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THE ONTOLOGY OF ROCK MUSIC: RECORDINGS, PERFORMANCES AND THE SYNTHETIC VIEW

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the state-of-the-art dispute over the ontological question of rock music: what is the work of art, or the central work-kind, of rock music, if any? And, is the work of rock music ontologically distinct from the work of classical music, which is the only musical tradition whose ontology is vastly studied? First, I distinguish between two levels of inquiry in musical ontology: the fundamental level and the higher-order level, in which comparative ontology – the project in which someone engages by considering that there is ontological variety among works of distinct musical traditions – falls. After addressing two general questions about rock music, I turn to Theodore Gracyk's ontological account of rock music, according to which the primary focus of critical attention in rock music are recordings, or recorded tracks. This view has the consequence that 'recordings' is a fundamental concept of philosophy of music, necessary for us to understand rock music. Stephen Davies objected that Gracyk's account fails to assign appropriate value to a valuable practice with which rock audiences are committed, live performance, and argued that the works of rock music are of the ontological kind *for studio performance*. Finally, Andrew Kania synthesized both views: rock recorded tracks are at the centre of rock as an art form, thus being the rock works. For, different reasons, none of these views is deemed satisfactory.

KEYWORDS

Comparative Ontology,
Rock Music,
Recordings,
Performances, Songs,
The Synthetic View.

1. Introduction: Musical Ontology and Rock Music

We should begin by distinguishing between two levels of inquiry in the field of musical ontology, which studies the kinds of musical things there are, and the relations that hold between them (Kania 2008: 20). At the fundamental level, there is the traditional – and, of course, traditionally philosophical – project of accounting for the nature of musical works, whose goal is pursued by answering three questions. First, what is the basic ontological category to which musical works belong? In other words, what kind of existents are musical works? Someone addressing this question – the *categorial* question – is engaged in a project of ontological categorisation. However, the statement that musical works are a certain kind of thing, e.g., abstract types, leaves a question about their ontological status unanswered: when are two musical works numerically identical? What are their individuation properties of

musical works? Someone addressing this question – the *individuation* question – has to provide a non-trivial and appropriate criterion of identity for musical works, of the form ‘musical work W = musical work W^* if and only if \Box ’. Finally, it is additionally necessary to determine the conditions in which musical works come to existence and cease to exist. Are musical works creatable? Do musical works persist through time when they are performed? And, are musical works destroyable? This final question is, non-surprisingly, the *persistence* question (Dodd 2007: 1–2.).

A performance of a given musical work is an event in which *that* work is authentically produced. But, when are two performances of the same musical work genuine performances of *that* work? Which are the conditions that a performance of a musical work must meet, in order for it to be an *authentic performance*, that is, a performance of *that* musical work? Note that agreement about the categorial nature of musical works does not imply agreement about when they are properly instantiated in performances (Ravasio 2018: 15). As such, there is a further stand-alone question concerning the instantiation relation between musical works and performances. The authenticity of performances is arguably the most widely discussed higher-order issue in the literature of musical ontology. This issue is *higher-order*, in virtue of working at a higher degree of generality than the *fundamental* questions described before. It problematizes a relation, of which musical works and performances are *relata*, independently of whatever turns out to be their fundamental nature. These levels of inquiry are, in principle, logically independent.¹

Now, though there are no *prima facie* reasons for restricting the applicability of any of these questions to a particular range of candidates belonging to a certain musical tradition, it is important to notice – mostly for our purposes, though – that the prime examples in their discussions are the works and performances of Western classical music, with emphasis given to the canonical repertoire that goes approximately from 1700 to 1950. Despite all its value and importance, classical music is, nevertheless, only a musical tradition among others. And, just as there may be ontological variety between works of classical music belonging to distinct historical periods, musical works belonging to other musical traditions beyond classical music may also deserve distinct ontological accounts. There are different appreciative focuses across musical traditions, as evidenced by their practices. So, do these differences warrant different ontological accounts of the works of those traditions (Ravasio 2018: 13)? The project of comparative ontology, in which this paper engages, aims at giving an ontological account of the work of art, or the central work-kind, of both non-Western and Western musical traditions other than classical music, such as jazz and rock. This paper discusses the ontological question of rock music: what is the work of art, or the central work-kind, of rock music, if any? And, is the work of rock music – if there is one – ontologically distinct from the work of classical music (Ravasio 2018: 1)?

In the following section, I discuss three influential accounts of the ontology of rock music, which are due to Theodore Gracyk, Stephen Davies and Andrew Kania. For different reasons, I shall conclude that each of these accounts is unpromising. It is important to notice that this discussion is neutral with regard to the

¹ For a radical objection to the project of higher-order ontology, see Brown 2011. The exchange continues in Kania 2012, and Brown 2012.

fundamental nature of musical works and performances. This means, in particular, that the existence of creatable pieces and recordings, but, as well, of performances and playback events that instantiate them, are taken for granted.

Rather, are the relations between these things, and the roles they play in the practices of rock music, that matter being disputed (Kania 2008: 32). Before engaging with the ontology of rock music, let me address two preliminary, general questions about rock. What is its historical and geographical location? That is, when did rock become a musical and a cultural category?

It is uncontroversial that rock did not exist before 1950. There are, however, different musicological views about this matter. If Elvis Presley's early recording sessions at *Sun Studios* count as its starting point, then rock emerged in the mid-1950s. It may also be slightly older, if earlier forms of *rhythm and blues* and *swing* are considered rock stylistically (Cf. Peterson 1990; Everett 2009). If, otherwise, one takes the advances made particularly by John Lennon, Paul McCartney, Bob Dylan and Ray Davies as essential contributions to the beginning of rock, it emerged in the mid-1960s – the role of the *British Invasion* of American cities in 1963-1964 is also crucial to this story (Moore 2011: 416). Whichever is the right view, there was definitely a time before which rock was not a part of the cultural experience. So, as philosophers, we should ask: *what* is it that did not exist prior to its originating era? As Moore nicely emphasises, declarative statements of the form 'rock is \square ' are bound to fail, for the term 'rock' describes a set of discrete ways in which music works (Ibid: 416). Even if it primarily describes a musical *style*, with many sub-styles, such as punk or indie rock, it also describes, at least, a musical *genre*, a musical *practice* and a musical *repertory*. Although these senses may often operate together, they are not necessarily coextensive (Ibid: 416). Rock's most distinctive characteristic may, in fact, lie at the realm of ontology.

2. Recordings, Performances and the Synthetic View

Recordings, that is, recorded tracks, are of a unique importance in rock music. In the tradition of classical music, however, such is not evident. The works of classical composers tend to be compositions created for live performance. Compositions are arguably the focus of critical attention in such tradition. Although there are recordings of classical music, these recordings are not attributed the status of *classical works* by classical audiences. Rather, they are simply documents of important live performances of compositions. Classical recordings are not usually intended to be works in their own right, though they document performances of classical works. The role of recordings in the classical tradition is evidently less important than the roles of composition and performance. They contribute for classical performances of classical compositions to be, rightly, disseminated, but they are not classical works. This contrasts drastically with the role of recordings in the tradition of rock music, in which they are sometimes purported as works of art in and of their selves, commonly containing features unfound in songs or performances (Burkett 2015: 1).

The dominant ontological account of rock music is Theodore Gracyk's (Cf. Gracyk 1996). Rock is, in Gracyk's view, "popular music of the second half which is essentially dependent on recording technology for its inception and dissemination"

(Ibid: 13). This conception is justified with a version of the first type of musicological view described before: the beginning of rock coincides with Elvis Presley's early recording sessions at *Sun Studios*, and found stability in Bob Dylan's first electric albums, and *The Beatles'* shift of focus from live shows to the recording studio (Ibid: 1–17). In a slogan: rock employs recording as its primary medium (Ibid: 13). In simple terms, rock works are the primary focus of critical attention in rock music. According to Gracyk, recorded tracks are rock works. Recorded tracks are brought into existence by recording processes – the process of making a recording. Recording is, thus, the primary means for rock works to be created. We might also wonder whether this account is circular: if rock music is a tradition in which recordings are primary, it is not surprising that the thesis that recordings are the mediums of rock comes out true (Fisher 1999: 486). However, I think that undermining this particular musicological view would not undermine Gracyk's ontological thesis.

So, what makes recordings *the* works of rock music? As stated, recordings of classical music document performances of compositions, thus being not classical works. Classical recordings are *veridic*, for they can be regarded as being true to performance (Fisher 1998: 115–117). They document live extended musical events which are treated, in the studio, according to a regulative idea of how that live performances should sound, as established by the conventions for listening to performances of that sort of music. Playbacks of veridic recordings – and so, playbacks of classical recordings – are meant to sound as much as possible as the live performances of which they are documents would sound, if we were listening to them in front of us, and not through the mediating tracks that resulted from their capture. Veridic recordings are regarded as products of a neutral registration process: recording technology ought to make them sound *not* like recordings of performances, but like performances.

Rock recordings are not generally documents of unmediated and temporally unified performances (Ibid: 115). There surely are recordings of live performances of rock songs. But, they are not the primary focus of attention in rock music. It is uncommon, if not unseen, for rock bands to record a *new live album*. Documenting live performances is not the appropriate way to produce a new rock work. These may be *rock* recordings, stylistically, but they are *veridic* recordings nonetheless, and thus not works themselves. Another way to put it is that rock works do not purport to be documents of live performances. Instead, they are created in the recording studio, through a recording process. The production of a rock recording articulates complex processes of multi-tracking, sound overdubbing, signal processing, editing, mixing, mastering, and so on. In this sense, rock recordings are *constructive*, thereby reflecting largely the way in which electronic signals are generated and treated. These features are not only acceptable, but truly essential to the works of rock music (Ibid: 120). And, they clearly undermine the principle of veridicality to performance (Bruno 2013: 66).

Those who take part in the recording process – the musicians, the sound engineers and, perhaps, the musical producers – collaborate in the creation of a rock work, which may not be disentangled from the created recorded track. It is distinctive of rock music that “the musical works do not exist apart from the recording itself” (Gracyk 1996: 13). Rock recordings are musical works in their own rights. Their sound is as relevant as any other aspect of the interpretation of those works.

This does not mean, however, that recordings are the only recognised works in rock music. Gracyk thinks that rock recordings exemplify, at least, two musical works: the autographic track, which are encoded on the recordings, and the allo-graphic song, which recordings frequently manifest, even though they are not performances of that song (Ibid: 17–18). The constructivity of rock recordings suggests that many of the properties of recorded tracks are not determined by the songs they manifest (Bruno 2013: 66).

It is useful to use Stephen Davies' well-known distinction between musical works, in terms of their relative 'thickness' or 'thinness'. Davies says: "The thicker the work, the more the properties of its sounded instances are essential to its character. A piece that is specified solely as a melody and chord sequence, leaving instrumentation, elaboration, and overall structure up to its performers, is thinner in constitutive properties than one in which those features are also work-determinative. Generally, the more a work's instances can differ while remaining equally and fully faithful to it, the thinner that work is" (Davies 2003: 39). On Gracyk's account, rock songs are *thin* sound structures, individuated "by little more than chord progression and basic melody" (Gracyk 1996: 21, 36). The thinness of songs opposes to the saturated thickness of recorded tracks, which are individuated by "precise detail of timbre and articulation" (Ibid: 32). Recordings of rock songs 'obliterate' previous interpretations by erasing any distinctions between performances of rock songs and rock songs themselves (Ibid: 14). The precise details of recordings are precisely the artistically primary features of rock music: subsequent live performances imitate recordings, thus showing their priority. The work of rock music is therefore not a thin sound structure to be instanced in different performances, as in classical music, but a thick sound structure, encoded on a recording, and properly instanced through playback (Kania 2006: 2–3; Gracyk 1996: 1–98).

As mentioned, rock recordings are not documents of performances. Nonetheless, rock audiences often seem to experience rock recordings as if they were recordings of unified performances (Fisher 1999: 469). Though recordings are constructive, they are often experienced veridically. It is often on the basis of something like the experience of listening to a rock recording *qua* a recorded live performance, that we judge the band or artist we are listening to, and that we decide whether or not to support their live shows. We have good reasons to do precisely so. Many rock bands or artists chose to record live performances in the studio, through a single take, with every musician playing at the same time. And, those bands often choose to do so, because they intend their recordings to have *that live feel*, so as to approximate the experiences that rock audiences obtain when they listen to their recordings and see their live shows. Is this evidence in favor of the primacy of live performances over recordings? I am not certain. But, at least, I think it is evidence for the inexistence of a sharp cleavage between veridicality and constructivity, in Fisher's senses.

Gracyk is aware of this. He concedes that rock recordings are not usually regarded as non-objective, non-referential works, similar to pieces of electronic music. Rather, they seem to be regarded as documents of virtual or imaginary performances. So, what is primary, the recordings or the imaginary performances presented by them (Ibid: 469)? I agree that recordings are *distinctive* works of rock music. This may explain why they are distinctively valued by rock audiences, and occupy a distinctive position in the configuration of rock music. But, I doubt them to

be *the* work, or *the* central work-kind, of rock music. There is a problem concerning the status of unrecorded rock songs, which Dan Burkett presents as follows:

In the 2011 documentary *Back and Forth*, Dave Grohl, lead singer of the *Foo Fighters*, describes how the song *Enough Space* was written and introduced into the band's repertoire mid-tour to cater to the European mosh pits. The song became the *Foo Fighter's* concert opener and was performed live for many months before being recorded. Much energy and experimentation were spent on the song's conception, and it subsequently became a focus of critical attention by fans and commentators alike. Despite this, a track-centred ontology would hold that until the song was recorded it failed to qualify as a work of rock music by the *Foo Fighters*. (Burkett 2015: 3)

I agree with Burkett. This seems wrong. Stephen Davies also presents an interesting objection to Gracyk's ontological account of rock music, according to which it fails to assign appropriate value to performative skills in the tradition of rock music. Rock musicians pride themselves on their live performance skills, and rock audiences, which are committed to live performances, expect them to be able to play live shows to a standard commensurate with the playing that is heard on the record (Bartel 2017: 145). Davies says, rightly, that "more groups play rock music than ever are recorded; almost every recorded group began as a garage band that relied on live gigs; almost every famous recording artist is also an accomplished stage performer; although record producers are quite rightly acknowledged for the importance of their contribution, they are not usually identified as members of the band" (Davies 2001: 32).

Gracyk's ontological account has the strange consequence that the groups who play rock music, without ever being recorded – either because no recording deals were offered or because they cannot afford the recording expenses – do not create rock works. This problem, which was baptized by Burkett as the *no works* problem, also applies to hypothetical cases in which recording technology never appeared in the first place, and, thus, no rock works would ever be created, or dystopian future scenarios in which recording technology is abolished, and, thus, no rock works will ever be created again. An alternative ontological account, which aims at minimising the differences between classical and rock music, was offered by Stephen Davies. First, Davies distinguishes, among musical works, between those works that are for performance and those that are not.

Works that are not for performance, like electronically generated pieces, are stored as encodings, and qualify as works for playback. As stated, Gracyk thinks of rock recordings, the works of rock music, as works for playback. However, classifying rock recordings as works for playback ignores the fact that some rock recordings are re-recordings of previous recordings – or, more simply, covers. The practice of covering songs suggests, according to Davies, that rock musicians operate within a performance tradition, the differences between two recordings of one and the same song being appreciated for their subtle nuances (Ibid: 31–32). The idea is that cover versions are more like new interpretations of existing works, that is, more like performances, than like new works in their own rights (Kania 2006: 403). As in classical music, works of rock music are created for performance. Nevertheless, whereas classical works are works for *live* performance, rock works are works for *studio* performance (Davies 2001: 34–36).

Works for studio performance are “special kinds of performances that involve the electronic manipulation and sculpting of sound to achieve effects that, typically, cannot be achieved live. Multi-tracking, collaging, filtering, mixing, and other interventions are central to the presentation of such works. The result, which is issued on disk, is what I call a virtual performance. It is virtual in two respects. No continuous performance event of the kind that seems to be represented on the disk need take place and the “performance” occupies an aural space unlike any present normally in the real world. A work for studio performance is like a work that is not for performance in being issued on disks that are themselves for playback, not performance. The difference between the two is not apparent either in the disk or in the reliance in both cases on the resources of the studio. It is apparent in the attitude to re-recordings or “covers”, should they occur. When William Shatner recorded “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds”, he produced a new performance of the Beatles’ song, not a distinct but related work that is not for performance” (Davies 2003: 37).

An important feature of works for studio performance is that they can be presented live, the normative conditions for these performances deriving from what is displayed on the recorded track, and not vice-versa. By their turn, those works which are for live performance, “such as Beethoven’s Fifth, can also be issued on studio recordings the making of which does not involve continuous real-time playing. I call what is on such a recording a simulated performance. They mimic the sound of a live performance, though no seamless performance, such as seems to be represented on the disk, took place. The normativity conditions for such recordings differ from those of works for studio performance. Large chunks of what is on the disk should have been played continuously in the recording studio – though the order of sections need not be respected and multiple takes will be standard – and the performers should be capable of giving the recorded work in performances that are live” (Davies 2003: 38).

As Kania underlines, “Davies’s claim is not that there are classical works and rock works, of some common ontological kind, and that the classical ones are intended for a certain sort of performance, while the rock ones are intended for a different kind of performance. The claim is that classical works are of the *ontological kind* work-for-live-performance, while rock works are of a different ontological kind: works-for-studio-performance” (Kania 2006: 403). Unrecorded songs, like “Enough Space”, will be considered rock works to the extent that they are created with the intention of eventually being performed in the recording studio (Burkett 2015: 3). But, this ontological account also suffers from a version of the *no works* problem. By replacing the reliance on recording by a reliance on the intention to perform a song in the recording studio, Davies makes his works for studio performance seem to necessarily require a sound engineer. But, Kania notices, “although many garage and pub bands may hope to be recorded one day, it is not clear that they write their songs with a part for a sound engineer even implicitly in mind. [...] These bands seem to think they are providing audiences with fully authentic performances of their songs, not with performances missing” (Kania 2006: 404).

Davies also considers the possibility that rock recordings may present more than one work of art, in particular, “an electronic piece that is replete with constitutive

properties, and [...] a realisation of a much thinner song” (Davies 2001: 33). Songs are, however, ontologically thin, consisting of little more than a simple melody, harmony, and lyrics (Ibid: 31; 180). And, this possibility is rejected in virtue of songs’ under-determination: “very thin works, such as songs [...] are usually not of much interest in themselves, and the prime candidate for appreciation is the performance. As pieces become thicker, they become more worthy of interest” (Ibid: 22). The last of Davies’ ideas seem to confound an ontological question concerning the relative thinness and thickness of musical works, with a value question concerning the worth of interest of musical works. Yet, songs are, for that reason, not considered the main object of interest in the rock tradition. Instead, it is the “fine details of the recorded sound [that is, of the studio performance, that] are of vital interest to an appreciative audience” (Ibid: 34). And, this is a further point of agreement between Davies and Gracyk. Songs do have some artistic value, but “more interest is taken in the details of the studio performance or interpretation than in the [song] itself” (Ibid: 34).

Is there a view that accepts rock recordings as the primary focus of critical attention, while also accommodating the importance of live performances? Could such be a plausible view? Andrew Kania’s synthetic view is the middle point. First, Kania rejects Davies’s claim that rock songs are works created for studio performance. Rock songs are neither works, nor for anything in particular (Kania 2006: 404). Notice that Kania defines a work of art as an object that “is of a kind that is a primary focus of critical attention in a given art form or tradition, and is a persisting object” (Ibid: 413). Songs are ontologically thin sound structures of “melody, harmony and lyrics”, which are manifested in both recordings and live performances (Cf. Gracyk 1996: 18). However, they are not written for either recording or performance. Moreover, songs “are not the, or even a, primary focus of critical attention in rock, and thus are not musical works” (Kania 2006: 413). Kania thinks also that “we compare cover versions without thinking of them as performances of the songs they manifest.” Drawing an analogy with cinema, and thinking that “remakes and covers are quite uncommon in the worlds of cinema and rock”, Kania concludes that narratives and songs are insignificant (Ibid: 409).

Rock recorded tracks, on the other hand, are ontologically thick sound structures that “are at the centre of rock as an art form”, thus being the musical works of rock music (Ibid: 411). That recorded tracks are the primary focus of critical attention in rock music is also evidenced by the “asymmetric dependence of live rock practices on recorded rock practices” (Ibid: 403; Gracyk 1996: 69–75). Live rock performances “look to” rock recordings, in the sense that the sound of a live performance is dependent on the sound of the recorded track (Bartel 2017: 145). In live performances, rock musicians can either choose to recreate the sound heard on the record or not. But, importantly, rock audiences are aware of this choice and attend to the similarities and differences directly (Kania 2006: 407; Bartel 2017: 145). Despite the central importance of tracks, songs may also be manifested in live performances. In simple terms, songs are a sort of basic framework that may be instantiated later as either an audio track or a live performance. It is only tracks, however, not performances, that are legitimate musical works (Burkett 2015: 4).

As Burkett emphasizes, “Kania’s privileging of tracks as the musical ‘work’ of rock does not necessarily entail that songs and performances receive no critical

attention. Instead, the track-centered ontology is best understood as implying that while songs and performances may receive some critical attention, they are not the primary focus of critical attention in the rock tradition” (Ibid: 10). Despite their differences, recording-centred ontologies share the following claims, highlighted by Franklin Bruno (2013: 67). Songs are ontologically thin, individuated by, at most, melody, harmonic progression and lyric text. The thinness of songs renders them incapable of supporting distinctively artistic forms of appreciation and evaluation. Given these claims, an account of the appreciation and evaluation of rock music must appeal to properties of thick recordings, rather than those of the thin songs that may underlie them. Christopher Bartel also highlights two ideas that “help to diminish the status of song writing and live performance within rock.” (Bartel 2017: 145).

First, all the accounts hold that the construction of tracks is of central importance in rock. Bartel thinks that this claim leads to a view of what happens in the song writing process, according to which “recording technology is utilised in the song writing process in such a way that changes the very nature of the song writing process.” Second, live performance practices depend somehow on recording practices. Kania defends this point explicitly. Similarly, Davies claims that “rock stage acts are measured against their recordings, and not vice versa” (Davies 2001: 30), and, while Gracyk allows that “live performance is unlikely to become obsolete”, he also speaks of performance as a matter of “packaging” (Gracyk 1996: 78). Thus, live performance is secondary to the importance of recordings. If recording-centred ontologists are right, the concept of ‘recording’ should be included in the basic text of philosophy of music: it is a fundamental concept, necessary for us to understand rock music. But, were it a fundamental concept of rock music, it ought to be that, if the recording technology necessary to produce recordings was never developed in the first place, then no rock bands would have produced any rock work. This is a really strange conclusion. Similarly, if, one day, no more recording technology is available, rock works will never be produced again. May the work of rock music be temporary, in this sense? If such scenarios happened in our world, I do think that rock would still evolve as a music tradition. Rock bands would still create songs. Rock audiences would still enjoy them at live performances. And, those rock bands would still be thrilling their path on the basis of performances of songs. Fortunately, our world is not like this. But, recordings are *distinctive*, not *primary* in rock music.

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Ugo Lusijo

Ontologija rok muzike: snimci, izvođenja i sintetičko stanovište

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad razmatra najnovije rasprave povodom ontološkog statusa rok muzike: šta je umetničko delo rok muzike, ili šta je osnovna vrsta dela rok muzike, ako takvo šta uopšte postoji? Dalje, da li je delo rok muzike ontološki različito od dela klasične muzike, koja predstavlja jedinu muzičku tradiciju čija se ontologija uveliko proučava? Najpre, u istraživanju ontologije muzike razlikovaćemo dva nivoa: osnovni nivo i nivo višeg reda, gde spada komparativna ontologija – projekat u koji se upuštamo kada razmatramo ontološku različitost dela zasebnih muzičkih tradicija. Nakon što postavimo dva opšta pitanja o rok muzici, posvetićemo se ontološkom razmatranju rok muzike Teodora Grejsika, prema kom su primarni fokus kritičkog ispitivanja rok muzike snimci, odnosno snimljene numere. Ovo stanovište za posledicu ima da „snimci” postaju osnovni pojam filozofije muzike, nužan za razumevanje rok muzike. Stiven Dejvis prigovorio je da Grejsikovo stanovište ne pridaje dovoljno značaja važnoj praksi koju rok publika ceni – nastupu uživo, te je tvrdio da dela rok muzike pripadaju ontološkoj vrsti studijskog izvođenja. Napokon, Endrju Kanja spojio je obe perspektive: snimljene rok numere su u srži roka kao vrste umetnosti, što ih čini delima rok muzike. Iz različitih razloga, ni jedna od ovih pozicija nije zadovoljavajuća.

ključne reči: komparativna ontologija, rok muzika, snimci, izvođenja, pesme, sintetičko stanovište.