Sládeček, Michal

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orcid::0009-0004-8874-0720
  • Sládeček, Michal (42)
  • Sládeček Michal, Džihana Amer (1)
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Author's Bibliography

Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2021
UR  - https://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/fid/article/view/944
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2395
AB  - The article deals with Hurka’s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson’s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her – primarily by state action – overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka’s and Arneson’s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless options can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person’s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy.
AB  - Tekst se bavi Hurkinom kritikom Kimlike (Kymlicka), kao i Arnesonovom kritikom Dvorkina 
(Dworkin) povodom teze o odobrenju osobe kao ograničenju državne intervencije ili uticaja. 
Prema ovoj tezi koju zastupaju Kimlika i Dvorkin osoba ne može da ima vredan život ukoliko 
su joj vrednosti nametnute – pre svega kroz delovanje države – prenebregavajući njene pre ferencije i uverenja o dobrom životu. Ova teza je često poistovećivana sa neutralističkim li beralizmom, a suprotstavljana perfekcionizmu. U tekstu se tvrdi da argumentacije Hurke i 
Arnesona protiv teze o odobrenju, prema kojima umerena prinuda i paternalistička redukcija 
trivijalnih, loših i bezvrednih opcija može da dovede do vrednijeg života, nisu valjane. U njima 
se ne uviđa u dovoljnoj meri razlika između prinude od strane neposredne društvene okoli ne i državne prinude, koje nisu jednako legitimne. Moja kritika, ipak, ne isključuje legitimnost 
perfekcionističkih mera, pošto osoba može državnu intervenciju da prihvati kao opravdanu 
kada se ona odnosi na podršku pojedinih vrednosti ili dobara, dok istovremeno osoba ne 
odobrava ove vrednosti ili dobra. Sva odobravana dobra ili aktivnosti ne treba da budu jed nako tretirane i određena politika može na legitiman način da podržava one koje su u većoj 
meri relevantne ili vredne.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint
T1  - Perfekcionizam o odobrenju kao ograničenju uticaja
IS  - 1
VL  - 32
SP  - 89
EP  - 104
DO  - 10.2298/FID2101089S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The article deals with Hurka’s critique of Kymlicka and Arneson’s critique of Dworkin on endorsement constraint thesis, according to which a person cannot have a valuable life if values are imposed on her – primarily by state action – overriding her preferences and convictions on the good life. This thesis has often been identified with neutral liberalism and counterposed to perfectionism. The text argues against Hurka’s and Arneson’s argument that mild coercion and paternalistic reduction of trivial, bad or worthless options can indeed bring about a more valuable life. Their argument does not acknowledge adequately the difference between coercion from a person’s immediate social environment and state coercion, which are not equally legitimate. My critique, however, does not exclude the legitimacy of perfectionistic measures, as a person could accept as justified state intervention concerning the support of particular values or goods, while at the same time not endorsing those values and goods. Not all endorsed goods or activities should be treated equally, as more relevant and valuable ones can be legitimately supported by particular policy., Tekst se bavi Hurkinom kritikom Kimlike (Kymlicka), kao i Arnesonovom kritikom Dvorkina 
(Dworkin) povodom teze o odobrenju osobe kao ograničenju državne intervencije ili uticaja. 
Prema ovoj tezi koju zastupaju Kimlika i Dvorkin osoba ne može da ima vredan život ukoliko 
su joj vrednosti nametnute – pre svega kroz delovanje države – prenebregavajući njene pre ferencije i uverenja o dobrom životu. Ova teza je često poistovećivana sa neutralističkim li beralizmom, a suprotstavljana perfekcionizmu. U tekstu se tvrdi da argumentacije Hurke i 
Arnesona protiv teze o odobrenju, prema kojima umerena prinuda i paternalistička redukcija 
trivijalnih, loših i bezvrednih opcija može da dovede do vrednijeg života, nisu valjane. U njima 
se ne uviđa u dovoljnoj meri razlika između prinude od strane neposredne društvene okoli ne i državne prinude, koje nisu jednako legitimne. Moja kritika, ipak, ne isključuje legitimnost 
perfekcionističkih mera, pošto osoba može državnu intervenciju da prihvati kao opravdanu 
kada se ona odnosi na podršku pojedinih vrednosti ili dobara, dok istovremeno osoba ne 
odobrava ove vrednosti ili dobra. Sva odobravana dobra ili aktivnosti ne treba da budu jed nako tretirane i određena politika može na legitiman način da podržava one koje su u većoj 
meri relevantne ili vredne.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint, Perfekcionizam o odobrenju kao ograničenju uticaja",
number = "1",
volume = "32",
pages = "89-104",
doi = "10.2298/FID2101089S"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2021). Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(1), 89-104.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2101089S
Sládeček M. Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(1):89-104.
doi:10.2298/FID2101089S .
Sládeček, Michal, "Perfectionism and Endorsement Constraint" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 1 (2021):89-104,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2101089S . .

Razvoj ljudskih kapaciteta i legitimnost državne intervencije

Sládeček, Michal

(Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3234
AB  - Analiza polazi od Rawlsova stajališta da autonomne osobe u liberalnom društvu trebaju 
posjedovati dvije moralne moći – kapacitet koji se odnosi na smisao za pravdu te za for-
miranje, slijeđenje i reviziju koncepcije dobra. Politički ili neutralni liberalizam podržava 
opravdanost državne intervencije za poboljšanje prvog kapaciteta, ujedno proglašavajući 
utjecaj na drugi kapacitet nelegitimnim. Kritika ove pozicije izložena je kroz analizu staja-
lišta Jonathana Quonga i Marthe Nussbaum, ukazujući na to da ona vode do dozvoljava-
nja iracionalnih i autoritarnih pozicija u obrazovanju, odnosno do zapostavljanja razvoja 
vrijednih kapaciteta. Premda institucionalni utjecaj može biti pristran i paternalistički, u 
pojedinim se slučajevima može ukazati na legitimnost institucionalne intervencije u osigu-
ravanju uvjeta koji poboljšavaju sposobnost osoba da procjenjuju, preispituju i revidiraju 
vlastite koncepcije dobra.
PB  - Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Filozofska istraživanja
T1  - Razvoj  ljudskih  kapaciteta  i  legitimnost  državne  intervencije
T1  - Development of Human Capacities and the Legitimacy of State Intervention
IS  - 4
VL  - 41
SP  - 737
EP  - 749
DO  - 10.21464/fi 41404
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2021",
abstract = "Analiza polazi od Rawlsova stajališta da autonomne osobe u liberalnom društvu trebaju 
posjedovati dvije moralne moći – kapacitet koji se odnosi na smisao za pravdu te za for-
miranje, slijeđenje i reviziju koncepcije dobra. Politički ili neutralni liberalizam podržava 
opravdanost državne intervencije za poboljšanje prvog kapaciteta, ujedno proglašavajući 
utjecaj na drugi kapacitet nelegitimnim. Kritika ove pozicije izložena je kroz analizu staja-
lišta Jonathana Quonga i Marthe Nussbaum, ukazujući na to da ona vode do dozvoljava-
nja iracionalnih i autoritarnih pozicija u obrazovanju, odnosno do zapostavljanja razvoja 
vrijednih kapaciteta. Premda institucionalni utjecaj može biti pristran i paternalistički, u 
pojedinim se slučajevima može ukazati na legitimnost institucionalne intervencije u osigu-
ravanju uvjeta koji poboljšavaju sposobnost osoba da procjenjuju, preispituju i revidiraju 
vlastite koncepcije dobra.",
publisher = "Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Filozofska istraživanja",
title = "Razvoj  ljudskih  kapaciteta  i  legitimnost  državne  intervencije, Development of Human Capacities and the Legitimacy of State Intervention",
number = "4",
volume = "41",
pages = "737-749",
doi = "10.21464/fi 41404"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2021). Razvoj  ljudskih  kapaciteta  i  legitimnost  državne  intervencije. in Filozofska istraživanja
Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo., 41(4), 737-749.
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi 41404
Sládeček M. Razvoj  ljudskih  kapaciteta  i  legitimnost  državne  intervencije. in Filozofska istraživanja. 2021;41(4):737-749.
doi:10.21464/fi 41404 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Razvoj  ljudskih  kapaciteta  i  legitimnost  državne  intervencije" in Filozofska istraživanja, 41, no. 4 (2021):737-749,
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi 41404 . .

Sveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizma

Sládeček, Michal

(Zagreb: Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, 2020)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2398
AB  - U članku se tvrdi da John Rawls u svojoj kritici perfekcionizma sa stajališta liberalističke
neutralnosti razmatra koncepcije dobra bez demarkacije između njih, odnosno bez njihova
razlikovanja. Naime, Rawls ne razrješava pitanje o tome je li tu riječ o sveobuhvatnoj religijskoj odnosno filozofsko-etičkoj koncepciji ili je riječ o parcijalnom poimanju lokalnih
vrijednosti, dobara i ciljeva. Bez obzira na spornu upotrebu pojma sveobuhvatnosti, neophodno je zadržati koncept razložnosti jer poimanja dobra, da bi bila relevantna u političkoj
raspravi, trebaju biti relativno dobro zasnovana, konzistentna i koherentna. Kada se pođe
od danih razlikovanja, može se tvrditi da u pojedinim slučajevima uvođenje razmatranja
određenih dobara u rasprave o osnovnim principima političkog ustrojstva može biti dobro
potkrepljeno i, sa stajališta razložnog pluralizma, moralno opravdano. Ipak, umjereni liberalistički perfekcionizam treba precizirati odnose li se političke odluke na stvaranje opcija,
na promociju vrijednih ili na odvraćanj
AB  - Comprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of
the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism

Abstract

The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral libe­ralism
scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether
they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high
contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept
of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good
in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable
pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless
goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly
PB  - Zagreb: Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Filozofska istraživanja
T1  - Sveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizma
T1  - Comprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism
IS  - 2
VL  - 40
SP  - 269
EP  - 282
DO  - 10.21464/fi40204
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2020",
abstract = "U članku se tvrdi da John Rawls u svojoj kritici perfekcionizma sa stajališta liberalističke
neutralnosti razmatra koncepcije dobra bez demarkacije između njih, odnosno bez njihova
razlikovanja. Naime, Rawls ne razrješava pitanje o tome je li tu riječ o sveobuhvatnoj religijskoj odnosno filozofsko-etičkoj koncepciji ili je riječ o parcijalnom poimanju lokalnih
vrijednosti, dobara i ciljeva. Bez obzira na spornu upotrebu pojma sveobuhvatnosti, neophodno je zadržati koncept razložnosti jer poimanja dobra, da bi bila relevantna u političkoj
raspravi, trebaju biti relativno dobro zasnovana, konzistentna i koherentna. Kada se pođe
od danih razlikovanja, može se tvrditi da u pojedinim slučajevima uvođenje razmatranja
određenih dobara u rasprave o osnovnim principima političkog ustrojstva može biti dobro
potkrepljeno i, sa stajališta razložnog pluralizma, moralno opravdano. Ipak, umjereni liberalistički perfekcionizam treba precizirati odnose li se političke odluke na stvaranje opcija,
na promociju vrijednih ili na odvraćanj, Comprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of
the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism

Abstract

The paper argues that Rawls’ critique of perfectionism from the standpoint of neutral libe­ralism
scrutinizes the conceptions of the good without demarcation between them, that is, without distinguishing whether they are comprehensive religious or philosophical conceptions, or whether
they are piecemeal comprehensions of local values, concepts and goods. In addition to the high
contestability in the use of the concept of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to retain the concept
of reasonableness, as comprehensions of the good have to be to some extent well-founded, consistent and coherent to be considered relevant in a political dispute. Considering these distinctions, it can be claimed that, in particular cases, the application of considerations of the good
in disputes concerning constitutional essentials can be supported and, considering reasonable
pluralism, morally justified. Nevertheless, moderate perfectionism has to specify whether political decisions create and support options, promote valuable goods or they discourage worthless
goods. It is necessary to delineate the limits of perfectionistic measures accordingly",
publisher = "Zagreb: Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Filozofska istraživanja",
title = "Sveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizma, Comprehensiveness and Reasonableness of the Conceptions of the Good in the Dispute of Political Liberalism and Perfectionism",
number = "2",
volume = "40",
pages = "269-282",
doi = "10.21464/fi40204"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2020). Sveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizma. in Filozofska istraživanja
Zagreb: Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo., 40(2), 269-282.
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40204
Sládeček M. Sveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizma. in Filozofska istraživanja. 2020;40(2):269-282.
doi:10.21464/fi40204 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Sveobuhvatnost i razložnost koncepcija dobra u raspravi političkog liberalizma i perfekcionizma" in Filozofska istraživanja, 40, no. 2 (2020):269-282,
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40204 . .

Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

Cvejić, Igor; Nikolić, Olga; Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2019)

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Cvejić, Igor
AU  - Nikolić, Olga
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2684
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T1  - Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2684
ER  - 
@book{
author = "Cvejić, Igor and Nikolić, Olga and Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2019",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
title = "Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2684"
}
Cvejić, I., Nikolić, O.,& Sládeček, M.. (2019). Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju. 
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2684
Cvejić I, Nikolić O, Sládeček M. Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju. 2019;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2684 .
Cvejić, Igor, Nikolić, Olga, Sládeček, Michal, "Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju" (2019),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2684 .

Može li se jednakost opravdati perfekcionistički?

Sládeček, Michal

(Sremski Karlovci : Centar za afirmaciju slobodne misli, 2019)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3237
AB  - Prema neutralnom egalitarizmu, cilj pravedne distribucije
jeste da svako može da računa da će imati na raspolaganju
dovoljno resursa za ostvarenje svojih životnih planova bez
obzira na sadržaj tih planova. Perfekcionička kritika smatra
da distributivna pravda ne bi trebalo da bude neutralna u
pogledu vrednosti opcija koje su pojedincima na
raspolaganju, kao ni u pogledu planova i kapaciteta za
njihovo ostvarivanje. Mada je ovakva kritika značajna
nadopuna egalitarnog liberalizma, ona je, ipak, spojiva sa
drugim nejednakostima kao što je prekomerna nejednakost u
bogatstvu i stoga njene osnovne postavke zahtevaju
kompleksniju razradu
PB  - Sremski Karlovci : Centar za afirmaciju slobodne misli
T2  - (Dis)funkcionalnost društvenog subjekta
T1  - Može li se jednakost opravdati perfekcionistički?
SP  - 57
EP  - 76
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3237
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2019",
abstract = "Prema neutralnom egalitarizmu, cilj pravedne distribucije
jeste da svako može da računa da će imati na raspolaganju
dovoljno resursa za ostvarenje svojih životnih planova bez
obzira na sadržaj tih planova. Perfekcionička kritika smatra
da distributivna pravda ne bi trebalo da bude neutralna u
pogledu vrednosti opcija koje su pojedincima na
raspolaganju, kao ni u pogledu planova i kapaciteta za
njihovo ostvarivanje. Mada je ovakva kritika značajna
nadopuna egalitarnog liberalizma, ona je, ipak, spojiva sa
drugim nejednakostima kao što je prekomerna nejednakost u
bogatstvu i stoga njene osnovne postavke zahtevaju
kompleksniju razradu",
publisher = "Sremski Karlovci : Centar za afirmaciju slobodne misli",
journal = "(Dis)funkcionalnost društvenog subjekta",
booktitle = "Može li se jednakost opravdati perfekcionistički?",
pages = "57-76",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3237"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2019). Može li se jednakost opravdati perfekcionistički?. in (Dis)funkcionalnost društvenog subjekta
Sremski Karlovci : Centar za afirmaciju slobodne misli., 57-76.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3237
Sládeček M. Može li se jednakost opravdati perfekcionistički?. in (Dis)funkcionalnost društvenog subjekta. 2019;:57-76.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3237 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Može li se jednakost opravdati perfekcionistički?" in (Dis)funkcionalnost društvenog subjekta (2019):57-76,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3237 .

Political morality and neutrality

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2018)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php?journal=fid&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=681
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1821
AB  - The article gives the reasons why a distinction between political morality
and ethical conceptions needs to be drawn, as well as the reasons for
which political liberalism is a substantial moral conception, and as such
in tension with certain understandings of the neutrality. Further, the text
analyzes the definition of personality through capacity for action (above
all ethical). Recognition of this capacity is necessary, but not sufficient
to attribute to a person a special status from the standpoint of political
morality, since individuals also must be capable to coordinate their ethical
actions with moral principles of others. Further, the text critiques Charles
Larmore’s moral grounding of the theory of justice on respect of persons
by arguing that the concept of respect should be considered as part of
the complex interrelationships with other moral concepts, such as equality.
In this way, neutrality regarding content of respect, as well as neutrality
regarding capacity for ethical action turns out to be insufficient.
AB  - U tekstu se navode razlozi zbog kojih je neophodno povući distinkciju između političke moralnosti i etičkih koncepcija, kao i razlozi zbog kojih se politički liberalizam ispostavlja kao supstancijalna moralna koncepcija, pri čemu se javlja napetost između nje i određenih shvatanja neutralnosti. Dalje se analizira određenje ličnosti kroz kapacitet za delanje (u prvom redu etičko), i obrazlaže se da je priznavanje ovog kapaciteta neophodno, mada ne i dovoljno da bi se osobi pripisao poseban status sa stanovišta političke moralnosti i da je za ovo pripisivanje takođe neophodno da pojedinac bude u stanju da usaglasi svoje etičke akcije sa moralnim principima drugih osoba. Takođe, u tekstu se kritikuje Larmoreovo moralno zasnivanje teorije pravde kroz poštovanje osoba, pri čemu se brani stanovište da pojam poštovanja treba razmatrati u sklopu kompleksnijeg međuodnosa sa drugim moralnim pojmovima, kao što je jednakost. Na taj način, neutralnost u pogledu sadržaja poštovanja, isto kao i neutralnost u pogledu kapaciteta za etičko delanje, se pokazuje kao nedovoljna.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Political morality and neutrality
T1  - Politička moralnost i neutralnost
IS  - 3
VL  - 29
SP  - 401
EP  - 414
DO  - 10.2298/FID1803401S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2018",
abstract = "The article gives the reasons why a distinction between political morality
and ethical conceptions needs to be drawn, as well as the reasons for
which political liberalism is a substantial moral conception, and as such
in tension with certain understandings of the neutrality. Further, the text
analyzes the definition of personality through capacity for action (above
all ethical). Recognition of this capacity is necessary, but not sufficient
to attribute to a person a special status from the standpoint of political
morality, since individuals also must be capable to coordinate their ethical
actions with moral principles of others. Further, the text critiques Charles
Larmore’s moral grounding of the theory of justice on respect of persons
by arguing that the concept of respect should be considered as part of
the complex interrelationships with other moral concepts, such as equality.
In this way, neutrality regarding content of respect, as well as neutrality
regarding capacity for ethical action turns out to be insufficient., U tekstu se navode razlozi zbog kojih je neophodno povući distinkciju između političke moralnosti i etičkih koncepcija, kao i razlozi zbog kojih se politički liberalizam ispostavlja kao supstancijalna moralna koncepcija, pri čemu se javlja napetost između nje i određenih shvatanja neutralnosti. Dalje se analizira određenje ličnosti kroz kapacitet za delanje (u prvom redu etičko), i obrazlaže se da je priznavanje ovog kapaciteta neophodno, mada ne i dovoljno da bi se osobi pripisao poseban status sa stanovišta političke moralnosti i da je za ovo pripisivanje takođe neophodno da pojedinac bude u stanju da usaglasi svoje etičke akcije sa moralnim principima drugih osoba. Takođe, u tekstu se kritikuje Larmoreovo moralno zasnivanje teorije pravde kroz poštovanje osoba, pri čemu se brani stanovište da pojam poštovanja treba razmatrati u sklopu kompleksnijeg međuodnosa sa drugim moralnim pojmovima, kao što je jednakost. Na taj način, neutralnost u pogledu sadržaja poštovanja, isto kao i neutralnost u pogledu kapaciteta za etičko delanje, se pokazuje kao nedovoljna.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Political morality and neutrality, Politička moralnost i neutralnost",
number = "3",
volume = "29",
pages = "401-414",
doi = "10.2298/FID1803401S"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2018). Political morality and neutrality. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 29(3), 401-414.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1803401S
Sládeček M. Political morality and neutrality. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2018;29(3):401-414.
doi:10.2298/FID1803401S .
Sládeček, Michal, "Political morality and neutrality" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 29, no. 3 (2018):401-414,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1803401S . .
2

Razložni pluralizam i neutralnost: Andrija Krešić o sekularizaciji religije

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 2018)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2018
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1632
AB  - U skladu sa koncepcijom političkog liberalizma, jedna od bitnih odlika razložnosti ideoloških, etičkih i religijskih doktrina jeste njihova spojivost sa pluralističkim poretkom. Stabilnost  pluralističkih neutralnih ili sekularnih poretka podrazumeva neophodnu podršku od strane ovakvih doktrina (kao i pojedinaca i grupa koji ih zastupaju), liberalne javne kulture i određenih pozadinskih humanističkih vrednosti i ideja. Teoretičari političkog liberalizma, kao i  nedogmatski marksizam, kakav je zastupao Andrija Krešić, smatraju da doktrine koje su uticajne u jednom društvu, kao što su pojedina religijska učenja i prakse, treba da prođu kroz procese demitologizacije (racionalizacije), humanizacije i sekularizacije da bi bile kompatibilne za zahtevima savremenog društva. Pri tome se prost pluralizam pokazuje kao nedovoljan, odnosno tolerancija treba da se razvije u socijalnu kooperaciju ili zajedničko delanje osoba i grupa sa različitim ideološkim, filozofskim i verskim ubeđenjima, koji u tom delanju zadržavaju svoj doktrinarni identitet.
AB  - Reasonable Pluralism and Neutrality; Andrija Krešić on the Secularization of Religion

	In accordance with the political liberalism, one of the crucial characteristics of the reasonable ideological, ethical, religious etc. doctrines is their compatibility with pluralistic political order. In order to achieve the stability, the pluralistic neutral or secular order have to be supported by those doctrines (and individuals and groups which endorse them), as well as by liberal public culture and particular background humanistic ideas and values. Theoreticians of political liberalism, as well as non-dogmatic Marxist such as Andrija Krešić, claimed that doctrines prominent in the society, such as particular religious teachings and practices, have to go through processes of demythologization, humanization and secularization in order to be compatible with the conditions of the modern society. In addition, simple pluralism turns out to be insufficient, and toleration has to evolve to the social cooperation or the joint practice of the individuals and groups which share various ideological, philosophical and religious convictions, at the same time retaining their doctrinal identities.
PB  - Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka
T2  - Andrija Krešić u svom i našem vremenu
T1  - Razložni pluralizam i neutralnost: Andrija Krešić o sekularizaciji religije
SP  - 175
EP  - 189
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1632
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2018",
abstract = "U skladu sa koncepcijom političkog liberalizma, jedna od bitnih odlika razložnosti ideoloških, etičkih i religijskih doktrina jeste njihova spojivost sa pluralističkim poretkom. Stabilnost  pluralističkih neutralnih ili sekularnih poretka podrazumeva neophodnu podršku od strane ovakvih doktrina (kao i pojedinaca i grupa koji ih zastupaju), liberalne javne kulture i određenih pozadinskih humanističkih vrednosti i ideja. Teoretičari političkog liberalizma, kao i  nedogmatski marksizam, kakav je zastupao Andrija Krešić, smatraju da doktrine koje su uticajne u jednom društvu, kao što su pojedina religijska učenja i prakse, treba da prođu kroz procese demitologizacije (racionalizacije), humanizacije i sekularizacije da bi bile kompatibilne za zahtevima savremenog društva. Pri tome se prost pluralizam pokazuje kao nedovoljan, odnosno tolerancija treba da se razvije u socijalnu kooperaciju ili zajedničko delanje osoba i grupa sa različitim ideološkim, filozofskim i verskim ubeđenjima, koji u tom delanju zadržavaju svoj doktrinarni identitet., Reasonable Pluralism and Neutrality; Andrija Krešić on the Secularization of Religion

	In accordance with the political liberalism, one of the crucial characteristics of the reasonable ideological, ethical, religious etc. doctrines is their compatibility with pluralistic political order. In order to achieve the stability, the pluralistic neutral or secular order have to be supported by those doctrines (and individuals and groups which endorse them), as well as by liberal public culture and particular background humanistic ideas and values. Theoreticians of political liberalism, as well as non-dogmatic Marxist such as Andrija Krešić, claimed that doctrines prominent in the society, such as particular religious teachings and practices, have to go through processes of demythologization, humanization and secularization in order to be compatible with the conditions of the modern society. In addition, simple pluralism turns out to be insufficient, and toleration has to evolve to the social cooperation or the joint practice of the individuals and groups which share various ideological, philosophical and religious convictions, at the same time retaining their doctrinal identities.",
publisher = "Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka",
journal = "Andrija Krešić u svom i našem vremenu",
booktitle = "Razložni pluralizam i neutralnost: Andrija Krešić o sekularizaciji religije",
pages = "175-189",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1632"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2018). Razložni pluralizam i neutralnost: Andrija Krešić o sekularizaciji religije. in Andrija Krešić u svom i našem vremenu
Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka., 175-189.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1632
Sládeček M. Razložni pluralizam i neutralnost: Andrija Krešić o sekularizaciji religije. in Andrija Krešić u svom i našem vremenu. 2018;:175-189.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1632 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Razložni pluralizam i neutralnost: Andrija Krešić o sekularizaciji religije" in Andrija Krešić u svom i našem vremenu (2018):175-189,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1632 .

Imaju li bliske osobe prednost? Etičke i političke dužnosti uzajamne pomoći

Sládeček, Michal

(Zagreb : Filozofska Istraživanja, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1635
AB  - U prvom dijelu članka ispituju se Humeovi i Smithovi razlozi zbog kojih je uzajamna briga 
ograničena na osobe koje su bliske jedna drugoj, pri čemu ovi autori naglašavaju utjecaj 
kako emocionalne, tako i fizičke bliskosti. Nasuprot tome, Singerova koncepcija univerzal­
nih dužnosti podrazumijeva da je posebnost odnosa između moralnih subjekata irelevantna 
sa stanovišta morala i da se etičko djelovanje treba rukovoditi sadržajem, odnosno znače­
njem, hitnošću i relevantnošću potreba. U ovom se tekstu tvrdi da je zasnivanje dužnosti 
isključivo na potrebama osobe kojoj je pomoć neophodna nedovoljno i da su dužnosti kao 
konkretizirani etički imperativi neodvojivi od ovlasti koje subjekti kao nositelji dužnosti 
imaju. U članku se analizira na koji način susret ili fizička bliskost može konstituirati po­
sebne odnose, kao i zajednička povijest, biološke veze, zajedničko građanstvo itd. Također, 
u tekstu se analizira može li i na koji način prebivanje na istom teritoriju, odnosno unutar 
granica jedne države, biti prihvaćeno kao argument u prilog posebnih dužnosti. Argumen­
tacija koja brani posebnost dužnosti nastalu iz bliskosti podrazumijevala bi da ne-državlja­
nima, koji se nađu u našoj zemlji uslijed ekstremno lošeg stanja u njihovoj matičnoj državi, 
treba pružiti pomoć kao i sugrađanima.
AB  - Do People Who are	Close Have the Priority? Ethical and Political	Duties of	Mutual Assistance.

The first part of the article explores David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s reasons due to which 
mutual care is limited to people close to one another, at which point the authors emphasize the 
influence of both emotional and physical closeness. Contrary to this, Singer’s conception of 
universal duties implies that from the perspective of morality the particularity of relationships 
between moral subjects is irrelevant, and that ethical actions should be led by the content, i.e. 
the significance, urgency, and relevance of needs. This text argues that it is insufficient for duties 
to be established exclusively on the basis of the needs of person who requires assistance, and 
that duties as concrete ethical imperatives are inseparable from assignments that belong to sub­
jects as duty-holders. The article analyses in what way the encounter or physical closeness may 
constitute special relationships. In addition, the text analyses whether, and in what way, residing 
on the same territory, that is, within the borders of the state, may be accepted as an argument 
in favour of special duties. The argumentation defending the specificity of duties formed on the 
basis of closeness would imply that non-citizens in our country, who came here due to extremely 
bad conditions in their own state, should receive assistance just as our co-citizens.
PB  - Zagreb : Filozofska Istraživanja, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Filozofska istraživanja
T1  - Imaju li bliske osobe prednost? Etičke i političke dužnosti uzajamne pomoći
IS  - 1
VL  - 37
SP  - 167
EP  - 180
DO  - 10.21464/fi37112
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2017",
abstract = "U prvom dijelu članka ispituju se Humeovi i Smithovi razlozi zbog kojih je uzajamna briga 
ograničena na osobe koje su bliske jedna drugoj, pri čemu ovi autori naglašavaju utjecaj 
kako emocionalne, tako i fizičke bliskosti. Nasuprot tome, Singerova koncepcija univerzal­
nih dužnosti podrazumijeva da je posebnost odnosa između moralnih subjekata irelevantna 
sa stanovišta morala i da se etičko djelovanje treba rukovoditi sadržajem, odnosno znače­
njem, hitnošću i relevantnošću potreba. U ovom se tekstu tvrdi da je zasnivanje dužnosti 
isključivo na potrebama osobe kojoj je pomoć neophodna nedovoljno i da su dužnosti kao 
konkretizirani etički imperativi neodvojivi od ovlasti koje subjekti kao nositelji dužnosti 
imaju. U članku se analizira na koji način susret ili fizička bliskost može konstituirati po­
sebne odnose, kao i zajednička povijest, biološke veze, zajedničko građanstvo itd. Također, 
u tekstu se analizira može li i na koji način prebivanje na istom teritoriju, odnosno unutar 
granica jedne države, biti prihvaćeno kao argument u prilog posebnih dužnosti. Argumen­
tacija koja brani posebnost dužnosti nastalu iz bliskosti podrazumijevala bi da ne-državlja­
nima, koji se nađu u našoj zemlji uslijed ekstremno lošeg stanja u njihovoj matičnoj državi, 
treba pružiti pomoć kao i sugrađanima., Do People Who are	Close Have the Priority? Ethical and Political	Duties of	Mutual Assistance.

The first part of the article explores David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s reasons due to which 
mutual care is limited to people close to one another, at which point the authors emphasize the 
influence of both emotional and physical closeness. Contrary to this, Singer’s conception of 
universal duties implies that from the perspective of morality the particularity of relationships 
between moral subjects is irrelevant, and that ethical actions should be led by the content, i.e. 
the significance, urgency, and relevance of needs. This text argues that it is insufficient for duties 
to be established exclusively on the basis of the needs of person who requires assistance, and 
that duties as concrete ethical imperatives are inseparable from assignments that belong to sub­
jects as duty-holders. The article analyses in what way the encounter or physical closeness may 
constitute special relationships. In addition, the text analyses whether, and in what way, residing 
on the same territory, that is, within the borders of the state, may be accepted as an argument 
in favour of special duties. The argumentation defending the specificity of duties formed on the 
basis of closeness would imply that non-citizens in our country, who came here due to extremely 
bad conditions in their own state, should receive assistance just as our co-citizens.",
publisher = "Zagreb : Filozofska Istraživanja, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Filozofska istraživanja",
title = "Imaju li bliske osobe prednost? Etičke i političke dužnosti uzajamne pomoći",
number = "1",
volume = "37",
pages = "167-180",
doi = "10.21464/fi37112"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2017). Imaju li bliske osobe prednost? Etičke i političke dužnosti uzajamne pomoći. in Filozofska istraživanja
Zagreb : Filozofska Istraživanja, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo., 37(1), 167-180.
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi37112
Sládeček M. Imaju li bliske osobe prednost? Etičke i političke dužnosti uzajamne pomoći. in Filozofska istraživanja. 2017;37(1):167-180.
doi:10.21464/fi37112 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Imaju li bliske osobe prednost? Etičke i političke dužnosti uzajamne pomoći" in Filozofska istraživanja, 37, no. 1 (2017):167-180,
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi37112 . .

Politički pojmovi, spornost i konflikt

Sládeček, Michal; Vranić, Bojan

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
AU  - Vranić, Bojan
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1633
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
PB  - Novi Sad : Akademska knjiga
PB  - Beograd : Institut društvenih nauka
T2  - Suštinski sporni pojmovi
T1  - Politički pojmovi, spornost i konflikt
SP  - 9
EP  - 20
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1633
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Sládeček, Michal and Vranić, Bojan",
year = "2017",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Novi Sad : Akademska knjiga, Beograd : Institut društvenih nauka",
journal = "Suštinski sporni pojmovi",
booktitle = "Politički pojmovi, spornost i konflikt",
pages = "9-20",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1633"
}
Sládeček, M.,& Vranić, B.. (2017). Politički pojmovi, spornost i konflikt. in Suštinski sporni pojmovi
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 9-20.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1633
Sládeček M, Vranić B. Politički pojmovi, spornost i konflikt. in Suštinski sporni pojmovi. 2017;:9-20.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1633 .
Sládeček, Michal, Vranić, Bojan, "Politički pojmovi, spornost i konflikt" in Suštinski sporni pojmovi (2017):9-20,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1633 .

Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism

Sládeček, Michal

(Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1613
AB  - In the first part of the article author discusses some objections to Brian Barry’s interpretation of justice as impartiality, in particular those regarding freestanding position of principles of justice. In the second part author offers his own critique of Barry’s conception, according to which Barry does not distinguished two senses of impartiality adequately, conflating impartiality as non-discrimination and equal opportunity with impartiality as neutrality between conceptions of the good. Impartiality as the equal treatment of persons regardless of their characteristics or belonging to groups is compatible with neutrality in the sense of equal respect and acknowledgement of the right of persons to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, it is also compatible with non-neutrality as the unequal treatment of conceptions of the good, insofar as some of them are unreasonable, that is, only reasonable conceptions are considered as relevant in public deliberation.
PB  - Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences
T2  - Dialogue and Universalism
T1  - Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism
IS  - 1
VL  - XXVII
SP  - 123
EP  - 134
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2017",
abstract = "In the first part of the article author discusses some objections to Brian Barry’s interpretation of justice as impartiality, in particular those regarding freestanding position of principles of justice. In the second part author offers his own critique of Barry’s conception, according to which Barry does not distinguished two senses of impartiality adequately, conflating impartiality as non-discrimination and equal opportunity with impartiality as neutrality between conceptions of the good. Impartiality as the equal treatment of persons regardless of their characteristics or belonging to groups is compatible with neutrality in the sense of equal respect and acknowledgement of the right of persons to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. However, it is also compatible with non-neutrality as the unequal treatment of conceptions of the good, insofar as some of them are unreasonable, that is, only reasonable conceptions are considered as relevant in public deliberation.",
publisher = "Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences",
journal = "Dialogue and Universalism",
title = "Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism",
number = "1",
volume = "XXVII",
pages = "123-134",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2017). Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism. in Dialogue and Universalism
Dialogue and Universalism, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Of The Polish Academy of Sciences., XXVII(1), 123-134.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613
Sládeček M. Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism. in Dialogue and Universalism. 2017;XXVII(1):123-134.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Can Justice be Really Ethically Neutral? Barry on Impartiality and Perfectionism" in Dialogue and Universalism, XXVII, no. 1 (2017):123-134,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1613 .

Jan-Werner Müller, 1197 What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016.

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2017)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1400
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Jan-Werner Müller, 1197 What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016.
IS  - 4
VL  - 28
SP  - 1197
EP  - 1200
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1400
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2017",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Jan-Werner Müller, 1197 What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016.",
number = "4",
volume = "28",
pages = "1197-1200",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1400"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2017). Jan-Werner Müller, 1197 What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 28(4), 1197-1200.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1400
Sládeček M. Jan-Werner Müller, 1197 What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016.. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2017;28(4):1197-1200.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1400 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Jan-Werner Müller, 1197 What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016." in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 28, no. 4 (2017):1197-1200,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1400 .

Impartiality, Neutrality and Perfectionsim

Sládeček, Michal

(Warsawa : Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science, 2016)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1653
PB  - Warsawa : Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science
PB  - Paris : Philosophy for Dialogue Foundation
C3  - Values and Ideals: Theory and Praxis
T1  - Impartiality, Neutrality and Perfectionsim
SP  - 143
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1653
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2016",
publisher = "Warsawa : Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science, Paris : Philosophy for Dialogue Foundation",
journal = "Values and Ideals: Theory and Praxis",
title = "Impartiality, Neutrality and Perfectionsim",
pages = "143",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1653"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2016). Impartiality, Neutrality and Perfectionsim. in Values and Ideals: Theory and Praxis
Warsawa : Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Science., 143.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1653
Sládeček M. Impartiality, Neutrality and Perfectionsim. in Values and Ideals: Theory and Praxis. 2016;:143.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1653 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Impartiality, Neutrality and Perfectionsim" in Values and Ideals: Theory and Praxis (2016):143,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1653 .

The Moral Justification of Civic Duties. Co-citizens, Non-citizens and Refugees

Sládeček, Michal

(Warszawa : Dialogue and Universalism, 2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1625
AB  - In the first part of the article the concept of associative duties and their justification as distinctive from general moral duties is analyzed. The second part considers associative duties to  fellow citizens and distinguishing features of those duties such as reciprocity, mutuality and equal status. In the final part the author deals with specific cases concerning refugees and stresses arguments as to why the associative duties of co-citizens should overcome duties to refugees, as well as the failures of those arguments. It is argued that the status of refugees is different from the status of other non-citizens, such as immigrants, due to the lack of institutional representation and protection.
PB  - Warszawa : Dialogue and Universalism
T2  - Dialogue and Universalism
T1  - The Moral Justification of Civic Duties. Co-citizens, Non-citizens and Refugees
IS  - 2
VL  - XXVI
SP  - 99
EP  - 112
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1625
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2016",
abstract = "In the first part of the article the concept of associative duties and their justification as distinctive from general moral duties is analyzed. The second part considers associative duties to  fellow citizens and distinguishing features of those duties such as reciprocity, mutuality and equal status. In the final part the author deals with specific cases concerning refugees and stresses arguments as to why the associative duties of co-citizens should overcome duties to refugees, as well as the failures of those arguments. It is argued that the status of refugees is different from the status of other non-citizens, such as immigrants, due to the lack of institutional representation and protection.",
publisher = "Warszawa : Dialogue and Universalism",
journal = "Dialogue and Universalism",
title = "The Moral Justification of Civic Duties. Co-citizens, Non-citizens and Refugees",
number = "2",
volume = "XXVI",
pages = "99-112",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1625"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2016). The Moral Justification of Civic Duties. Co-citizens, Non-citizens and Refugees. in Dialogue and Universalism
Warszawa : Dialogue and Universalism., XXVI(2), 99-112.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1625
Sládeček M. The Moral Justification of Civic Duties. Co-citizens, Non-citizens and Refugees. in Dialogue and Universalism. 2016;XXVI(2):99-112.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1625 .
Sládeček, Michal, "The Moral Justification of Civic Duties. Co-citizens, Non-citizens and Refugees" in Dialogue and Universalism, XXVI, no. 2 (2016):99-112,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1625 .

Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere

Sládeček, Michal

(2016)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1469
AB  - In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry’s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry’s interpretation, arguing that Heinz’s right of giving advantage to his wife’s life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circumstances,and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality.
AB  - Prvi deo teksta razmatra distinkciju između nepristrasnosti prvog i drugog reda, zajedno sa Berijevom (Brian Barry) temeljnom elaboracijom karakteristika i razlika ovih nepristrasnosti. Dok se nepristrasnost prvog reda odnosi na nefavorizovanje bliskih osoba u svakodnevnim odnosima, nepristrasnost drugog reda se ispoljava u institucionalnoj strukturi društva i njenom javnom i političkom moralitetu. U drugom delu članka uvodi se pojam javne nepristrasnosti kroz analizu dva primera. Prvi primer jeste Kaledonijski klub sa svojim ekskluzivitetom članstva i razmatra se kao oblik udruženja koje je pristrasno, ali je ipak moralno prihvatljivo. Drugi primer predstavlja takozvana Hajncova dilema, pri čemu autor daje svoju reinterpretaciju slučaja i ukazuje na pojedine slabe tačke Berijevog tumačenja, smatrajući da se kroz postojanje olakšavajućih okolnosti može prihvatiti Hajncovo pravo da daje prednost svojoj supruzi u odnosu na prava vlasništva i da ova pristrasnost može biti prihvaćena u javnoj sferi. Na taj način javna nepristrasnost određuje granice restriktivnosti i rigidnosti političke nepristrasnosti koja je implicirana u nepristrasnosti prvog reda.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere
T1  - Nepristrasnost drugog reda i javna sfera
IS  - 4
VL  - 27
SP  - 757
EP  - 771
DO  - 10.2298/FID1604757S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2016",
abstract = "In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry’s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry’s interpretation, arguing that Heinz’s right of giving advantage to his wife’s life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circumstances,and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality., Prvi deo teksta razmatra distinkciju između nepristrasnosti prvog i drugog reda, zajedno sa Berijevom (Brian Barry) temeljnom elaboracijom karakteristika i razlika ovih nepristrasnosti. Dok se nepristrasnost prvog reda odnosi na nefavorizovanje bliskih osoba u svakodnevnim odnosima, nepristrasnost drugog reda se ispoljava u institucionalnoj strukturi društva i njenom javnom i političkom moralitetu. U drugom delu članka uvodi se pojam javne nepristrasnosti kroz analizu dva primera. Prvi primer jeste Kaledonijski klub sa svojim ekskluzivitetom članstva i razmatra se kao oblik udruženja koje je pristrasno, ali je ipak moralno prihvatljivo. Drugi primer predstavlja takozvana Hajncova dilema, pri čemu autor daje svoju reinterpretaciju slučaja i ukazuje na pojedine slabe tačke Berijevog tumačenja, smatrajući da se kroz postojanje olakšavajućih okolnosti može prihvatiti Hajncovo pravo da daje prednost svojoj supruzi u odnosu na prava vlasništva i da ova pristrasnost može biti prihvaćena u javnoj sferi. Na taj način javna nepristrasnost određuje granice restriktivnosti i rigidnosti političke nepristrasnosti koja je implicirana u nepristrasnosti prvog reda.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere, Nepristrasnost drugog reda i javna sfera",
number = "4",
volume = "27",
pages = "757-771",
doi = "10.2298/FID1604757S"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2016). Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 27(4), 757-771.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604757S
Sládeček M. Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2016;27(4):757-771.
doi:10.2298/FID1604757S .
Sládeček, Michal, "Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 27, no. 4 (2016):757-771,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1604757S . .

Problematičnost pojma ’kolektivno sećanje’

Vasiljević, Jelena; Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Zavod za udžbenike i Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2015)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Vasiljević, Jelena
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2002
PB  - Beograd : Zavod za udžbenike i Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Kolektivno sećanje i politike pamćenja, prir: M. Sládeček, J. Vasiljević i T. Trifunović
T1  - Problematičnost pojma ’kolektivno sećanje’
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2002
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Vasiljević, Jelena and Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2015",
publisher = "Beograd : Zavod za udžbenike i Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Kolektivno sećanje i politike pamćenja, prir: M. Sládeček, J. Vasiljević i T. Trifunović",
booktitle = "Problematičnost pojma ’kolektivno sećanje’",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2002"
}
Vasiljević, J.,& Sládeček, M.. (2015). Problematičnost pojma ’kolektivno sećanje’. in Kolektivno sećanje i politike pamćenja, prir: M. Sládeček, J. Vasiljević i T. Trifunović
Beograd : Zavod za udžbenike i Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2002
Vasiljević J, Sládeček M. Problematičnost pojma ’kolektivno sećanje’. in Kolektivno sećanje i politike pamćenja, prir: M. Sládeček, J. Vasiljević i T. Trifunović. 2015;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2002 .
Vasiljević, Jelena, Sládeček, Michal, "Problematičnost pojma ’kolektivno sećanje’" in Kolektivno sećanje i politike pamćenja, prir: M. Sládeček, J. Vasiljević i T. Trifunović (2015),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2002 .

Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost

Jovanov, Rastko; Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2015)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/334
AB  - U prvom delu teksta autor izlaže argumente protiv pristrasnosti u moralnom odlučivanju, kao i argumente koji govore u prilog pristrasnosti i ukazuju na ograničenja i moguće neprihvatljive posledice nepristrasne pozicije. Središnji deo teksta tiče se pitanja moralnog statusa ličnih projekata, kao i pitanja da li je i na koji način povezanost i bliskost između osoba relevantna po moralno odlučivanje. Uposlednjem delu rada autor ističe značaj refleksije o granicama važenja razloga moralne pristrasnosti ukazujući na ključni značaj karaktera odnosa između osoba, konteksta, kao i moralne težine ili značaja slučaja na koje se moralno procenjivanje odnosi.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost
SP  - 710
EP  - 729
DO  - 10.2298/FID1503710S
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2015",
abstract = "U prvom delu teksta autor izlaže argumente protiv pristrasnosti u moralnom odlučivanju, kao i argumente koji govore u prilog pristrasnosti i ukazuju na ograničenja i moguće neprihvatljive posledice nepristrasne pozicije. Središnji deo teksta tiče se pitanja moralnog statusa ličnih projekata, kao i pitanja da li je i na koji način povezanost i bliskost između osoba relevantna po moralno odlučivanje. Uposlednjem delu rada autor ističe značaj refleksije o granicama važenja razloga moralne pristrasnosti ukazujući na ključni značaj karaktera odnosa između osoba, konteksta, kao i moralne težine ili značaja slučaja na koje se moralno procenjivanje odnosi.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost",
pages = "710-729",
doi = "10.2298/FID1503710S"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Sládeček, M.. (2015). Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 710-729.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1503710S
Jovanov R, Sládeček M. Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2015;:710-729.
doi:10.2298/FID1503710S .
Jovanov, Rastko, Sládeček, Michal, "Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2015):710-729,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1503710S . .

The Reasons for the Moral Partiality

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2015)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2782
AB  - U pr vom delu teksta autor izlaže ar gumente protiv pristrasnosti u
mo ral nom od lu či va nju, kao i ar gu men te ko ji go vo re u pri log pri stra sno sti i
uka zu ju na ogra ni če nja i mo gu će neprihvatljive posledice nepristrasne po zicije.
Središnji deo teksta ti če se pita nja moralnog statusa lič nih proje ka ta, kao
i pi ta nja da li je i na ko ji na čin po ve za nost i bliskost izme đu osoba re levantna
po moralno odlu čiva nje. U poslednjem delu ra da autor ističe zna čaj re flek sije
o gra ni ca ma va že nja raz lo ga mo ral ne pri stra sno sti uka zu ju ći na ključ ni
zna čaj ka rak te ra od no sa iz me đu oso ba, kon tek sta, kao i mo ral ne te ži ne ili
zna ča ja slu čaja na ko je se moralno procenjiva nje odnosi.
AB  - In the first part of this text, the aut hor ex pla ins the ar gu ments aga inst parti
a lity in mo ral de ci sion-ma king, as well as the ar gu ments advo ca ting for
par ti a lity and in di ca ting to li mi ta ti ons and pos si ble unac cep ta ble con se quen
ces of im par tial po si tion. The cen tral part of the text con cerns the mo ral
sta tus of per so nal pro jects and the is sue of whet her and how re la ti on ships
and clo se ness bet we en per sons are re le vant for mo ral de ci sion-ma king. The
fi nal part di scus ses the im por tan ce of re flec tion re gar ding the li mits of
va li dity of mo ral re a sons of par ti a lity, whi le po in ting at the cru cial im portan
ce of na tu re of re la ti ons bet we en pe o ple, the con text and mo ral re le van ce
or the sig ni fi can ce of ca se to which mo ral as ses sment re fers.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - The  Reasons  for  the  Moral  Partiality
T1  - Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost
IS  - 3
VL  - 26
SP  - 710
EP  - 729
DO  - 10.2298/FID1503710S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2015",
abstract = "U pr vom delu teksta autor izlaže ar gumente protiv pristrasnosti u
mo ral nom od lu či va nju, kao i ar gu men te ko ji go vo re u pri log pri stra sno sti i
uka zu ju na ogra ni če nja i mo gu će neprihvatljive posledice nepristrasne po zicije.
Središnji deo teksta ti če se pita nja moralnog statusa lič nih proje ka ta, kao
i pi ta nja da li je i na ko ji na čin po ve za nost i bliskost izme đu osoba re levantna
po moralno odlu čiva nje. U poslednjem delu ra da autor ističe zna čaj re flek sije
o gra ni ca ma va že nja raz lo ga mo ral ne pri stra sno sti uka zu ju ći na ključ ni
zna čaj ka rak te ra od no sa iz me đu oso ba, kon tek sta, kao i mo ral ne te ži ne ili
zna ča ja slu čaja na ko je se moralno procenjiva nje odnosi., In the first part of this text, the aut hor ex pla ins the ar gu ments aga inst parti
a lity in mo ral de ci sion-ma king, as well as the ar gu ments advo ca ting for
par ti a lity and in di ca ting to li mi ta ti ons and pos si ble unac cep ta ble con se quen
ces of im par tial po si tion. The cen tral part of the text con cerns the mo ral
sta tus of per so nal pro jects and the is sue of whet her and how re la ti on ships
and clo se ness bet we en per sons are re le vant for mo ral de ci sion-ma king. The
fi nal part di scus ses the im por tan ce of re flec tion re gar ding the li mits of
va li dity of mo ral re a sons of par ti a lity, whi le po in ting at the cru cial im portan
ce of na tu re of re la ti ons bet we en pe o ple, the con text and mo ral re le van ce
or the sig ni fi can ce of ca se to which mo ral as ses sment re fers.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "The  Reasons  for  the  Moral  Partiality, Razlozi za moralnu pristrasnost",
number = "3",
volume = "26",
pages = "710-729",
doi = "10.2298/FID1503710S"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2015). The  Reasons  for  the  Moral  Partiality. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 26(3), 710-729.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1503710S
Sládeček M. The  Reasons  for  the  Moral  Partiality. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2015;26(3):710-729.
doi:10.2298/FID1503710S .
Sládeček, Michal, "The  Reasons  for  the  Moral  Partiality" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 26, no. 3 (2015):710-729,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1503710S . .

(Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use

Sládeček, Michal

(Wien : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, 2014)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1649
AB  - In the first part of the article the basic characteristics of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) are briefly sketched, as well as some problems and objections to this hypothesis. The second part points to affiliations between the hypothesis and Wittgenstein's approach to problems of mind. According to the argumentation presented here, Wittgenstein's position leads to the claim that there are cases in which an external object, along with activity of the organism, are necessary elements for the fulfilment of a cognitive task. Also, Wittgenstein's approach can be helpful as a response to objections to HEC concerning the scope of the cases which can be marked as extended cognition. This approach proceeds from activity, practice of use or acquired technique as the main basis for the determination of the characteristics and the criteria of external cognition.
PB  - Wien : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria
PB  - Pölten : Department for Science and Research of the Province of Lower Austria
T2  - Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives
T1  - (Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use
SP  - 258
EP  - 261
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1649
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2014",
abstract = "In the first part of the article the basic characteristics of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) are briefly sketched, as well as some problems and objections to this hypothesis. The second part points to affiliations between the hypothesis and Wittgenstein's approach to problems of mind. According to the argumentation presented here, Wittgenstein's position leads to the claim that there are cases in which an external object, along with activity of the organism, are necessary elements for the fulfilment of a cognitive task. Also, Wittgenstein's approach can be helpful as a response to objections to HEC concerning the scope of the cases which can be marked as extended cognition. This approach proceeds from activity, practice of use or acquired technique as the main basis for the determination of the characteristics and the criteria of external cognition.",
publisher = "Wien : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, Pölten : Department for Science and Research of the Province of Lower Austria",
journal = "Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives",
booktitle = "(Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use",
pages = "258-261",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1649"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2014). (Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use. in Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives
Wien : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria., 258-261.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1649
Sládeček M. (Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use. in Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. 2014;:258-261.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1649 .
Sládeček, Michal, "(Non)cognitive Aspects of the Notebook: Extended Cognition and Practice of Use" in Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives (2014):258-261,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1649 .

The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy

Sládeček, Michal

(2014)

TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/652
AB  - Editor’s Preface
Reč priređivača
The 125th anniversary of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s birth provides the occasion for the texts presented here. These articles, by mainly younger researchers, are a modest contribution to this anniversary. Despite the distance in time, if we judge according to Wittgenstein’s impact on contemporary philosophical production (his works span numerous subjects including questions of the limits of philosophy, the foundations of language and meaning, the problems of necessity, the existence of the external world and the nature of the mind and the self, as well as questions of religion, ethics and the significance of human existence), he is our contemporary and interlocutor maybe more than any other philosopher from the past. Wittgenstein’s thought is a subject of discussion not only in philosophical circles, but in those of the theory of literature, cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology and cultural studies as well.
Wittgenstein’s’ influence on 20th century philosophy is immeasurable and it continues unceasingly into the 21st century. The articles presented here underwrite a continued interest in his philosophy manifested not only in the exegesis and interpretation of his work, but, above all, in scrutinizing the interconnections of Wittgenstein’s thought with relevant endeavours in current philosophy. Ken Shigeta elaborates Kripke’s skeptical argument in rule-following considerations as well as the possibility of its revision, which would make the argument compatible with Wittgenstein’s understanding of the paradox of interpretation. Tamara Dobler surveys the place of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the autonomy of grammar in the dispute between externalism and internalism. Finally, Michael O’Sullivan in his article analyses affiliations and differences between Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s understanding of the relation of language and meaning to the stimulus and the speaker’s environment.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy
T1  - Savremeno značenje Vitgenštajnove kasne filozofije
SP  - 125
EP  - 179
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_652
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2014",
abstract = "Editor’s Preface
Reč priređivača
The 125th anniversary of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s birth provides the occasion for the texts presented here. These articles, by mainly younger researchers, are a modest contribution to this anniversary. Despite the distance in time, if we judge according to Wittgenstein’s impact on contemporary philosophical production (his works span numerous subjects including questions of the limits of philosophy, the foundations of language and meaning, the problems of necessity, the existence of the external world and the nature of the mind and the self, as well as questions of religion, ethics and the significance of human existence), he is our contemporary and interlocutor maybe more than any other philosopher from the past. Wittgenstein’s thought is a subject of discussion not only in philosophical circles, but in those of the theory of literature, cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology and cultural studies as well.
Wittgenstein’s’ influence on 20th century philosophy is immeasurable and it continues unceasingly into the 21st century. The articles presented here underwrite a continued interest in his philosophy manifested not only in the exegesis and interpretation of his work, but, above all, in scrutinizing the interconnections of Wittgenstein’s thought with relevant endeavours in current philosophy. Ken Shigeta elaborates Kripke’s skeptical argument in rule-following considerations as well as the possibility of its revision, which would make the argument compatible with Wittgenstein’s understanding of the paradox of interpretation. Tamara Dobler surveys the place of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the autonomy of grammar in the dispute between externalism and internalism. Finally, Michael O’Sullivan in his article analyses affiliations and differences between Wittgenstein’s and Quine’s understanding of the relation of language and meaning to the stimulus and the speaker’s environment.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Savremeno značenje Vitgenštajnove kasne filozofije",
pages = "125-179",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_652"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2014). The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 125-179.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_652
Sládeček M. The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2014;:125-179.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_652 .
Sládeček, Michal, "The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2014):125-179,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_652 .

Pravila i kontekst upotrebe : teme i tumačenja Vitgenštajnove filozofije

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2014)

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2014
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/109
PB  - Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T1  - Pravila i kontekst upotrebe : teme i tumačenja Vitgenštajnove filozofije
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_109
ER  - 
@book{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2014",
publisher = "Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
title = "Pravila i kontekst upotrebe : teme i tumačenja Vitgenštajnove filozofije",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_109"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2014). Pravila i kontekst upotrebe : teme i tumačenja Vitgenštajnove filozofije. 
Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_109
Sládeček M. Pravila i kontekst upotrebe : teme i tumačenja Vitgenštajnove filozofije. 2014;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_109 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Pravila i kontekst upotrebe : teme i tumačenja Vitgenštajnove filozofije" (2014),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_109 .

A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of 'Collective Memory'

Moyall-Sharrock, D.; Munz, W.; Coliva, A.; Sládeček, Michal

(Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2013)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1248
PB  - Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
T2  - Mind, Language, and Action
T1  - A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of 'Collective Memory'
SP  - 384
EP  - 387
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1248
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Moyall-Sharrock, D., Munz, W., Coliva, A.",
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2013",
publisher = "Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society",
journal = "Mind, Language, and Action",
title = "A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of 'Collective Memory'",
pages = "384-387",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1248"
}
Moyall-Sharrock, D., Munz, W., Coliva, A.,& Sládeček, M.. (2013). A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of 'Collective Memory'. in Mind, Language, and Action
Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society., 384-387.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1248
Moyall-Sharrock D, Munz W, Coliva A, Sládeček M. A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of 'Collective Memory'. in Mind, Language, and Action. 2013;:384-387.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1248 .
Moyall-Sharrock, D., Munz, W., Coliva, A., Sládeček, Michal, "A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of 'Collective Memory'" in Mind, Language, and Action (2013):384-387,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1248 .

Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity

Jovanov, Rastko; Sládeček, Michal

(2013)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2013
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/96
AB  - The introductory part of the article deals with general features of
Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s
interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as
Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity.
In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and
rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as
immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically
shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application,
and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences
of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments
as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also
claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity
involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives
rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity
T1  - Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost
SP  - 245
EP  - 267
DO  - 10.2298/FID1304245S
ER  - 
@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2013",
abstract = "The introductory part of the article deals with general features of
Brandom’s social pragmatic position. The central part considers Brandom’s
interpretation of Kripke’s conception of social character of rules, as well as
Habermas’ critique of Brandom’s conception of I-thou and I-we types of intersubjectivity.
In the final part the author is surveying Brandom’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein’s understanding of intersubjectivity, as well as of norms and
rules in general. According to the author, Brandom treats intersubjectivity as
immediate communication, while neglecting the role of socially and historically
shared norms. Also, Brandom rejected justification of rules by past application,
and, by emphasizing the key role of inferential and practical consequences
of accepted rules, he considered pragmatic attitudes and commitments
as oriented towards future validation of meaning and rules. The author also
claims that, from Wittgensteinian perspective, communication and intersubjectivity
involve more a profound re-adjustment of interlocutors’ perspectives
rather than doxatic interchange of perspectives, as Brandom suggested.",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity, Brandom, Vitgenštajn i intersubjektivnost",
pages = "245-267",
doi = "10.2298/FID1304245S"
}
Jovanov, R.,& Sládeček, M.. (2013). Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 245-267.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304245S
Jovanov R, Sládeček M. Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2013;:245-267.
doi:10.2298/FID1304245S .
Jovanov, Rastko, Sládeček, Michal, "Brandom, Wittgenstein and Intersubjectivity" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society (2013):245-267,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1304245S . .

Od čega se sastoji 'čvrsta stena' pravila? - Mekdauel o Kripke-Rajtovom tumačenju Vitgenštajna

Sládeček, Michal

(2012)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2012
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1185
AB  - U tekstu se razmatra Mekdauelovo (John McDowell) stanovište o pojedinim problemima Vitgenštajnove (Ludwig Wittgenstein) filozofije, pre svega kroz njegovu kritiku Kripkeove (Saul Kripke) i Rajtove (Crispin Wright) interpretacije Vitgenštajnovog shvatanja pravila. Ovim su autorima zajednička pojedina stanovišta koja se odnose na mogućnost zahvatanja pravila, pri čemu bi se rešenje razlikovalo kako od objašnjenja putem interpretacije, tako i od platonizma pravila. Prema Mekdauelu, u Kripkeovom i Rajtovom tumačenju podudarnost pojedinaca u ponašanju, odnosno u upotrebi jezičkih oblika prethodi jezičkim normama i značenju. Na taj način se normativnost jezičkih pravila eliminiše, odnosno ono se nadomešta deskripcijom aktuelne javne upotrebe jezika, što u suštini ne odgovara izvornoj Vitgenštajnovoj intenciji. U kontrastu sa ovim, Mekdauel govori o Vitgenštajnovom naglašavanju autonomije pravila, kao i o implicitnoj normativnoj zasnovanosti životnih formi. U poslednjem delu teksta razmatra se opravdanost Mekdauelove kritike ovih dveju interpretacija. Naglašava se da je i pored toga što pojedine primedbe koje se odnose na značaj prakse i interpretacije nisu dovoljno utemeljene u tekstovima Kripkea i Rajta, ipak reč o značajnoj kritici, koja je znatno doprinela razumevanju Vitgenštajnovog stanovišta u pogledu pravila i njihovog praktičkog zasnivanja.
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Od čega se sastoji 'čvrsta stena' pravila? - Mekdauel o Kripke-Rajtovom tumačenju Vitgenštajna
VL  - 55
SP  - 5
EP  - 20
DO  - 10.2298/THEO1204005S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2012",
abstract = "U tekstu se razmatra Mekdauelovo (John McDowell) stanovište o pojedinim problemima Vitgenštajnove (Ludwig Wittgenstein) filozofije, pre svega kroz njegovu kritiku Kripkeove (Saul Kripke) i Rajtove (Crispin Wright) interpretacije Vitgenštajnovog shvatanja pravila. Ovim su autorima zajednička pojedina stanovišta koja se odnose na mogućnost zahvatanja pravila, pri čemu bi se rešenje razlikovalo kako od objašnjenja putem interpretacije, tako i od platonizma pravila. Prema Mekdauelu, u Kripkeovom i Rajtovom tumačenju podudarnost pojedinaca u ponašanju, odnosno u upotrebi jezičkih oblika prethodi jezičkim normama i značenju. Na taj način se normativnost jezičkih pravila eliminiše, odnosno ono se nadomešta deskripcijom aktuelne javne upotrebe jezika, što u suštini ne odgovara izvornoj Vitgenštajnovoj intenciji. U kontrastu sa ovim, Mekdauel govori o Vitgenštajnovom naglašavanju autonomije pravila, kao i o implicitnoj normativnoj zasnovanosti životnih formi. U poslednjem delu teksta razmatra se opravdanost Mekdauelove kritike ovih dveju interpretacija. Naglašava se da je i pored toga što pojedine primedbe koje se odnose na značaj prakse i interpretacije nisu dovoljno utemeljene u tekstovima Kripkea i Rajta, ipak reč o značajnoj kritici, koja je znatno doprinela razumevanju Vitgenštajnovog stanovišta u pogledu pravila i njihovog praktičkog zasnivanja.",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Od čega se sastoji 'čvrsta stena' pravila? - Mekdauel o Kripke-Rajtovom tumačenju Vitgenštajna",
volume = "55",
pages = "5-20",
doi = "10.2298/THEO1204005S"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2012). Od čega se sastoji 'čvrsta stena' pravila? - Mekdauel o Kripke-Rajtovom tumačenju Vitgenštajna. in Theoria, 55, 5-20.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1204005S
Sládeček M. Od čega se sastoji 'čvrsta stena' pravila? - Mekdauel o Kripke-Rajtovom tumačenju Vitgenštajna. in Theoria. 2012;55:5-20.
doi:10.2298/THEO1204005S .
Sládeček, Michal, "Od čega se sastoji 'čvrsta stena' pravila? - Mekdauel o Kripke-Rajtovom tumačenju Vitgenštajna" in Theoria, 55 (2012):5-20,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1204005S . .

Vitgenštajn o jeziku i prirodi

Sládeček, Michal

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2012)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2012
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/894
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Priroda, etika, politika : Ekološke (pre)okupacije i (pre)orijentacije
T1  - Vitgenštajn o jeziku i prirodi
SP  - 69
EP  - 97
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_894
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2012",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Priroda, etika, politika : Ekološke (pre)okupacije i (pre)orijentacije",
booktitle = "Vitgenštajn o jeziku i prirodi",
pages = "69-97",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_894"
}
Sládeček, M.. (2012). Vitgenštajn o jeziku i prirodi. in Priroda, etika, politika : Ekološke (pre)okupacije i (pre)orijentacije
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 69-97.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_894
Sládeček M. Vitgenštajn o jeziku i prirodi. in Priroda, etika, politika : Ekološke (pre)okupacije i (pre)orijentacije. 2012;:69-97.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_894 .
Sládeček, Michal, "Vitgenštajn o jeziku i prirodi" in Priroda, etika, politika : Ekološke (pre)okupacije i (pre)orijentacije (2012):69-97,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_894 .

Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices

Grief, H.; Weiss, M.; Sládeček, Michal

(Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2012)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Sládeček, Michal
PY  - 2012
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/1267
PB  - Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
T2  - Ethics–Society–Politics
T1  - Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices
SP  - 313
EP  - 316
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1267
ER  - 
@inbook{
editor = "Grief, H., Weiss, M.",
author = "Sládeček, Michal",
year = "2012",
publisher = "Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society",
journal = "Ethics–Society–Politics",
booktitle = "Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices",
pages = "313-316",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1267"
}
Grief, H., Weiss, M.,& Sládeček, M.. (2012). Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices. in Ethics–Society–Politics
Kirschberg am Wechsel : The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society., 313-316.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1267
Grief H, Weiss M, Sládeček M. Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices. in Ethics–Society–Politics. 2012;:313-316.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1267 .
Grief, H., Weiss, M., Sládeček, Michal, "Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices" in Ethics–Society–Politics (2012):313-316,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_1267 .