

Making Sense: the Role of Memory in Media Representations of Serbo-Croatian Conflict

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This article analyses several examples of Serbian and Croatian newspaper writings during the war in Croatia, 1991-1995. The aim is to show how the conflict which marked the dissolution of Yugoslavia was converted, by virtue of narrative techniques, into meaningful stories about the Self, the enemy and reasons that ‘inevitably’ led to war and state dissolution. The focus is on the role that culture of memory played in shaping these narratives and forming ‘explanations’ so frequently offered by the media of that time.

Keywords

culture of memory, narration, war in Croatia.

1. Introduction

This paper will analyze the use of memory, the appropriation of images from the past, and specific interpretations of history in several examples of writing appearing in the Serbian and Croatian press during the conflict in Croatia – between 1991 and 1995 [1]. Although it deals with the media and the war in ex-Yugoslavia, my research does not follow the well-known and often formulated premise that places these terms in conjunction to demonstrate their devastating codependence – through the role and responsibility of the media in the latest Balkan wars. What I search for are *concepts* about the war (and, more generally, the conflict and its causes). I am interested in the ways in which the war was conceptualized through the processes of transformation of information from the battlefield into narratives, stories that lent meaning to the reality of war, offering it an explanatory framework, protagonists, motives, causes and purposes.

The press is an ideal source for the study of such narratives production, as it reported on the war daily, offered different models towards its explication and interpretation and

reflected the dominant public perceptions of it. Many local histories, family memories and other narratives that figured as part of the (intimate) culture of memory, but could not be publicly articulated before the war (during the period of communism), entered the public space at the break-up of the federation and imposed their frameworks on the understanding of the war, and were consequently reflected in the media – especially the press, which gave them significant leeway in order to manipulate them towards legitimizing the dominant politics which often controlled the press itself. I therefore view the press as a source for the study of the narrative frameworks in which battlefield news was placed to be shaped in a certain way, and thus, to be read and understood in a certain way. The analyzed material, of which a small portion will be presented in this paper, consists of texts in the Serbian and Croatian press covering the war in the aforementioned five years – from the first armed conflicts in Plitvice region to the Croatian military action *Oluja (the Storm)*. These texts thematize the images of the past and employ collective memories to form narratives in an attempt to construct a point of stability from which to suggest/impose an understanding of reality. In them we can read different war stories which, in order to provide explanations, use history and put forth repressed memories, old 'truths' long 'proven' in the past and new ones legitimized in it. They are here presented and analyzed with the idea to demonstrate the connection between the culture of memory, the process of narrativization, and the conception of cognitive patterns for the presentation of (the war) reality.

2. The Culture of Memory and Narration

Apart from signifying an interdisciplinary scientific field dealing with interpreting the uses and distortions of the past, the culture of memory is also used as an umbrella term for the total non-scientific public use of the past [2]. Images from the past are quite usable content for articulating the needs of today, for they are not so much a reflection of past times as socio-integrative constructs enabling the continuity of the collective identity; we also use the culture of memory to institute and enforce social images of ourselves. The past is thus an extremely active factor activated by the needs of today, whether we are concerned with a planned instrumentalization of the past by political elites in the interests of preserving power, or broader cognitive (sometimes unconscious) needs of a society to secure a learning pattern as well as reduce the complexity of reality by introducing meaning.

Images of the past are not static but mutable, and the changes they undergo are effected by the changes in the communities of memory. Wars and times of great crises especially induce great changes in the dominant images of the past, for it is then that the emphases of collective self-determination and identity shift, as well as the definitions of the Other in relation to which the new positionings are conducted. It is also at the times of crises that images of the past are invested with a new force and form, becoming part of the mobilizing moral rhetoric. The material analyzed in this paper will demonstrate the use of memory and the past in a time of crisis and war when a new framework for investing the devastated past, the war present, and the desired future with meaning was sought after.

It is also necessary to mention the importance of the narrative technique without which memory could not have the importance and mobilizing potential that it does. Narratives,

put simply, consist of a string of sequences which, ordering themselves, provide an answer to the question *what the story is*. They also often hide an answer to the question *why the story is told* [3]. The interest in the study of narratives derives from the insight that they hide the processes of cognitive patterning of different life facts into a single fabric that invests reality with meaning; through narratives we interpret and understand events surrounding us [4]. Their crucial function is cognitive, as they organize perceptions of reality into a meaningful and coherent pattern. Especially in times of crises, narratives, as stories about the self, the world, and others, find meaning in the current position through an illusion of coherence in otherwise fragmentary experiences of reality. Instrumentalization of the past would hardly be efficient without the narrative mode of rendering it, which includes its conception, selection according to a dramatic pattern, emotionalization. Fabulization reduces content and forms it into a meaningful story.

3. History, the Past, and Memory in the Serbian and Croatian Press

The press material from which the examples analyzed here derive was collected by using the press clips of the largest newspaper archives in Belgrade and Zagreb – the *Borba* and the *Vjesnik* and encompasses texts covering the greatest events and turning points in the war, from 1991 to 1995. Considering my research topic, my selection criterion was not a particular newspaper, but article type. What I selected from the press clips and included in the material were texts whose content clearly strove to offer an explanation, an analysis, an interpretation of the events they wrote about. These texts are not of a primarily informative form (those on the front pages, concisely formulated), but those which transfer information in *sujet* form, usually offering a point or an explanation – mainly, thus, authorial columns, *feuilleton*, reports from war correspondents, interviews etc. For the research into the culture of memory I selected as relevant the texts in which the subject of the past, history, memory, was present in various ways; in this paper, owing to limitations of space, I will only cite a few, but sufficiently to illustrate my point.

3.1 Printed Media from Serbia

3.1.1 Historical Fate and Peculiarities

Narratives 'polish' the content they connect, invest it with coherence and form it into a source of meaning. Thus narratives of the past yield explications of the present, the course of events are understood to be 'inevitable', and collective behaviors and characters gain an affirmation of their existence. By far the greatest number of articles from the Serbian press where we find the *topoi* of the past, memory, and history, narrativized the theme of the historical destiny of 'this area' and the peculiarities of characters and phenomena that derive therefrom. These are texts that interpret the recent or more distant past of Yugoslavia and the history of the relations of the great powers with it, drawing conclusions from these analyses of the 'inevitable' development of affairs, a break-up that was to be expected, etc. Within the range of

these motifs I also consign the texts whose interpretations and explications manipulate 'national characteristics', stereotypes, 'truths' about characters which history and popular experience have 'confirmed'.

The fate of this region has, according to numerous interpretations, been such that it has always been the victim of the interests of the great powers, especially Germany, whose *drang nach osten* was intercepted by Serbia. As maintained by some interpretations, fate is even bleaker: the history of the relations of the great powers with Serbia can be summarized in a history of hard ultimatums. In the text headed "Serbs and European ultimatums" and "How the great have sacrificed Serbian legitimate rights to their plans and egotisms" [5], those ultimatums and the losses they signified for Serbia are enumerated: from the Russian-Turkish Peace of 1812, in which Serbia "renounced its hard-won statehood", through the annexion of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the ultimatum of 1941. And "now, in 1991" comes the latest – the Hague ultimatum that "states": "erase decades and centuries of your history, renounce all your sacrifices and return to the borders and the state of before 1912...".

Very frequently, the reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia were sought in its 'inside' history, its structural bases. These texts indicated different clusters of reasons. According to many, the Constitution of 1974 prophesied the break-up, as it followed from it that the republics will grow stronger at the detriment of the federal government, so the secessionism of the Western Yugoslav states was seen as its inevitable and expected consequence.

Yugoslavia was not the only perceived victim of its 'imposed' fate. The story of the fateful repetition of history the Serbian people was doomed to was also constructed. One text reacts to the alleged existence of camps for Serbs on the island of Pag, in Croatia, with a resigned constation that it is the fate of the Serbian population to die in camps after each war [6].

Especially interesting are those narratives which place certain characteristics of Serbs and Croats into a (para)historical context. Actually, both the Serbian and Croatian press has dealt much with 'the other side', and often used the authority of the past in these 'analyses' to confirm its 'diagnoses' and explain the 'peculiarities' of the tackled mental patterns. Dealings with the Other often yielded certain conclusions about 'us' – through comparisons of the 'what they are like, and what we are like' variety. The existence of self-critical narratives, a critical stance towards *our* 'historically generated' characteristics should also be mentioned, but they were certainly a minority compared to the themes 'vivisecting' Croathood, or more precisely '*ustaštvo* (ustashas)', or even more precisely the historical roots of the hatred of Serbs.

Such narratives sought to explain certain 'general characteristics' of Croats – e.g., the superiority they were claimed to feel:

Croathood is, as they say, the loft of Christianity, and Catholicism the only true Christianity... The feeling of Croatian superiority stems from this. Belonging to Catholicism for Croats signifies belonging to something great and gives them the illusion of being a priori Europeans because of it... [7]

More often, the question of 'Serbophobia' as the key determinant of Croathood was investigated (remarks such as: an 'ustasha' is a "Croat who derives his Croathood from

Serbophobia’’). It was noted that the ’essence of the conflict between Serbs and Croats’ stems from

...the dominant belief among Croats that Serbs are a disruptive factor, which has long interfered with the creation of the Croat state. This belief must produce an intention to disable this disruptor. It is well known what these disablings are like... [8]

Serbophobia was not the only recognized characteristic of Croathood; some texts were indicating that the Croatian people was by its nature genocidal. In an interview, the writer Đorđe Očić states that ’’Tudman’s government risks to verify the thesis of the genocidal character of the Croatian people, thus inflicting the worst ill upon it.’’ [9]

The climax of such accusations was reached around the time of the Vukovar conflicts when a single news shook the domestic press. The Italian journalist Milena Gabanelli allegedly found the corpses of 40 children (some sources said 41) and from the beginning it was stated, which Gabanelli’s claim corroborated, that these were Serbian children slain by the ’ustashas’’. Despite the many weeks’ exploitation of the topic, the corpses were never found, some ’witnesses’ withdrew, and Croatian media wrote about Serbian propaganda and lies. Finally, the story simply died out in the press, without receiving an epilog. Although the newspaper articles never clarified how the ethnic identity of the victims and executioners was determined, many explanations invoked ’well known truths ascertained in history’:

Although no one said whose children these were, it is known. For, though all children are ours, such a thing could only be done by the ustashas... Only they can close their eyes deeply enough... [10]

Reactions to such morbidity of the steaming media propoganda came from dominant narratives of individual intellectuals, articulated in certain oppositionary newspapers. They again saw the problem in some essence, formed by history and the past, only now it concerned ’our’ side:

For two centuries in Serbia, heads have gone down in the name of power, enemies have been invented, friends have been changed. The Kosovo myth is getting more clamorous... The end of the century is approaching, and irrationality roams the newspapers, the blurred screens, the streets. [11]

3.1.2 Authorities from/of the Past: the Sources of Legitimacy, Historical Rights, the Victim Status

The past is an exceptionally important and powerful political and discursive factor because it is probably the most reliable and almost inexhaustible source of legitimacy we can turn to. As long as there is consensus in a society on certain images of the past and the values they confer, they will be taken recourse to as the litmus for values and referent framework in which to place the messages of today. ’’The YNA (Yugoslav National Army – J.V.) has fascists for enemies’’, states the title of a text beginning with the sentence ’’Vukovar must fall, and it is only a matter of time before it happens’’ [12]. Tanks in the streets of Vukovar thus receive their justification, for one is not to doubt the righteousness of the fight if the enemy is a fascist, and the state army his opponent. The ’halo’ of fighting against fascism is here to eliminate any doubt as to the rightness of ’our’ army’s actions.

It is thus sufficient to reach for solidified and confirmed values of formed past images to obtain an instant frame of legitimization. Those can be images of the Yugoslavian fight against fascism, as in the cited example, but they can also be images from a narrower national past. [13] As an example of the use of the latter, it is interesting to note how a text used the fate of major Milan Tepić [14] to refute the claim that the war beginning in those months was a "dirty war". Namely, the text tackles such claims by certain Western newspapers and dedicates itself to their refutation by performing a 'logical bravura'. It asks the question: "Is it possible, however, to honorably participate in a 'dirty' war? Is it possible to fight 'dirtily' for an honorable cause?". [15] Instead of an answer, it reminds of Tepić's feat and its similarity with the feat of vojvoda Sindelić. [16] For Sindelić's feat we *know* that it was magnificent and honorable, and as these feats are comparable, it follows that Tepić's action is indubitably honorable and respectable. If so, how can this be a dirty war, the author of the text wonders. In a dirty and senseless war there can be no honorable and respectable feats. Vojvoda Sindelić, as an already established symbol of honor and virtue, legitimizes Tepić's feat and serves to refute the claims of a dirty war.

The past was also used to derive the 'historical right' of Serbs to fight for the disputed territories in the seceding Croatia. The horrendous destruction and fighting in Vukovar, opened the question of this town's 'ethnicity'. The heading of a text introduces an "witness" of the "Catholic deceit that the town on the Vuka is the 'Stalingrad of Croatia'":

Vukovar is Serbian... because in 1914 in the 'diocese of Vukovar there were 14,896 Serbs (or 35 per cent) and 10,353 Croats (or 24 per cent)... Since then, from census to census, there has been deceit. The census was always religious instead of ethnic, so the Catholics were... always more numerous than the Serbs. [17]

The newspaper also reported the stance of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) presidency's members, given in a unique epistle to "foreign members, affiliates, friends and science institutions" entitled "Several basic facts about the position of the Serbian people in Croatia". The 'unenlightened' are given in this epistle several moments of older and more recent history of Southern Slavic peoples from which the centuries of freedom-loving, state-forming efforts of the Serbian people, the sacrifices it suffered through history, and finally the oppressed position it had in the Communist Yugoslavia are to be understood:

Serbia has by mid-19th century already formed an independent state... which was a parliamentary and multi-party monarchy of the Western type. In both world wars Serbia fought on the side of the Western Allies. [18]

During World War II... in 1943 was created... the second Yugoslavia, headed by President Tito and the Communist Party, in which the leading roles were taken by Croats (Tito, Bakarić) and Slovenians (Kardelj, Kidrič and others), and only a minority and marginal role was assigned to Serbs (Ranković and others)... In Tito's Yugoslavia the Serbian people and Serbia were culturally, spiritually, and materially impoverished. [19]

3.2. Printed Media from Croatia

3.2.1 Historical 'Testimonies' About the Other

An important place in the conceptualization of every conflict is occupied by the definition of the Other. We have seen how the narratives of the Serbian press reached for 'historical argumentation' and the collective knowledge of the past to explain certain 'characteristic tendencies' of the Croatian people. In the Croatian press dealing with the Other, i.e., the Serbs, is a much more prominent theme, and, I would venture to say, separately formulated, with a self-serving purpose.

As in the Serbian narratives the term 'ustasha' became a commonplace to describe the actions of the Croatian army and police, so the Croatian narratives, when describing conflicts with Serbian para/military units, but also YNA units, accepted and constantly reproduced ideological determinants from the past. "The fascist army and its 'chetnik' aides continue the raid of Vukovar"[20] Or:

Although yesterday it was again fully surrounded by the Serbo-Communist occupators, Vukovar was defended by superhuman efforts. Airplanes of the criminal Yugoslav army bombed the town again last night, aided by the Serbian fascists from the neighboring villages... [21]

Communists and fascists merge into a single face of the enemy, becoming an instant explanation why *such* an enemy *must* be fought against.

So that the *explanation* of the enemy does not remain in purely ideological terms, detailed analyses of the Serbian character were conducted, using the knowledge provided by history and the past. How to explain why the "Greater-Serbia-Communist so passionately strives to destroy all that is ours and of the world"? The answer follows:

If we pass through Serbia, which has been a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, we will not find a single sign that here was once the Islamic Ottoman Empire precisely because the Serbian barbarogenius destroyed all the mosques, banished the Muslims or christened them in the Orthodox faith... Continuing this path, the Serbian barbarogenius raised its own barbarism onto the level of a cult and a national myth, and today we pay with our own blood the climax of such politics... [22]

Dealing with the Other has the purpose of 'explaining' the situation by vivisectioning the mentality of the enemy in order to clarify what it is we are up against, what course of action is justified. At the same time, however, we deal with the Other in order to reposition Ourselves or confirm a position that suits us. By explaining the Other in a situation of conflicting it, we will reach some new conclusions about Us. If, along the way, we 'discover' some 'historical truths', 'confirmed' in the past, about the Other, so much the better for the historical truth about Us:

The myth of the invincibility of the Serbian army has collapsed, confirming the thesis that it is only a myth. Again is exposed this primitive mentality of a part of Dinara Serbs with an inferiority complex, who are jealous of something that Zagreb is... In a city they hated even in the former Yugoslavia, because it was more beautiful, cultured, European, intelligent than their Belgrade. [23]

Finally, for the 'Greater-Serbian aggression' to become a clear and obvious fact, suitable historical-structural causes and satisfactory explanations must be found for it. Thus, in this case, the experts were given the say. The *Vjesnik* wrote about the presentation of the book "The sources of Greater-Serbian aggression", where the authors, professors, analyzed "the Serbian imperialistic consciousness as a consequence of a pathological Serbian possessiveness"[24]. The following words have a similar ring to them:

The idea of a Greater Serbia has been deeply rooted in the Serbian tradition since the middle of the previous century. It developed from the premise that Serbs are actually the heirs of the Ottoman Empire and that Serbs should inherit all that the Turks had once occupied in the West. [25]

3.2.2 History and the Croats

Like the Serbian narratives, Croatian ones also searched history for the confirmation of the victim status, but also rights, before all to the statehood over the territory the Serbs refuse to admit as (only) Croatian. Within these narratives the themes are varied of the Croats' subordinate position in both Yugoslavias, described as constructs subsidiary to the Serbian interests of ruling West of the Drina, and the theme of the centuries-long presence of Croathood in the areas of today's Croatia.

It was accentuated that Yugoslavia in any form, whether a monarchy or a Communist republic, never allowed the interests of Croats to be realized, so it is justifiable to assume that a third Yugoslavia (discussed before the final secession of Slovenia and Croatia) would also be a dissatisfactory solution.

It is a fact that in both Yugoslavias the Croats were unhappy... The Communists were in no way different from the regime of the old Yugoslavia – they continued and supported Serbian hegemony over all state affairs... [26]

Another great theme in which history was called forth as a witness to Croatian rights was to prove the antiquity of Croatian statehood and the Croathood of the disputed territories. The renowned academic Ivan Supek, who often appeared as an authority in the newspapers, commences a text with the following musings: "Few peoples have such an old and precise date of their state's independence as we Croats do. John VIII in his letter of June 879 confirms to knez Branimir full authority over the entire Croatian territory"[27]. Supek is propagating the idea to mark this date as the day of Croatian statehood.

It was of even greater importance to prove the legitimate right to total sovereignty and control over the areas where the fiercest battles were taking place and where the Serbs wanted autonomy. The feuilleton "The Croathood of Vukovar" wrote about this

Croatian town where there has long persisted a European mode of life and economy... in the recent past it was not correct to write about Vukovar, because its Croathood would have been seen, because it would have been confirmed as a Croatian town[28].

This feuilleton 'confirms' it by citing the advantage the Croatian population has always had here. The trouble began with the creation of the first Yugoslavia when:

the empire in which Vukovar was an European town dissolved, and a time started when Vukovar, like the other Croatian areas, was shoved under the

gendarme boot of Yugoslavia... The Serbian minority and the officials brought here have an increasingly strong influence... [29]

After the action 'Oluja' (military operation *Storm*) and the establishment of the integrity of the Croatian state, 'proof' was given not only of the antiquity of Croathood in the recently regained areas, but also the prehistoric connection between different parts of Croatia:

Numerous archaeological remains from Knin and its surroundings confirm that this territory has belonged to Croatia for centuries... [30]

4. Conclusion

It is undeniable that interpretations of the past, history, and collective memories exerted a conducive influence on the formation of the explanatory framework for the war on both sides. It is also undeniable that efficient instrumentalization of the past cannot occur without the narrative technique. Both Serbian and Croatian narratives present in the press strove to invest the war with a meaning by determining its 'real' causes, defining the position of the self and the enemy... Naturally, legitimizing one's own position and delegitimizing the enemy's was of the greatest importance. Strategies for reaching this goal were varied, often almost symmetrically distributed on both sides: confirming the status of the victim, dealing with the Other and the historical relations with it etc. Differences between narratives are also noticeable, starting with the fact that Croatian narratives generally dealt with the theme of the past and memory to a lesser extent and that it was more narrowly defined – it mostly boiled down to historical relations between the Serbs and the Croats, especially in the context of former Yugoslavias. Serbian narratives of interpreting the past reached back further into history and wider into international relations between the great powers. Also, in Croatian narratives, the ultimate Other are the Serbs, while in Serbian narratives, I would say, the Other is a more diluted category: it encompasses primarily the Croats, but also all others recognized as a threat to Serbian interests, again doubly understood – as a striving to unite all Serbs and as a striving to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia. [31] In that sense, Croatian narratives display a perhaps greater stability concerning the themes they tackle, the structure of the motifs, and the clear goal they serve: an independent Croatia with a solved problem of the uprising of the Serbs in Krajina. Serbian narratives vary from fidelity to the Yugoslav state of the past, when their standpoint of attacking the Other is fighting against secessionism and the break-up of the state, to immersion in revived nationalistic discourses, when their main line was the endangered state of the Serbian people and the injustice inflicted upon it.

References

- 1 The paper is part of wider research into the narrativization of war in the Serbian and Croatian press and is the result of participation in the project entitled '*Spinning' out of control: rhetoric and violent conflict. Representations of 'self' – 'other' in the Yugoslav successor states* financed by the Norwegian Research Council.

- 2 Kuljić T. *Kultura sećanja*. Beograd: Čigoja štampa; 2006. This study is the most complete source in Serbian for theoretical explanations and the problematization of the use of the past and it is therefore what I will primarily be using in the explication of the term.
- 3 Franzosi R. Narrative Analysis – Or Why (And How) Sociologists Should be Interested in Narrative. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 1998; 24: 517-54.
- 4 Patterson M, Monroe K. R. Narrative in Political Science. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 1998; 1: 315–31.
- 5 Brišu nam i žrtve i istoriju. *Politika Ekspres*. 21. 03. 1992. Sources indicating newspaper texts will be given in italic.
- 6 Za Srbe ponovo logori. *Večernje Novosti*. 4. 02. 1993.
- 7 Ratuje li se zbog religija. *Politika*. 28. 11. 1991.
- 8 Suština sukoba Srba i Hrvata. *Politika*. 13. 02. 1993.
- 9 Huškaju na genocid. *Politika Ekspres*. 12. 05. 1991.
- 10 Vest kao zver. *Večernje Novosti*. 21. 11. 1991.
- 11 Javna kuća – metež. *Nin*. 20. 03. 1992.
- 12 *Politika*. 08.11. 1991.
- 13 In that sense the narratives in the Serbian media were less stable and clearly articulated than the narratives of the Croatian media. The new Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was considered to be the heir of former Yugoslavia, and a part of the public and media supported this idea of continuity and heritage of the disappearing federation. In such narratives, the secessionism of the Western republics (Slovenia and Croatia) was condemned, while Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army (YNA), while it still existed, were represented as the core of the fight for the preservation of a unified state. On the other hand, nationalistic narratives concurrently grew stronger, portraying the old Yugoslavia as the graveyard of Serbian national interests and building their motifs from parts of the national past ignored by Communism. Consequently, a lack of clarity concerning the attitude towards the Yugoslav state was obviated – it was, in different narratives, both a source of injustice to Serbs, and a legitimate frame in which Serbian interests can be defended against separatist tendencies. In the dominant narratives in Croatia, as will be seen, the attitude towards Yugoslavia is clear and unambivalent: that state symbolizes the authoritarian system of Communism, with a Serbian hegemony, from which the Croatian democracy is emancipating itself.
- 14 Milan Tepić was a YNA major who, in September 1991, blew up an ammunition warehouse in which he himself was situated, to prevent the approaching Croat soldiers from obtaining arms. Because of this action, he was often compared to the famous Serbian military leader from the First Serbian Uprising, vojvoda Sindelić, who had similarly prevented the Turkish army from taking over a Serbian army garrison.
- 15 Prljavi rat. *Večernje Novosti*. 19. 11. 1991.
- 16 See reference 14.
- 17 Žico s onog sveta. *Večernje Novosti*. 14. 12. 1991.
- 18 Glas istine i razuma. *Politika*. 16. 10. 1991.
- 19 Genocid nad srpskim narodom. *Politika*. 17. 10. 1991.
- 20 Pomahnitala soldateska. *Večernji List*. 30. 08. 1991.
- 21 Herojska odbrana grada. *Večernji List*. 29. 08. 1991. s
- 22 Kocka je bačena. *Danas*. 08. 10. 1991.
- 23 Najteži poraz velikosrba. *Večernji List*. 05. 05. 1995.

- 24 Cvijeće političkog zla. unknown source and date.
- 25 *Globus*. 27. 08. 1993.
- 26 Balvani na kninskoj cesti. *Vjesnik*. 18. 08. 1994.
- 27 Papa priznaje Hrvatsku. *Novi Vjesnik*. 04. 06. 1992.
- 28 Papa priznaje Hrvatsku. *Novi Vjesnik*. 04. 06. 1992.
- 29 *Novi Vjesnik*. 08. – 09. 07. 1993.
- 30 *Vjesnik*. 07. 08. 1995.
- 31 See reference 13.

Appendix

List of Acronyms

SASU	Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
YNA	Yugoslav National Army