

uzimaju moć a obično ne žele to da osveste i da se uzdrže od njene zloupotrebe.

Iz rečenog sledi da su od aktualnih značenja preživele tradicije srpskog društva uočljivija ona negativna, bilo da je reč o njenoj zloupotrebi pri uslovljavanju društvene svesti politizacijom nacionalizma, bilo da je reč o njenom nedostatku, kao nedostatku kulturnog ponašanja ili civilizovanog poštovanja zakona. Pozitivni elementi tradicije, neračunajući kolektivno kulturno nasleđe i njegov uticaj, svakako su prisutni u prisnim elementima domaće atmosfere, porodičnim predanjima i običajima, ili u prijateljskim druženjima.

To što su ti životni elementi tradicije toliko lični, možda ukazuje na ulogu individua u čuvanju, prenošenju i stvaranju tradicije. U krajnjoj liniji, lični izbor usvojenih aspekata tradicije određuje šta će biti preneto na buduća pokolenja. No, još značajniji činilac tradicije predstavlja stvaralački doprinos pojedinaca. Jer tradiciju, pogotovo u kulturi, određuju stvaralačke ličnosti, pesnici i mislioci koji doprinose evoluciji društva. Njihov se značaj kod nas (tako reći tradicionalno) prenebregava. No i pored toga, našu tradiciju će uvek predstavljati Dositej, Vuk, Zmaj, Dučić, Kostić i ostali stvaraoci koji su iz ličnog doživljaja u svoja dela uneli elemente univerzalnog ljudskog iskustva.

Pa i obični pojedinci mogu značajno unaprediti svakodnevni društveni život otkrivajući vrednosti koje u specifične zahteve sadašnjeg vremena unose univerzalnost. Pojava 'kritične mase' takvih individua mogla bi celom društvu, suočenom sa zadatkom da iznova oživi svoju autentičnost, omogućiti oblikovanje takvog dinamičnog identiteta, čiji su stožer univerzalne vrednosti i koji je sposoban da opstane u situaciji globalnog 'prelaska'.

Zato rekonstrukcija institucija kao bitnih elemenata integrišuće tradicije društva treba da uključi podržavanje individua koje najviše mogu doprineti njegovom napretku i njegovoj, najpre unutrašnjoj, a zatim spoljašnjoj integraciji. Jer, bez iznutra integrisanog dinamičnog identiteta nije mogućna ni šira interkulturalna integracija, već samo zastrašujući pritisak integrizma na svim nivoima.

Te razlike integracije i integrizma, tradicije i tradicionalizma, univerzalnosti i univerzalizma i drugih pozitivnih i negativnih značenja, predstavljaju opozicije koje proizvode ceo istorijski zaplet. Svima je u interesu njegovo globalno razrešenje pre nego što globalizacija izmakne svakoj humanoj kontroli.

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## INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION OF TRADITIONS – BETWEEN *IDEALPOLITIK* AND *REALPOLITIK*\*

The problem of relation between tradition and integration is treated in this text from the angle of a more general relation – more precisely, a hiatus between *Idealpolitik* and *Realpolitik* of the main actors of the socio-political dynamics as defined on a global level following the termination of the Cold War. In that context, special attention has been focussed, according to the author, on the exemplary case of the hiatus at issue – the state disintegration of the multi-national, multi-confessional and multi-traditional Second Yugoslavia, which, at least in terms of potentials, represented a European "America in miniature", the disintegration to which the most powerful external contribution was given by the US itself, as the only current super-power, and at the time, at the level of its official *Idealpolitik* – a forcefully proclaimed political, economic and cultural integration of the world.

The central part of the work is focussed on the identification of main social and psychological obstacles to imperative processes, primarily those of the economic integration of south Slavic regions, obstacles arising from years-long traumatic experiences in relations between the inhabitants of those regions with those parts of the world, or at least their political élites, which were meant to extend concrete, primarily financial, support to those processes.

In the final section of the text, what is pleaded is political-anthropological realism in the study of relations between tradition and integration, between the particular and the general, the local and the global. A plaidoyer thus intoned is aimed at reducing the practical-political danger of surrendering too easily, in the circumstances of a tragic end of a utopia, in the situation of a "post-socialistic melancholy", to the lures of another and different utopia (the world as a "global village") which can equally disappoint one with immense promises it cannot fulfill.

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## (Dis)integration of Traditions, Big Power and Temptations of Triumphalism

*Interculturalism* was undoubtedly one of the most frequent terms in the social and political theory of the last decade of the previous century. Theoreticians suggest it does not imply a mere parallel existence, a passive coexistence of numerous ethnic cultures located in geographically close and politically integrated regions, but their active and multi-directional interconnection and intertwining, to which the prefix *inter* in the aforesaid compound term refers. This also points to a key difference between this term and a kindred term of *multiculturalism*, which is metaphorically represented as a "salad bowl", unlike the former, which is depicted in terms of metaphor as a "melting pot" and in the sphere of life as the only model of true integration (at a level of society) of a multi-ethnic political community.

Despite the ever-increasing tendency of laying emphasis on particular national, religious or racial identities of the large population groups it is inhabited by<sup>1</sup>, the US is still, primarily due to the way it was created, a unique historical example of a relatively long existence and continuous progress of a mega-state, a "humankind in miniature" in the national, confessional and racial sense, integrated on the principles most related to those postulated by the ideal-typical model of interculturalism. The end of the Cold War and the unexpectedly fast and dramatic implosion of one of the two active models of the political-economic order of society, won the US, as the embodiment of the other, competitive model, the status of the winner and also the only remaining world super-power. The aforesaid facts taken collectively imparted multiple significance to the role of the US, i.e. the character of its practical-political activism in the forthcoming global processes. This was due primarily to the fact that the processes were marked, on the one hand, by the state disintegration of several federal state formations in which the rival, defeated model had been implemented, and on the other hand, by the global tendency towards political, economic and cultural integration at a planetary level, to such an extent and with such intensity as had never been recorded in the history of the world, which is in the past several centuries a scene of larger and smaller-scale integration processes. In what way has thus the US foreign policy defined or identified itself through the character of its implemented praxes, in one of the undoubtedly decisive moments of modern world history?

Let us note once again the basic elements of the unique epochal constellation of facts, which provided US foreign policy acts with a

<sup>1</sup> More on this in: Degler, 1991

potentially historic-turning-point meaning (which they assumed immediately at the rhetoric level). At issue is the state disintegration of 1) multinational and multi-cultural/multi-traditional state formations (which is also the US itself) and 2) at the moment when at the level of the foreign policy rhetoric this mega-power is forcibly proclaiming the economic, political and cultural world integration on the foundations of the very same values which represent an axiological substrate of its own state and national identity. The two sets of facts imparted to the possible (im)compatibility of political "words and deeds" of the only remaining super-power the dimension of a test of potentials the realization of which would mark the establishment of a *novum* in the permanently conflicting relations between politics and morals in the modern times, a *novum* of a certainly epochal significance. How did the US do at that historic test – in other words, was it and how was it (objectively/justly, consistently/principled, in a word, *disinterestedly*, or *morally correctly*) guided by the principles of its own, rhetorically unequivocally self-defined and self-articulated *Idealpolitik* (the leading *topos* of which become "human rights", "democracy", "multiculturalism" "planetary solidarity"... ) or with its own, particular, state-national *interest* as a key category of its own traditional *Realpolitik*, rhetorically disguised in discursive figures of a moralistically impregnated newly-created political discourse?

The case of the US stand, i.e. the *active* treatment of the Yugoslav crisis at all its stages seems to be an exemplary one – not for the reason of a sad existential and epistemological privilege, which, to a considerably larger extent, we have reluctantly experienced in our own, individual lives, acquainting ourselves with the nature of the then seemingly newly-arising foreign policy of a current super-power. Thus, *objectively*, owing to the extent of its multiethnicity and multiculturalism (with certain elements of intercultural intertwining at a higher quality level, stemming from the ethnic heterogeneity of a larger part of its territory), the former SFRY used to represent, much earlier than the former Czechoslovakia (as a state union of merely two nations, which were, furthermore, clearly divided territory-wise) or the Euro-Asian Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (many of which were annexed by force to that Communist empire), and even with small potentials, a European "America in miniature". By encouraging integration processes and by discouraging, blocking and preventing the unequivocally announced and soon afterwards, realized acts of disintegration and secession within the SFRY, the way they act in similar situations in some other parts of the world (e.g. in the case of their Turkish allies), in other words, by investing true efforts in the preservation of the state, the US could have provided the most truthful evidence of its veritable attachment to the principles of multiculturalism/multitraditionalism, i.e. interculturalism, on which it itself is based to a large extent, as well as the equally important confirmation of a possibility of the survival, stability and progress of an "America in miniature"

in European regions, which has always been deficient in the capacity for the realization of that normative ideal of multinational societies. Regardless of the outcome (successful or unsuccessful) of the US involvement in the Yugoslav crisis based on those motives, this role, having been expressed and identified as such, would have won the US a reputation of a unique super-power in the history of mankind, which, at the moment when it was one and only of its kind, resisted the temptation of triumphalism, i.e. the demonstration and confirmation of the newly-acquired absolute power and expressed readiness to subordinate its particular state-national interest to the welfare of humankind, or its larger part.

However, it turned out that from the US point of view, the Second Yugoslavia represented too uncomfortable a state framework for multi-ethnicity of such proportions – but that was *not*, or should not be, the case with the years-long war-divided Bosnia-Herzegovina, that former "Yugoslavia in miniature" in the unitary-state survival of which the US is investing immense diplomatic efforts. Thus, from the US angle, the right to the unilateral secession of ex-Yugoslav republics from the rest of the state composition *did represent* an undisputed democratic right (which, by the way, is not envisaged by any positive international legal act), whereas the right of the Serb people to secession from the newly-established states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (incidentally, the only right acknowledged by the aforesaid acts) was not considered as such. Serb expellees from the region of the former Republic of Srpska Krajina, were *not*, from the US point of view, victims of ethnic cleansing, one of the most flagrant forms of infringement upon human rights, but Albanian refugees from Kosmet at the time of the legally unfounded NATO aggression undisputedly were – which, then again, according to the US, was *not* the case with Serb and other non-Albanian expellees from Kosovo-Metohija following the termination of the aggression and the deployment of "peace-keeping" troops of so-called KFOR. The US extended immense support in armament to Albanian rebels, at the same time treating the provoked action of the Yugoslav federal authorities, which according to the US, occasioned the NATO aggression, as an excessive and morally intolerable ("genocidal") use of force and as such, deserving planetary retaliation, with their victims meriting planetary solidarity, which was, however, *not* the case with the victims/oppressors of the years-long and incomparably more brutal anti-secessionist war conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. By the way, the US has never been willing to envisage the clearly genocidal episodes from its own history (the extermination of natives) even in terms of individual, let alone collective guilt, but nevertheless persevered for an almost entire decade in applying harsh economic, political and cultural sanctions towards the FR Yugoslavia, which, as it was claimed, were aimed against its ("genocidal") regime, whereas in reality affecting ordinary (furthermore multi-ethnic) people, as a form of collective punishment for otherwise pros-

cribed and *as such* denied *collective guilt*, of which (the non-existent one), the Serbs are to be relieved by means of Hague trial proceedings against individuals from their ranks for crimes committed during years-long ethnic wars in the regions of the formerly unified SFR Yugoslavia...

All these and many other examples of the inconsistency of the US policy towards the Yugoslav crisis can be properly interpreted only in terms of *authentic*, publicly unexpressed US political motives, based on a mostly non-thematic, but quite easily readable, interest-wise profiled *Realpolitik* stand. Determined to, by treating the Yugoslav crisis a) conform to the stands and interests of the united Germany as the economically most powerful and therefore most significant European partner, b) restore trust in the Islamic world, seriously shaken by the decades-long unprincipled stand to the Palestinian issue and the brutal war against Iraq, c) fragment state-wise the non-submissive and self-conscious Serbian factor and, at the same time and in the same part of the world, consolidate the only unconditionally loyal – Albanian one and ultimately d) cause the formation of several small and mutually and within a long period of time confronted states to provide it, as a necessary "factor of peace and stability" with a very long military and economic presence in those, geo-politically very significant, regions, the US clearly announced that it did not aim to endorse the state survival of its European "alter-ego", but to politically manage the crisis in a way which, notwithstanding all international legal norms and standards, would secure the protection and promotion of its own state-national interests, regardless of the price to be paid by all the ex-Yugoslav peoples, or at least by those regarded and treated by the US in certain phases of the years-long sanguinary fragmentation/dismembering of the SFR Yugoslavia as its allies and protégés (the Croats, the Muslims, the Macedonians, the Albanians).<sup>2</sup>

This foreign-policy technology of the US, demonstrated in the Yugoslav case more clearly than in any other case, contains all elements of an ethically "filthy game", totally incompatible with its proclaimed moral motives. Even in the post-Cold War period of great expectations (and the self-same number of failed hopes), the opinion voiced by Kant in the appendix to the *Draft for Eternal Peace* that politics cannot take a single step before it has bowed to the morals turned out to be the voice of someone "moaning in the desert" (Kean), an *interest* still and, apparently more powerfully than ever, the *spiritus movens* of political praxes at both

<sup>2</sup> Some authors (Stupar, 2002) rightly warn that, while discussing these phenomena, one should clearly differentiate between the unequivocally liberal-democratic aspect of the US home policy and the essentially different foreign policy aspect. This view, however, should be supplemented with another one which significantly limits its range – for the large non-American "rest of the world", which is a permanent potential object/victim of the US anti-liberal, autocratic and self-interested foreign-policy activism, it is of a very small non-theoretical, i.e. *practical* importance.

the global and local plan, with *power* remaining the prevailing political value.<sup>3</sup>

### South-Slavic Regions and Integration – between Necessity and Socio-Psychological Potentials

The ideological and programmatic (and by no means less propaganda-like) platform for the establishment and an attempted stabilization of "the order of things" at global level, following the termination of the Cold War, has been offered in a book by Francis Fukuyama (1992): *The End of History and the Last Man*. The key stand its content is focussed on is that, with the triumph of the US in the Cold war competition, i.e. of the liberal-democratic model of the economic-political order of the society it embodies as a state, history has reached its end, a long searched-for *telos* of its own, in terms of preventing the establishment of any other, potentially competitive model of social organization, as a valid alternative to the victorious one. In that respect, Brzezinski (1997) did not need much intellectual (let alone *Realpolitik*) audacity for his statement that US interests in the establishment of a global hegemony and the interests of the world, i.e. some parts of the world, in democratization (society) and liberalization (economy) quite accidentally overlap<sup>4</sup>. However, as it has been already noted, the critics of ideological novelties "seldom had an easier task: the newly-published Fukuyama's utopia of 'the end of history' had already been refuted by instances of nationalism, chauvinism and separatism rampant in post-Communist circumstances. The critics of that utopia did not even need to mention examples of anti-liberal fundamentalism of different type and descended from a much earlier period." (Stojanovic, 1999: 101).

What may, however, on the other side of Fukuyama's superficial ideological-propaganda optimism and Brzezinski's arrogant real-politics cynicism, be identified as a complementary aspect of the agonistic global-political dynamics to which Stojanovic is pointing, is the progressive and the ever-increasing process of global, mostly economic integration.<sup>5</sup> To be included in it represents a systematic imperative for those nations and

<sup>3</sup> More on this in: Radojčić, 2002

<sup>4</sup> That blend of Messianic elements characteristic of the other, defeated, "real-socialistic" doctrine of the political-economic organization of society on the one hand and the victorious system of bare and unimpeded interests on the other, have been labelled "real-liberalism" – an unusual but effective neologism invented by Vladimir Cvetkovic (cf. Cvetkovic, 2000: 150)

<sup>5</sup> As it has been already noted (Sam, 1998), the strengthening of the community of capital does not imply the strengthening of the community of people – in other words, a higher degree of the capitalization of the world does not entail a higher degree of its humanization. On numerous contradictions within economic aspects of globalization – cf. Vukotic, V. (ed.), (2001).

states which in the past decade found themselves, through the ill will of history, not only beyond the main trend of the integration, but also on paths leading in quite opposite, catastrophic directions. However, precisely for this reason, with all the immanent, objective antinomies of those processes, mercilessly exploited by anti-globalist movements from Washington to Genoa, their promoters in South Slavic regions will have to allow for additional, local socio-psychological obstacles, stemming from the specific collective experience of these regions, acquired throughout the previous dramatic decade. The obstacles face them with many issues, of which we are to mention just a few.

How to secure legitimacy to discourse on integration, i.e. on their necessity to the addressees of that discourse which were, and are still potentially, ("open" definitive statuses of Kosovo, Montenegro, Sandzak, Vojvodina...) the objects/victims of thorough and comprehensive disintegration processes? How, on the other hand, to render the very project of integration at supra-state levels of regions, continents or the entire world close to those who have failed to remain integrated at the level of a much smaller political-territorial unit/entity such as the state, in which they lived together with members of ethnic groups with whom they shared the same or a very similar ethnic origin, the same or a similar language and even the same religion (the Serbs and the Macedonians)? Further, how to escape from the discouraging effects of the realization that it is precisely the "narcissism of small (cultural) differences", such as those that divided the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, that has often throughout history been the factor of brutal ethnic conflicts, but that the "narcissism of big (economic) differences" such as those dividing the successor-states of the former Yugoslavia from the rest of Europe and the large part of the world can hardly be the factor of the promotion of their integration? This time, only due to an optimal number of topics that may be included in a single text, we shall skip the question, (a crucial one), as to who is responsible for such a large economic gap and can the blame, even if we are to exclude the very clear case of the brutal economic and ecological devastation of the regions of the FR Yugoslavia during the NATO aggression that lasted three months, be exclusively laid on internal participants in the decade-long ex-Yugoslav drama? However, it is precisely in the light of those, on this occasion non-thematic facts, that a new dilemma occurs – how to render socially and psychologically convincing the strictly economy-wise by no means disputable reasoning that without a complete opening for foreign financial investments, i.e. foreign capital, it is not possible to imagine the economic revitalization and subsequently the prosperity of all the eastern-central European countries and even those created on the ruins of ex-Yugoslavia, the unbeatable "authorship" of the political and economic collapse of which will have to be admitted, sooner or later, and for a more considerable part, by the political élites of the self-same countries which are

to extend incentives, and even concrete financial support, to the processes at issue? And last, but not least, how to ensure that those acts not be interpreted in non-*élite* circles as a finale (economic colonization) of a comprehensive and, with political and military means already achieved submission and invasion of these regions, but as a possibility to, by reaching economic prosperity even through apparently paradoxical stages of economic subordination and negation, secure an opportunity, in a world such as this, for attaining a maximally possible and reasonably dimensioned, cultural and traditional individuality and identity and thus finally confirm that the cases of "Asian tigers" or, say, the closer, Orthodox, capitalist and in Euro-Atlantic terms firmly integrated and tradition-conscious Greece (allowing for all significant distinctions rendering the analogies relative) are not unrepeatable as such?<sup>6</sup>

These were only some among the significant practical-political "aporias" to be solved (by all means in the necessarily fast political "course") by the political *élites* of the states created on the ruins of the Second Yugoslavia. The challenge of their disclosure should not, however, be resisted by their intellectual *élites*, either. Success in this enterprise will mostly depend on their readiness to defy both the strong pressure exerted by intellectual trends and the temptations of ideological conformity and to found their activity on what was defined by Merton (1973) as the constitutive principles of a scholarly *ethos* – intellectual honesty, integrity, organized skepticism and impartiality.<sup>7</sup>

### Tradition, Integration and the World as a "Global Village" – Plaidoyer for Political-Anthropological Realism

The relation between tradition and integration is, however, and in principle, encumbered with numerous tensions. While integration is seen from the normative angle based on its positive assessment as a process which *should be*, or, from the empirical angle pointing to the inevitable

<sup>6</sup> The disappearance of Communism, it is rightly warned (Cvetkovic, 2000) did not mark the end of modern ideologies and especially national states, national traditions and national identities. On the contrary, it was only and precisely the states of unformed traditions and unconsolidated national identities that vanished together with Communism. Certain authors (Obrenovic, 2002) predict that a similar fate will befall such countries in the tumultuous processes of economic globalization.

<sup>7</sup> The exclusion and displacement ("eradication") of the intellectual from his own ethnic and social context, which are defined by Djordje Vukadinovic (2000) as the essential properties of his own specific social position in all times, and the critical ones as well, is morally unproblematic only if it is practiced in the name of sincere attachment to the principles of the scholarly *ethos* as conceived by Merton, which was very often not the case in the Serbian regions in the previous dramatic decade. Many an intellectual attachment and loyalty was of a non-scholarly and non-ethical origin at the time, both in the broadest and the most limited sense of a scholarly *ethos*.

imperatives of inclusion in wider structures as that which *must be*, tradition is perceived as a given value, something which already *is*. It is, however, warned (Dimitrijevic, 2002) that tradition is not what has simply been given: it is acquired through the process of critical confrontation with the past, its critical reconstruction in which, it is noted, one should affirm those elements of tradition which are worth preserving and as such represent a valid basis, a solid foundation-stone of a future mansion housing a universal, pan-human identity. However, the problem to be pointed to here, or at least its larger part, seems to lie elsewhere, though – in the fact that every tradition does aspire to present itself within these, in terms of their value, incontestable, normative elements worth preserving (it is according to that principle, the principle of selective memory, i.e. remembrance, that the human psyche functions anyway, both at the individual and collective level), and at the price of the repression and annihilation of those contrary ingredients which make each tradition (American, or the Western one in general, perhaps more than any other – colonialism, racism, Nazi-Fascism,...) antonymous and inconsistent in terms of value. The urgent order of time is therefore, according to us, a repeated critical confrontation with the past, particularly with those dark sides of its Janus-like face, given to the inheritors of all traditions, and particularly those offered as a source (and the destination!) of universal values, those that affirm themselves as the pillar of a future, minutely projected and pompously announced identity of a global society.

A skeptic might note that the only universal, i.e. pan-human characteristic which could be clearly identified as such, is the ever-confirmed aspiration of man to evil and destruction, which has throughout history only assumed various modes of externalization and the ever-increasingly perfect technical means of self-realization (from the bow and arrow to the cruising missile). All, or at least the larger part of what has remained and is active in the content of each particular identity/tradition, is perceived as particular from that angle (e.g. Koprivica, 2000), and it is in the reaffirmation of the particular that one recognizes the key element of identity strategies at all levels of the practice of self-interpretation – the individual, group, national, regional one... The current attempts at integration also identifiable at all the aforesaid levels, even at the continental one (e.g. the European Union) are interpreted from this point of view in terms of attempts to recognize one's own interest (in this case, the interest of an entire continent), still interpreted in terms of *particularism*, in the integration of all its parts, i.e. nation-states, which could thus more successfully resist the currently not very limited economic, cultural and, most of all, military expansion of the overseas global hegemony of the frightening and hostile Other.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This perception refers to a much lesser extent to political *élites* which are necessarily interested in what is happening globally. However, according to Koprivica,

One such stand, fairly pointed but no less respectable, traces its generally non-reflected theoretical descent from existential anthropology, which is known to have been formed under the strong influence of Freud's revolutionary psychoanalytical discoveries on the one hand and the traumatic experiences of the Second World War on the other. In his play *Huis-clos* (*In Camera*), created under the working title of *Les Autres* (*The Others*), and boasting a considerably programmatic character, the corypheus of existentialism offered his own vision of hell, not at all resembling the usual theist one. There is no mention of cauldrons, fire, stakes and poles in Sartre's play, there are no strictly differentiated circles in which sinners perish in a way proportionate to the extent of their earthly sins. The hell, says Sartre, is the others, to be in Hell means to live with the Other. Later, under the influence of Marxism, Sartre is to significantly revise his attitude and try to bring it in a juxtaposition with the new "epochal knowledge", declaring his former philosophy as a mere *ideology*, a parasitic system which "lives on the brink of knowledge it used to oppose at the beginning, whereas nowadays it tries to be included in it" (Sartre, 1979: 14). The knowledge that Sartre has in mind is Marxism, on which, according to Sartre, existentialism can feed as a parasitic ideology as long as the former does not verify its anthropological and optimistic conception of man in the practice of societies which through the will of others or their own became and "experimental property" of a utopia-minded German Jew, or a social-systematic project based on his doctrine. The results of that large-scale historic experiment, which caused resignation and led to traumas among members of those societies – both the "real-socialistic" and "self-managing socialistic" ones, and the no less threatening character of the global social dynamics initiated by its failure, bring a new topical quality into the significance of Sartre's insight from his first, existentialist phase, formed under the strong influence of Freud's meta-psychology and the calamitous experiences of the biggest war adventure in the past century.

The Freud's theory, on the one hand, and the practicality of war, on the other, seriously undermined the liberal and enlightening image of the world built during the past two centuries on the foundations of a prog-

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in a special way, it refers to them as well. "If a certain tendency at a micro-level assumes significant proportions and begins to determine the nature of new relations *within society*, then that will have to reflect on the strategy of other political élites governing their own societies and thereby on the very possibility of founding external strategies of the relevant states and on international relations themselves." (Ibid: 76). The current efforts invested in the presentation of an essentially local, particular and specifically *American* problem (Islamic terrorism) as an international and global one which, as such, binds the entire world to participate in its solution, represents a good illustration of the perception. It is also testified to by the warning words of a high European Union official that the majority of Europeans do not feel in the least threatened by the so-called international terrorism and that that they actually fear George Bush more than Osama Bin Laden.

ressivist philosophy of history and an unambiguously optimistically intoned concept of anthropology in its base. The notorious anthropological fact – that man *is* a sociable being, a being of a gregarious disposition, who cannot exist beyond and without cohabitation with the Other – was not thus called in question. That fact contains the generic essence of man, his innate *differentia speciica*, in other words, the key element of that qualitative leap in the evolution of living beings from their animalistic to their human form of bio-psychological organization. For, unlike an animal, man is a "deficient being" (Gehlen), the "thinking reed" (Pascal) and thus necessarily dependent on the Other as the prerequisite of his own survival. What psychoanalysis insisted upon and the Second World War (and many a local one that ensued) confirmed as a rightful claim, is the knowledge that with the remaining and no less significant part of his instinctive structure, *homo sapiens* is and the one who perceives and treats the Other (especially if the Other differs in terms of his language, customs, the system of norms and beliefs, the type of religion he practices, in a word, what is summarily marked as *culture*<sup>9</sup> in anthropology) as a danger to himself, his own cultural identity and even to his biological survival. Those two, generally formulated disparate elements of man's bio-psychological constitution (erotic vs. thanatic) are persistently and indefatigably confirmed by history (and even more cruelly so by the recent one, to which we have been unfortunate witnesses) as its constant qualities, firm and stable structural-functional elements on which the social circumstances of human life can obviously exert a rather limited influence.

It was only by Freud that those facts, which were seriously taken into account by the pre-Freudian anthropology as well, were raised to the level of an anthropological axiom. As such, his anthropology certainly represents an enormous challenge to utopian thought, on which each future project of human cohabitation at any intended level will have to count much more seriously than any one hitherto achieved. All the attempts at a slightly more significant revision of Freud's doctrine (the most ambitious among them being Fromm's) have produced modest results, less convincing than findings by Freud himself. That fact should be borne in mind in order to evade, in the circumstances of a tragic end of a utopia, in the situation of a "post-socialist melancholia", strongly encouraged by the apocalyptic images of ethnic war in which socialism perished in south-Slavic regions, the real danger of easily surrendering

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<sup>9</sup> To a concept of an almost identical content (with, however, emphasis on the element of religion within), Huntington (1996) on the model of Braudel, applies the term "civilization", placing it in the very centre of his treatises on the conflict-like character of international relations shaped upon the termination of the Cold War. The Other, who is both the subject and object of conflicts which essentially determine the character of the relations is, thus, defined by Huntington as well as the cultural, i.e. civilization Other – the different one.

to the lures of a different utopia, the utopia of a conflict-free and definitively and idyllically united world ("a global village"), which can be equally disappointing with too big promises it cannot fulfil. For it turned out that utopias mostly inhibit those indisputable and significant human capacity for community, inter-human cooperation and solidarity at all levels, from the lowest one – local – to the highest one – global.

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