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Current Challenges of the European Integration Process of the Western Balkans Countries[2]

Abstract

In this article, the authors analyze the most significant achievements of the current dynamics of the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU (Process of Stabilization and Association), with a special emphasis on numerous issues that stand in the "European way" of these countries. In this context, a specific analysis will be linked to numerous internal problems in the Western Balkans countries, as well as in their bilateral relations, and how does this affect the possible acceleration of the European integration process.

Of course, the authors in this paper devoted considerable attention to the role of "non-EU" countries in the region of the Western Balkans, especially the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the People's Republic of China. Also, the presentation will discuss how the countries of the Western Europe, which obviously will remain dominant in the European Union in the next period (Germany, France and Italy) will position themselves concerning a new enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans. Also, the unfinished process of *Brexit* (2016) opens up some problems when it comes to the entering the countries of the Western Balkans into the European Union. Certainly, there are some "weak points" in the European integration process of the Western Balkans countries (corruption and organized crime in the case of Montenegro, relations with the government in Pristina when it comes to Serbia, etc.).

Key words: European Union, European integration, Western Balkans, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania.

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Introduction

Over the past decade and a half and after the introduction of the Stabilization and Association Process for the countries of the Western Balkans, certain progress has been made in "relocating" these countries from the extreme European periphery, affected by armed conflicts during the 1990s, to the European mainstream. (Sajdik, Schwartzinger 2009: 313-320) Namely, these countries came into such a very difficult position, among other things, because of the process of building nation states in a rather heterogeneous area of the Balkans. (Mulaj 2008: 79-120) Today, when we generally observe the achievement of the European integration process which started more than fifteen years ago, we can conclude that there is some progress. On the one hand, Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia are leading this process, which they started together within the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001. These two sovereign states are negotiating the membership in the European Union, but Montenegro has more open chapters and an accelerated European perspective.[3]

On the other hand, certain backlogs in this process are mainly expressed by the Republic of Macedonia, which since the acquisition of the status of a candidate for the membership in the Union at the end of 2005, failed to speed up the process for twelve years in any respect. (Đukanović 2015: 247-259) Determination of the beginning of this process by addressing the issue of the name of Macedonia on which the official Athens insists has been *de facto* blocking the possibility of acceleration of this process for more than a decade. (Shea 2008: 211-277) Although Macedonia had a significant initial advantage over the rest of the Western Balkan countries, it is obvious that thanks to the right-populist government of VMRO-DPMNE this country remained "trapped" in its own reassessment and construction of identity frameworks (primarily the revision of ancient and contemporary history), and less related to the European and Euro-Atlantic perspectives. (Đukanović, Arnaudov 2016: 277–295) It should be noted that since 2008, Macedonia has not received the invitation for the membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) due to the stubborn attitudes of the Macedonian authorities. Also, the access protocol has not yet been granted. After the change of power in this former southernmost Yugoslav republic,

3) By the end of August 2017, Serbia opened 10 chapters in the negotiations on membership with the European Union, and Montenegro 28 out of 35 chapters.

there were numerous announcements of acceleration of the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. In this sense is also mentioned the resolution of two and a half decades long dispute over the name of the state. (Murray: 2017) Moreover, it is obvious that this track of events followed after the strengthening of the role of the Russian Federation in the Western Balkans in the second half of the past decade, whose dominant goal is to stop the Euro-Atlantic and certainly the European integration of the countries in the region. (Helsinški bilten 2017: 6-7)

The situation with Bosnia and Herzegovina is similar, where due to the persistent political conflicts of the three ethnoelites (Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian), which has *de facto* paralyzed this country and its functioning, the process of European integration is not actually a fundamental foreign policy priority. (Đukanović 2016: 53–68) On the contrary, it is clear that there is a certain resistance to the acceleration of this process, first of all, in the Bosniak leadership and the dominant political structures (gathered around the Party of Democratic Action), and also in the leadership of the Republic of Srpska, which is increasingly openly connected with the authorities in Moscow, on which even the authorities in Belgrade do not have a significant influence. (*Ibidem*: 53–68) The authorities of the Republic of Srpska express a special animosity towards the Bosnia and Herzegovina's membership in NATO, although there is still very little effort to be taken to obtain an invitation to the membership.[4] This can be also explained by the constant tendencies of strengthening the Russian influence in Bosnian entity – the Republic of Srpska. (Mujanović 2017) In a certain way, the Croatian component in Bosnia and Herzegovina sees in the European integration a possibility of approaching its "mother country" – the Republic of Croatia, which became a member of the Union four years ago.

The internal turmoils in Albania point to the fact that the authorities are more preoccupied with solving the so-called Albanian national issue in the west of the Balkans, putting it before the European integration, as an actual foreign policy priority and task. (Đukanović 2016a: 107-110) On the contrary, it seems that the crisis of the authorities in Tirana and the continued and large divisions between the ruling Socialist Party of Albania and the leading opposition Democratic Party indicate that there will be insufficient progress in the process of European integration. Although Edi Rama's Socialist Party of Albania managed to convincingly win the parliamentary elections, it is obvious that these tensions will

4) These conditions are mainly based on the necessity of the registration of military property of the former Army of Republika Srpska to the Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Kovačević: 2017).

continue. (Mali 2017) On the other hand, the European Union has already postponed several times the beginning of negotiations with Albania due to insufficient implementation of certain internal reforms in the field of justice, the rule of law and the fight against corruption. However, the statements of Albanian Prime Minister from the beginning of 2017 regarding the potential unification of Albania and Kosovo, and then probably the "unification" of other Albanians inhabited areas of the Western Balkans, do not create a real precondition for a very important issue of normalizing relations with individual countries of this region, primarily with Serbia but also with Macedonia. (Mejdini 2017) On the contrary, such statements have only strengthened the right-oriented public in Serbia and Macedonia.

After a one-sided declaration of independence at the beginning of 2008, Kosovo is besides visibly accelerated process of accession to the European Union still burdened by strengthening of the ethnic-nationalist tendencies. Namely, the new government in Kosovo, as well as a great part of the opposition, are dominantly focused on the further delay of the initiated dialogue process with Belgrade which started in 2011. (Feilcke 2017) Moreover, it is evident that the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo has not yet been formed even four years after the founding agreement on its establishment (the agreement was signed on April 20, 2103 in Brussels).[5] Also, the unwillingness of Pristina authorities to actually integrate the Serb community in a proper manner into the Kosovo's legal, security, educational and economic system is undeniable. After two-year long avoidance of the ratification of the border agreement with Montenegro, the Pristina authorities pressed by the radical opposition further show some unwillingness to improve the relations in the Western Balkans and to get rid of the accumulated historical heritage to a certain extent. (Radio Free Europe, 2017) This will unquestionably affect the extension of the visa liberalization suspension from the European Union.

In general terms, the Western Balkans is, therefore, in a sort of a turning point. On the one hand, there is an evident progress in the European integration after 2000, but the completion of this process is not even close. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, pointed out in August 2017 the disparity between the necessity of acceleration of the "European perspective" of the countries of the region and their lack of readiness. (Eder 2017) This again unleashes

5) See integral version of the agreement – First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. Brussels. 20. April 2013. [online] Available at: http://www.kord-kim.gov.rs/eng/p03.php [Accessed 7 September 2017].

a number of frustrations in the region, ranging from strengthening of ethnic nationalism and mentioning of nationalist mega-state projects to the potential emergence of secessionist movements. To this has also often contributed the constant revival of the idea of "border rearrangements" in the Balkans, in which way, in fact, all countries in this region are moving away from the full perspective of the EU membership. Moreover, the above-mentioned ideas, which are reviving and strengthening in the period of the still unfinished project of the „post-conflict Western Balkans", point to the fact that the European Union is fundamentally incapable of re-examining its current legal framework for future enlargement, but also the full integration of this region into the Union. (Đukanović, Gjurovski 2016: 87-107) It is certain that without ending this process, which is objectively complicated by the internal crisis in the European Union, there is not a real possibility of consolidation of the stability in the western parts of the Balkans. Naturally, this process should be observed in relation to the enlargement of the NATO in the Western Balkans, especially when it comes to Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the countries that have made the most progress in this process, and who, after removing certain obstacles, could soon become its Member States.

I

The Most Important Problems of the Western Balkans Countries In the Region In the Context of Accession to the European Union

A general view of the dynamics of the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union shows the division on at least three groups into which we can include the countries of the region. The more successful countries in this process are Montenegro and Serbia. On the other hand, we can notice that Albania, which by the end of this year should start the membership negotiations, is lagging behind in the process. Also, due to the failure to provide recognition of its 2008 independence declaration by five EU member states, Kosovo has a "special" treatment compared to the rest of the Western Balkans.[6]

In the third group of countries we can count in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, which are *de facto* stopped in this process

6) Five member states of the European Union – Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain did not recognize Kosovo's independence.

due to numerous internal political problems for a very long time. After the change of power in Skopje this year, it was clear that the process of European integration will gradually accelerate. In connection with this, there are increasingly frequent announcements that Macedonia will soon achieve a "historic" agreement with neighboring Greece regarding its name in international relations. As before, the most serious proposal is the "Republic of Upper Macedonia", which should replace the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". (Smith, 2017)

a) The countries of the Western Balkans which started the negotiations process – Montenegro and Serbia

As already mentioned, Montenegro and Serbia are currently leading in the process of European integration, when we compare the dynamics of this process in the Western Balkans. Moreover, it is evident that these two countries are increasingly standing out from the rest of the region regarding the European integration. Although they started this process together within the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the last decade, the process of accession to the European Union of Montenegro and Serbia has "split out" in the middle of the past decade within the so-called twin track (2004). After the restoration of Montenegrin independence in 2006, this process was formally completely separated.

It should also be noted that the two countries, after restoring their independence, gradually faced certain problems that determined their progress towards membership in the European Union. Montenegro gained the status of a candidate for the EU membership in 2010, and two years later the process of membership negotiations began. However, although the annual progress reports of the European integration process of Montenegro show significant progress, the question remains whether the successful dynamics of the opening of numerous negotiating chapters could be slowed down due to certain "fragile issues". When it comes to Montenegro, these are certainly the fight against organized crime and corruption. (Montenegro 2016 Report: 53-66)

The European Union insisted on these very important issues from the very beginning of the negotiations with Montenegro, and especially within this process, it insisted on the verification of chapters 23 and 24 dealing with the judiciary and fundamental rights, i.e. justice, freedom and security. Although the "Pandora's box" of crime and corruption on the Montenegrin coast (cases in Budva and Bar) has been opened over the past few years, it is obvious that it is still not realistic to expect that the European Union will be fully satisfied with the achieved. Namely, despite the fact that the fight against corruption has begun, there is still no significant progress related to the judicial epilogue of these cases.

On the other hand, it should be noted that Montenegro has achieved an almost absolute level of compliance of its foreign policy with the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. (Montenegro 2016 Report: 80-81) Therefore, this otherwise very fragile issue in the Balkans, primarily because of the strengthening of the influence of certain states such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, still shows that Montenegro has positioned itself as part of the "western hemisphere", as shown by its accession to the restrictive measures of the European Union against Russia during 2014. It should be emphasized that on June 5, 2017, Montenegro became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, which further strengthened its international position as a Western Balkan and Mediterranean country.

Therefore, Montenegro is facing potential problems of the necessity for an even more pronounced fight against corruption, as well as a greater efficiency of the judiciary. A major problem can also be the application of the European environmental legislation (Chapter 27). (Pobjeda, 2015) Also, there are areas of agriculture and rural development (Chapter 11), but also the regional policy (Chapter 22).

The Republic of Serbia gained the status of a candidate in 2012, but the negotiations on membership were conditioned by the already started dialogue between the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade. (Đukanović 2013: 365-385) Namely, unlike the rest of the Western Balkan countries, Serbia is a subject to the normalization of relations with Kosovo under Chapter 35 (Other issues). It is necessary to emphasize once again that the issues related to future relations between Belgrade and Pristina will remain prevalent in the process of European integration. Therefore, in the next period, a completely new dynamics of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo should be expected. First, it is necessary to fully implement everything achieved in the dialogue on the normalization of relations between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina since 2011, and in particular the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, whose foundations were "set up" in 2013 within the framework of the First Agreement Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.

In the forthcoming period, a significant encouragement of the United States and the European Union should be expected in order to speed up the process of the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. (Đorđević 2017) That is why in Serbia was announced an “internal dialogue” about the most sensitive national and in a somewhat identity issue –– the status of Kosovo. At the end of this year, it should result in a new agreement between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina that would improve the process of normalization and more thoroughly determine their own relations in the context of European integration. (B92 2017) Of course, the dynamics of this process will depend not only the position of Serbia, but also Kosovo, in the process of accession.

However, Serbia has another very significant problem in the process of European integration. Namely, since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine and the introduction of the EU sanctions against the Russian Federation, Serbia has not had a satisfactory degree of harmonization of its foreign policy with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (Đukanović 2015: 81-106) It seems that the problem will also have a long-term impact on the occasional slowdown in the process of European integration. For now, this issue seems to have been *ad acta* in some degree, until the intensifying and ending the process of normalization of relations between the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade.

It should be emphasized that Serbia is the only state in the region that has given up the pretensions for the membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. This was done ten years ago due to the NATO engagement in Kosovo at the eve of its proclamation of independence in mid-February 2008. Increasingly, in Serbian public discourse is pointed that it will be more difficult to achieve the membership in the European Union before the country is integrated into NATO. So far, this is shown in the experiences of the Central and Eastern European countries in their accession to the European Union, i.e. the states that joined the Union in 2004, 2007 and 2013.[7] On the scale of the existing foreign policy priorities, this question is conditionally stated only in the third place, i.e. after the normalization of relations between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina, and redefining relations between Serbia and the Russian Federation.

It should be noted that, like Montenegro, Serbia could be faced with the problems related to Chapter 27 – the environment. (Santovac 2017) Significant reforms in this area also imply fairly large investments, but it is not clear whether Serbia, without a significant Union’s assistance, could at all achieve that. There is, therefore, little progress in this field over the past years. In addition, there are problems related to the

7) These are Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.

segment of the "rule of law", i.e. Chapters 23 and 24, in which problems related to judicial reform and significant fighting against organized crime and corruption remain dominant. Namely, at the beginning of this decade, the so-called judicial reforms only further aggravated the situation in this area, and the successful resolution of this situation is not entirely certain in a short period of time. The negotiating Chapter 11 – agriculture and rural development could be a very significant problem for Serbia in the upcoming period, as well.

Although up to now (end of August 2017), Serbia opened 10 out of 35 chapters and temporarily closed 2 chapters, it is nevertheless a significant progress for less than two years. However, in the forthcoming period, everything will primarily depend on (re) defining Belgrade's relations with the status of Kosovo. In this regard, a significant breakthrough in the European integration process could only come in the next calendar year, i.e. after the announced "historic" agreement between the authorities in Belgrade and Pristina. In a wider context, after this the issue of future relations between Serbia and the Russian Federation will be imposed, where it will be necessary to coordinate it with official Brussels views and policies towards Moscow.

b) Albania in anticipation of the beginning of the negotiations and accelerated progress of Kosovo

After a long period of political crisis and disputes, *the Republic of Albania* has emerged from a rather turbulent period. Namely, due to the elections held at the end of this year, the dominance of the Socialist Party of Albania as the most influential political party was confirmed. In mid-2014, Albania gained the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union, but three years later it still did not begin the negotiation process.

Namely, Albania has been often faced with problems related to a set of issues concerning the rule of law. (Albania Progress Report 2016) The judiciary in this country is fairly inefficient, and there is a lack of resolution of very large scandals in the area of corruption and organized crime. It is still not clear when the negotiations on Albania's membership in the European Union will begin, thus it is very difficult to predict the future dynamics of the country's European integration. In the regional context, Albania is expected to influence the stabilization of the situation in its Balkan hinterland, and in particular not to hamper the normalization of relations between the authorities in Pristina and

Belgrade. Also, this country will be expected not to contribute to the radicalization of the Albanian population in neighboring Macedonia, which is also burdened with numerous problems with its neighbors. (Sotirović 2017)

In addition to the numerous initiated reforms, the new Albanian government must fight more decisively against organized crime (primarily drug trafficking), but also make significant efforts to consolidate the internal economic opportunities. Of course, a significant change was made due to the fair and democratic elections in whose organization also participated the representatives of the opposition Democratic Party. Albania's Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has on several occasions expressed an optimistic view that the negotiations on EU membership will start at the end of the current 2017 year. (Xinhua 2017)

Looking ahead in the long-term and after the potential opening of EU membership negotiations, Albania will surely face issues related to Chapters 23 and 24 due to the still insufficiently strong capacity of the judiciary and the existing corruption in this system. Also, Albania, as well as Montenegro and Serbia, are likely to have significant problems related to the European criteria for environmental protection, and above all the possibility of implementing the European legislation in this area. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Albania fully coordinated its activities with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as illustrated by the annual reports on the progress of this country in the process of European integration, which highlights the one hundred percent compliance in the past few years. (Đukanović 2015: 81-106) However, on the other hand, it does not reflect the alignment of Albania's regional (Western Balkans) policy with its neighbors where, in recent years, problems have often been expressed in relations with Serbia and with the neighboring Macedonia primarily because of the status of Albanian communities in these countries. Therefore, Albania's renouncement of the "pan-Albanian" policy, which does not encourage the full integration of Albanians into the neighboring countries, would be very significant.

Two years after the proclamation of independence, at the end of October 2010, *Kosovo* managed to significantly accelerate its European path, i.e. to compensate for the previous backlog. Namely, the priorities of the authorities in Pristina until 2008 were primarily related to the declaration of independence, as well as its recognition by the most influential European and world countries. However, it was precisely at that time that the Feasibility Study was signed. Three years later, at the end of October 2015, Kosovo signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement. It was ratified by the European Parliament in late January

2016 in a very quick procedure. Namely, because of the lack of full recognition of all EU member states in the Stabilization and Association Process, Kosovo has gained a special place or status.

In February 2017, Kosovo's former foreign minister Enver Hoxhaj announced that Kosovo will soon submit a request for membership in the Union. (BalkanPlus 2117) However, there was a parliamentary and political crisis in Kosovo and the elections in June 2017, after which it is still not clear whether the government will be formed from two political groups. On one side is the PAN coalition formed from the representatives of the ruling coalition, while on another side the Self-Determination Movement and the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo lead a fairly Euro-skeptic policy and are not ready to allow the normalization of relations with Belgrade. The Self-Determination Movement has long obstructed the ratification of Kosovo's border with neighboring Montenegro, although the United States and the European Union insisted on it since its signing in August 2015. In particular, the Union considers this issue as a condition for the liberalization of the visa regime for the citizens of Kosovo, which makes them "outcasts" in relation to the rest of the region. New Government led by Ramush Haradinaj was formed in September 9, with support of the Serbian List.

On the other hand, the current President of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, has repeatedly insisted on speeding up the process of normalizing relations with Serbia under the strong influence of the European Union and the United States. In this regard, he has often announced the signing of a legally binding bilateral "agreement on good neighborly relations" between Kosovo and Serbia, which would solve the long-standing problems in the long run, which has not yet been solved through the dialogue started in 2011. (Blic 2017) Raising the level of this dialogue to the level of two presidents will surely give more hope for its successful completion in the coming period. Such an epilogue would certainly contribute to a significant consolidation of the relations in Southeast Europe and would further open the possibility of accelerating the process of European integration in the Western Balkans.

It is very important that the authorities in Kosovo begin to form the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo in accordance with the 2013 Brussels Agreement. Namely, they have so far delayed this in order not to be blamed by the very radical Kosovo opposition, and above all the Self-Determination Movement. This created an additional insecurity among the Kosovo Serbs who are neither ensured what was agreed with the European Union, but also with the official Belgrade. Of course, this process will certainly depend largely on the fact who and how will form the government in Kosovo in the coming period.

If in the long run, we look at the potential challenges of Kosovo in the outbreak of the negotiation process for the membership in the European Union, the inadequate fight against organized crime and corruption, as well as ensuring human rights for non-Albanian communities, primarily Serbian, would surely arise as the main problem. Also, the insufficiently strong institutions of the judiciary, which should be exempted from political influence, could be a significant problem. Of course, Kosovo, like other actors in the Western Balkans region, would certainly have problems with environmental protection. However, the acceleration of the European path of Kosovo should contribute to reducing the evident strengthening of the more radical political options there (primarily the Movement of Self-Determination), but at the same time to contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations, and above all between Albanians and Serbs. The European perspective of Kosovo should also contribute to the improvement of economic opportunities, which are not currently showing positive parameters.

The Kosovo problem was a fuse that began the process of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The dominant Serbian opinion is still not in a position to accept the existing reality, i.e. that there is another political, economic and security system in the greater region of Kosovo, and that all the contours of the authorities of Serbia in the north and in some enclaves of Kosovo actually disappeared after the signing of the Brussels Agreement in April 2013.

c) The prevalence of bilateral disputes and internal issues in relation to the European integration: Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

The course of European integration in the Western Balkans has shown that they can be used in the context of the blackmailing of neighbors regarding certain bilateral issues. So far, this proved to be the case between Slovenia and Croatia about unresolved border issues (border at sea and on land not definitely confirmed after international arbitration in July 2017), as well as between Serbia and Romania when acquiring the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union due to the status of the Vlach minority in 2012. Croatia has also unsuccessfully tried to block Serbia in the opening of some negotiation chapters (23, 24 and 26) by imposing conditions which are actually related to their bilateral relations.[8] But certainly, the most drastic case of this kind is the Greek-Macedonian name dispute, which has been ongoing since 1991. (Shea 2008: 211-277) It stopped Macedonia to join the European Union, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Greece first blocked Macedonia to start the membership negotiations after acquiring the candidate status in November 2005, and at the same time, it prevented the receiving invitations to join NATO at the summit of this organization in Bucharest three years later.

In the previous period of VMRO-DPMNE's rule in Macedonia, it turned out that the authorities in Skopje were not ready to accept numerous proposals of inter-ethnic factors for the new name of the country. This resulted in an internal crisis that threatened to lead to significant escalation, especially in the first half of 2017. VMRO-DPMNE was not ready to leave power in the usual way in Macedonia, which resulted in conflicts in the Macedonian Parliament in late April 2017. However, after the arrival of the US official Hoyt Brian Yee in Skopje in early May 2017, the situation returned to the constitutional frame and a new pro-European government was formed, which has the essential goal of accelerating the Euro-Atlantic and the European integration. (MIA, 2017) The new government of Zoran Zaev, the president of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia, accentuated the successful completion of the process of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Regarding this, there are certain predictions according to which Macedonia will receive an invitation to join NATO during 2018, possibly under the temporary name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". (Đukanović, 2017) In this way, the attempt to enter NATO, which began in the early 1990s, would be successfully completed. This would also strengthen the regional security and mitigate the potential for intra-party conflicts in Macedonia between the more radical members of the Albanian community and representatives of the central authorities, modeled on those that took place in 2000 and 2001.

On the other hand, Macedonia has been blocked regarding the accession to the European Union for a long time. In fact, due to Greece, but also the strengthening of nationalist tendencies in the Macedonia itself over the past decade, its suspension has *de facto* occurred. A recent shift in power in Skopje will, however, make it possible to improve relations with neighboring Greece and the possibility of finding a compromise on the country's name. In this context, two concrete

8) These conditions hampers the comprehensive jurisdictions of the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor's Office, co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the status of Croats in Vojvodina / Serbia.

proposals are currently being made public – the Republic of Upper Macedonia or the Upper Republic of Macedonia.

If and when it comes to opening the negotiations with Brussels regarding the EU membership, Macedonia will certainly predominantly face the problems with the set of "rule of law" issues like other countries in the Western Balkans region. This primarily relates to the fight against corruption and organized crime, judicial reform, and may also raise issues of the status of certain minorities, primarily Bulgarian in Macedonia. Although on August 1, 2017, Macedonia with Bulgaria signed an agreement on good neighborly and friendly relations, it is not a guarantee that the issue will be easily removed from the list of Sofia's official priorities. (Reuters 2017) The issue of the status of its minority has already been emphasized several times by the official Tirana, but when it comes to joining of Macedonia to NATO, Tirana will condition the completion of this process by the utter implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (2001). (Vesti 2015)

Unlike Macedonia, whose main problem in the process of European integrations was tied to relations with Greece for a long time, *Bosnia and Herzegovina* is lagging behind on this path due to a very divided political system. Namely, three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) and their representatives, as well as two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska) cannot reach a minimum consensus on how to improve and accelerate the path towards full membership in the European Union. It seems that occasionally Bosniak, but also the Serbian elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have largely ignored the European integration under various external influences. On the one hand, the Republic of Turkey also faced with a marathon long and uncertain process of European integration, affects the Bosniak political elite (primarily the Party of Democratic Action of BiH) to speak about this process more declaratively than to substantially and successfully end it. Also, for the past 22 years since the signing of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, Bosniak political parties expected that the structure of the state would fundamentally change and completely return to unitary compliance before the outbreak of armed conflict in 1992. The Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, expected an additional "loosening" of the Bosnia and Herzegovina framework and strengthening of its own integration. The current president of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, often mentions the possibility of holding a referendum on the "state-legal" status of this entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (ATV 2017) At this moment, the leadership of the Republic of Srpska is more reliant on preserving the constant support it receives from the Russian Federation, while the last year's referendum on the Republic of Srpska Day (January 9th) held in September 2016 was highly disputed by the Republic Serbia.[9]

The leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Croats, although already demographically rather weakened, as shown by a comparative overview of the results of the 2013 census and the pre-war census from 1991, in the acceleration of European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina see the possibility to link additionally with the Republic of Croatia. This preoccupation of the three ethnic national elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina with its own "national" interests only blocks the possibility of accelerating the European integration of the entire state in the long run. Even with a strong diplomatic initiative (German-British plan from November 2014) to accelerate European integration, with the undoubted internal blockade of this process a substantial progress has failed. (Balkan Insight 2014)

Despite the defrosting of the Stabilization and Association Agreement of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the European Union on June 1, 2015, which was signed in February 2008, a substantial progress was not achieved. However, the submission of a candidacy for membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the EU followed in mid-February 2016. But due to the internal blockade of the European integration process, BiH did not submit a completed questionnaire preceding the approval of the candidate status. Namely, the Republic of Srpska and the state authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not agree on certain activities related to the above questionnaire. Similarly was repeated at the Trieste Western Balkan Summit, which was held in mid-July 2017, when the Republic of Srpska challenged the entry of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Transport Community of South-East Europe. (Al Jazeera Balkans, 2017)

At the beginning of February 2016, a mechanism for coordinating the European integration was established in a very complex state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the Republic of Srpska entity has been challenging it for a very long time, thus it was modified at the beginning of August 2016. Nevertheless, this also did not create realistic assumptions for the acceleration of Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to the European Union. Two earlier very intense attempts to amend the 1995 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the April package

9) This referendum was organized on the basis of a decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina challenging this date as discriminatory. However, this referendum did not have the support of the United States and the European Union, and Serbia also showed significant reserves.

of constitutional reforms of 2006 and the Butmir Package of 2009) failed to harmonize the views of the leading political and ethno national factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina to change the set of issues related to the coordination of activities concerning the country's accession to the European Union. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still far from the possibility of similar constitutional audits.

Otherwise, the highly complex and multi-stranded bureaucratic apparatus in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also monitors the dysfunction of state power structures, only further complicates the process of European integrations. This is confirmed by the inability to reach consensus within such a state structure on very important issues. This implies, in the first place, the additional consultations of the cantons within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then two BiH entities (Federation of BiH and the Republic of Srpska), and then additionally with the state level of government. Only after completing such a complex procedure Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state can communicate with the official institutions of the European Union "in one voice".

The progress in the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the coming period will depend primarily on the further strengthening of the influence of the Russian Federation and Turkey in this country. If it does not weaken, any progress will be hard to imagine. Both Russia and Turkey, due to their influence on the leadership of the Republic of Srpska and the Bosniak political elite, are trying to re-position themselves much wider, i.e. in the Western Balkans. A potential case of Croatia's blockade of the European integration of neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be diminished. Croatia showed that it was capable of this when it launched the issue of "traditional trade" on the eve of the submission of the candidacy for membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[10] At the same time, one should bear in mind that similar can happen by transposing certain bilateral issues between the two countries – Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – such as the undefined borders, but also the so-called Croatian issue within the Dayton political system. The official Zagreb has often pointed to the necessity of "ethno-federalization" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which implies to a certain extent the revival of plans for the establishment of the so-called Croatian „Third entity" or the restoration of the war formed creation of the so-called Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosnia (1992–1994).

10) Croatia, after joining the European Union, demanded that certain quotas of duty-free imports of products of animal and plant products be imported. This has jeopardized a large number of manufacturers from Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Al Jazeera, 2015)

In the long-term context, when Bosnia and Herzegovina secures the status of candidate for membership in the European Union, as well as most Western Balkan countries, it will face problems related to the set of issues of the "rule of law", i.e. the more efficient judiciary. Of course, within these issues, the systematic fight against corruption and organized crime will also be actualized. Like the rest of the countries in the region, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not able to accelerate the implementation of environmental standards.

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, having in mind the internal non-conformity of legal regulations, a number of negotiating chapters that can be labeled as "technical" (e.g. taxes, statistics, financial regulations, etc.) could be a problem. That is why the prediction of the duration of Bosnia and Herzegovina's potential negotiations with the European Union regarding the membership is very ungrateful.

Conclusion

The prediction of any development of events in the Balkan is often a very difficult and ungrateful endeavour. This was particularly obvious at the end of the 20th century in these areas. That is why it is not an easy task to give any reliable prediction of what will happen in the Western Balkans over the next ten years. Any long-term absence of the Western Balkans' attachment to the European mainstream, i.e. the European Union will result in a significant instability. Namely, a region that is so divided and in which there is still a considerable distance between the dominant spheres of societies, as well as political elites, can only progress if it is "embedded" in the most important economic and political flows in Europe.

Needless to say, the European Union itself faces a number of problems. Only its further strengthening and transformation into an enhanced institutional structure can respond to the numerous challenges of time. Of course, it cannot rest on the (crypto) hegemony of only one state, but it still needs to rely on the broader circle of states. At this moment, it is obvious that this will be done by the "three" – the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy. Naturally, for such a development, the question arises as to what will happen to the countries of the so-called New Europe, that is, primarily the countries of Central Europe, which are increasingly prepared to expand the existing cooperation frameworks within the Visegrad Group and strengthen their additional integration with the Danube regional component.

In this sense, it is also possible that certain "border" countries of the Western Balkans, and above all Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the perspective find their surroundings in the midst of the geostrategic estimates of the leading countries of this Central European region (as well as Austria and Hungary).

On the other hand, leaving the Western Balkans to the strengthened influence of Russia or Turkey could lead to the new instability if one bears in mind the traditionally unbalanced relations between Moscow and Ankara towards the countries of the region and the peoples of the Western Balkans. The efforts of certain European countries, primarily the Federal Republic of Germany, to strengthen the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries within the Berlin Process since 2014, show a certain deficit of potential progress, i.e. insufficient prospects of improving the rather intricate bilateral relations. (Đukanović, Krstić 2016, 169-185) Moreover, the results of this initiative are becoming less visible from year to year, but they are reduced to certain issues which to some extent do not reflect the complexity of the Western Balkan political agenda.[11]

At the same time, re-shifting the focus of the topics in the Western Balkans from political to almost dominant economic themes (e.g. infrastructure and development projects) is not enough to calm the situation in the region. Namely, over the past half century, it has not been possible to focus on economic problems in this part of Europe, bearing in mind the enchantment of local societies and political elites with ethnonationalism and the so-called "unresolved" national issues. In other words, only the urgent focusing of the empowered European Union on the Western Balkans and strengthening of the prospect of their membership, after the ending of Brexit, can contribute to the stabilization and modernization of the countries in the region.

According to some ideas, this scenario should not be based on favoring only one Western Balkan state and the demonstration of good examples of Europeanization in this part of Europe, but essentially on a broad impartial observation of the Western Balkans as a region that shares a common human history and has many similar features. At the same time, this should not involve a substantial change of the existing individual approach within the Stabilization and Association Process,

11) Like the constant emphasis on the establishment of the Regional Youth Cooperation Office of the Western Balkans – RYCO, which in 2016 has its headquarters in Tirana. Namely, this office is essential for better understanding among young people in the Western Balkan region, but its establishment was actually marked as the most important meeting point in Paris, which was organized in 2016 under the Berlin Process.

but in a certain way a greater respect for the particular "weak points" of these countries in the process of European integration. Namely, each of the Western Balkan countries has just a certain degree of issues that slow them down along the way towards the membership in the European Union. There was a lot to say about it in the second part of our work. For Serbia, for example, the matter of relations with the authorities in Pristina and the relations with the Russian Federation are one of the most significant obstacles. On the other hand, when it comes to Montenegro, it is the fight against organized crime and corruption, i.e. a set of problems concerning the rule of law. Bosnia and Herzegovina is burdened in the process of European integration by insufficient development of the institutional capacity to take up obligations in the context of accession to the Union, etc. In a certain way, strengthening the institutions of the European Union and their competencies in the coming period could compensate for particular problems of individual countries in the region due to the introduction of potentially new and, moreover, sharper sanctions for the member states and the candidates for membership deterring from the commitments. In this way, in fact, there would be significant opportunities for Brussels to have a more intensive influence on the Western Balkans through much stronger conditionality.

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Attitudes and Happiness in Serbia[2]

Abstract

The Annual Attitude Examination Survey consisting of 366 questions was deployed on nationally representative sample in Serbia to get 2608 valid inputs on the Oxford Happiness Inventory and Multiple Lickert scale questions concerning attitudes, fears, media use and closeness of different social categories to the participants. Research results confirm that happiness is affected by certain attitudes and characteristics of research participants such as those indicating openness to new experiences, being people loving, optimistic, positive, future and present focused, knowledge oriented, relaxed, creative, helping, just and empathetic. This is the first happiness research in Serbia. Future inquiries of this kind should be moved towards the Internet as a source of continuous data.

Key words: Happiness, Attitudes, Personality, Serbia, Personal Philosophy, Relationships, Empathy, Society

1. Introduction

Happiness has been significant topic of substantial and ongoing scientific inquiries. Despite extensive focus of various researchers from different countries, happiness has not been the matter of scientific inquiry in Serbia. This may have been a mistake, because by conducting this kind of research it may be possible to direct individuals and society as a whole towards happier, healthier and more fulfilled lives. International researchers have grasped happiness, unhappiness, positive and

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negative affect, subjective well-being, and psychological well-being as areas to their interest. On this line, previous research endeavors have been exploring demographic, socio-economic and personality variables through prism of happiness. Previous research endeavors have established the most significant correlations between happiness on one side and extraversion and neuroticism on another side. Other personality traits such as openness to experience and agreeableness have also shown correlations to happiness.

In an early research done by Costa & McCrae (1980) sociability and fear are found to correlate with happiness, being aspects of temperament. Negative Affect Scale, Positive Affect Scale and Affect Balance Scale are used in measurement to conclude that extraversion and neuroticism are correlated with the three measures of happiness such as hopelessness, personal security and Life Satisfaction Index (Costa, McCrae 1980). These researchers find 11 out to the 12 correlations statistically significant.

In more recent period, McCann (2014) found more happy tweets in American states with lower levels of resident neuroticism. With intention to use Twitter as data source and previous findings about levels of Big Five personality traits in USA states, McCann combines analysis of over 10 million location tagged tweets to find higher strengths of correlations between happy twits and levels of neuroticism. However, levels of other personality traits such as openness, extraversion, conscientiousness and agreeableness showed no relation to state levels to the happiness of tweet content. In his untypical analysis McCann uses state socioeconomic status, white population percent, and urban population percent as statistical controls.

Another research inquiry finds neuroticism negatively related to happiness and on the other hand openness and extraversion positively related to it (Furnham, Petrides 2003). Measured of trait emotional intelligence, personality, happiness and cognitive ability were completed by participants in research of Furnham and Petrides. Cognitive ability was found unrelated to happiness. Interestingly, Furnham and Petrides highlighted that research inquiries in the past have been mainly examined relation of anxiety, depression , emotional disorders and traits, while happiness was neglected.

Spangler and Palrecha (2004) combine measures of hedonic well being (pleasure and pain) and eudaimonic well-being (self-actualization) on one side and extraversion, neuroticism and personal strivings on another. Researchers use a sample of 271 students. They conclude extraversion and neuroticism are related to hedonic factors of well being. Their examination could not find correlations with eudaimonic well-being. In conclusion authors argue that main problem is methodology they used. Research of well-being is confusing because of how hedonic and eudaimonic views are defined and measured (Spangler, Palrecha 2004: 1201).

Subjective experience of happiness or subjective well-being is examined by Lu, Shih, Lin and Ju (1997) who summarized different approaches towards happiness research. In one concept, happiness is examined as a trait, which depends from personality in great extent meaning it is present in similar extent through life (Lu, Shih, Lin, Ju 1997: 453). Other approach includes life events as important factors in determining levels of happiness. Again, it is shown that some life events relate to personalities of people that encounter them(Headey, Wearing 1989). Study of Lu, Shih, Lin and Ju combined personality and life events model to research happiness in Taiwan. Through newly developed general measure of happiness to the Chinese people and participation of 494 residents Kaohsiung city in Taiwan these researchers have shown that social support was an important mediator, which had the strongest association with happiness.

Three measures on happiness and Five Factory Inventory were completed by 111 persons to conclude that extraversion and neuroticism best predicted scores on the Oxford Happiness Inventory (Hayes, Joseph 2003: 726). On the other hand, in this research conscientiousness was found to correlate with life satisfaction, which is claimed to be the most important contribution of this research inquiry. Personality was found to account for between 32 and 56 % of variance in subjective well-being, write Hayes and Joseph.

Validation of happiness inventory and confirmatory evidence of previous research has been achieved by Furnham and Brewin (1990) in a research that encompassed over 100 participants and confirmed positive correlation between happiness and extraversion and negative correlation between happiness and neuroticism. They conclude extraversion accounts for about 30% to the variance in happiness. Probably neuroticism, economic circumstances and personal relationships account for the other 70%, (Furnham, Brewin 1990: 1096).

Cheng and Furnham (2003) examine causes of happiness and depression in population of adolescents. They include the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale, Affect Balance Scale, Beck Depression Inventory, and Oxford Happiness Inventory in their research inquiry to find out self-esteem and relationship with parents had a predictive power on happiness and the opposite relationship with depression. On the other hand extraversion and neuroticism predicted happiness and depression through self-esteem (Cheng, Furnham 2003: 937). Researcher also concluded that happiness and depression were far from identical or mirror images of one another and that leisure was the direct predictor of happiness but was not the predictor of depression.

According to above presented research findings the following questions and hypotheses related to some personality traits such as extraversion, openness to experience and agreeableness are being posed in this inquiry.

Question 1. What is the relationship between stands about personal life philosophy and happiness?

Hypothesis 1. The following statements will be positively correlated with happiness: "There is so much to be learned and I always try to increase my knowledge and learn something new"; "I am primarily focused on future, as I have big plans and expectations without regard to past or what is happening in present time"; "I am very stable and cool and it is almost impossible to shake me and make me angry"; "I live in present time, while trying to make most out of every second of my life and not caring much about past or future"; "I cannot be satisfied no matter what I achieve, because I know I can get more and do better and I always work on it"; "My guiding principle is: never in a hurry to whatever destination it may be and never in a worry whatever the cause might be"; and "I always have so many ideas in my mind in terms of what should be done, so much that I do not have time to realize those ideas and it looks it to me as if day is too short".

Hypothesis 2. The following statements will be unrelated with happiness: "I tend to be moving at all times, because I don't feel comfortable being static"; "I have never had any big goals: I work as much as I can and hopefully there will always be enough assets to make a living"; "There is God or some higher force that we must account to for good or bad that we are doing or for what we have done"; and "While I am interested in past, tradition and historic figures I am not interested in present and future".

Question 2. What is the relationship between stands about other people and happiness?

Hypothesis 3. The following statements will be positively correlated with happiness: "I am amongst persons who always fight for justice for myself and others until the end, without any regard for consequences"; "Man is often faced with envy and hatred of other people, but if he is people loving, good and just person, love always wins at the end"; "I love to help others";

Hypothesis 4. The following statements will be negatively correlated with happiness: "World is unjust no matter how much one seeks justice, because injustice always wins at the end"; "People are evil by their nature, no matter how much somebody is trying to be good and people loving, when everything is accounted, hatred wins at the end, despite everything"; "I look after myself and my own interests only"; "I think individual cannot fulfill justice, so I do not try to make it for myself or others".

Hypothesis 5. The following statements will be unrelated with happiness: „Troubles of other people and injustices done to them hit me hard like they are done to me"; „I tend to mind my own business not caring much about troubles of other people, especially if they are not too close to me"; „It is not my business if other people love or hate each other, fight or make peace, because I mind my own business"; „Man is always faced with different misfortunes and unjust situations, but despite that justice always wins at the end"; „I have no nerves to talk with people who think differently about some important topics"; „I can listen to anyone and express my opinion, despite the fact our attitudes are extremely different"; „I am very nervous and I am easy to get out of tact when somebody make me crazy"; and „I love being better than others"; „I feel well when others feel well".

Question 3. What is the relationship between attitudes about society and happiness?

Hypothesis 6. The following statements will be positively correlated with happiness: "How much are you satisfied with current situation in the country?"; "Individual should take responsibility in his hands for himself and his family"; "We need to execute speedy and deep reforms in order to overcome crisis and recover economy to the country despite some parts to the society would become poorer than they were before the reforms"; "Increasing taxes for successful businessmen would disincentive both the most productive part of society and the foreign investors as well, therefore slowing down economic development, decreasing employment and decreasing development of whole society"; "Current labor laws are securing right amount of workers inclusion in decision making process about their wages, security of workplace and work conditions"; and "Increasing expenditures for health would be overwhelming for the budget, therefore decreasing economic growth and endangering wages of labor".

Hypothesis 7. The following statements will be unrelated to happiness: "Privatization needs to be limited only for companies that were owned by society, while public companies such as oil sector, telecommunications infrastructure and energy corporation should be owned by state in major percentage"; "Complete privatization needs to be conducted, including public companies"; "State should ensure free education at all levels for those students that fulfill standards such as taking classes and passing exams"; and "Current education policies of state in terms of free education are the right measure in order not to be overwhelming for the budget and not to interfere with development to the country".

2. Method

2.1 Subjects

The Attitude Examination Survey has been conducted by TNS Medium Gallup - Public Opinion, Market and Media Research Company from Belgrade in collaboration with the University of Megatrend in November of 2009. This annual survey consists of 366 questions placed into the following sections: Daily Activities, Attitudes and Statements, Satisfaction, Emotions and Values, Relationship with Others, Media, Society and Politics, Household and Demographics.

Interviewing was done by students of the Faculty for Culture and Media. They had an assignment to interview citizens as a part to their Media Analytics course. Students conducted face-to-face surveys. The response rate to the interviews was 75%. An average interview lasted 25 min. The sample included cities such as Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis and rural areas. Coordinators to the research received 2966 inputs from the students. After filtering, multistage random sample of 2608 subjects was considered valid. This sample was representative for general Serbian population older than 15 years of age.

2.2 Procedure

The sample is formed in three steps: first, sample points are randomly chosen without replacement, from the lists of voting stations (Branković 2014). Second: Statistical database of voting places is used as a source for selecting sample points. Selection is conducted randomly, with probability of selecting that is proportional to the share of a given sample point in the total number of adult population. Ten respondents in each sample point are chosen. In the second and third stages participants are chosen at random and systematically. The following procedure of choosing of participants was implemented: the interviewer would start from a initial point, randomly determined by local supervisor from maps and street lists. Going up from the given home number, interviewer enters every 2nd household (household is defined as all persons living in the flat or in a house). In the household, interviewer chooses individual older than 15 years of age whose birthday is closest to the day of discussion. If the chosen respondent is not available at the moment to the first visit, the interviewer schedules next appointment (on different time and day). In the case of denial, the interviewer would enter the next household.

2.3 Measurements

Data came from several questionnaires/scales. Each participant was assured to the confidentiality to the investigation and subsequently received a booklet containing the following questionnaires which they were asked to complete.

Main personal background of survey participants was recorded, such as age, gender, marital status, levels of income and education.

Participants also completed the 30-item Oxford Happiness Inventory (OHI: Argyle, Martin, & Crossland, 1989) which is similar to the Beck Depression Inventory, showing test-retest

reliability of (r = -0.78) and a of between 0.64 and 0.87.

Multiple Lickert scale self-report inventory questions were employed to access attitudes, fears, media use and closeness of social categories to the participants.

2.4 Statistical procedures

SPSS was used to analyze data. The two main tools of this statistical software were employed. First, Pearson correlations were calculated to examine significance and strength of relationships between happiness and items of interest. After that, multiple regressions were used to examine these relationships in more detail and provide final conclusions

2.5 Survey questions

Given the fact that happiness levels were brought into relationship with answers to survey questions that measure some aspects of personality in a broader way, list of questions used in the survey is presented below.

2.5.1 Personal philosophy

Question Z7 is: Could you please answer for if each statement describes yourself: 1.if is completely incorrect; 2, if it is mainly incorrect; 3.if it is partially incorrect and partially correct; 4.if it is mainly correct; and 5.if it is completely correct. Statements include the following: 1.I always have so many ideas in my mind in terms of what should be done, so much that I do not have time to realize those ideas and it looks it to me as if day is too short; 2.My guiding principle is: never in a hurry to whatever destination it may be and never in a worry whatever the cause might be; 3.I tend to be moving at all times, because I don't feel comfortable being static; 4.I cannot be satisfied no matter what I achieve, because I know I can get more and do better and I always work on it; 5.I have never had any big goals: I work as much as I can and hopefully there will always be enough assets to make a living; and 6.There is so much to be learned and I always try to increase my knowledge and learn something new.

Question S1 is: could you please grade in what extent each of listed statements is applicable to you, or in other words how much each to these statements describe you personally? Grade answers on scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means this statement is not applicable to you at all, while on the other hand 5 means the statement relates to you completely or in other words describes you correctly. You can choose any to the grades, from 1 to 5. Statements are as follows: 7.I live in present time, while trying to make most out of every second of my life and not caring much about past or future; 15.There is God or some higher force that we must account to for good or bad that we are doing or for what we have done; 16.While I am interested in past, tradition and historic figures I am not interested in present and future; 19.I am very stable and cool and it is almost impossible to shake me and make me angry; and 21.I am primarily focused on future, as I have big plans and expectations without regard to past or what is happening in present time;

2.5.2 Relationship towards other people and empathy

Question S1 is: could you please grade in what extent each of listed statements is applicable to you, or in other words how much each to these statements describe you personally? Grade answers on scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means this statement is not applicable to you at all, while on the other hand 5 means the statement relates to you completely or in other words describes you correctly. You can choose any to the grades, from 1 to 5. Statements are as follows: 1.Troubles of other people and injustices done to them hit me hard like they are done to me; 2.I am very upset when I see hate between people, while I am happy when I see people loving each other; 3.I tend to mind my own business not caring much about troubles of other people, especially if they are not too close to me; 4.It is not my business if other people love or hate each other, fight or make peace, because I mind my own business; 5.I think individual cannot fulfill justice, so I do not try to make it for myself or others; 6.Man is always faced with different misfortunes and unjust situations, but despite that justice always wins at the end; 8.I am amongst persons who always fight for justice for myself and others until the end, without any regard for consequences; 10.Man is often faced with envy and hatred of other people, but if he is people loving, good and just person, love always wins at the end; 9.I have no nerves to talk with people who think differently about some important topics; 11.I can listen to anyone and express my opinion, despite the fact our attitudes are extremely different; 12.I am very nervous and I am easy to get out of tact when somebody make me crazy; 13.People are evil by their nature, no matter how much somebody is trying to be good and people loving, when everything is accounted, hatred wins at the end, despite everything; 14.I love to help others; 17.World is unjust no matter how much one seeks justice, because injustice always wins at the end; 18.I look after myself and my own interests only; and 20.I love being better than others; 22.I feel well when others feel well.

2.5.3 Attitudes about society

Question Z3 is: how much are you satisfied with current situation in the country? Possible answers include: 1. I am very unsatisfied; 2. I am mainly unsatisfied; 3. I am partially unsatisfied and partially satisfied; 4. I am mainly satisfied; and 5. I am very satisfied.

Question DP1 is: we present you some confronting thoughts about what could be done in order to improve our state system and change things towards better direction. Compare each to these sets of statements and grade them from 1 to 5 depending which statement is closer to your opinion. Choose 1 if left statement is very close to your opinion; choose 5 if right statement is very close to your opinion; or choose one of numbers between 1 and 5 depending if left or right statement is closer to your opinion. Statements are as follows: 1.1 State should take care of each individual helping him make a living; 1.2 Individual should take responsibility in his hands for himself and his family; 2.1 We need to execute economic reforms very carefully and cautiously In order to prevent deprivation of some parts of society despite the fact this would slow down overcoming crisis and economic recovery to the country; 2.2 We need to execute speedy and deep reforms in order to overcome crisis and recover economy to the country despite some parts to the society would become poorer than they were before the reforms; 3.1 Taxes should be increased for wealthy people in the society in order to increase lowest pensions and salaries and help poor and deprived families and individuals; 3.2 Increasing taxes for successful businessmen would disincentive both the most productive part of society and the foreign investors as well, therefore slowing down economic development, decreasing employment and decreasing development of whole society; 4.1 Privatization needs to be limited only for companies that were owned by society, while public companies such as oil sector, telecommunications infrastructure and energy corporation should be owned by state in major percentage; 4.2 Complete privatization needs to be conducted, including public companies; 5.1Labor should be included in decision making process more than they are now, especially in terms of wages, security of workplace, work conditions, no matter if they are employed by domestic, foreign, private or state companies; 5.2 Current labor laws are securing right amount of workers inclusion in decision making process about their wages, security of workplace and work conditions; 6.1 State should ensure free education at all levels for those students that fulfill standards such as taking classes and passing exams; 6.2 Current education policies of state in terms of free education are the right measure in order not to be overwhelming for the budget and not to interfere with development to the country; 7.1 Healing serious illnesses must be free and available to all, no matter if person in question has health insurance; and 7.2 Increasing expenditures for health would be overwhelming for the budget, therefore decreasing economic growth and endangering wages of labor.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 Personal philosophy

Significant positive correlations of weak strength have been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: Z7/6 in relation to the statement "There is so much to be learned and I always try to increase my knowledge and learn something new" ($r=.195$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2406$), S1/21 in relation to the statement "I am primarily focused on future, as I have big plans and expectations without regard to past or what is happening in present time" ($r=.146$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2406$), S1/19 in relation to the statement "I am very stable and cool and it is almost impossible to shake me and make me angry" (r=.132, p≤.000, n=2406), S1/7 in relation to the statement "I live in present time, while trying to make most out of every second of my life and not caring much about past or future" (r=.131, p≤.000, n=2399), Z7/4 in relation to the statement "I cannot be satisfied no matter what I achieve, because I know I can get more and do better and I always work on it" (r=.130, p≤.000, n=2407), Z7/2 in relation to the statement "My guiding principle is: never in a hurry to whatever destination it may be and never in a worry whatever the cause might be" (r=.108, p≤.000, n=2407) and Z7/1 in relation to the statement "I always have so many ideas in my mind in terms of what should be done, so much that I do not have time to realize those ideas and it looks it to me as if day is too short" (r=.106, p≤.000, n=2407).

Significant correlations have not been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: Z7/3 in relation to the statement "I tend to be moving at all times, because I don't feel comfortable being static", Z7/5 in relation to the statement "I have never had any big goals: I work as much as I can and hopefully there will always be enough assets to make a living", S1/15 in relation to the statement "There is God or some higher force that we must account to for good or bad that we are doing or for what we have done" and S1/16 in relation to the statement "While I am interested in past, tradition and historic figures I am not interested in present and future". Answers on questions relating to personal philosophy and happiness are presented on Figure 1.



Figure. 1 Feeling of happiness (OHI) is correlated to certain kinds of personal philosophy stands. Survey answers on OHI, Z7/1, Z7/2, Z7/4, Z7/6, S1/7, S1/19 and S1/21 are presented as stacked line graph in which number of answers is presented on Y axis, while answers (1 to 5) are presented on X axis.

3.2 Relationship towards other people and empathy

Significant positive correlations of weak strength have been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: S1/10 in relation to the statement "Man is often faced with envy and hatred of other people, but if he is people loving, good and just person, love always wins at the end" (r=.111, p≤.000, n=2406), S1/14 in relation of statement "I love to help others" (r=.106, p≤.000, n=2404), S1/8 in relation of statement "I am amongst persons who always fight for justice for myself and others until the end, without any regard for consequences" (r=.101, p≤.000, n=2406).



Figure. 2 Feeling of happiness (OHI) is correlated to stands in terms of relationship towards other people. Survey answers on OHI, S1/2, S1/8, S1/10 and S1/14 are presented as stacked line graph in which number of answers are presented on Y axis, while answers (1 to 5) are presented on X axis.

Significant negative correlations of weak strength have been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: S1/17 in relation of statement "World is unjust no matter how much one seeks justice, because injustice always wins at the end" and feeling of happiness (r=-.183, p≤.000, n=2405), S1/13 in relation of statement "People are evil by their nature, no matter how much somebody is trying to be good and people loving, when everything is accounted, hatred wins at the end, despite everything" (r=-.128, p≤.000, n=2406), S1/18 in relation of statement "I look after myself and my own interests only" (r=-.103, p≤.000, n=2406) and S1/5 in relation of statement "I think individual cannot fulfill justice, so I do not try to make it for myself or others" (r=-.100, p≤.000, n=2406).



Figure. 3 Feeling of happiness (OHI) is correlated to stands in terms of relationship towards other people. Survey answers on OHI, S1/18, S1/17, S1/13 and S1/5 are presented as stacked line graph in which number of answers are presented on Y axis, while answers (1 to 5) are presented on X axis.

Significant correlations have not been found between OHI and the following variables: S1/1 in relation of statement "Troubles of other people and injustices done to them hit me hard like they are done to me", S1/3 in relation of statement "I tend to mind my own business not caring much about troubles of other people, especially if they are not too close to me", S1/4 in relation of statement "It is not my business if other people love or hate each other, fight or make peace, because I mind my own business", S1/6 in relation of statement "Man is always faced with different misfortunes and unjust situations, but despite that justice always wins at the end", S1/9 in relation of statement "I have no nerves to talk with people who think differently about some important topics", S1/11 in relation of statement "I can listen to anyone and express my opinion, despite the fact our attitudes are extremely different", S1/12 in relation of statement "I am very nervous and I am easy to get out of tact when somebody make me crazy", S1/20 in relation of statement "I love being better than others", S1/22 in relation of statement "I feel well when others feel well". Answers on questions relating to relationship towards other people and happiness are presented on Figure 2.

3.3 Attitudes about society

Significant positive correlations of weak strength have been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: Z3 in relation to the question "how much are you satisfied with current situation in the country" ($r=.184$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2407$), DP1/2 in relation to the statement "We need to execute speedy and deep reforms in order to overcome crisis and recover economy to the country despite some parts to the society would become poorer than they were before the reforms" ($r=.157$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2407$), DP1/1 in relation to the statement "Individual should take responsibility in his hands for himself and his family" ($r=.118$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2407$), DP1/7 in relation to the statement "Increasing expenditures for health would be overwhelming for the budget, therefore decreasing economic growth and endangering wages of labor" ($r=.108$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2405$), DP1/3 in relation to the statement "Increasing taxes for successful businessmen would disincentive both the most productive part of society and the foreign investors as well, therefore slowing down economic development, decreasing employment and decreasing development of whole society" ($r=.105$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2407$) and DP1/5 in relation to the statement "Current labor laws are securing right amount of workers inclusion in decision making process about their wages, security of workplace and work conditions" ($r=.104$, $p\leq.000$, $n=2407$).

Significant correlations have not been found between feeling of happiness (OHI) and the following variables: DP1/4 in relation of statements 1: "Privatization needs to be limited only for companies that were owned by society, while public companies such as oil sector, telecommunications infrastructure and energy corporation should be owned by state in major percentage" and statement 2: "Complete privatization needs to be conducted, including public companies", DP1/6 in relation of statements 1: "State should ensure free education at all levels for those students that fulfill standards such as taking classes and passing exams" and statement 2: "Current education policies of state in terms of free education are the right measure in order not to be overwhelming for the budget and not to interfere with development to the country". Answers on questions relating to attitudes about society and happiness are presented on Figure 3.



Figure. 4 Feeling of happiness (OHI) is correlated to some attitudes about society. Survey answers on OHI, Z3, DP1/1, DP1/2, DP1/3, DP1/5 and DP1/7 are presented as stacked line graph in which number of answers are presented on Y axis, while answers (1 to 5) are presented on X axis.

4. Conclusion

All hypotheses of this research are confirmed. It may be possible to conclude that those open to new experiences, people loving, optimistic, positive, future and present focused, knowledge oriented, relaxed, creative, helping, just and empathetic are happier than others. These research findings may pose as helpful hints or "recipes" for happiness on individual level.

It may be interested to highlight the fact that more expressive activities are connected to happiness. This goes along the international findings on this matter which relate happiness on one side and increased extroversion, decreased neuroticism, increased openness to experience and increased agreeableness. These common results do not mean much if we overlook the ones connecting strong social component and happiness. The explanation to the fact that happier people are those with strong ties to family and friends might be depth and quality in those relationships which basically means high expressivity. This may be compared to previous finding about the media addiction claiming the highest levels of dependence to newer when compared to older media. Internet may be more expressive because it employs more senses than TV, radio and press and therefore that may be the reason it is the most addictive. Decrease in expression and reception potential towards non-proffered media may be caused by substitution of more expressive activities, such as direct communication with less expressive activities such as Internet communication (Bojic, Marie, Brankovic 2013: 366). Thus the reason why extraversion is correlated with happiness may be that family and social interactivity mean high expressivity.

This research is significant because it is the first of this kind in Serbia. Despite the fact that many international researchers drew conclusion on several different levels about happiness, Serbian colleagues used to neglect this topic.

Although results of this inquiry indicate relationship of happiness to personality traits, future research endeavors should use similar measurements to the ones used by international researchers in the past in order to draw parallels more accurately. In other words, limitation of this research may be in deployed measures which should be the same one used in previous inquiries.

At the same time, more research of online social networks posts should be done in order to see how positive and negative emotions fluctuate in different countries, through the day and in relation to weather parameters.

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Emotional Spatiality and Critical Geography of the Balkans[1]

Abstract

Over the past thirty years the analysis of the Balkan discourse have been raised issues on spatial and symbolic distribution of the affects. Today, the subdiscipline of emotional spatiality provides a new insights into the link between the political, economic and social status of Southeastern Europe and representations that imply affects. Taking into account the knowledge which comes from imagology and postcolonial critics, new question arise: "What is the role of representation in the creation of emotional geography and vice versa.?" Namely, these seemingly different and somewhat opposed approaches which are resistant to essentialism, outline a number of key issues which are present in the text on the Balkans. These approaches were exposed and analyzed to indicate the silent presence of emotional geography in earlier studies of the Balkans, and to point out the possibility of their comprehensive application in the future.

Key words: emotional spatiality, critical geography, Balkan studies, space / place, affects, exclusion / inclusion.

1. Discourse Analysis and Human Geographies

Almost thirty years after the early imagological, postcolonial and other anti-essentialist efforts, problems linked to the so called Balkan studies, were presented as unsolvable, while disciplines and subdisciplines initiated by these researches were criticized for their obscure language, reductive character and constructionism. Academic optimism that emerged at the beginning of the first decade of the third millennium has been replaced by a critical tone sent to the account of previous contributions in the area of Balkan studies. At first, the enthusiastic

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phase reveals that the academic circles shared a belief that political and economic crises are over, while the deconstruction of the text on Balkan, and especially on post - Yugoslav space, would end the cultural trauma, heal the emotional wounds, and replace the unpleasant memories with new and peaceful solutions. Despite hopes, researchers have faced no bright social future. Discourse analyisis was understood as an academic practice which remains closed in its own space of deconstruction while using postmodern terminology and disabling the comprehensive understanding of the relationship between representation and the social problems. Today, the understanding of the Balkan as an essentialization, construct or insufficiently defined geography requires co-operation of studies that could complement, clarify and make visible the problem of the reality of imaginary and concealing of the real problem. One of them could be critical geography (Agnew 2005: 81-96). Its subdiscipline, spatial emotionality enables analysis of discourses about the Balkans in order to question individual and collective traumas expressed in feelings of fear, shame, guilt, belonging and intimacy. They are organized around different cultural practices. All of them are inscribed into space, both physically and symbolically (Urry 1985: 20-47).

Polemics about the place of emotions in political theory and practice expose in which way emotions are involved in the discourse on international relations and various contexts where they can be interpreted as positive and negative ones. The first includes love, trust and compassion, while the key negative emotion remains shame. Christina Tarnopolsky, Jon Elster, Martha Hussbaum and Toni Massaro consider the shame a most powerfull emotion because it causes painful experiences and primary reactions that lead to identity crisis (Tarnopolsky 2008).

2. Politics and Emotional Spatiality

In international politics, language is often used to refer to affective states. Thus, countries are often presented as frustrated, aggressive, frightened, challenging or repentant. Although this practice leaves an impression of anthropomorphization, the representations arising from ‘imputed’ affects rely on media, and often enter academic discourse. One should not neglect the well-known floscules about traditional friends, brotherly countries, traditional love and understanding or eternal sympathy among peoples, which are frequently used in the Balkans. They mainly come from the need to achieve short-term political and economic solutions and using the evocation of great narratives and political myths.

One of the reasons for neglecting the role of emotionality in political life is based on seemingly incompatible explanations that come from psychology, psychiatry and neurology. The other reason is attributed to general ambiguity to anything that can not be placed in the categories of rational. Emotions are seen as something private, elusive, insufficiently materialized. Acctually, we belive that these reasons could be a starting point for theorizing emotions as institutionalized, incorporated and deeply embedded in the human geography and therefore processes and structures of world politics (Crawford 2015: XX). One of the problems come from the inability to use classical definitions of emotions and resistance of contemporary psychologist to define emotions as simple and universal. Various individuals and groups experience the same emotions in different way. Psychologists trying to compare and to elucidate emotion concepts have used, primary features of meaning. For certain purposes, parameters of this kind may be helpful, but also complex and obscure as any emotion concepts which one might be trying to elucidate. A number of emotional dimensions have no clear, intuitively graspable meaning whatsoever. Others are non-technical and their meaning can be intuited through natural language, but they are not less complex than happy, sad, angry or worried (Wierzbicka 1992: 2).

Despite these problems, emotion takes place. They can be attributed to squares, parks, states, regions, parts of the world, such as Balkans. Geography, like many of its disciplinary siblings, has often had trouble expressing feelings. The difficulties in communicating the affective elements at play beneath the topographies of everyday life have meant that, to a greater or lesser extent, geography has tended to deny, avoid, suppress or downplay entanglements. Perhaps the recent 'emotional turn' in geography results from recognition that emotions have an important place as vital ingredient in the very composition of the world. They are something more than a concatenation of causes and affects, as those places, people and incidents, which become meaningful to us. Without emotions we might indeed survive in a world that resembled the empty space measured by Cartesian coordinates. This 'formal and quantitative' understanding of space erases distinctions which derive from nature and history that claims to be neutral, universal, apolitical, value and emotion free, despite the fact that emotions are inseparable from our daily lives and even places we live in (Davidson, Cameron 2008:1-17).

For most political geographers, understanding of place and context has moved away from geometric or 'Cartesian' view; this move now considers relational understandings of the settings in which people live their lives. Relative interactive measures of places, locales, and regions can be defined by the links which are related to social identity, political economy, or migration (Linke, O'Loughlin 2016). During the sixties and seventies of the last century, geography went through a sociological and cultural turn. At first, social cartography has demonstrated a critical potential by avoiding the rigidity of traditional mapping practice and shifting focus to the efforts of individuals and groups to redefine their own socio-spatial relationships and the ways in which they are represented (Pickles 2004:30). The cultural turn has many manifestations. The following list is hardly exhaustive: a revivification of traditional areas of interest in cultural geography under the influence of new theoretical ideas; the textualisation of subfields such as political geography; the revival of interest in historiography of geography under the influence of theories of colonial discourse and postcolonialism; understandings of the construction of social relations of gender, race and class; a focus upon cultural constructions of environment and nature. Perhaps one common thread connecting these and other myriad projects is a commitment to epistemologies, often loosely labelled poststructural, that emphasise the contingency of knowledge claims and recognise the close relationship among language, power, and knowledge (Barnett 1998: 379-394). Thus, Balkan studies which take into account the relation between power and space/place are inseparable from this approach.

The shift in social and human geography is preceded by David Sibley's concept on geography of exclusion. He recognizes the reason for studying the social and psychological aspects of geography in the invisibility of social control (Sibley 1995: 548). Here is a starting point for rethinkig representations, geographies and emotions. Relying on Paul Rabinow's understanding of the importance for critical approach to hegemonic cultures, Sibley seeks to make visible the oppressive practices and assumptions about the inclusion and exclusions through which Occident organizes places and spaces. Geographies of inclusion and exclusion opens questions like: "Which places have attributes of power"?; "Whom they exclude and how the prohibitions are maintained in practice?" (Trudeau, McMorran 2015: 20). In this case, they can be identified in the form of the question: "Should Balkan expect European future?" One of the aspects that support this selection are emotions. Similar questions are posed in subdisciplines that derive from the synthesis of comparative literature, discourse analysis, and philosophy.

The problem of the emotional spatiality of the Balkans becomes inseparable from the production of emotions attributed to its potential reference frame. Therefore, if Europe adopts / integrates the geography of happiness and security, it excludes / rejects emotional geographies which oppose its self-representation. Indeed, parallels between the previous studies on representations of the Balkans and the emotional spatiality as subdiscipline of critical geography become more visible.

3. Literature, Geography and Emotions of Orientalism

A review on previous contributions reveals three key approaches in the research of the representations on the Balkans: imagology, Orientalism and the Balkanist paradigm. While they provide resistance to essentialization, they all outweigh the affects involved in building the overall image of the Balkans. Affects arise as a result of (most often) passenger's observation, literature, film imagination, or taking the "second hand narrative", and their precipitation along historical discourse. At last, these representations make the platform for the construction of a contemporary media image of a city, region, state or continent.

Imagology is dedicated to the metadiscursive quest, because the concepts studied within its framework, are considered intellectual product whose truth is not measurable, or a reliable unit of information on objective reality (Leersen 2009: 83-97). In recognizing the ideological character of images and drawing attention to their sociocultural differences and similarities, imagology considers reciprocal characterization as pivotal in understanding national perception and representation in terms of the self/other dichotomy, which also underlies the dialectic of identity and alterity. As its name asserts, image is the main working concept in the field. It is understood as a mental picture or idea. In this, it resembles a cognitive knowledge structure or schema that controls our opinion and behavior towards the Other. A fundamental distinction is made between self-image and hetero-image: the first one refers to a characterological reputation current within and shared by a group, the latter to the opinion that others have about a group's purported character (Mohor, Praisler 2007: 69-74). According to imagologists, popular literature became a source of disemination of the representations on the Balkans (Goldsworthy 2005). The future understanding of the relationship between representation, daily life, political life, and the state of the economy rely on these theoretical basis. Orientalism, balkanism and postcolonialism, thus have a common ground in the idea that mental images are able to create political relations. They are further reflected in the whole space, making the Balkans one in the series of emotional geographies.

Some of the first studies of the Balkans were based on the Edvard Said's Orientalist paradigm. Inspired by Marxism and post-structuralist theories, Said managed to wage a frontal attack on orientalism as a subject of the orientalists, scholars versed in the cultures, histories and languages of the so called Orient. Said understands orientalism as a cumulative and hegemonic discourse and the West´s eternal Other. The West stands for rationality, progress and modernity, while the Orient stands for backwardness, tradition, and following the logic of developmental thinking, the West possessed therewith the right to conquer, suppress and rule. Orientalism is a way of thinking about Orient as Other - servile, exotic, erotic, dark, mysterious and dangerous, and has helped the West to define itself through this contrasting and dichotomous image. (Said 2008:16). In spite of criticism, most often justifiably addressed to the account of essentializations that, paradoxically, arise from the efforts to resist them, Said's research is considered to be the basis for post-colonialism, and a starting point that has allowed the authority of the binary logic to be challenged. Latter, it gave the results in the field of ecology, gender studies, the fight for human rights.

According to Orientalist paradigm, frequently used in the field of Balkan studies, from its beginnings, texts about this part of the world have been following a logic that link Islam and the Ottoman Empire, and thus, create emotions that reproduce stereotypes on Turkey and European Turkey in its referent frame (Said 2003). Affects are determined by the established political relations that continue to reproduce and enable this mechanism to work backwards. The very first records on the Balkans, bring affects to its geography. Certain issues are attributed to its population, while simultaneously depicting human geography and determining the course of foreign policy on the relation Occident-Orient / the Balkans. Orientalization does not imply exclusively the designation of the Balkans as a part of the Orient, but brings the insistence on its exclusion from Europe as a synonymous of development, excellence and freedom. The feeling it causes comes in conjunction with inferiority.

One and a half centuries later, these meanings got an affective form and, as sadness, enter a public discourse. It turned out to be a long lasting image. Attempts have been made to determine the relationship between the early representations and what followed one and a half centuries later. Namely, after the end of the turbulent nineties of the twentieth century, the emotions of grief, hatred, lost, hostility towars neighbors found their place in the popular culture of post-Yugoslav societies. Public discourse, and research show interests in topics about tragic losses; cultural products which are closely related to sadness like *sevdalinke;* new releases of characterologies on the alleged innate and genetically transmitted South Slavic practice of grief and wailing; magical realism in the film[2] as a thematization of nostalgia for a country that no longer exist. Geography of sadness becomes both psychological and political analitical tool.

4. The Balkanism and Narcissism

In accordance to Balkanist paradigm, the Balkans, like their geo-symbolic position, are ambivalent, while the reasons for sympathy with them are in balance with the reasons for its political and symbolic rejection by Europe. Todorova argues that while Orientalism is a discourse about an imputed opposition, Balkanism is a discourse about an imputed ambiguity (Todorova 2004: 17). By notifying that the Balkans were viewed, if not strictly Oriental than semi-Asian, semi-Oriental and Other Europe, she concludes that Balkan was always paired in opposition to the West and Europe, whereas its inhabitants were percived as the inner other of the Western civilization. Balkanization has come to signify the general disintegration of viable nation-states and the reversion to the 'tribal conflicts and hatreds'. It seems that masculinization and the stereotype of belligerence, combined with the geo-symbolic border position, reproduce a representation of a restless and unstable ground. In an affective sense, it could be said that the geography of the Balkans 'suffers' from the excess of aggression that empties through internal conflicts. This representation for more than two centuries influences the overall formation of its media image and therefore produces geography that requires limitation or at least a temporary suspension from the geo-symbolic framework of Europe.

The global geometry of power allows a deeper understanding of the geography of marginalization and enriches the theoretical understanding of individual cases of social exclusion. The geography of Balkanism implies resources similar to those which come from Orientalist paradigm, although attributes them different emotions. The boundary between the East and the West is regarded as a criterion for exclusion/inclusion inside/outside the Europe. Since symbolic liminal position of

2) Examples: E. Kusturica, *Underground,* 1995. Later, dramatic realism, *Circles,* Srdan Golubović. In Croatia, *Karaula*, by Rajko Grlić, 2006.

the Balkans implies displacement from the mainstream of capital and the events that Occident appropriates as cultural property, the defense system against inferiorization appears within the framework of internal Balkanist discourse. On the level of self-representation, the liminality is interpreted as a sort of exclusivity of geographical and geo-symbolic position. In this sense, the dominant emotional geography becomes love for oneself brought to narcissism. Narcissism refers to a fragile and unstable image of oneself. Below ones surface, lies compensation for the absence of security and sensitivity to shame and humiliation. A seemingly grandiose image of oneself is just a cover for trauma and frustration that led to hunger for attention and recognition. In Sibley's terms, the margin space replaces the privilege space.

Symbolic liminality is based on the assumption that the center contains all the positive sides of a society, while the marign is a space of negativity and elements that disturb the harmony of the center. Delinquents and rebels who are expelled from the center ussually settle the marginal areas (Zanini 2002: 58). Therefore, the delinquent figure become the most prominent Balkan protagonist since the epic published in nineteenth cenury to the contemporary film.[3] The Balkanist discourse of exile, excommunication and equalization with the delinquent, builds and manifest an identity with the meaning of the superior inner Other. If the Balkans is recognized as a margin and an excluded subject, the population that inhabits it through cultural practices, politics and economics strengthens the symbolic value of seclusion and delinquency, and replacing the semantics of exclusion by the semantics of privilege. Symbolics of the boundary with the meaning of division into Us/Others; domestic / foreign; legally / illegally has been iverted to adopt an afirmative connotation of mythic, archetypal, ancient and abstruce geography (Mountz 2009: 198-209). At first, his geography arises in the process of what Sibley named space cleansing and defines it as a process of social control through which the dominant Occident constructs social-spatial boundaries and marginalizes everything beyond the mainstream (Sibley, 1996:104). Marginalization enables the reproduction of social identity by linking individual and collective behavior inherent to the process of exclusion. The exclusion, which we already noticed in the image studies, takes the form of a spatial division into people and places. The Balkans do not experience a manifest and striking material division in relation to the rest of the continent. It becomes a symbolic ghetto, while problems with establishing the administrative boundaries and its transition have a dynamic form in the

3) Slobodan Skerlić, *Rage,* 1997, Srdjan Dragojevic, *Wounds,* 1998.

last thirty years. Imposing sanctions, requiring visas and special permissions become material boundaries. They resemble the walls that separate the ghetto from the center. The inner defense system is recognized in the excesses of self-love that leads to aggression in relation to the immediate neighbor, and is justified by diversity, inequality, and historical reminiscences. Such self-love excludes the Other by glorifying hostile feelings and by using rhetorical and discursive means in order to legitimize this process. Self-love functions at the same time as a defense mechanism against negative labeling and relocation outside the reference, physical continent and the culture. If Europe represents civilization, knowledge, rich cultural heritage, the Balkans mobilizes myths to occupy an equally imaginary position, representing itself as older, spiritually rich, and civilized before Europe 'existed'. But this geography of love for oneself, gets a destructive and self-destructive form, which deals with post-colonial criticism since 2000's, in a more complex manner, recalling the breakup of the SFRY, the war and its consequences.

5. Postcolonialism: "Inferiority" as a Reason for Depression and Shame

The question, whether the Balkans can be placed within the framework of postcolonial theory, without breaking the boundary between discourses and crucial historical moments, violent practices such as apartheid, the destruction of material culture and systematic poverty of certain parts of the world, has been opened along with the first wave of polemics over the breakup of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (Lazarević Radak 2013: 45). Postcolonialism is still in the edge of research interest when it comes to Balkan studies, due to the sensitivity of political issues related to the accession of the Balkan countries to the European Union and ambivalent positions of post-structuralist theories in social sciences (Spivak 2005: 18).

Taking into account the influence that geography has on emotionality, Robert Young focuses on the relationship between knowledge and power and the interest of capitalism towards new forms of consumerism (Young 2013: 13). What is true for individuals is valid for peoples / groups. It allows him to continue asking questions that begin to resemble a test to determine the postcolonial state: "Do you feel that your own people and country are somehow always positioned outside the mainstream?" (Young 2013: 13).

In the context of post-Yugoslav societies, the answer is confirmed, which opens up space for further review.

Although critics of the text on the Balkans consider this part of the world colonized at the level of discourse, the fact that since the beginning of the 19th Century it is described in terms that are common in the imperial texts about Asia and Africa, testify on creating the geography of inferiority/superiority. As early as the nineteenth century, the texts about the Balkans speak of 'half-wild population' (de Vindt 1907:15); 'cultural dely', 'dirty half-barbarians' (Tcherson 1855), 'people from the devil's mountains' (Jezernik, 2007:21) Stigmatization begins to function as self-stigmatization, and the inferiorized entity experiences a much deeper crisis than the one Balkan paradigm assume. Considering that the wars between the Yugoslav republics ended in posttraumatic syndrome, guild and disappointment, it becomes clear to what extent, the insecurity regarding symbolic, cultural and human geography is certain (Lazarević-Radak 2014: 46).

The effects of psychological and social scars remain unsettled for years after the end of the war. Criminalization of war accompanied by public condemnation, ensures uncertain and fragmentary justice, while the establishment of war crimes courts enables the profiling of hero, victims, exiles figures (Dahlman 2009: 235-246).

The representation and emotion comes from the outside, affecting only a part of the population that is most likely to seek emigration. While balkanization leads to proud self-love and involves the exclusion of Otherness, the feeling of shame remains equally destructive and self-destructive as it developes the feelings of helplessness and worthlessness (Dahlman 2009). The introduction of a discourse on rationality that opposes the passions of war provides an invitation to rational behavior involving narratives on ignorance, primitiveness and image of lower, underdeveloped political order.

The affects linked with shame lead to self-destructive behavior. Groups become objects of negative emotions such as hatred, rejection, scandal, lose the connection to healthy narcissism, which results in a sense of embarrassment and humiliation. For example, social-class differentiations are held through the practice of disgracing the Other, especially when it comes to cultural differences. The shame and anger that arises from it play a significant role in challenging and maintaining internal conflicts and provoking conflicts with neighboring countries

Instead of approaching the past in a neutral manner to resolve the conflicts, there begins a situation of repetitive self-marginalization. This process leads to a complex of superiority / inferiority that occurs in a colonial situation. The first aspect is related to self-stigmatization, which acts at the level of self-indulgence and marking of one's own cultural practice as inferior to the other, in this case European. Discourses on aggression, backwardness, impurities, internal incompetence for political organization, as well as the conclusions about the necessity of interventionism and the emphasis on internal class, ideological and political divisions, become elements of self-representation in the Balkan countries. The internal tension is rising. Rejecting neighbors, shifting responsibility for economic and social crisis to neighbors as foreigners and the increase of domestic violence indicate the so called psychopathology of the colonized (Lazarević-Radak 2014:47). Newspaper articles, popular culture and the overall media picture reveal the geography of depression.

Balkan is no longer what the representatives of the balkanist paradigm believed in – a space located between the East and the West for which wars were vaged. The political crises are peacefully blocked while the largest percentage of the population abandoned ideologies and practical political activism. The reality of unemployment, a high level of poverty, migration, a decline in birth rate, domestic violence and a high degree of suicide reiterate the geography of aggression. In the postcolonial state, previous Balkanist aggression turns to feelings of guilt.

6. Feelings From The Periphery: A Fear And Geography Of Blocked Transition

A distance between the center and the periphery produces a bimodal and trimodal distribution of states, so the understanding of the geography of the Balkans could be contributed by the theory of semi-periphery (Terlouw 1992: 36-45). The societies from 'in-between' are not allowed to move in the other direction – further to the periphery, or closer to the center that could be read in terms of the post-industrial and postmodern era (Arrighi 1985: 243-279). Applied to the Balkan, theory of semi-periphery does not reveal anything new. Transition indicate the the absence of dynamics, and this absence is also reflected on the spatial emotionality. As in the case of postcolonialism, there is a feeling that we are 'nor-there-neither-here' (Hughson-Blagojević 2005), without a chance to achieve affective turn. Confusion brought about by the collapse of educational and cultural institutions, coupled with corruption, creates a sense of impotence. Emotionally, the Balkans remains a geography of exclusion (Zanini 2002:58). During the period of symmetrical differentiation the political elites choose the isolation of society. The rest of the population begins to feel cutt off and behave in accordance to the cultural, psychological and political price of the new isolation, imposed from the inside. These processes are easily visible in Serbia. The absence of clear, understandable and acceptable political programs provide a fertile soil for the growth of a fear policy. Such a policy becomes useful for political elite. Fear occurs due to the lack of security (Kinvall 2013: 143-166). These feelings come into play with the escape and strongly reflect on society. The problem of escape - continuous immigration in the form of brain drain are present in the public discourse and testify on real problems that society meets. People leave the Balkans in search of healthy emotions – security and well-being.

7. Geography Of Sadness, Agression, Shame And Fear

Emotional geographies are not the specificity of South East Europe, nor can it be claimed that only in its fluid / symbolic borders there is a sense of sadness, shame and fear. Mixed with sadness and fear, aggression, produce conflicts, followed by reconciliation, repentance, or new conflicts. Studies conducted over the past ten years have shown that emotions can be mapped, thus creating colorful world maps that show the degree of racism, fear and aggression towards the Other. The map of the world can be recognized as a map of emotions of mediated events, narratives, discourses, representations, as well as patterns of behavior in crisis and peacetime situations.

The affects that the problematized paradigms point out enable the insight into symbolic and emotional map of the region that include their simplified forms of stereotypes and prejudices determining who will be its neighbors, friends or enemies. The analysed paradigms enable us to percive the Balkans as an emotional geography. They reveal that this part of the world is linked with aggression, shame and fear. This representation leaves a mark on the place of the region in the international politics and thus opens an old polemic about the relation of symbolic geography as self-produced and externally imposed representation.

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Dropping Out: What Are Schools Doing To Prevent It?[2]

Abstract

This paper approaches the occurrence of dropout as a consequence of social and academic disengagement from school. Starting from this theoretical position, we analysed responses made by employees (principals, teachers, school counsellors) from primary and secondary schools regarding intervention actions undertaken when there is a risk of a student dropping out of school. The analysed data were collected by in-depth interviews and focus groups. Responses were then classified using thematic content analysis. The existing system of prevention programs s are most often not aimed at all aspects of this phenomenon and in the course of their implementation unsatisfactory level of cooperation between different institutions has been observed. The preventative actions constructed at school level, sometimes take the shape of pseudohelp for

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students in the form of justifying their absences from school or awarding them higher marks than they deserve. Prevention programs listed by employees are not aimed at increasing students' social engagement despite a significant number of findings that prove the importance of this kind of integration.

Key words: dropout, thematic analysis, prevention, primary and secondary school

1. Introduction

Early school leaving is in modern society defined as quitting education before obtaining minimum qualifications for work (De Witte, Cabus, Thyssen, Groot, & van den Brink 2013: 14). Apart from dropping out, the following expressions are also used to describe premature voluntary termination of one's education: early school leavers (ESL), "withdrawal", "attrition", "youth not in education, employment or training (NEET)". It is a phenomenon associated with decades of research (in papers by Tinto 1975; Finn 1989) and it regularly features in current affairs from the perspective of education policy planning.

It is possible to single out at least three interrelated sources of interest in this phenomenon. Firstly, in the 1970s, a need to increase the level of education at the national level was observed in Western countries (Wehlage & Rutter 1985: 2), which resulted in an increase in the number of qualified workers. Efforts were made to have more students completed secondary education. Describing that motivation, Finn (Finn 1989: 117) declares the increase in the interest in the phenomenon of early school leaving as a national obsession which was present in America in the 1980s. The trend of increasing the percentage of population with at least secondary school completed is a characteristic of contemporary society also (Marginson 2016: 249). In accordance with this national policy common in numerous countries, there has been a linear increase in the number of papers dedicated to dropping out of high school and investigating various factors that can be related to it.

Another source of motivation resulted from education fairness concept created somewhat later, at the end of 1990s and the beginning of 21st century (Castelli, Ragazzi & Crescentini 2012: 2245; Espinoza 2007; Hutmacher, Cochrane & Bottani 2001: 345; Pešikan & Ivić 2016: 103). Propagating accessibility of education to all the children and supported by the convention on child rights (e.g. No Child Left Behind Act, 2001), a significant number of epidemiological research works appeared, with the primary emphasis on purposeful intervention. They point out inconsistencies in including children in mandatory education. These studies, contrary to previously mentioned ones, most often examine dropping out of primary education, and even complete absence of a child's inclusion in the system. Their conclusion is that *those who need most get the least*, namely that there is an expected inequality reflected in unsatisfactory rate of inclusion in education when it comes to children from minority ethnic groups, as well as those from marginalised, socially disadvantaged groups (Castelli, Ragazzi, S., & Crescentini 2012: 2247, Pešikan & Ivić 2016: 110). Apart from insufficient inclusion, it can be observed that organisation and functioning of school system is such that it makes it more difficult for children from vulnerable groups to achieve academic success. In the field of educational sociology, Bernstein's, Bourdieu's and recently Apple's works contribute to critique of education as a mechanism for reproducing social inequalities (Bourdieu & Passeron 1970; Apple 2010, 2011, 2013). For example, in Bourdieu's theory, which is classified as reproduction theory, it is pointed out that practices in the field of education are such that they decrease chances of success for children from families with less cultural capital (Radulović 2014: 90). Anticipating that chances of success are slim, children from working families will give up on further education, never properly understanding the function of educational system in reproducing and legitimising class differences. In other words, what is in fact pushing a student out of school is disguised and comes across as pulling out.

Finally, what makes this topic popular today is the fact that, despite decades of research and significant interest, early school leaving still poses a problem in contemporary educational systems, which is associated with negative outcomes, both for individuals and for society as a whole. People who dropped out of school encounter more difficulties in finding employment, are at risk of getting involved in criminal activities, often have to resort to benefits as a source of income, which increases country's expenditure (DeWitte et al. 2013: 14; Rumberg 2001: 86).

1.1. Dropout as a form of disengagement from school

A numerous studies view early school leaving as a dynamic, cumulative and multidimensional process of gradual disengagement from school (Finn 1989:118; Rumberg 2001: 48; Rumberg & Lim 2008: 2). Dropping out of school can be described as double failure (Finn 1989: 117). On the one hand, this represents a failure for educational system because it failed to keep its students in school. On the other hand, it is an individual's failure for failing to adopt academic competencies necessary for entering the job market. In other words, dropout occurs as a result of interaction between students' characteristics (individual factors) and school characteristics (institutional characteristics) (Bradley & Renzuli 2011: 523). Recent research indicates that results of these interactions can take different forms, so it is possible to typologically differentiate between students who drop out of school (Videnović & Lazarević 2017: 77; McDermott, Anderson, Zaff 2017: 14).

We can point out a common characteristic of viewing disengagement from school as two-dimensional, i.e. social and academic, which is observed in numerous models. Thus Tinto, the creator of one of the first models of the occurrence of dropout in higher education, differentiates between academic and social integration of students (Tinto 1975: 95). The former refers to fulfilling explicit standards and identifying with the implicit norms of the given academic system (Tinto 1975: 104). On the other hand, social integration involves connectedness with the social milieu of the college (primarily informal peer groups, extracurricular activities, teachers and other staff) (Tinto 1975: 106). Similarly, Wehlage and Rutter differentiate between social bonding and educational engagement (Wehlage & Rutter 1985: 5). Finn's model is associated with two early school leaving scenarios (Finn 1989: 117). According to one, due to their lack of success a student exhibits low self-esteem, which leads to further failures. According to the other, lack of identifying with school causes ever-decreasing participation in school activities (classroom participation, homework, and participation in the social, extracurricular, athletic, and governance aspects of the school), which ultimately leads to poor school performance and even weaker identification with school. As Rumberg points out, sometimes it is enough for only one dimension of integration (social or academic) to be present in a student for dropping out not to take place (Rumberg 2001: 152). Consequently, preventative intervantions should also be aimed at increasing students' academic achievement and towards better social integration.

The importance of academic integration and educational engagement is emphasised in studies in which early school leaving is considered an extreme form of educational failure (Rumberg 2011: 160; DeWitte et al. 2013: 15), as well as those that point out the significance of low student motivation, poor discipline in class, low teachers' expectations, absence of individual approach for students with learning difficulties (Bridgeland, Dilulio & Morison 2006: 25; Christenson & Thurlow 2004: 36; Kaufman, Bradbury & Owings 1992: 15). Another course of action was confirmed: factors at school level are in correlation with dropping out. Research has shown that positive school atmosphere, good relationship with teachers and other students, fewer breaches of discipline, have positive impact on social integration, identifying with the school and developing social bonding, and therefore they represent protective factors for dropping out not to occur (Christle, Jolivette & Nelson 2007; 327; Erktin, Okcabol & Ural 2010: 111; Lee & Burkam 2003: 355).

As we can see, particular emphasis was given to the importance of factors at school level for the occurrence of dropout (Lessard, Poirier & Fortin 2010: 1638; Simić & Krstić 2017: 53). A question that arises is whether school staffs shares this perspective and what they think about the opportunities for organising preventative action within school. The assumption we deem justified is that individuals directly involved in educational system have less trust in the efficiency of intervantions applied at school level, than is the case in scientific paradigm. The reason why we would expect the importance of school to be oversight lies in the fact that, despite constantly emphasising the complexity of this phenomenon, there is still belief that students are the only ones to blame because they proved not to be capable of completing a certain level of education (Smyth, & Hattam 2001: 403). Research shows that when it comes to attributing blame for children's lack of success in school, teachers and parents sometimes exhibit a simplified perspective, so the majority of them believe that children themselves are mostly and/or solely to blame (Videnović & Lazarević 2017: 81; Bridgeland, Dilulio, & Balfanz 2009: 20; Simić & Krstić 2017: 59). Describing this phenomenon, LeCompte uses the expression "blaming the victims" (LeCompte 1987: 232). Findings from Serbia follow the same route, i.e. teachers primarily point out the significance of familial factors for the occurrence of dropout and consider themselves powerless to change anything, even occasionally as those who should not change anything because there should be a selection of students who complete a certain level of education (Simić & Krstić 2017: 59).

Despite the ambivalent attitude of the staff, results of empirical studies indicate that the number of possible preventative actions organised at school level is not small. Rumberg (Rumberg 2011: 208) differentiates target approach intervention which involves identifying students at risk and organising a special course of academic and social support so as to make them more successful, from comprehensive or school-wide reform. The advantage of the first approach is in its organisational simplicity, because it is aimed at fewer students, and the support they receive is specific and adequate for their individual needs. Comprehensive approach involves a reform of the entire system or adopting programs at school level, which also influences students not at risk, thus developing a peersupport system. In the empirical part of the work, measures for preventing dropout listed by school staff will be analysed in terms of being a systematic solution or an attempt by school to help an individual student.

2. Method

2.1. Problem

The aim of this study is investigating which preventative actions for reducing dropout teachers, counsellors and principals perceive as available, as well as how they would rate their usefulness. In a previous research (Simić & Krstić 2017: 59), performed on the same sample, factors operating at school level that can contribute to dropout were analysed.

2.2. Subject

The sample included staff from 8 primary and 13 secondary schools. Schools were chosen so that, according to the official data (The data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia) they belong to poorer municipalities and report higher incidence of dropout (Nova Varoš, Negotin, Grocka, Belgrade, Bosilegrad, Boljevac, Beočin, Kladovo, Prijepolje, Merošina, Brza Palanka, Sokobanja).

Table 1 shows the number of school principals, teachers and counsellors examined on the basis of working in primary or secondary schools.

Table 1: Sample structure

	Primary school	Secondary school	Total
Principals	8	13	21
Counsellors	12	13	25
Teachers	25	27	42

2.3. Procedure

A semi-structured interview was performed with principals and counsellors. When it comes to teachers, in order to include as many of them, in every school we organised focus groups with teachers and heads of the years or individual classes with cases of students quitting their education without completing it. Topics included in talks are: a) whether schools encountered the dropout phenomenon and when, b) what preventative actions the school applies in those cases, c) which of them are prescribed and regulated as school's duty, and which ones represent alternative preventative actions, i.e. do not belong to school's legislative obligations, d) how they rate the efficiency of these actions, e) what they think of the dropout phenomenon, f) what contributes to its occurrence.

With the aim of singling out which preventative actions the employees consider as ways of reducing dropout, we applied thematic content analysis (Mayring, 2014: 39). First we deductively classified the stated interventions into two groups. Selection was made on the basis of whether actions represent existing **systematic solution**, i.e. prescribed ways in which a school is obliged to react in the event of a higher dropout risk, or whether they are **extra-systemic** attempts made by school with the aim of reacting using available resources at its disposal. Within these two groups further classification of responses was performed inductively. The classification was done using Maxqda programme for qualitative data analysis. Apart from classifying intervention actions, we also analysed employees' assessment of how efficient the existing systematic solutions are.

3. Results

We classified a total of 82 responses by employees mentioning programs and actions their school implements with the aim of not letting a student leave school early. Responses were first grouped on the basis of whether they represent a systematic solution or a specific extra-systemic attempt to solve the problem. A slight majority of answers (60%) belongs to the first category.

Systematic solutions to the dropout phenomenon stated by employees are classified into seven categories. Table 2 shows all the interventions the employees listed and their frequency.

Table 2: Systematic programs for preventing dropout

Intervention	f	%
Increased student monitoring	16	33%
Cooperation with social services	15	31%
Switching from regular education to taking exams only	6	12%
No systematic preventative programs	5	10%
Informing the local juvenile court	3	6%
Sending the student to another school	3	6%
Primary school expulsion	1	2%
Total	49	100%

Respondents most often mentioned the preventative action of increased student monitoring as the school reaction to situations where there is a greater risk of early school leaving or observed breaches of discipline. That usually includes intensive talks with parents, the student and teachers when the number of unjustified absences from school becomes significant or when there is a noticeable drop in academic attainment. In such situations school counsellors often become involved. Employees believe that establishing cooperation and working together represent an advantage (*The idea is to establish cooperation with parents by talking to them and advising them and then that together they do all they can to prevent a child from dropping out of school*). Parents are repeatedly invited to come to school, first over the phone and later in writing. One disadvantage of this action is that parents can refuse to come to school, do not show up or refuse to cooperate. It is also thought that this is not a proper action but "only" an advisory talk. Thus one school pedagogue stated that school *has no other mechanisms for preventing dropout except talk.*

Contacting social services and magistrates are systematic actions undertaken by schools, and they also involve contacting other institutions and cooperation between different departments. The school contacts social services when frequent absences from school or poor academic attainment are connected with other difficulties: extreme poverty, a child from a foster family, or "behaviour in school becomes extremely problematic". Respondents express divided opinions when it comes to the cooperation between the school and social services. They believe it is not always up-to-date and it is not always clear whose duty it is to react and provide financial help to the family. The school contacts magistrates when a child does not come to school for an extended period of time. Employees think that in that case the magistrate should start court proceedings against the parents. However, they cannot remember a single case where the trial actually took place and the magistrates' court had them punished. Bad experiences in cooperation with other state institutions indicate the absence of networking between institutions dealing with children from vulnerable groups.

Changing schools or switching to not attending the classes but taking exams only is an act that employees see as a way for a child to continue their education after all and not drop out. Employees believe that a child is thus given a second chance and that it can benefit from that change of scene. The problem is though that a student then becomes invisible for school, i.e. there is no systematic daily monitoring of student's attendance, and the school is not required to check how the child adapted to a new school or at new way of attending it.

Around 10% of answers (5 answers) represent denying the existence of a single programm in school. One answer describes a situation in which a 15-year old child dropped out of primary school because he or she no longer had to attend. Employees saw this measure as a systematic one, but actually that is a case of wrongful interpretation of the law because the child had to be allowed to continue their education in another institution.

Table 3 list categories of actions employees see as alternative ones, i.e. attempts made by schools to do what they can outside the prescribed ways of tackling this issue in order to prevent a child from dropping out. Most answers belong to the category of reducing criteria, which represents a way to help students improve their academic attainment (*Schooling has been so simplified that it is impossible not to finish it*). On a number of occasions the employees stated that this action is particularly common when school is at risk of being closed down or having to let off some of the teachers due to a decreasing number of pupils. In other words, the source of motivation for implementing this measure sometimes is not the desire to help a child but to keep jobs. A similar preventativeaction is justifying student absences in which there is a cooperation between several individuals (doctors from a local doctors' surgery issuing fake sick notes, parents who ask for such a solution to the problem, teachers who pretend not to notice that problem) who act with the aim of hiding a significant number of student absences.

Providing financial help where it is needed usually involves school establishing cooperation with local authorities in order to secure funds for student transportation, a place in students' residence or provision of meals. Sometimes the employees themselves collect money so as to provide a short-term financial help for a student who *fainted in school due to malnutrition*.

Alternative ways of getting parents to cooperate are visiting their home (*Since they do not want to come to school*) in order to motivate them to take part in their children's education. It is not entirely clear how competent the school staffs feel when they visit parents. One of the ways to react is to threaten parents (*We usually threaten that we will report them and that they will lose their child and social benefits. That is why you should consider whether it is worth it not sending your child to school*) or to help the family by providing clothes and shoes.

Early identification of children at risk of dropping out represents a preventative action that has a huge potential to be efficient, but in the course of our talks was only mentioned twice. Helping through projects was mentioned once, but the problem with them lies in the fact that project activities usually cease following the end of project financing.

Only one answer stated that within the compulsory curriculum there are topics related to the importance of education for life. Besides, it transpires that inclusion of peers is underused as a preventative action since it appeared in one answer only during our talks.

Table 3: Target measures for dropout prevention

Intervention	f	%
Giving students better marks than they deserve	14	42%
Providing financial help	6	14%
Justifying unjustified absences	4	12%
Threats to parents	3	9%
Early monitoring	2	6%
Help via projects	1	3%
Visiting parents	1	3%
Involving peers	1	3%
Propagating education as valuable	1	3%
Total	33	100

4. Discussion

In the theoretical part we saw that numerous papers agree on the importance of student social integration (Finn 1985; Tinto 1975; Wehlage & Rutter 1985) for reducing dropout. However, by analysing the preventative actions school staff listed, we observe that that importance in not recognised, so there are almost no actions aimed at this aspect of education.

When it comes to systematic prevention programs, we have noticed that school staff is ambivalent towards their efficiency. The finding that there is a problem in interdepartmental cooperation with other institutions particularly drew our attention. The dropout phenomenon is complex, hence good networking between different institutions is seen as a prerequisite for systematic efforts to be successful (Stepanović, Lazarević, Simić 2017: 91; Stepanović, Videnović, Lazarević 2015: 462). Apart from the ambivalent feeling towards existing preventative actions, it is also noticeable that they are not visible enough since some members of staff claim there are no systematic programs at all.

Systematic programs of sending a student to only take exams and not attend classes, or sending them to another school, appear to be common and accepted by staff. However, they can also represent a way of masking a problem since the difficulties those students encounter are no longer systematically monitored.

It can also be seen that there is no systematic support in cases of students from poor families, more precisely family's inability to pay for student transport or accommodation in halls of residence. The financial help is realised as extra-systemic action and only when cooperation with local authorities is established. This type of systematic support is necessary because family's poverty undoubtedly represents a risk factor for the occurrence of dropout (Krstić, Stepanović, Videnović 2017: 34; Krnjaić, 2004: 295; Stepanović, Videnović, Lazarević 2015: 462; Stepanović, Lazarević, Simić 2017: 100; Videnović & Lazarević 2017: 72).

When analysing extra-systemic interventions, our attention was drawn to the fact that the most mentioned ones are those where the problem is masked, either by justifying unjustified absences or giving students better marks than they deserve. When they are implemented, there is an easily established cooperation between multiple actors (parents – doctors – teachers) which often does not exist in other preventative actions. In order to understand this, we should take into account the specific context of our educational system. Within educational policies in contemporary society there is often an inexplicable tension. Namely, one of the aims of every contemporary educational system, particularly in the West, is an increase in standards. The pressure placed on students to improve student attainment in external evaluations is significantly higher today than ten years ago (Koretz 2015: 1). On the other hand, as Finn observed at the end of 1980s, this pressure leads to an increase in dropout (Finn 1989: 117), since children from disadvantaged environment find it harder to meet these demands. In other words, the challenge of today's educational systems lies in the issue of maintaining or increasing standards whilst at the same time reducing or keeping dropout at the same level. Similarly, some authors see increasing the quality of education and improving equality as two contradictory tendencies in education (Pfeffer 2012: 1). In Serbian educational system external evaluation is less developed than in the rest of Western Europe and the

USA, hence we cannot talk about the existence of a lot of pressure to meet quality standards. For that reason, the abovementioned tension is not as strong, resulting in an easier development of the practice of lowering criteria. Setting clear standards and insisting on them being met would lead to students developing better competencies and becoming more competitive in the job market. Furthermore, it would be easier to recognise students with learning difficulties and the possibility of them getting adequate help would be increased. Besides, lowering criteria and giving students better marks than they deserve have an unfavourable impact on school atmosphere because students do not think of teachers as fair. Finally, we feel the need to once again emphasise the importance of a wide range of preventative actions at school's disposal, as well as preventing the help a child receives from actually being in a form or a pseudofavour (doing a child a disservice).

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Faith Matters? How Religion Shaped American Presidential Election 2016[2]

Abstract

Religion is one of the most important social institutions in the United States of America, and Americans are among the most religious nations in the world. In this paper I explore how religion shaped the American presidential election in 2016. Although the significance of religion in the United States has been acknowledged since the time of Tocqueville, it seems that religion was, once again, overlooked as a factor in pre- and post-elections analyses. The starting point of my paper is the fact that 80% of born again/evangelical Christians say they voted for Donald Trump, while only 16% of them voted for Hillary Clinton. This paper builds on existing empirical data and polls, as well as the analysis of the role and use of religion in the presidential campaign, to show that religion was a important factor in the final results of the election. Besides, in this paper I argue that religion has become an important factor in the United States foreign policy by analyzing the first year of Trump's presidency.

Key words: religion, politics, elections, United States of America, Trump, Clinton

Introduction

One of the most important lessons you will learn as a political science student is that "elections are interesting because they are precarious"[3].

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3) Quote by Dr. Milan Jovanović, Full-time Professor at Department of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Serbia.

However, the 2016 presidential election in the United States annunciated everything but precariousness. A majority of estimates announced the victory of Hilary Clinton, a Democratic Party nominee. America surprised the world in 2016. The presidency of Donald Trump, a Republican candidate, is a result of numerous factors, including economic and international politics at the top of the bucket list. However, in this paper I will try to answer the question *how did religion shape the 2016 presidential election?*

Therefore, the starting point of this paper is the fact that religion (still) matters in politics regardless of region or a specific religious tradition (Jevtić 2007a: 59-69). The United States is no exception to this; moreover, one can argue that the United States is actually a vivid example of how religion and politics mix and how religion can influence politics, political behavior and political outcomes. In this paper I describe the role of religion in the American presidential election 2016. According to the available pre- and post-election analysis, religion in the American presidential election 2016 was quite important. Beside the tendency of certain religious groups to vote Democratic and other Republican, it seems that religion shaped 2016 election in other ways too. In this paper I shall focus merely on the presidential debate between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in order to answer the question how did religion shape the American presidential election in 2016? Furthermore, I will briefly analyze the first year of Donald Trump's presidency with a focus on how, if at all, religion influenced some of his most important political decisions as the President of the United States.

Theoretical Rationale

The importance of religion in the United States and for Americans in general is a well-known fact. In Tocqueville's seminal work on *Democracy in America* (1835; 1840), he argues that "alongside each religion is found a political opinion that is joined to it by affinity" (Tocqueville 2002: 249), and that "religion in America… must be regarded as the foremost of the political institutions of that country" (Ibidem: 336). Following Tocqueville, while investigating the importance of religion for United States' presidents, Jevtić claimed that religion "played a huge role in the creation of the United States of America and continues to do so today" (Jevtić 2007b: 43). Consequently, the role of religion in the previous presidential election was a subject of many studies. For example, Green argues that religion "has long mattered in American elections…

Furthermore, the presidential candidates and their allies used extensive religious appeals to mobilize voters. In fact, much of the commentary and coverage of the campaign recognized the crucial links between religion and politics" (Green 2007: 1). Moreover, Chapp's research focuses on religious rhetoric and argues that the, "extent to which an election takes on a religious character depends on how successfully elites use religious language to activate emotions and identities" (Chapp 2012: 4). His argumentation is that the religious character of American politics "is shaped by a confluence of three factors: the religious makeup of the U.S. electorate, the psychological basis of persuasion, and the political demands imposed by competitive winner-take-all elections" (Ibidem: 5). Thomma's research on religion and political preferences of religious voters in the United States came up with a simple conclusion: "Want to know how Americans will vote next Election Day? Watch what they do the weekend before – If they attend religious services regularly, they probably will vote Republican by a 2-1 margin. If they never go, they likely will vote Democratic by a 2-1 margin" (Green 2007: 3; Thomma 2003). What is important to mention here is that the work Robert Putnam and David Campbell actually showed that it is not religious affiliation that matters, but rather religiosity. In their seminal work on religion in the United States, they claim that the best predictor of vote choice is religiosity, a "God Gap" (Putnam 2012). On the other hand, many empirical studies on how religion can influence political behavior actually use the example of electoral behavior in United States. For example, a study of Geoffrey C. Layman shows that in the period of time from 1980 to 1994 "the influence of doctrinal conservatism on partisanship and presidential vote choice is growing over time" (Layman 1997: 288). Although his study tends to empirically prove this correlation, he too claims that there "is already a good deal of evidence that political activists and voters with orthodox beliefs and affiliations tend to support the Republican Party while the Democratic Party draws its activists and voters disproportion – ately from the ranks of religious liberals and secularist" (Ibidem: 289). The backdrop of these studies mentioned above highlights the influence of religion behavior in voting practices, which propels the United States up the chart of the most religious nations in the world (Putnam, Campbell 2012; Wald, Calhoun and Brown 2011).

That being said, religious influence on political behavior and particularly voting preferences is a well-known fact. It is therefore surprising that there are only a few studies on the role of religion in American presidential election 2016. For example, authors in a special issue of *Serbian Political Thought* (Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, pp. 7-120), dedicated to the phenomena of the 2016 election, focused on different factors in the election. However, none of them found religion to be an aspect of interest to explore except for Nedeljković and Dašić who briefly mention the voting patterns of religious people in previous U.S. elections (Nedeljković and Dašić, 2016: 81-82). On the other hand, another Serbian journal, *Politics and Religion,* has published a special issued titled "Religion and Politics in contemporary United States of America" (Vol. 7, No. 2, 2013, pp. 229-395), gathering a number of scholars interested in the field of religion and politics. This issue represents a valid and a high-qualitative source for studying religion and politics in the U.S., but when it comes to the 2016 elections, we need to rely more on recent sources and available data.

Mostly relying on the above mentioned facts, Corwin E. Smidt argues that "religion serves to shape the political behavior of the American people in at least three different ways" (Smidt 2017: 134), due to its regarded position in American life and society. First, based on the work of Warner (1993), he indicated that religion is the fundamental category when it comes to identity and association in America. Therefore, Smidt claims that "religion shapes patterns of social interaction and perception among the American people that, in turn, serve to color their political preferences, mold their partisan identities, and affect their voting decisions" (Smidt 2017: 134). That is why many authors points out the association between religious affiliation and voting preferences. Secondly, religion can influence political behavior through specific forms of "constraints or parameters" within which political life in America operates. As an example, Smidt argues that even though there is a clear separation of Church and state in America, most of the people actually favor religious involvement in political life (Ibidem: 135-136). And lastly, Smidt claim that religion can serve "as a building stone for the mobilization of different voters on Election day" (Ibidem: 136). What is interesting here is that mobilization usually goes in both directions: political party leaders are using religion, specific religious rhetoric and issues in order to mobilize voters on one hand, but religious leaders and organizations can mobilize their adherents to vote specific candidate through public statements or speeches, on the other hand. Importantly, all the ways Smidt argues religion shape the political behavior of the American people have been empirically proven. When it comes to the 2016 election, Smidt analyzed change and continuity in American electoral politics and a specific relationship between presidential candidates, religion and their religiosity. He finally concludes that the 2016 election showed that the "voting patterns of those affiliated with the major American religious traditions basically reflected their past voting patterns – with the political alignment of the major religious traditions – and the strength of those alignments – largely remained unchanged" (Ibidem: 153). However, although this article gives useful insight into the relationship between religious affiliation and political behavior of Americans, with a solid and well developed theoretical framework, I believe that it is possible to develop its argument further.

How did Religion shape American presidential election 2016?

In order to answer this question, I propose a three-level analysis. In the first level, I will focus on the religious affiliation of the presidential candidates, namely Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, and their attitudes towards religion in general. In the second level, I will try to analyze if one or both used religion in their campaign, and if so, how? The third level of my analysis will focus on the empirical data provided by relevant polls and data, which can help us understand how religious affiliation influenced political choices in the American presidential race in 2016.

When it comes to the religious affiliation of the presidential candidates in America, it is of utmost importance to mention the fact that there is a certain pattern in America when it comes to the religious affiliation of the president of this country: approximately one-third of Americans think that it is important for a president to have strong religious beliefs. It is quite the same when it comes to the Congressional members; polls show that more than a three-fifths of Americans claim that "it is important to me that members of Congress have strong religious beliefs" (Ibidem: 136). These data show us that an atheist is not likely to become the president of the United States, at least not in the near future. Therefore, it is logical to presume that it is important for the candidates to express their religious affiliation to the voters. There is also one more interesting fact which should be mentioned here: in the entire history of the United States presidents, only one U.S. president has been Catholic, namely John F. Kennedy. The other forty four presidents were affiliated with one of the protestant denominations (Jevtić 2007b: 39-60). When it comes to the 2016 election, the Republican Party nominated Donald Trump as their candidate, who had to face Hillary Clinton, a Democratic Party nominee. Trump's religious affiliation is, however, paradoxical. What is paradoxical here is the fact that Trump was seen as the least religious when compared to all the other Republican Party candidates

(Pew Research Center 2016). Although he claims to be a member of the Presbyterian Church (Stebenne 2017), many would actually question his dedication to religion based on his lifestyle, especially in terms of his previous marriages and reportedly questionable business ethics. Trump's Presbyterian affiliation alongside his slogan „Make America Great Again" would bring to the minds of his supporters nostalgic memories of the days after WWII, when Americans attended church regularly and religion was a central to social life.

On the other hand, Hillary Clinton was affiliated with the United Methodist Church, and had been since she was a child. According to David Stebenne, her religiosity became more complicated when she married Bill Clinton, a lifelong Southern Baptist (*Ibidem*). These facts are important for political preferences of the American voters, according to the above stated data. However, even though the religious affiliations of Trump and Clinton is important for the voters, from the aspect of politology of religion it is even more important on how presidential candidates used religion as an instrument of drawing voters support. This brings us to the second level of my analysis.

If we try to put it simple, Trump's campaign was mostly based on the criticism of the Obama's administration, while Clinton's campaign was mostly based on the fact that she was a far competent and qualified candidate. Where then does religion fit in their campaigns? There were no substantial religious dimension of their campaigns; however, Trump's campaign was more religiously inspired than the Clinton's campaign, due to several reasons. This, however, does not mean that religion was a key factor in his campaign, but one of his most stressing messages were actually related to religion. Starting with his slogan "Make America Great Again", which was endorsed by many Evangelicals as a call to make American Christian Again. Although there have been disputes over this question, there is also a potential religious note in this slogan. That is why many Evangelicals openly endorsed Trump's candidacy. In the middle of the presidential campaign, in June 2016, Trump and his team decided to form the "Evangelical Executive Advisory Board". Members of this Board met a couple of times with Trump during the campaign. Although the very purpose of this board remained fairly unclear, it is logical to presume that Trump tried to make an additional impact on the church goers. What is important to note here is the fact that some of the most influential Evangelicals joined this board, including Jerry Falwell Jr., president of the Liberty University; Gary Bauer, president of the American Values association; Mark Burns, CEO of the NOW Television Network, followed with Tim Clinton, James Dobson, Jack Graham etc., making a total of 25 members. It is a fact that religious leaders in America, as well in other parts of the world, are at the same time political figures who tend to give direct political statements or even calls to their believers to vote in a specific manner. For example, Jerry Falwell Jr. openly endorsed Trump's presidency, surely making a strong impact on the voting preferences of his believers. However, one of the most striking pieces of evidence of the role religion in Trump's campaign is his proposal for the shift in immigration policy. Namely, he called in his campaign, and later on confirmed in the speech after accepting a Republican Party nomination, for a travel ban on Muslims entering the United States. He tried to defend this position with the fact that the travel ban should be imposed only to the countries affiliated with terrorism and that it had nothing to do with religion itself. More importantly, he tried to support his position with data and polls, indicating that the American were in favor of such a policy. Thus, this was another example of how religion was used, both directly and indirectly in Trump's campaign in order to attract voters. This is based on the fact that even though America is a multicultural society, there are still significant differences in the country based in racial, and above all, religious affiliations. Compared to Trump, there is a little evidence that Hillary Clinton used religion extensively in her campaign. However, she did make an interesting statement after the acceptance of the Democratic Party nomination when she said that American society has to change its "deep-seated cultural codes, religious beliefs and structural biases". Some of the reporters even regarded this statement as a war on religion (Thiessen 2016). Despite this and a couple of other remarks by Clinton regarding religion, it seemed that her and her team did not regarded religion as an important factor in the campaign. As already mentioned, Clinton's campaign was mostly based on emphasizing her political experience and Trump's lack of, which they believed would resonate with most Americans and lead to a substantial increase in voters support. Besides, Democrats counted on their traditional voters: religious but not affiliated with any religion, other social groups, such are African Americans and women, Jewish community. Therefore, Clinton's campaign was more focused on these voters, rather than religiously affiliated Americans.

In the third level of this analysis, I shall focus on several available sources and data on how the faithful voted. Exit poll conducted by Pew Research Center, Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) and CNN claimed that religion did matter in the 2016 presidential election in United States. For example, exit poll by Pew Research claim that "eight-in-ten self-identified white, born-again/evangelical Christians say they voted for Trump, while just 16% voted for Clinton” (Smith, Martinez 2016). This is very interesting report, indicating that Trump succeed to win the votes of the Evangelicals, which supports the pattern from the previous elections about the support of the religiously affiliated Americans to the Republican Party candidate. However, it is important to mention that this 65% margin of victory within this group “matched or exceeded the victory margins of George W. Bush in 2004, John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012” (Ibidem).

Table 1. Presidential vote by religious affiliation and race

Presidential vote by religious affiliation and race

	2000		2004		2008		2012		2016		Dem change '12-'16
	Gore	Bush	Kerry	Bush	Obama	McCain	Obama	Romney	Clinton	Trump	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Protestant/other Christian	42	56	40	59	45	54	42	57	39	58	-3
Catholic	50	47	47	52	54	45	50	48	45	52	-5
White Catholic	45	52	43	56	47	52	40	59	37	60	-3
Hispanic Catholic	65	33	65	33	72	26	75	21	67	26	-8
Jewish	79	19	74	25	78	21	69	30	71	24	+2
Other faiths	62	28	74	23	73	22	74	23	62	29	-12
Religiously unaffiliated	61	30	67	31	75	23	70	26	68	26	-2
White, born-again/evangelical Christian	n/a	n/a	21	78	24	74	21	78	16	81	-5
Mormon	n/a	n/a	19	80	n/a	n/a	21	78	25	61	+4

Note: “Protestant” refers to people who described themselves as “Protestant,” “Mormon” or “other Christian” in exit polls; this categorization most closely approximates the exit poll data reported immediately after the election by media sources. The "white, born-again/evangelical Christian" row includes both Protestants and non-Protestants (e.g., Catholics, Mormons, etc.) who self-identify as born-again or evangelical Christians.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of exit poll data. 2004 Hispanic Catholic estimates come from aggregated state exit polls conducted by the National Election Pool. Other estimates come from Voter News Service/National Election Pool national exit polls. 2012 data come from reports at NBCnews.com and National Public Radio. 2016 data come from reports at NBCnews.com and CNN.com.

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Source: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/, accessed January 4th 2017.

Table 1 clearly indicates Trump’s victory over the religiously affiliated Americans. Besides the major gap in the votes from white, born-again Evangelicals, Trump also gain support from American Catholics, but not within the Hispanic Catholic community though. This was rather expected, due to Trump’s views and attitudes towards Hispanic immigrants in general, alongside his views on foreign policy towards Mexico. He also gained significant support from the Mormon community, which was as well expected. On the other side, Clinton gain support by a significant margin from the Jewish community, Hispanic Catholics, other faith and religiously unaffiliated. All of these groups in America are traditionally voting Democrats, and by that there is nothing new in the 2016 election. That being said, according to this data, there are no significant change in the pattern on religion and political preferences in elections 2016.

Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) indicated that there were no significant changes in voting patterns of religiously (un)affiliated in the 2016 election. According to PRRI "the religion vote broke along strikingly familiar lines" (Cox 2016). It means that, compared to the elections in 2004, 2008 and 2012, 2016 election were actually no different in a major way. Table 2 shows that voting preferences of major religious groups, and those who describe themselves with no religious affiliation, share almost the same pattern described in the theoretical rationale of this paper. Namely, religiously affiliated Americans, particularly Evangelicals, tend to support Republican candidate, while Jewish people, minor religious groups and those with no religious affiliation tend to support Democratic candidate. As mentioned above, this is a clear evidence of the "God gap" in American politics.

Table 2. Presidential Vote by Religious Affiliation (2004 – 2016)

	2004		2008		2012		2016		
	John Kerry	George W. Bush	Barack Obama	John McCain	Barack Obama	Mitt Romney	Hillary Clinton	Donald Trump	*% of electorate*
	48%	51%	53%	46%	51%	47%	48%	48%	*100%*
White born again Christian	21	78	24	74	21	78	16	81	*26*
Catholic	47	52	54	45	50	48	45	52	*23*
White Catholic	43	56	47	52	40	59	37	60	-
Hispanic Catholic	65	33	72	26	75	21	67	26	-
Mormon	19	80	-	-	21	78	25	61	*1*
Jewish	74	25	78	21	69	30	71	24	*3*
Unaffiliated	67	31	75	23	70	26	68	26	*15*

Note: 2004 Hispanic Catholic estimates came from aggregated state exit polls conducted by the National Election Pool.

Sources: National exit polls, 2004-2016.

Source: Public Religion Research Institute, available at: *https://www.prri.org/spotlight/religion-vote-presidential-election-2004-2016/*, accessed January 8th 2018.

Table 2 shows there is a clear empirical support for the above mentioned tendency between religious affiliation and voting preferences in American presidential elections. That being said, it seems that support from Christian Evangelicals for Trump, a Republican candidate, is not something new in American elections. However, he won their votes with the highest margin since 2004. What is important to mention here is the issue of race and religion. Support from white Evangelicals is something that really matters here. Earlier in this work I have mentioned that Trump's slogan "Make America Great Again" has a specific racial connotation. If we take a look into Table 3, we can see that Trump won support in most of the states with dominant white population.

Table 3. States with dominant White Christian Population



Source: Public Religion Research Institute, available at: *https://www.prri.org/spotlight/religion-vote-presidential-election-2004-2016/*, accessed January 8th 2018.

That being said, Trump won support in almost every state with dominant white Christian population, including Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania. According to PRRI's, only exception to this pattern was Minnesota, where her narrowly lost. What is important here is the fact that Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania made a difference in the final results of the election 2016.

On the other hand, CNN's exit polls are also useful in order to get insight of how the faithful voted in 2016. According to 24558 respondents, who were surveyed after leaving the voting place, there is a similar margin between Clinton and Trump when it comes to the white/born-again Evangelicals, compared to the above mentioned Pew Research. According to this source, 80% of white/born-again Evangelical voted Trump, 16% voted Clinton, with 4% of those with no answer. Furthermore, this source confirmed that Trump won the support with a high margin within Protestants (59% voted Trump, 36% Clinton) and Mormons (56% Trump, 28% Clinton). Trump won the votes of America's Catholics and other Christians, although with a significantly smaller margin. For example, Trump won 50% of Catholic votes (compared to Clinton's 46%) and 54% of votes of other Christians (compared to 43% of them who voted for Clinton). However, Clinton won support from the Jewish community with a high margin (71% voted Clinton, while 23% voted Trump), as well as support from the people affiliated with other religions than Christian (Clinton 58%, Trump 32%) and particularly of those with no religion (Clinton 67%, Trump 25%), according to CNN Exit polls (CNN 2016). What is also interesting is the fact that we can trace a pattern in the relations between the church service attendance and voting preferences, as it was states in the theoretical framework of this paper. To put is simple, it is expected for a person who visits church's more often to vote Republican, and vice versa, those who do not attend church often are more likely to vote Democrats. According to the CNN data, we can see that those who attend church "weekly or more" voted Trump by 55%, and Clinton with 41%. Similar data are shown for those who attend church monthly or more. On the other hand, Clinton won support from those who attend church less often. For example, those who never attend church said they voted 62% Clinton, and 30% for Trump (Ibidem).

The question which arises is: why is the support of America's white Evangelicals so important? One of the main reasons is, of course, in the numbers. According to the organization "Lift to vote", white Evangelicals are estimated at 26% of eligible voters in the United States, which makes it about 52 million (Lift the Vote 2016). This organization has a goal to mobilize the Christian voters around America, in order to make their voice heard. In the 2016 elections, they were particularly interested in several "battleground states" (or the swing states), namely Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Nevada, North Carolina, Florida and Wisconsin.[4] According to them, Evangelicals support Trump in these very important states, and that is why Trump's tried to get closer to these voters in his campaign. Trump's stands on abortion, alongside with his views on fighting religious extremism and terrorism, immigration policy and same-sex marriage. Also, one important thing should also be stressed. Trump won the large margin support within white Evangelicals, which is a significant fact as it indicates a specific racial problem which still exist in the U.S. And last but not the least, according to polls, most Evangelicals said that they are mostly concerned about economy,

4) "Battleground states", or the "swing states", includes, besides these, Ohio, New Hampshire and Iowa. They are of mass importance in the U.S. elections due to the fact that either party has a chance to win the elections in it, making it of great importance for the final elections outcome.

which is the first driving force for them in the elections day (Renaud 2017). That is why it is important to understand that Trump's "Make America Great Again" campaign succeeded to involve all of these issues and to target specific group of people.

Religion and the first year of Trump's presidency: the saga continues

First year of Trump's presidency was rather turbulent. However, when it comes to religion, it seems that religion was very present in his first year of his presidency, particularly in the foreign policy. According to several different authors, "this is a significant break from the Obama administration, which tended to view other factors as more significant drivers of foreign policy" (Green 2017). What is very important to point out is the fact of how religion is differently treated by Obama's and Trump's administration. On one side, during the Obama's mandate, it seems that religion was rather considered as a one of the factor which can influence politics, economy, or conflict, while Trump's administration sees religion as a significant contribution to violent extremism (Ibidem). However, as many other things under Trump's presidency, role of religion in his first year of presidency has been paradoxical. On one hand, president Trump shut down the State Department's Office of Religion and Global Affairs, which was intended to work with international religious groups. On the other side, Trump managed to expand relations with Saudi Arabia, even though this country is well-known for banning religious right to minorities and other religious groups other than Sunni Muslims. Besides, Trump's rhetoric is often based in religion, and religious terms. The implementation of a "travel ban" or "Muslim ban", and recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital by the United States of America were two significant political decisions made by Trump and his administration in 2017 which had certain, or even dominant, religious dimension. The appointment of several conservative federal judges and Trump's decision to allow employers not to cover contraception for their employees is also related to religion.

When it comes to the travel ban, President Trump issued an Executive order 13769 (officially titled as "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States") shortly after his inauguration in January 20th 2017. This decision caused mass protests among the USA, claiming that religious tolerance, which is one of the corner stones of the USA, is under threat and that this ban presents a religious discrimination. Two important questions arise here. First, does this ban have anything to do with religion in the first place? And second, why did Trump decided to make such a move? When it comes to the first question, religion was often used as one of the key arguments in supporting this decision. The very idea was to temporary ban immigration from "terror-prone regions", which could affect security in the USA. However, this ban became known as the "Muslim ban" while most of those regions are actually dominantly inhabited by Muslims.[5] Thus, this political decision was at the very beginning related to religion. On the other side, imposing a travel ban to certain countries was one of the Trump's promises to the voters in his campaign. What is particularly important here is that many of the white Evangelicals, who actually gave a significant contribution to his victory, supports this idea. According to the Pew Research, 76% of white Evangelicals approve the travel ban, while black Protestants (84%) and 74% those with no religious affiliation (74%) disapprove this (Smith 2017). After a debate on of this ban was constitutional, the United States' Supreme Court ruled that Trump's order "could be immediately imposed while multiple court cases challenging the ban are resolved" (The Guardian, December 4th 2017).

However, one of the most captivating evidences of how religion shaped the first year of Trump's presidency is the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, on December 6th 2017. It is well known that the status of Jerusalem if the key issue in the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. The value of Jerusalem lies completely in religion, as it represents a holy place of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. That is why recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital is a tricky question. Trump's recognition caused many negative statements from the Muslims leaders and people, and has a tendency not to drive towards the reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, but rather toward the future conflicts. However, if we once again have a look into the support that Trump received from specific religious people in the USA, we would see that this political decision was related to it. There is a strong support from the conservative Evangelicals for supporting this decision. For example, two Evangelical groups, namely the "My Faith Votes" and "American Christian Leaders for Israel", had influenced this move. Besides, there is also a significant influence of Trump's conservative Evangelical advisors. For Evangelicals, the significance of Jerusalem is solely based in theology. Jerusalem was a place where Solomon's temple was built. After two demolitions of the Temple (first one in 587 BCE, and the second one in 70), there is a

5) There were three "travel bans" issued by President Trump. First one included Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Second one took Iraq off, while in the third one added Chad and North Korea to the list.

strong Biblical message on restoring the Temple which is connected to the second coming of Jesus. This message is mostly accepted within the Evangelical Christians, which was transformed in the movement called "Christian Zionism" (Clark 2007; Jevtić 2013). Therefore, this political decision is strongly based in religion, thus making understanding of religion very important for understanding political outcomes and behavior.

Concluding remarks

The American presidential election in 2016, as well as evidences from the first year of Trump's presidency, showed that religion still matters in politics. Even though it would be wrong to label religion as a key factor in the final outcome of the American presidential race in 2016, it would be equally wrong to ignore and neglect its role. Presidency of Donald Trump is a result of numerous factors, mostly based in domestic and foreign policy, but in this paper I argued that religion gave a significant impulse to his campaign and moreover, in his first year of presidency.

Trump's campaign had an important religious dimension, compared to the one of Hilary Clinton. Trump succeeds to gain support from White/born-again Evangelicals, which represented one-fifth of the eligible voters in 2016 election and, according to available data, 8 in 10 of them voted for him in 2016. Moreover, White Evangelicals represents the dominant group in many "swing states", such are Wisconsin, Michigan or Pennsylvania, where he won support and, consequently, the presidency. On the other side, Hillary Clinton won support from traditional Democrat voters, religious unaffiliated, Jewish community and African Americans. That being said, the pattern between religious affiliation and voting preferences in United States has been once again proven. It is likely that religiously affiliated will vote Republican, while religiously unaffiliated will vote Democrat. Besides the role of religion in presidential election 2016, it was important to stress the fact that religion continued to play a significant role in Trump's first year of presidency. This fact can be seen in numerous examples. In this paper, I used cases of a "travel ban" and recognition of Jerusalem as a capital of Israel to illustrate this interesting aspect of the first year of Trump's presidency.

Evidences from the 2016 presidential election in United States, as well as from the first year of Trump's presidency, show that political science should not ignore religion and its importance for politics. Religion has a potential to influence politics, political behavior and outcomes, and therefore, it should not be neglected. At the same time, it is equally important not to overestimate its influence. Religion is just a piece in a complex puzzle of politics, „a nut or bolt" (Elster 2015) for political scientist, which can be seen from the experience of United States, as this paper argued.

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Perception of Discrimination in Serbia: Normative Framework and Practice[4]

Abstract

The paper, firstly, points to the existing normative anti-discrimination framework of the Republic of Serbia, or whether and to what extent the existing Serbian legal solutions comply with international standards. The authors then present a comparative analysis of the results of their research into the attitudes of Serbian police to discrimination with those of similar research conducted among citizens and other public administration representatives in Serbia up to this point. Thus, the authors offer a complete picture of how Serbian citizens and public administration representatives, including the police, perceive discrimination in Serbia. In the third part of the paper, the authors attempt to point to the most important indicators and results of institutional response to the forms of discrimination manifested in the Serbian society, particularly through the activity of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, and through the analysis of case law and jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Serbia.

Key words: Discrimination, police, citizens, Serbia, Constitutional Court.

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Introduction

In the late '90s of the 20th century, Serbia entered the period of transition, which meant a thorough revision of the legal framework for human rights protection to ensure its compliance with international standards (Uildriks 2005). As part of this reform, Serbia had a duty to revise its anti-discrimination normative framework as well. After more than 15 years on the transition path, Serbia is now formally standing at the door of the European Union, and yet one question recurs – is Serbian society ready and able, and to what extent, to properly protect fundamental civilizational values, of which the equality of citizens, or non-discrimination, are at the top of the scale of these values?

This article attempts to offer the answer to that question. Firstly, through the analysis of the existing normative framework for protection against discrimination in the Republic of Serbia, and then through a comparative analysis of the results of empirical research on Serbian citizens' and public administration representatives' perceptions of discrimination. This analysis was made possible by previous quantitative surveys that measured attitudes of citizens, police officers and other public administration representatives towards discrimination. The analysis of these attitudes clearly shows whether the adopted legal rules are accompanied by adequate legal awareness and recognition of the essence of discrimination, its presence in the Serbian society, and vulnerability of social groups. Specifically, anti-discrimination normative framework, even if fully appropriate, cannot be effective unless a society has an adequately developed individual awareness of the need to eliminate discrimination, the awareness of its essence, harmfulness, and other issues relevant to understanding this social phenomenon. Of course, no society can be expected to have a fully harmonized normative (expected, prescriptive) and actual state of matters, which requires an appropriate institutional response (preventive-repressive) to the manifestations of discrimination. This is another field where Serbia records results which will be discussed in the third part of the paper. Thus, we would like to offer a complete picture of the basic means of eliminating discrimination from the Serbian society, and of the results of this combat which most clearly demonstrate the true commitment of the Serbian society towards this task.

Anti-discrimination normative framework of the Republic of Serbia

Serbia has accepted and ratified the most important international universal and regional treaties in the field of fundamental human rights, as well as discrimination (Bantekas, Oette 2013; Doebler 2007). During 2001 Serbia has ratified universal international conventions - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination from 1965, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women from, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 1966, Convention on the Rights of the Child from 1989. It is important to underline that all these conventions were ratified by the former Yugoslavia, thus Serbia has just accessioned to them again as the new independent state in the form of succession (Šurlan 2014). As for the conventions that were created later on, Serbia has ratified, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities from 2006 in 2009 (Šurlan 2015). All ratified conventions are part of the Serbian legal system; they are directly applicable before Serbian courts. Besides, Serbia itself comes under obligations created by conventions in terms of compliance with monitoring bodies over the conventions (Bantekas, Oette 2013).

As for the regional arrangements, Serbia has become the member of the Council of Europe, the most important regional international organization in the field of the protection and promotion of human rights, in 2003.[5] Prior to the membership, Serbia has ratified Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) already in 2001.[6] As the member state Serbia has diligently ratified European Convention on Human Rights (1950) in 2004, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) in 2006 and Revised European Social Charter (1996) in 2009. Other legal acts, produced by the CoE organs accordingly are applicable in Serbia, such as, Recommendation 1915 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly – Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity or The Strasbourg Declaration on Roma (Council of Europe 2010).

5) Serbia has become 45th Member State of the Council of Europe on 3 April 2003
6) It is worth mentioning that not all Council of Europe member states have ratified this act; until now four states have neither ratified nor signed the Convention – Andorra, France, Monaco and Turkey, while four states have just signed it – Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg and Iceland.

Serbian legal system, in whole, is devoted to the protection from discrimination. In furtherance of the international legal acts, Serbia has created significant legal basis for the protection from discrimination starting with the Constitution itself (Simović, Zekavica 2012). The Constitution of Serbia, contains a broad catalogue of human rights, proclaims equality and prohibits discrimination. The Constitution stipulates that *"any direct or indirect discrimination on any ground, particularly on race, sex, national origin, social origin, birth, religion, political or other opinion, property status, culture, language, age, mental or physical disability shall be prohibited"* (Constitution of Serbia: art. 21, par. 3). Thus, there is no definition of discrimination in the form of the constitutional norm, but a list of grounds that could form the basis for differentiation.

Fundamental anti-discrimination legal act – The Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination was adopted in 2009. It is both the Law that prohibits discrimination, as well as the law that provides foundation of the new independent body - Commissioner for Protection of Equality and tools for every person, group or state to react to the discriminatory behaviour. Important novelty introduced by this Law is the institution of the Commissioner for Protection of Equality. It is positioned as an independent, autonomous and specialized public body, with two main jurisdictions - to prevent and to protect from discrimination. Together with the Ombudsman of Serbia, whose main function is protection of citizens' human rights from the state officials/bodies violations, Commissioner provides improved method of human rights protection (Simović, Zekavica 2012).

Specific anti-discrimination law, which is of the utmost importance in the scheme of anti-discrimination legal acts, is the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, adopted in 2002. Protection of minorities is generally important issue, recognized as such by general international law and incorporated in the majority of national systems. For Serbia, as a multinational country it is even of higher interest. The Law on the Prevention of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities was adopted during 2006. The subject-matter of this law is prohibition of the discrimination of disabled persons, while their inclusion into society was regulated within the Law on the Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities, adopted in 2009. Discrimination grounded on gender is stipulated in The Gender Equality Act from 2009 (Simović 2015; Šurlan 2014).

Besides presented laws, there is a whole reservoir of laws with specific subject-matter that refers to the issue of discrimination in several articles. Labor Law, for example, prohibits discrimination in employment; the Law on the Fundamentals of the Education System reacts to discrimination by introducing the inclusive education. In the field of education there are also the Law on Preschool Education and the Law on Youth. Freedom of religion and anti-discriminatory norms are incorporated in the Law on Churches and Religious Organizations. Criminal law protection against discrimination, as specifically important, is regulated by the Serbian Criminal Code. Several criminal offences refer to the prohibition of the discrimination: violation of equality – Art.128, violation of the right to use language and script – Art. 129, prohibition of racial and other discrimination – Art. 387 (Todorović, Stjelja, Grujić 2013).

This brief introduction into the network of anti-discrimination legal acts, strategies and bodies that were formed and adopted in Serbia since the beginning of this century, shows state's coordinated action in the field of discrimination. It would not be exaggerating if we state at this point that normative framework, as well as anti-discrimination bodies are formulated and organized according to the highest human rights standards (Simović, Zekavica 2012). First decade of the 21 century was marked with ratification of international legal acts and adoption of national laws. Second decade started with adoption of strategies there were about to implement laws. Hand in hand with this difficult task, comes the issue of the perception and knowledge of citizens on the matter of discrimination. Sole existences of laws and strategies have no meaning if they are not truly incorporated within the population.

Perceptions of discrimination in Serbia – an analysis of the results of empirical research

Empirical research investigating attitudes towards discrimination provides a clear insight into the perception of this social problem (Jones 2015; Kääriäinen 2012). In this part of the paper, we would like to present and analyze the key findings of researches on attitudes of citizens and representatives of public administration of the Republic of Serbia (RS) towards discrimination that have been conducted in Serbia so far.

In Serbia, several surveys of this type have been conducted to date. At the request of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, and with the support and assistance of the UN Development Programme, CeSID has implemented such public opinion surveys in four iterations so far – in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013.[7] For the purposes of Office of

7) CeSID - The Center for Free Elections and Democracy is a non-governmental,

the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, and within the project 'Support to the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality for the Efficient Implementation of Anti-discrimination Legislation in the Republic of Serbia', in 2013, Ipsos Strategic Marketing carried out a similar public attitude survey among the representatives of all three branches of power (legislative, executive and judicial), at all three levels (national, provincial, local) (IPSOS 2013.)[8] And finally, within the internal scientific research projects of the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies in Belgrade, we have conducted, in two research cycles thus far, similar surveys of attitudes towards discrimination among members of the Serbian police.[9] This survey was necessary in order to complete the picture of public administration's perception of discrimination, because the IPSOS survey of public administration representatives did not involve police members (Zekavica, Kesić 2016).

Bearing in mind the original concept of this paper and realistic limitations related to its scope, we will focus on key findings concerning the level of legal awareness of citizens and public administration in Serbia with respect to: recognition of the essence of discrimination and its presence in the Serbian society, degree of vulnerability of social groups in Serbia, social and ethnic distances of citizens and the police, perceptions of influence and responsibility of public and social institutions in the occurrence of discrimination, and the existence and acceptance of prejudice among citizens and public administration representatives and the police in Serbia. A comparative analysis of the results of all three surveys is possible insofar as the survey instruments used therein were identical in content. The citizen attitude survey and police attitude survey used identical questionnaires, while the IPSOS survey of attitudes of other representatives of public administration used similar rather than

non-political and non-profit organisation. The Center was established with a primary goal to organise impartial monitoring of the elections in Serbia, including media, voting process and parallel counting of votes.

8) Ipsos Strategic Marketing is part of IPSOS Group, a regional leader in public opinion and market research. As part of Ipsos Group, the services of Ipsos Strategic Marketing in the sector of public opinion research are part of Ipsos Social Research Institute. The research includes attitudes, behaviour and experience of citizens and narrower target groups with respect to the most diverse spheres of life.

9) The first research cycle was carried out in the period between April and May 2014, and it investigated the attitudes of members of crime investigation police from five regional police directorates in the Republic of Serbia - Belgrade, Novi Sad, Subotica, Vranje and Novi Pazar. The second cycle was carried out in September-November 2015, and it investigated the attitudes of members of police of general jurisdiction (public order and peace) and traffic police from seven regional police directorates – Belgrade, Novi Sad, Subotica, Vranje, Novi Pazar, Kragujevac and Zajecar.

identical survey instrument, thus limiting the comparative analysis to the matching issues and topics. Table 1 provides basic details on the methodology used in all three surveys.

Table 1. Comparative samples methodology

Survey conducted by	CeSID	IPSOS	Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies
Sample	*Citizens*	*Public administration*	*Police*
Fieldwork	21-28 November 2013	3.10.2013 - 30.10.2013	3.2.2014 – 25.2.2014 (cycle I) 10.9.2015 - 30.09.2015 (cycle II)
Sample type and size for the Republic of Serbia	Random representative sample of 1,200 citizens aged 15 and over, throughout the Republic of Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija	The planned sample was a quota sample and it included 1,352 respondents from the Republic of Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija	Random representative sample of 734 police officers from all three operational segments of the police – crime investigation, public order and peace, and traffic police in 7 regional police directorates on the territory of Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija – Belgrade, Novi Sad, Subotica, Novi Pazar, Vranje, Kragujevac, Zajecar
Selection of statistical units	Random sampling without replacement – every second home address from the starting point, within the boundaries of the polling station	The sample was planned in such a way that it represented the basic composition of each given institution according to the following groups: judicial, executive and legislative authority	The sample was planned in such a way that it represented the basic composition of each given institution according to the principle of regional distribution of employees in police directorates
Selection of respondents within a statistical unit	Random sampling without replacement – respondents were selected by the method of 'next birthday' in relation to the survey date	The sample was planned according to the following variables: Government of the Republic of Serbia, Provincial Government, City Councils, Municipal Councils, Courts, Prosecutor's offices	Selection was made by heads of directorates – police officers in active employment
Survey technique	Face to face, within households (F2F, face to face)	Face to face, in the premises of public administration authorities (F2F, face to face)	PAPI - Paper and Pen Interview
Survey instrument	Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Questionnaire

Survey findings

Spontaneous understanding of discrimination and perception of its presence in Serbia –All three types of survey examined whether the respondents recognize the essence of discrimination. The respondents were asked to state what they think discrimination was. Their first associations to the term discrimination reflect some of its main features: endangering/denial of rights, inequality, belittling and endangering due to differences, etc. Table 2 shows the stated answers in the comparative analysis of the results of all three surveys.

Table 2. Recognition of the essence of discrimination (%).
Question: According to you, what is discrimination?

	Citizens	Public administration	Police
Endangering of rights	22	23	3
Belittling	13	12	7
Inequality	8	18	21
Rejection	6	4	0
Endangering due to differences	5	20	8
Other	4	15	10
Don't know/no attitude	24	2	49

As can be seen in table 2, there is significant divergence among all three groups of respondents in terms of the main feature of discrimination, as they cite a number of different features in different proportions. The highest coincidence of views is found between citizens and public administration on the endangering of rights and belittling as discrimination features, and between public administration and the police on inequality as discrimination feature. However, what stands out as a concern is the fact that every second police officer was unable to identify discrimination – 49%. This proportion is the average of the results obtained from the surveys of members of all three operational segments of the police – crime investigation police (47% - see Zekavica 2014:67), public order and peace police (49%) and traffic police (50%). These data clearly indicate that general familiarity of the Serbian police with the essence of discrimination is inadequate (Zekavica, Kesić 2016). This fact is particularly worrisome if we consider that failure to recognize discriminatory behaviour prevents the appropriate response to it, which is unacceptable for the police in a democratic society and the rule of law (Zekavica, Kešetović 2015).

The examination of respondents' attitudes regarding the perceived level of presence of discrimination in the Serbian society revealed that the majority of citizens and public administration representatives (including the police) consider that discrimination is present in the Serbian society to a certain extent. Thus, only 3 % of the respondents (average of all three surveys) consider that there is no discrimination in the Serbian society. The highest proportion of those who think discrimination is present in Serbia is among public administration representatives – 98%, citizens – 94%, and police officers – 79%. However, the most noticeable proportion of those who have no attitude towards this issue is among the police – 16%, and hence the lower proportions regarding whether and to what extent discrimination is present. Also, the area perceived by all three groups of respondents as one where discrimination is most common is employment – as many as 61% of public administration representatives hold this view, followed by 35% of citizens and 17% of police officers. Beside employment, the respondents frequently cited healthcare services, education and schooling and social welfare services, but in considerably lower proportions (IPSOS 2013; CeSID 2013; Zekavica 2014).

Perception of vulnerability of social groups – All three surveys asked the respondents to name the social group they think is discriminated against the most in Serbia. The common belief shared by citizens and public administration representatives (including the police) is that Roma are the most vulnerable social group in Serbia. This opinion is held by 42% of citizen respondents, 51% of public administration respondents and 16% of police respondents. Differences occur in the perceptions of vulnerability of other social groups in Serbia; thus, as viewed by citizens, the second most vulnerable group are women – 42%, then persons with disabilities – 28%, the poor – 27%, and the elderly – 24%. Public administration representatives rank as the second most vulnerable group women – 35%, the poor – 31%, and sexual minority representatives – 27%. The police' list includes sexual minority representatives – 13%, followed by the poor – 8%, women – 7%, Serbs – 7%, persons with disabilities - 7%.

As can be seen, there is a significant difference between citizen and public administration respondents and police respondents in terms of proportions reporting on the above question, which is the result of exceptionally high proportion of police officers – 50 % who have no attitude towards the degree of vulnerability of social groups in Serbia. The high proportion of police officers without an attitude towards this issue is a cause for concern, because the police maintain a daily contact with citizens, and hence the awareness of which citizen groups are socially threatened constitutes the information necessary and useful for the police in performing their tasks and adapting their role to the needs of vulnerable groups (Mršević 2014; Loftus 2009).

Analysis of the existence and level of socio-ethnic distances – Investigating the existence and level of social and ethnic distances is vital to establishing the index of discrimination, as the existence of distances, or reluctance to enter into social relationships of appropriate type with particular persons is just the other side of the coin of readiness to discriminate against those persons. The existence and level of this phenomenon were gauged within citizen and police attitude surveys. The IPSOS survey of attitudes of public administration representatives lacked this analysis, which thus makes the results comparable only for citizens and the police. The existence and level of social and ethnic distances were measured using a version of Bogardus scale which comprised eight different types of social relationships, of varying degrees of social interaction – from the type that entails the broadest interaction, like the one of fellow citizens, through more intimate forms of social relationships: to be neighbors, co-workers, someone to be a teacher to our children, to be friends, someone to be our boss at work, someone on the high elected position in the state, and to be spouses or our children's spouse. The questionnaire indicated 11 ethnic and social groups (ethnic – Roma, Bosniaks, Hungarians, Croats, Albanians, Serbs; social – LGBT, religious minorities, refugees, asylum seekers, and HIV-positive people). The respondents were asked to answer either affirmatively or negatively (binary responses) whether they *'would mind if a member of the stated groups…'* was in the above stated relationships with them. Thus we obtained a clear picture of the existence and level of social and ethnic distances, or the willingness-unwillingness to socially interact with members of the stated groups.

The obtained results indicate the following. The most prominent social and ethnic distances of citizens are shown towards members of sexual minorities (LGBT) – an average of 43% of the affirmative answers for all types of social relationships, then towards HIV-positive persons –39% average, to Albanians – 35%, whilst the least social distances are found to be towards Serbs – 2%, refugees – 10% and Hungarians – 14%. When interpreting these results, one should consider the ethnicity of most of the respondents, or the fact that 87% of them were of Serbian nationality (CESID 2013).

When it comes to Serbian police officers, the most prominent social and ethnic distances are found to be towards members of sexual minorities – an average of 44% for all three operational segments of the police (crime investigation, public order and peace and traffic police), then towards HIV-positive persons – 38%, and Albanians – 36%. The least social and ethnic distances are found to be towards Serbs – 13%, refugees – 16%, and religious minorities – 18%. In regard to Roma, both groups of the respondents are found to feel relatively low distances, namely 23 % - citizens and 27% - police officers.

General conclusion is that police officers show somewhat higher distance than citizens towards most of the groups for which they were surveyed. Interestingly, the most prominent difference in terms of greater average social and ethnic distance of the police, compared to citizens, was shown towards Serbs (-11)!

Perception of responsibilities and roles (influence) of institutions in the occurrence of discrimination – The perception of roles and responsibilities of particular governmental and non-governmental institutions in the occurrence of discrimination was explored in all three surveys. The analysis of attitudes towards institutions with respect to discrimination was focused on capturing the respondents' attitudes regarding two questions – *which institution is the most responsible one for discrimination* and *which of the indicated institutions could influence the reduction of discrimination*. The questionnaire included a list of institutions and offered a five-point scale for responses to each question (1 – not at all, 5 much, 0 – I don't know).

The institutions that citizens and public administration representatives (including the police) perceive as the most responsible ones for the occurrence of discrimination include: the Government, political parties, National Assembly, media and non-governmental organisations. Citizens and public administration representatives share similar perceptions regarding institutional responsibility for the occurrence of discrimination in the Serbian society. Certain differences do exist, but they are, in our opinion, almost minimal and insignificant. Thus, topping the citizens' list are the political parties, Government, National Assembly and judiciary (CeSid 2013:37). The public administration representatives' list includes National Assembly, Government, courts and family (IPSOS 2013:58), while the police place media on top, followed by political parties, non-governmental organizations, and also vulnerable groups themselves.

From the results obtained, one gains the impression that the key creators of discrimination, as perceived by citizens and public administration representatives, are precisely the subjects of political power. In other words, precisely those who should be the creators of such policies, programs and strategies by which discrimination should be reduced or completely eradicated.

In regard to the influence (role) of individual institutions on reducing the extent of discrimination, the findings indicate a trend more or less similar to that of the responsibility for the occurrence of discrimination in general. The most influential institutions, as perceived by citizens, are: the Government, National Assembly and media. Public administration representatives consider that these are family, media, school, Commissioner for the Protection of Equality and the Ombudsman, whilst the police reported media, political parties, the Republic Government, family and school.

An important fact is that police officers do not see the police as an institution more essentially responsible or influential in the occurrence of discrimination, which was revealed in both 2014 survey (Zekavica 2014:80) and the findings of the most recent police attitude survey from the end of 2015. The only institution that police officers perceive as less responsible and influential than the police is the army. This belief does not correspond to truth, because one should bear in mind the fact that police officers maintain a daily contact with citizens and that in doing so they may have the opportunity to enforce laws, and therefore to possibly discriminate against citizens.

The fact causing concern is that almost every second police officer – 48% is not aware of the existence of institution concerned with combating discrimination to which citizens can refer if exposed to discrimination. Only 11% of the police officers in total cited the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality as one such institution, which is another cause for concern, the more so as the police officers are usually the first to interact with victims and is, therefore, essential for them to be able to provide these persons with necessary and helpful information about whom to address for protection against discrimination. However, survey findings indicate exceptionally high proportions of those who would never approach anyone if being exposed to discrimination. Among citizens, 68% of the respondents felt this way (CeSID 2013), and among the police officers - 55% of the respondents. What is interesting is that the largest proportion of citizens cited precisely the police as the institution they would first approach in case of discrimination – 10 %, which further justifies the need for the police to be adequately informed of the existence of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality and of other means of protection against discrimination.

Existence and acceptance of prejudice. – This part of the research deals with the analysis of attitudes towards statements containing the prevailing stereotypes and prejudice of the Serbian society. The degree of agreement or disagreement with these statements is a clear indicator of discriminatory tendencies and hence it was crucial to determine whether and to what extent citizens and public administration representatives agree with them. The questionnaire contained 14 such statements. The respondents answered them on a scale ranging from 1 – completely disagree… 3 – unsure… to 5 – completely agree. Since this question was identical only in the questionnaires surveying citizens and police officers, we will point to the results obtained from a comparative analysis of attitudes between citizens and police officers. To provide a more detailed view of the diversity of attitudes within the police as a whole, we present findings of the 2014 crime investigation police attitude survey and findings of the most recent survey of members of public order and peace police and traffic police from the end of 2015. Table 3 shows the obtained results, expressed in percentage terms and grouped into three categories: agreement (completely agree and agree), unsure and disagreement (completely disagree and disagree).

Table 3. Attitudes towards offered statements –comparative analysis citizens-police (%).
CIT – citizens, CIP – crime investigation police,
POP – public and order police, TP – traffic police

	Disagreement			Unsure			Agreement		
	2013	2014	2015	2013	2014	2015	2013	2014	2015
	CIT	CIP	POP TP	CIT	CIP	POP TP	CIT	CIP	POP TP
It is easy to support the Roma when they are not your neighbors	46	41	42	20	17	20	34	34	25
I have nothing against the Roma, but they, still, like to steal	38	34	38	23	21	23	39	41	30
Homosexuality is a disease that should be treated	30	27	24	21	16	22	49	54	45
I have nothing against homosexuals, but they should do that at home	12	15	19	14	10	15	74	72	57
Children with developmental difficulties should not be mixed with other children	62	57	53	25	22	24	13	17	15
There are few disabled people in our nation	57	47	44	33	39	38	10	11	9
Healthcare institutions should refuse to treat those suffering from HIV/AIDS	84	83	67	12	8	18	4	6	7
HIV/AIDS patients should blame themselves for their illness	42	52	51	30	21	27	28	25	19

	Disagreement			Unsure			Agreement		
	2013	2014	2015	2013	2014	2015	2013	2014	2015
	CIT	CIP	POP TP	CIT	CIP	POP TP	CIT	CIP	POP TP
One should be cautious of other nations even when they appear friendly	31	36	35	23	20	19	46	41	38
Serbia should be the state of Serbian people only, as this is the majority people	59	59	50	18	16	19	23	21	22
A normal person recognizes only traditional religions (Orthodox, Catholic, Islam)	39	51	41	24	21	23	38	25	28
Small religious communities 'steal' people's souls	33	52	43	32	28	30	35	17	18
There is some truth to books that explain the existence of Jewish conspiracies	30	42	35	54	40	43	16	14	13
The Jews tend to profit even from their own misfortune	33	44	37	48	34	39	19	19	15

As can be seen in the table 3, although there are some differences in the attitudes between citizens and police officers, it can be generally stated that they are similar in tendencies to discriminate against particular social groups. Members of public order and peace police demonstrate the lowest agreement with most of the statements, which is a point of difference from citizens and crime investigation police. It is evident that LGBT population is most prone to discrimination. Specifically, while regarding most of the statements one can notice higher proportions of those disagreeing with them than those agreeing; the only statements for which the same is not true are those that concern members of sexual minorities. Thus, almost every second citizen and every second police officer (in total) considers that 'homosexuality is a disease that should be treated', while the vast majority of citizens and members of crime investigation police agree with the statement 'I have nothing against homosexuals, but they should do that at home'. This point suggests that citizens, just like most of the police officers, see nothing wrong in that statement, that is do not see that such an attitude affirms social invisibility of members of sexual minorities.

Discrimination in practice – institutional response

In this part of the paper, we would like to point to indicators of the actual level of discrimination in the Serbian society and to the main forms in which it manifests itself. One of the key problems faced in measuring the exact level and type of discrimination arises from the fact that Serbia lacks a uniform, centralized and standardized system for collecting, recording and analyzing data on discrimination that would provide information on how widespread it is, as well as on the impact of applying laws in this area. Consequently, indicators of the actual level of discrimination in Serbia can be observed by looking into the work of those Serbian institutions that deal with the suppression of discrimination and promotion of equality, such as the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, and also by analyzing case law and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of RS.

Let us proceed from the practice of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality. From the Commissioner's Regular Annual Reports it is possible to extract basic statistical data concerning the number of discrimination complaints, and also other measures taken by this authority within its legal powers (Table 4).

Table 4. Practice of the Equality Protection Commissioner - volume of cases over a six-year period.

Cases	2012.	2013.	2014.	2015.	2016	2017
Complaints	465	716	665	797	626	532
Recommended measures	117	24	198	215	665	501
Lawsuits	5	3	2		4	7
Opinions on draft acts	3	6	2	17	40	41
Proposals to the Constitutional Court	1	2	3	1	1	1
Legislative initiatives	1				1	2
Warnings	2	10	6	9	9	13
Public Announcements*	17	15	20	35	25	20
Total number of cases*	600	763	878	1040	1346	1098

As can be seen, the number of discrimination complaints filed with the Commissioner by individuals and organizations shows a decline trend (except during 2012-2013 and 2014-2015). In the total number of complaints in 2017 the majority of the complaints refer to disability (18%), age (11, 8%) gender-based discrimination – 11%, followed by those referring to nationality (9, 8%), etc. Of the total number of complaints of nationality-based discrimination, half (50%) of the complaints cited belonging to Roma nationality as discrimination ground. As for areas in which discrimination is most common, the majority of the complaints, just like in previous years, claimed discrimination in the process on employment or at the workplace – 31, 2 %. This is also the area where women are more frequent complainants than men, in contrast to other areas of social life where men appear as complainants more frequently. Similarly to previous years, the largest number of the complaints was filed against public authorities – as many as 43 % (Commissioner's Report 2017).

Taking into account the statistical indicators from previous reports of the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality concerning the cases acted upon by this authority, it can be stated that, in Serbia, those who are most exposed to discrimination include women, persons with disabilities and members of Roma national minority. Women and members of Roma population face most discrimination in the area of employment and education. These data confirm that the perception of discrimination, and especially of vulnerability of particular social groups, and the perception of areas where discrimination is most common largely correspond to the Commissioner's experience from practice.

Considering that powers vested in the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality by law do not include meritorious decisions on the responsibility for discrimination, the true picture of the institutional response to discrimination in Serbia can be obtained by examining case law, and particularly the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Serbia.

In regard to judicial protection mechanisms, one can observe that judicial proceedings for protection against discrimination are rare. Specifically, in the first three years of application of the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination, only 184 proceedings were conducted (Euractiv 2013). In this period, discrimination was established in only 10 cases throughout Serbia (Todorović, Stjelja, Grujić 2013). The analysis of the previous case law suggests that, in a considerable number of lawsuits, discrimination was confused with harassment at work, for which reason these claims got dropped. This is another in a series of confirmations that the major problem of Serbian society is in failing to recognize discrimination and its main features.

For a positive example, we can look at the verdict of the Basic Court in Novi Sad, of 12 September 2011, which established discriminatory conduct of a public authority. This was the first positively decided case of discrimination against citizens of Roma nationality. Specifically, the General Affairs Department of the City of Novi Sad rejected the requests for late registration of birth of three citizens of Roma nationality, by invoking 'the current situation in Novi Sad, with the increasing inflow of Roma persons who claim for themselves and their children to be borne in Novi Sad', and expressing, at the same time, a fear that 'rash, frivolous and incautious' acting on their requests would induce 'a massive influx of similar requests from persons of Roma nationality' The Court found discriminatory treatment of members of Roma minority and ordered the defendant to have the verdict published in daily newspapers.

Particularly indicative of the state's strategic action towards the problem of discrimination is the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Serbia. Although this authority should be independent and autonomous from the political government, the Constitutional Court of Serbia is a highly politicized authority both in regard to judge election process and the rules of procedure (Simović 2013). In this respect, the Constitutional Court has so far unmistakably stood on the position of current politics. Therefore, the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence authentically illustrates the state's institutional response to discrimination. The most instructive example is certainly the case of banned association 'Nacionalni stroj'.

The Republic Public Prosecutor submitted to the Constitutional Court the proposal to ban the unregistered organization 'Nacionalni stroj', with an explanation that the activity of that association was aimed at violation of constitutionally guaranteed human rights and against the prohibition of discrimination. The constitutive acts of this Association were not available to the public. The activists of the Association were convicted for the criminal offence of inciting racial, national and religious hatred and intolerance (Verdict of the Supreme Court of Serbia, KZ 1.617/07 of 6 June 2008), which indicated that 'Nacionalni stroj' was founded not only to pursue forbidden goals, but also to act in that direction.

However, this case is significant in many respects. The first dilemma was that of the Constitutional Court's competence to decide to ban a secret association, given the Constitution's explicit prohibition of the existence of such civic associations (Article 55, paragraph 3 of the Serbian Constitution). Besides, if the Constitutional Court in any event admitted to considering such a case, one question would remain open: what would be the effect of the Constitutional Court's decision establishing that a civic association is secret? The Act on the Constitutional Court provided that only the decision banning a registered association could produce legal effects, with the ban involving merely the removal from appropriate registers. The question arose of the basis on which the Constitutional

Court could order the enforcement of a decision establishing that an association is secret. Nevertheless, in 2011, the Constitutional Court found that 'Nacionalni stroj' was a secret association and, therefore, that its activity was prohibited pursuant to Article 55 (3) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court banned the registration of this organization into any register, as well as any further action and promotion of goals and ideas of 'Nacionalni stroj'(Constitutional Court Decision 2008).

This decision of the Constitutional Court was the herald of new practice, because, before adopting it, the Constitutional Court had declared itself incompetent to rule on banning non-formal associations. Immediately before that, in 2011, the Court rejected the proposal of the Public Prosecutor to ban 14 fan groups, reasoning its decision on the fact that entry into the appropriate register was a legal assumption for establishing the competence of the Constitutional Court to rule on banning associations. This decision encouraged the amendments to the Constitutional Court Act, after which incident it was explicitly prescribed that, on a receipt of a proposal to ban a secret or paramilitary association, the Constitutional Court would, by way of decision, establish that the activity of such an association was prohibited. Also, it was provided that the Constitutional Court could order such measures as necessary for the prevention of the activities of secret or paramilitary associations.

In 2009, the Public Prosecutor submitted to the Constitutional Court a proposal to ban the civic association "Otačastveni pokret obraz", claiming that the activity of that association was aimed at violent overthrow of constitutional order, violation of human and minority rights and incitement of racial, national and religious hatred and intolerance. Other reasons cited for ban included the statute of this association, as well as actions that were reflected in open threats to and attacks on LGBT population. However, their activity was aimed at discrimination not only on the basis of sexual orientation, but also mainly at violation of the prohibition of nationality-based and religion-based discrimination.

In 2012, the Constitutional Court rendered a ban on the association "Otačastveni pokret obraz" because of activities aimed at violation of guaranteed human and minority rights and incitement of national and religious hatred (Constitutional Court Decision 2009). The Court ordered the relevant registration authority to strike off the Association from the register, reasoning its decision on the existence of a pressing social need to restrict the freedom of association, because the said Association advocated, in its views and actions, for a model of society founded on discrimination against particular social groups, in the form of hate speech, harassment and humiliating treatment.

Apart from the sphere of banning associations, normative control of rights was another field in which the Constitutional Court was consistent in protecting the constitutional principle of the prohibition of discrimination. An illustrative example is the Act on the Means of Determining the Maximum Number of Public Sector Employees (2015), which placed women in an unequal position. Specifically, the Court established that the provisions of Article 20 of the contested Act regulated the institution of termination of employment by force of law, as one means of downsizing public sector workforce, that reason for termination in that case was meeting of eligibility requirements for old-age pension and that on that ground employment can terminate only to women, not men employed in the public sector. It was for that reason that, in October 2015, the Constitutional Court suspended the enforcement of individual acts or actions taken under Article 20 of the Act on the Means of Determining the Maximum Number of Public Sector Employees (Constitutional Court Decision 2015).

However, when it comes to acting on constitutional complaints, the situation is diametrically opposite. Since its very introduction into the Serbian constitutional system in 2006, the first case in which the Constitutional Court adopted the constitutional complaint and establishing the violation of the prohibition of discrimination took place in 2016 (Constitutional Court Decision 2014) Taken alone, this fact does not have to be assessed as negative, because it may be that in the previous period not even one constitutional complaint seeking protection against discrimination has been justified. More realistic seems to be the inference that this state of affairs is the consequence of wrong and incomplete perception of Serbian citizens on what discrimination is.

Conclusion

Serbia's effort so far in the field of eliminating discrimination clearly shows its consistent commitment to solving this social problem. The adopted constitutional and legislative solutions offer an adequate anti-discrimination normative framework, aligned with international standards. By introducing the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, as an independent public authority elected by the National Assembly, Serbia joined the group of many European countries already having specialized bodies in place for combating discrimination. Other, no less important, efforts are reflected in the conducted quantitative surveys of public attitudes (citizens' and public administration representatives') towards discrimination, which creates and offers a clear idea of how the phenomenon of discrimination is perceived in the consciousness of citizens and public administration representatives. It should be emphasized that Serbia is the only country in the region in which these surveys included police forces as well, which clearly indicates the good will of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of RS to make the attitudes of its members regarding this sensitive social topic transparent.

As we have seen from the paper, the findings of these surveys produce a complex picture of the perception of discrimination in the Serbian society, with many positive, but also negative indicators involved. General conclusion is that there is a need to further increase the level of legal awareness of the very essence of discrimination and of its recognition in practice. This level is inadequate and results in failure to respond to discrimination, in its tolerance and acceptance in everyday life, which, again, may be the result of people's tendency to give up their own protection, and also of the lack of knowledge, or failure to recognize the essence of discrimination. Such a setting narrows down the possibilities for institutional response to discrimination, not only within the national protection framework, but also before the European Court for Human Rights. The relatively small number of verdicts in Serbia pertaining to discrimination cases, and the fact that Serbia is the country in the region with the smallest number of cases before the European Court for Human Rights in relation to Article 14 of the European Convention, do not necessarily imply the non-existence of discrimination in the Serbian society, but can suggest exactly the inadequately developed individual ability to recognize it and lack of readiness to respond to it. This is more the reason that the priority task of the Serbian society should be to continue to work towards raising legal awareness among citizens, and in particular public administration representatives, especially the police as its most visible representative in whose hands rests, among other powers, the possibility to use force against citizens.

When it comes to discriminatory tendencies, the obtained findings confirmed that these are most prominent towards those ethnic and social groups to which Serbian society generally feels a degree of animosity. This outcome was to be expected, as discriminatory tendencies usually result from the existing social divisions that have evolved intensely in the Serbian society in the field of ethnic and religious conflicts over the last two decades. Having said that, it is clear why Albanians and Croats constitute ethnic groups to which the respondents show the greatest ethnic distance. With respect to social groups, the same pertains, as seen above, to members of LGBT population, which is mainly because of the fact that Serbian society is a typical traditional society where, due to dominant heterosexual tradition and influence of the religion, a full assimilation of persons of homosexual orientation was made difficult. These and other data from the conducted surveys provide clear indicators of the primary goals of future combat in the field of eliminating discrimination and bringing Serbian society closer to the essential values of a democratic society.

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Book review

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

Claus Offe: *Europe Entrapped*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015, 136 p.

"The European Union finds itself at a crossroads between something considerably better or something much worse than the plainly unsustainable status quo; in other words, in a continuing crisis". With these introductory words, Claus Offe, a prominent political sociologist, begins with his analysis of turbulences that the Euro has inflicted on States and societies of the Euro zone and the EU. His book *Europe Entrapped* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2015) does not have ambition to argue about the economic measures that should be taken in order to overcome the current situation in the process of European integration, or about the overall direction in which this integration should proceed. The central research question raised in this book is the question of agency. The European Union is caught in trap, argues Offe, creating the condition "which is itself painful and unbearable to those caught in it but where, at the same time, movement is incapacitated, escape routes blocked, and forces of liberating agency weak and uncertain" (p. 3). How to overcome this "painful" and "unbearable" situation? Offe's ambition is to analyse if there are social and political forces, inspiring ideas or sufficiently resourceful actors who might liberate Europeans from the

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trap into which the Euro has led them (p. vii). The answer is rather sober and pessimistic.

The book can be divided into two parts. In the first part, which comprises chapters one to five, the author analyses the origins of the crisis. The first chapter deals with the interaction between democratic states and capitalist market economy. Offe rejects neoliberal standing of "free" markets. According to Offe, markets are "coercively implemented artefacts of political design and decisions, not outcomes of some alleged 'natural' evolution or simply 'normal' conditions" (p. 7). Markets are not "given" nor do they just "happen" naturally, but they are staged and shaped by state policies. The "fair" market competition, once installed, is far from self-enforcing and self-sustaining, its competitiveness needs to be permanently supervised and controlled (p.10). However, the national regulatory politico-institutional framework is hard to transfer to the EU level. As Offe argues, the EU is not a democratic polity with an elected accountable government and parliamentary budget rights, hence the probability that regulations and programs contrary to business interests will be adopted at the supranational level is significantly reduced (p. 13). The EU common market offers, according to Offe, power to investors and employers, which are seeking to restrict national market regulation and taxation. Despite the fact that the regulation is not absent at the EU level, the advantage for investors represents the unitary mode of regulation that uniformly applies to all agents across all markets in the EU. Accordingly, the common market is not deregulated, but the regulation is *depoliticized* (p.13). As a consequence, the European integration has weakened the regulation role of the national states and enabled to investors to escape their political control and to move to more agreeable tax and regulatory environments. The market integration that is not followed by the efficient political agency strengths significantly economic participants that have numerous "exit" strategies.

In chapters two and three, Offe analyses the nature of the crisis. According to the author, the crisis started in the private sector and not with states running unsustainable budget deficit and having accumulated excessive debt. Offe enumerates features leading to the crisis that occurred simultaneously with the inauguration of the third and final phase of the economic and monetary union in 1999: cheap money supplied by central banks, reckless risk-taking in lending practices of major banks following the principle of "doing what everyone else does" and engaging in "moral hazard" games, the decline of growth rates in advances economies and "financialization" as a pervasive trend of not just productive activities in the "real" economy but equally in private ones relying on debt finance as opposed to finance through income and revenues from taxes (pp.18-19). What is more, according to Offe, the monetary regime of the Euro is suffering from two major "defects": it has been created in a highly inhomogeneous economic space, and it represents an institutional deficiency as its policy making capacity is limited in the areas of fiscal, economic and social policies. As a consequence of these two "defects", the creation of the Eurozone has produced two negative phenomenon in the EU: on the one side, it has institutionalized the fragmentation between "core"/"surplus" countries (Germany, Austria, Finland, Netherlands, Luxembourg) and "periphery"/"deficit" countries in the southern and western (Ireland) peripheries; on the other hand, due to the lack of the democratic legitimacy needed for the making of economic and social policies, the EU cannot legally coerce member states governments to adhere to the debt rules which these governments often violate in order to prevent the social and economic "disasters" that result from greater compliance with austerity rules (pp. 26-27). Offe outlines the phenomenon of "doom loops" that appeared after the beginning of the crisis as a consequence of the conflict of interests between key actors in the economic sphere. The first one is between private investors and consumers vs. creditors. Banks are unwilling to grant credits and thus become all the more risk-averse. This unwillingness to extend credits deepens the existing economic crisis. The second "doom loop" is between banks and national states. The rescue operation of banks has led to a fiscal crisis that has severely affected national states. Paradoxically, the states now become depend on banks for credits while banks emerge stronger than before (p. 37). Then, the conflict between state and real economy should also be mentioned. It concerns the incapacity of the individual states to solve the problem of their structural disadvantage vis-à-vis markets and capital. The states turn from a tax state into a debt state, which gradually change its spending obligations, with the spending on growth and employment being crowded out by spending on the costs of credit (p. 40). Finally, the conflict between states and citizens is based on the lack of legitimacy and effective supranational crisis policy which leads to reluctance of voters to support supranational initiatives in this domain.

However, despite the above mentioned "defects" of the Euro, Offe considers Euro as an irreversible arrangement (p.48). According to Offe, the Euro "is a mistake the ondoing of which would be an even greater mistake" (p. 55) that would cause "a tsunami of economic as well as political regression" (p. 50). In chapter four, he convincingly presents arguments against the exit from the Eurozone. According to Offe, complexities and risks involved in a return to national currencies are of "an uncontrollable and prohibitive order of magnitude" (p. 48). What is more, none of the participants in the Eurozone has a clear and overwhelming interest in abandoning the Euro. Everybody has benefits from Eurozone. Core countries benefit, directly and indirectly, from the Euro, in several ways (the inflow of cheap capital, the underevaluated external exchange rate of the Euro, which enables competitiveness of their exports, the cheap credits that the ECB indiscriminately makes available to all Euro states which enables their budgetary balance). But the Euro represents also an asset to the "periphery" states because it provides them with political power at the European level. As Offe argues, "while players in the 'Germany' position often take the paternalist position of claiming superior knowledge about what is good for those in the 'Greek' position, the latter players might well respond by turning the tables and by telling and trying to convince the former about what is, in a medium-term perspective, good for *them*." (p. 54).

Having all abovementioned in mind, Offe argues that the neofunctionalist integration theory logic of avoiding negative spillover effects through the quasi spontaneous stepping up of sovereignty transfers and emergent new modes of cooperation does not work in the current banking, Euro, fiscal and economic crisis. The crisis has not produced a process of increased integration, but on the contrary, it accelerated the dynamic of disintegration. As Offe outlines, Member state governments are no longer ready to transfer sovereignty, pool resources and practice cooperation to the extent that appears "functionally" necessary (p. 57). This puts in question the viability of the integration that has been reached so far as well as the desirability of its continuation. However, Offe is not ready to renounce the process of European integration.

In the second part of the book, Offe tackles the question of political agency. Is there some political actors that are capable to lead European Union out of this trap? If yes, who will they be and what measures should they take? From chapters five to nine, Offe is searching for an answer to these questions. He emphasizes that the EU lacks the collective capacity to clearly address the causes and consequences of the crisis. In chapter six, Offe enumerates the various goals, aspirations and guiding visions that are potentially driving the integration process. He focuses on the numerous discourses on the EU as a historically unique supranational non-state that supply it with legitimacy and normative validity. However, these narratives about European integration (as a guarantee of international peace, as a promise of economic prosperity and social inclusion, as an institutionalized commitment to protect and promote representative and democratically accountable government and rule of law, as the globally unique scene of diversity of cultures, historical traditions, languages, etc.) are not enough to become a mass phenomenon. According to Offe, the destiny of the EU depends on receiving more loyalty and support from its citizens than it has been able to generate (p.72). The crisis created dividing lines separating EU Member States: the further integration of the EU does not mobilize agency, call for engagement or infuse the notion of "project" based on a widely shared sense of "identity". All this contribute to the decline of citizens' support to the further integration of the EU. This is notably emphasized in chapter seven, in which Offe focused on major political forces and ideologies and their connection with the integration project. The further course of European integration is highly fragmented and divided along the left/right, national/supranational and creditor/debtor axes. These cleavages lead to the pervasive paralysis of agency.

In chapter eight, Offe analyses the role of the Germany as one of the often cited actors that can find a way out from the current paralysis of the EU. However, he rejects this possibility as the exit strategy from the current crisis, not only for historical raisons but also because of the role that German government has played during the crisis. Offe argues that dependency of the states on external effects of German economic policies does not logically imply the desire to comply with policies made by German government. Apart from this, Germany follows a destructive "moral truth of austerity policy" (p. 95) based on discourse that the debtor is morally inferior/guilty because he lacks self-control which is necessary to live within the limits of his means (p. 96). German public discourse, according to Offe, is "upstream" and "nationalist", i.e. is framed in terms of what or who caused the problem, not in terms of downstream consequences and solutions. In other words, Germany advocates that the causes of one country's malaise must exclusively be looked for within that country and flawed activity of its political elite, not in the flawed design of the Euro and/or external shocks (p. 91). This logic of moralizing victim blaming creates “good” *vs.* “evil” axe with the “us” *vs.* “them” code of national collectivities as moral agents (p. 97), which turns away attention from the institutional and systemic causes of the crisis and contributes to the current situation of entrapped EU.

Offe also analyses the role of the EU institutional regime as a possible rescuer of the EU from the trap in which it has been caught. In the ninth chapter, he observes the main EU agents, ECB, European Council, Commission, and European Parliament in terms of principal-agent (PA) relationship. This relationship is, according to Offe, “greatly distorted” (p.112). This is due to the lack of control of the principals over agents. He distinguishes three types of deficient principal-agents arrangements in the EU institutional regime. First, he outlines the case of the European Council, as an expression of deficiency in PA relationship when the agent does not coincide with that of principal. Second, the deficiency also exists in the case of ECB, European Court of justice and European Commission to the extent it “oversees the application of Union law”. In this case, the roles of principals and agents become merged. Hence, these agents are allowed to make decisions without accountability mechanisms. The obvious example in this regard is the unaccountable Troika of the International Monetary Fund with its conditionality regime imposed on debtor states. Finally, there is also deficiency in the case of European Parliament. Although the European Parliament is an agent who is “perfectly accountable to the population in its domain”, he has very limited scope for agency, because he is deprived of “normal” legislative body competences (p.113). Offe highlights the paradox of this situation, stressing that “it is precisely those EU institutions that have the greatest impact on the daily life of people which are the *farthest* removed from democratic accountability” (ECB, European Court of justice, European Commission) (p. 114). These institutions are completely depoliticized, with the domination of discourse of emergency, exceptional situations that demand exceptional *ad hoc* measures based on “surveillance framework”. All this leads to the situation where the EU functions “as a political amplifier of the silent forces of economic power” (p.117).

Is there an exit from this situation? Can we found the way forward? At first glance, Offe’s sober and pessimistic analysis of the current EU crisis may lead to the conclusion that there is no way out from this trap in which the EU has been caught. However, Offe rejects "the end" of European integration process and believes in irrevocability of this process. In the final chapter, Offe is keen to propose solutions to current situation. He emphasizes two key elements that are vital for the recovery of Europe, namely the idea of solidarity and social justice. Starting from the point that the EU must be politicized, he highlights the necessity of "improving social justice through social security and income redistribution across member states and social classes" (p.122). Why, according to Offe, the idea of social justice might have potential to mobilize a kind of agency capable of carrying out viable responses to crisis? Offe considers that social justice regains ambition of the EU having a "social" dimension already foreseen by the Treaty (art.3.3 TEU and 151 TFEU). The renewing of "social Europe" can be achieved through various measures such as youth guarantees, tax harmonization, progressive taxation, Europeanization of unemployment insurance (pp. 124-126). This social or "positive" integration is needed in order to strengthen the supranational institutions which would then be "sufficiently legitimated to make decision which involve significant redistributive effects" (p. 41). But how such a policy could be created and implemented? Offe finds the answer in the concept of solidarity that should be the basis of cooperation which will deepen European integration process. Solidarity could be achieved by reframing the common perception of the current crisis. This reframing means for Offe shift away from "causal responsibility" to "remedial responsibility". According to Offe, while causal responsibility deals with what you have done, remedial responsibility concerns what you can do (p. 106). The latter means that the less an agent has suffered as a consequences of the mistakes made collectively, the greater the share of the burdens the agent must shoulder. Solidarity thus means focusing on remedial responsibility, which should lead to the change of perception among EU citizens, i.e. to the establishment of a collective identity as Europeans.

Overall, the book *Europe Entrapped* strives to answer the question if there is a capacity of institutional mechanisms to reach the political consensus. The main contribution of the book is its focus on the question of deficient political agency. His approach represents a mixture of rational-choice considerations, cultural *rationale* and morality, with the emphasis on the latter. In his political-sociological analysis of agency and future steps of the EU, Offe's left-oriented normative position is explicitly expressed. His liberalization regime critique is clearly outlined, as well as the negative image of the banks that are defined as "structural equivalent of hostage takers" (p. 17) possessing "a miraculous second-strike capability" that makes them stronger than before (p. 37). Despite pessimism that surrounds the book, the author sees the light at the end of the tunnel. He urges for more democratization of the EU in a manner that the political will of citizens plays more important role. He stresses the necessity for social integration which will strengthen supranational institutions in order to efficiently regulate transnational market in accordance to the principle of solidarity. In other words, the agency that could lead EU out of the trap should work in accordance with principle of solidarity and social justice, which will be formulated by supranational institutions and widely accepted by citizens. It remains to be seen if this is sufficient for the EU to exit from the trap in which it has been caught.

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