inert, but its meaning is constantly reshaped in the present event of understanding.

In this way, we arrived to Gadamer’s *history of effect* (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) and historically effected consciousness, which we will refer to several times in the following chapters. After showing what the relationship is between Gadamer’s notions of recollection, recognition, and representation, the text turns to Ricoeur, in order to show how Ricoeur uses Gadamer’s motives we have elaborated, the active act of understanding, and the connection between what *was* and what *is* on the problem of *Death* as a *temporal distance*.

Crossing the Distance: Returning to Presence

In his Essay *Temporal Distance and Death in History*, before introducing Gadamer’s hermeneutics of recollection, Paul Ricoeur begins by re-examining the phenomenon of *Death*. We can divide this examination into two stages. The first seeks to offer a new interpretation of the relationship to Death, and then the second moves on to the phenomenon of Death within history.

For these purposes, it is not necessary to re-examine all the authors to whom Ricoeur refers to in an effort to offer a “different” attitude toward Death, but one must not be left out, because the above-mentioned “novelty” in Ricoeur’s interpretation refers to him. It is, of course, Heidegger and his ontological conception of “being towards death”. In Heidegger, Death is ontologically inseparable from *being-in-the world*. This is because Death is the ontological horizon of the self of Being (*Sein*), that is, *Dasein*. Being toward death is “Dasein’s ownmost possibility” (Heidegger 1962: 307) Although Ricoeur argues that Heidegger’s *being toward death* for several reasons has no effect on the critical consideration of Death in the *sciences de l’esprit*, and especially on the problem of understanding history which is in focus here, that is not entirely true. Even if we agree with all the reasons that Ricoeur states: That Heidegger’s relationship with Death is too internal and personal to be “echoed in the relationship with the historical past which appears to be relegated to the anonymous level

of ‘one dies’ (*Man stirbt*), and that historiography is too determined to look back to the past, to keep in its own circle of understanding a pure relationship to the future implied by *being towards death*, and that therefore *being towards death* cannot contribute to understanding of Death within history (Ricoeur 2002: 240–241), from further reading it becomes clear that it is necessary for Ricoeur to reverse this view. In that sense, such an interpretation of Heidegger’s Death may not contribute to the historical understanding of Death, but it is limiting for a different understanding of Death that Ricoeur seeks to develop through the hermeneutics of recollection, which is also why Ricoeur devotes the whole chapter to something “irrelevant to his critical examination”.

To understand Ricoeur’s intent, we must begin with the problem of understanding the history. The most common gesture of historians is to understand history through reconstruction. Reconstruction of the past is done either with the help of objects or through witnesses. A historiographical gesture is an intellectual critical action, which uses objects to remove mystery from memory, materializing the past through stories in which causes are arranged and connected with consequences, in a way that assures that Truth is *representation* (Krzysztof Pomian, 1999: 63). Studying, writing or talking about history is an attempt to return the *past*, which *is no longer present*. In this regard, a witness is someone who gives objectivity to the cognitive act of recollection. The word *testis*, as the witness is spoken in Latin, had a close connection with *tertius*, which means third, and at the same time in Roman law it meant a person who confirmed an oral contract, i.e. was its guarantor, had the authority to certify it, something Ricoeur also wrote about (Ricoeur 2000). It is interesting to note here that the witness also has a role to separate the process of recollection from subjectivity, but by no means in the same way that Gadamer aimed. The witness turns the inner act of consciousness and its *encounter* with the past into an objective picture of what *has passed*, in such a way that what *has passed* is no longer in close connection with the consciousness that tries to invoke it through recollection, and thus neither with what is *now*. Unlike Gadamer’s historically effected consciousness in which the Truth of the past exists only in the present, here the witness guarantees the Truth of the past, as a truth that has no need to confirm itself in its re-actualization. In addition, as Fernando Catroga observes, the Latin word *suprestes* would also apply to a witness – as the one who is present, who has survived, a word that is also a translation of the Greek *martyros* which meant “witness” (Katroga 2011: 53). But, in both cases, this necessity and significance of the witness speaks not only in favor of the *objective truth* that lies in the past, and which needs to be discovered and then confirmed, but also of the constant and expressed “doubt”, of distrust that recollection can capture this objective truth. This doubt, however, is not enough to give up the claim to the objective truth that has remained in the past, but rather a call for a continuous examination of recollection, and recollection as an examination of what is said, by means of the *Truth that once was*. In this context, recollection and history (which is understood as a historiography) together build unique retrospectives. In Ricoeur words:

A memory subjected to the critical test of history can no longer aim for fidelity without being sifted through the truth. And a history, replaced by memory in the dialectic movement of retrospection and project (conception, tendency), can no longer separate the truth from the fidelity which ultimately attaches to the broken promises of the past. (Ricoeur 1998: 32)

The Truth in history must thus be revealed or discovered, and as an obstacle to this discovery stands temporality. Thus, Temporal distance, not only separates from the Truth that is no longer present, but, due to the temporality of the Being (everything that is), can make *objects* or *witnesses*, that can point to, or provide credibility to a certain reconstruction of the past, *absent* from our time, from *now*. *Death* can thus be interpreted as temporal distance, *as an absence* – the question posed by Ricoeur is, how do we deal with *Death* as an extreme form of temporal distance? How to return *absent* to the *presence*, and with it *the absent Truth*?

Here, Ricoeur will (although in a different context) follow Heidegger distinction between two types of speech about the past, namely “no longer is” (from *Vergangenheit*) and having-been form of time (*Gewesenheit*) expressed in a phrase “this once was” (Ricoeur, 2002: 249). Both forms speak of absence, but of two different kinds of absence. One of the tasks of history is to move from “no longer is” to “once was” and that is also a way to approach the phenomenon of *death*. The twofold meaning of absence can be explained by the “act of burial”, as well as the meaning of the *grave*.

At the level of symbolism, recollection is an act in which the absent receives its symbol, i.e. within recollection that which is absent re-present (come into presence) itself, and thus, indirectly, through the symbol acquired by recollection, it becomes *present* in the *now*. *Grave* or *burial* signifies death or the absence of an object – something which was is there no more. However, the emphasis in the previous sentence is on “signify”. To mark an absence means that that absence is placed in the presence, but so that the presence to which the grave refers is not the presence of an object from the past, but precisely the presence of its absence. Then we can say that the role of historiography is no different, it speaks of the past in order to bury it, or rather, to give it a place and distribute space” (Katroga 2011: 48). The form “no longer is” refers to those who are slowly becoming “absent from history” (*les absents de l’histoire*) in the words of Michel De Certeau. Written history is a struggle against oblivion, because it represents an appropriate transition from “grave – place” to “expression – grave” (Ricoeur 2000: 147). This is the articulation of death, and the transition from “is no longer” to “once was”, but the knowledge of “once was” rests on the meaning already assigned to it. Instead of disappearing, history as well as narration seem to bring back those who have died or disappeared as *traces*, which are completely at the disposal of those who are alive. Marking the past means giving place to the dead, and that is also sublimating the possible distribution of space and pointing out the meaning in the direction of the living. (M. de Certeau 1975). If the past is retained only as the

presence of absence, it means that the *object of the past* is transformed into an inert object, which the present has, but which, since it is inactive, no longer has an influence on it besides the one present assigns to it. There is no doubt that these objects or traces are the bearers of meaning, but the idea that their accumulation leads to the reconstruction of the *truth of the past*, turns recollection into recording, and then into recognition. What still remains there is an insurmountable time gap, because the past in reference to the historian and the present is still in a state of *otherness*, where that otherness is only hinted at, but remaining hidden (absent).

Therefore, the grave and the graveyard must be interpreted as significant wholes that articulate two very different levels: one that is *invisible* and the other that is *visible*. The semiotic layers of which this second level is composed have the role to *conceal* decay (time) and at the same time to *simulate* non-death, conveying to those who come, meaning that is able to help individual *presentation*, or rather, to *represent – restore the presence* of one who is absent with his Being. (Katroga 2011: 49)

In a certain way, a parallel can be drawn between the Platonic *mimesis* as a representation, and this representation within history. Both refer to the being of the past and the Truth of the past, but they can never be ontologically relevant as the original, both representations are just a copy, or a label that serves to refer to, to recognize the original. However, there is one important difference that will enable Ricoeur to link the representation within history with the Gadamer interpretation of representation. Namely, it is about the fact that reading the sign – becomes a funeral act, so the understanding of the meaning comes from *now*. The “absent object” in order to “preserve” itself, receives its symbol, which, although it confirms the time gap between the presence and the presence of absence, points that meaning of that symbol comes from the understanding that takes place in the present. Death turned into an inert tomb, will show its inner infinity when it encounters with the act of understanding. This will be adequately noticed, in addition to Ricoeur, by Dosse: the act of burial “reopens the horizon of possibilities, because assigning a place to the dead is a way of continuing the path towards a creative horizon, both indebted and unburdened, with a past that is not haunted by the creativity of an unknowing presence” (F. Dosse 2006: 63).

The key motive that Ricoeur opposes Heidegger’s attitude towards death is now clearly visible: Death is not the ultimate horizon in relation to which Life is determined. For the active capture of the past, for its active understanding, the setting must be reversed: Instead of Death reducing the possibilities of Life, it opens them up. This opening of possibilities does not only mean finding a space for Death by writing it down and inserting it into the narrative, which will offer new meanings for the living. It has another fundamental role, to abolish *otherness* as the predominant and only relationship of Life and Death.

In order for something like this to be possible, it is necessary to think differently about the problem of temporal distance. For, although this thought

gesture of Ricoeur and Dosse brings the possibility of multiple ways of communication between the past and the future, and thus the richer meaning of representation, in history, memory in which traces are stored as evidence constantly strives to confirm the meaning of *the past in the present*, by (with a sufficient number of traces) crossing the time distance between the absent and the present. As long as the time that has elapsed represents an abyss, or distance, for the *now*, past remains *the other*. This is where we involve the history of effect (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). In order to finish his idea on recollection as a bridge between past and present, between history and philosophy, Ricoeur needs Gadamer's notion of historically effected consciousness.

Understanding as Encounter: Distance as Condition of Possibility

It is necessary, after all, to return once more to the notions of recollection, representation, recognition, and finally, temporal distance. Temporal distance is the distance that separate the *Being of the past* from the *Being of the present*, or more simply, past from the present. Representation is the representation, or rather presentation of something that existed before this moment in the present (which does not necessarily mean that its existence ended in the past), which means that temporal distance is space between *past being*, and its representation. We stated why, for Gadamer this is not the simple form of repeating, or recollection of something already known: in Platonic sense, representation holds the essence or the Truth of the past, being able to recognize that truth in the present, implies already a more distinct knowledge. However, here we find the similar problem as in historiography. "Original" *Being of the past* is always more than its representation. For Plato, to know something is to remember what it is (we could also say "what it was"); in history, in order to know the past, you must use representations of the past, as signs, as traces, so you can reconstruct it in its Truth (which is the Truth of the past) Turning to Aristotle understanding of (ethical) cognition, Gadamer gave a bigger role of the present moment in the process of understanding. Finally, understanding became and active act, inseparable from the way we are in that *now*, from Heidegger's *Dasein*.

The fact that understanding is an effective event dependent of the present moment, does not neglect the relevance of the *past*. Same goes for opening possibilities of *meaning* that Ricoeur talked about – temporal distance is still there. Maybe now there are more ways to cross it, but as we stated above, *past* still remains *otherness* for present understanding.

Answer to this problem lies in Gadamer's historically effected consciousness. But, what is historically affected consciousness? Understanding for Gadamer implies that something (the subject of understanding) is *speaking to us*. Consciousness, together with its prejudices, must not be neglected in this process. Only by entering the game, only by surrendering oneself to the message of *another*, is it possible to experience the *Truth of otherness*:

The naivete of so-called historicism consists in the fact that it does not undertake this reflection, and in trusting to the fact that its procedure is methodical, it forgets its own historicity [...]. The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. (Gadamer 2004: 299)

Hermeneutics must show the effect of history that is present in every act of understanding – the whole of history is an active process that is always actualized in that *now* of understanding. In this manner, understanding is in its most essential meaning “a historically effected event”. This means, there is no reenactment, no reconstruction of *the past*, but always its actualization. Every consciousness is historically effected one – it is the way it functions. In other words, past is always embodied inside present, there is no other meaning of the past, no other Truth than one which actualizes itself in the present moment. This mediation, or transmission of tradition in *Truth and Method* turns “temporal distance from an empty space into a field of energy”, as Ricoeur will notice (Ricoeur 2002: 250). Time between *being of the past*, and *being of the present*, absence and presence, stops to be a distance that needs to be crossed somehow in order to understand, but rather, temporal distance becomes a condition of possibility, of understanding as an event. In this way, past reopens itself on to the future, because that future is the future of the past. “Repetition *qua* reopening, allows for the completion and enrichment of the preceding mediation on death in history” (Ricoeur 2002: 250). But this notion of repetition, this representation holds different meaning. Inside hermeneutic of recollection there is no typical recognition. It is a recognition which becomes an *encounter*. Before we summarize, we will turn shortly to Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, as it can be of great help.

Speaking about the difference, Deleuze points out that the world of representation is characterized by the impossibility of establishing a *difference* in itself, and by the same principle repeating by itself, “since the latter is grasped only by means of recognition, distribution, reproduction and resemblance in so far as these alienate the prefix RE in simple generalities of representation” (Deleuze 1994: 138) In order to reverse these traditional postulates, Deleuze starts from the notion of recognition and of course from Plato – research which is of great interest for the purposes of this paper. It starts with the following speech from *The Republic*:

[...] some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgment of them by sensation seems adequate, while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted. – You obviously mean distant appearances, or things drawn in perspective. – You have quite missed my meaning [...]. (Plato 1963: 523b)

No doubt, this provocative place in dialogue, that can cast a shadow on our previous interpretation of Plato and the representation, begins extremely simply: Some things in our perception do not encourage thinking, while

others make us think. Undoubtedly, it would be a case of recognition first. If we see something that we can recognize, the thought, according to Deleuze, is fulfilled only with “an image of itself” (Deleuze 1994: 138). It follows that when we do not recognize, that is, when we are not sure that it is something we have already perceive, or what we already know, then we are encouraged or forced to think, as Socrates’ interlocutor will ask – but the interlocutor, as we see from the cited quote, is missing a point. Deleuze will notice that this is not at all about the known or unknown as a property of the object – the one who doubts does not escape recognition. It is about the *good will of a thinker*, as Deleuze will call it, or *good will of thinking*, that is, of the way in which thought approaches these objects. An certain object can force thinking, in same manner like the one that is suspicious, i.e. is not certain – the Notion is only a condition of possibility, in other words it is not necessarily related to thought, and thus to recollection. Recognition thus has nothing to do with the relationship between the past and the present, with the nature of the object and its representation, but with the (in)active act of thinking. Representation becomes repetition, but it is a repetition of the way in which the object of representation can be grasped – or “interpreted” for Gadamer. Getting out of the usual image of thought which tends to recognize, for Deleuze means a true *encounter* with the object of understanding. “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter [...]. It is not a quality but a sign. It is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible” (Deleuze 1994: 139). This is a fundamental part of the principle of understanding that we find in Gadamer and Ricoeur, expressed in a slightly different manner. However Deleuze will add a twist that allows us to conceive the recollection from a different angle, adding another dimension to it. The thing (re)appears inside process of recollection, but only as forgotten (Deleuze 1994: 140). It addresses recollection, only if it addresses forgetting within recollection. Indulging in conversion means forgetting. Forget to be able to surrender yourself to the voice of the Past (*Geschichtsüberlieferung*), to abolish the *otherness* of the object.

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This is how, through recollection, recognition becomes *encounter* of consciousness and past as the history of effect – and this is the very act of *understanding*. Whereas Death in history bears negative meaning of “temporal distance” as a loss, as a separation, the resurrection of past which happens in each representation, the evoking of meaning is the positive side expressed in the idea of *Wirkungsgeschichte*. Through Gadamer and Ricoeur, we have showed the dialectic relationship between *absence* and *presence*. Although it is true that their projects differs from here on, because Gadamer’s *mediation i prepuštvanje povesti* is not same as Ricoeur’s imaginative reconstruction or “fictive experience” (Dimitrov 2019: 14), we managed to (re)present the meeting point – as the common ground of hermeneutics of recollection.

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Aleksandar Ostojčić

Hermeneutika sećanja: Gadamer i Riker

Apstrakt

Tekst analizira pojam sećanja kod Hansa Georga Gadamera i Pola Rikera u kontekstu vremenske distance kao „prepreke“ razumevanja prošlosti. Naročita pažnja usmerena je na razumevanje fenomena „smrti“ kao vremenskog ponora između prošlosti i sadašnjosti. U vezi sa tim stoje i nastojanja filozofske hermeneutike sa jedne strane i istoricizma sa druge. U odnosu na ulogu koju sećanje igra u procesu razumevanju kod Gadamera i Rikera, daće se ocrutati razlike između istoricizma i hermeneutike. Šta smrt predstavlja u pogledu razumevanja za istoriju a šta za hermeneutiku? Kako razumeti vremensku distancu? Da li je moguće i da li je neophodno prevazići je? Koja je uloga sećanja i kako ono učestvuje u razumevanju? – neka su od glavnih pitanja koja će biti adresirana u tekstu. Na kraju, zadatak teksta je da kroz interakciju misli dvojice autora, ponudi značenje i značaj hermeneutike sećanja u pogledu na navedena pitanja.

Ključne reči: sećanje, Smrt, vremenska distanca, reprezentacija, prisustvo, razumevanje

