@phdthesis{
author = "Prodanović, Srđan M.",
year = "2015",
abstract = "Predmet istraživanja ovog rada biće istorijski prikaz i kritička analiza teorijskihsličnosti i razlika između pragmatizma i sociologije. U središtu našeg interesovanja ćebiti teorijski uvidi u zdravorazumsko mišljenje koji su prisutni u savremenoj sociologijii pragmatizmu. Pažnju ćemo pre svega posvetiti autorima interpretativne sociologije isavremenim teoretičarima prakse. U radu ćemo ispitati kakvu ulogu je pragmatičkoshvatanje zdravog razuma igralo pri formulaciji teorijskih uvida o svakodnevnomiskustvu koji se nude u interpretativnoj sociologiji i novim teorijama prakse. Pored toga,razmotrićemo značaj ovih istorijskih preklapanja izmenu pragmatizma i sociologije zapotencijalnu rekonceptualizaciju međusobnog odnosa teorijskog znanja i svakodnevneprakse.Metod koji ćemo koristiti će pre svega podrazumevati istraživačke postupke skojima se srećemo u studijama koje se bave međusobnim uticajem teorijskih ideja kaošto su: poređenje ideja, teza i teorijskih polazišta; ispitivanje evolucije teorijskihstanovišta; ispitivanje kontekstualnih uslova nastanka i razvoja teorijskih ideja. Ovapoređenja ćemo vršiti sa namerom da pokažemo da je konceptualizacijazdravorazumskog mišljenja igrala važnu ulogu pri stvaranju novih pristupa i pravaca usavremenoj sociologiji. Metod će takođe biti analitički kada su u pitanju procenelogičke koherentnosti teorijskih određenja zdravog razuma u delima autora koji će biti ufokusu istraživanja.Cilj rada je da pokaže da pragmatičko poimanje zdravog razuma može daposluži kao teorijski okvir za povezivanje društvene teorije i svakodnevne prakse.Nastojaćemo da dokažemo da kontinuitet između zdravorazumskog načina mišljenja isociološke teorije koji ne podrazumeva podrivanje kritičkog potencijala same društveneteorije.U uvodnom delu rada u kome ćemo se ukratko osvrnuti na radove klasičnihpragmatista i sociologa, Džona Djuija i Emila Dirkema. Videćemo da je između dvojiceautora postojalo teorijsko saglasje po pitanju razumevanja osnova fenomenadruštvenosti, te da su se razlike uglavnom bazirale na različitim epistemološkomuvidima. Naime, naturalizam koji je svojstven Djuievom pragmatizmu je u određenojmeri podrazumevao kontinuitet između zdravorazumskog i naučnog mišljenja, a ovakvogledište je pak bilo u suprotnosti sa Direkemovom verzijom pozitivizma u kome5svakodnevno, zdravorazumsko znanje nikada ne može samerljivo sa naučnom istinom.Tvrdićemo da je ova razlika temeljno pratila dalji razvoj odnosa sociologije ipragmatizma. Međutim, značaj Dirkemovih epistemoloških gledišta se svakako najvišeogledao u činjenici da su upravo ovi uvidi odigrali jednu od ključnih uloga u formiranjufunkcionalizma, kao jednog od najuticajnih teorijskih struja u savremenoj sociologiji. Uprvom poglavlju ćemo tako nastojati da objasnimo na koji način su fenomenologija ipragmatizam stvorile osnovu za prevazilaženje ove paradigme. Naročito pažnju ćemoposvetiti radovima Alfreda Šica i Džordža Herberta Mida koji su značajno uticale nainterpretativnu sociologiju. U drugom poglavlju ćemo kritički razmotriti teorijske uvidedvojice prominentnih interpretativnih sociologa, Harolda Garfinkela i ErvingaGofmana. Usredsredićemo se na njihovo tvrdnju da nesvodivosti konkretnogzdravorazumskog znanja na opšte obrasce razumevanja društvene stvarnosti, kao i naustaljeni prigovor da se u okvirima njihovih sociologija ne mogu osvetliti odnosi moći udruštvu. U trećem poglavlju analiziraćemo radove Pjera Burdijea i Lika Boltanskog kojisu u okviru pravca novih teorija prakse upravo pokušali da formulišu sintezupartikularnog zdravorazumskog znanja i univerzalnog jezika teorijske kritike. Učetvrtom poglavlju promatraćemo u kojoj meri nam uvidi neopragmatista RičardaRortija i Donalda Dejvidsona omogućavaju da prevaziđemo određene manjkavati novihteorija prakse.U zaključnom delu rada tvrdićemo da nam naša analiza sugeriše nužnostuviđanja strukture zdravog razuma. Shodno tome, obrazložićemo distinkciju izmeđusvojstava konkretnog, svakodnevnog znanja zdravog razuma i zdravorazumskih kvaziteorija. Pokazaćemo da se prva vrsta znanja ne može univerzalizovati i sledi uvide kojesu formulisali Garfinkel i Gofman, dok druga vrsta znanja često reprodukuje odnosemoći i nejednakosti i zahteva teorijsku kritiku., The object of the research conducted in this thesis will be an historical reviewand critical analysis of theoretical similarities and differences between pragmatism andsociology. The focus of my interest will be on the theoretical insights into commonsense that can be found in contemporary sociology and pragmatism. I will mainlydedicate my attention to the authors of interpretive sociology and new theories ofpractice. In the thesis I will investigate the role that the pragmatic view on commonsense had on the formulation of theoretical insights into everyday experience offered bythe interpretive sociology and new theories of practice. Aside from this, I will alsoreflect on the importance that the theoretical overlapping between pragmatism andsociology had for the potential reconceptualization of the relation between theoreticalknowledge and everyday practice.The method that I am going to rely on generally entails research procedures thatcan be found in studies that deal with mutual influence of theoretical ideas such as:comparison of ideas and theoretical standpoints; investigation of evolution of theoreticalinsights; investigation of contextual factors that influence the emergence anddevelopment of theoretical ideas. The goal of these comparisons that I will be making isto prove that conceptualization of common sense played an important role in creation ofnew approaches and paradigms in contemporary sociology. The method will also beanalytical in the sense that I will systematically question logical coherence of theoreticaldesignations of common sense in the works of authors that will be in the focus of thiswork.The goal of this thesis is to show that pragmatic understating of common sensecould serve as a theoretical frame in which social theory and everyday practice mightbecome closer. I will try to prove that there is continuity between common sense andsociological theory which does not imply that the critical potential of the social theorybecomes undermined by this fact.In the introductory part of the thesis, we will shorty review the works of twoclassical pragmatists and sociologist, John Dewey and Emile Durkheim. We will seethat there was a theoretical accordance between the two authors regarding the basis ofthe phenomena of sociability, and that the differences were mainly grounded onepistemological insights. Namely, Dewey’s naturalism largely entailed a certain amount7of continuity between commonsense and scientific ways of thinking and this view wasin opposition with Durkheim’s positivism, which implied that everyday knowledge ofcommon sense can ever be commensurable with scientific truth. I will maintain that thisdifference thoroughly followed further development of both sociology and pragmatism.However, the importance of Durkheim’s epistemological insights can primarily befound in the fact that they played a crucial role in the appearance of functionalism, asone of the most influential theoretical currents in modern sociology. Therefore, in thefirst chapter I will try to explain how phenomenology and pragmatism laid thefoundation for the overcoming of this paradigm. I will especially focus my attention tothe works of Alfred Schutz and George Herbert Mead that profoundly influencedinterpretative sociology. In the second chapter, I will critically reflect on the theoreticalinsights of two prominent interpretative sociologists, Harold Garfinkel and ErvingGoffman. We will center our analysis on their claim that the concrete everydayknowledge can never be reduced to general forms of understanding social reality, aswell as on the typical objection to their work according to which this kind of sociologycannot shed light on power relations present in the society. In the third chapter we willanalyze the works of Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski in which they tried toformulate a synthesis of particular common sense knowledge and universal language ofsocial critique. In the fourth chapter we will consider to which extent the views of theneopragmatists, Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson can help us to overcome some ofthe shortcomings of the new theories of practice.In the concluding part of the thesis I will claim that our examination suggeststhat we must take into account the structure of common sense. Therefore, we I willexplain the distinction between the properties of concrete everyday knowledge ofcommon sense and commonsensical quasi theories. I will show that the first kind ofknowledge cannot be universalized and that it follows the insights Garfinkel andGoffman, while the second kind of knowledge often reproduces the power relations andinequality and demands a theoretical critique.",
publisher = "Београд : Институт за филозофију и друштвену теорију",
journal = "Универзитет у Београду",
title = "Status zdravog razuma u savremenoj sociološkoj teoriji, The status of common sense in contemporary social theory: toward a pragmatic reconceptualization of the relationship between theory and practice",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_nardus_4549"
}
