Fatić, Aleksandar

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Authority KeyName Variants
orcid::0000-0002-5672-7183
  • Fatić, Aleksandar (195)
  • Fatic, Aleksandar (32)
  • Fatić Aleksandar, Zagorac Ivana (1)
Projects

Author's Bibliography

“Normalcy” in Behavioral Philosophy and in Spiritual Practice

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Basel : MDPI, 2024)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2024
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3769
AB  - This paper introduces the concept of behavioral philosophy, discusses its relationship to philosophical counseling and psychotherapy, and focuses on the concept of normalcy as the normative foundation for a broader discussion on pathology versus philosophical dysfunctionality in life. Following the starting definitions, the argument proceeds to considering how normalcy as a normative foundation of both behavioral philosophy and philosophical counseling and of psychotherapy (along with pathology and pathologization) plays a role in the perspective of behavioral self-improvement sought by behavioral philosophy and by psychotherapy (for various reasons, depending on the psychotherapeutic school and methodology). The author concludes that normalcy, rather than pathology or mental disorder, is the focal concept to discuss in order to understand the role of spirituality and spiritual conviction and belief within the context of therapeutic change, whether it is interpreted philosophically or strictly psychotherapeutically.
PB  - Basel : MDPI
T2  - Religions
T1  - “Normalcy” in Behavioral Philosophy and in Spiritual Practice
IS  - 2
VL  - 15
DO  - 10.3390/rel15020205
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2024",
abstract = "This paper introduces the concept of behavioral philosophy, discusses its relationship to philosophical counseling and psychotherapy, and focuses on the concept of normalcy as the normative foundation for a broader discussion on pathology versus philosophical dysfunctionality in life. Following the starting definitions, the argument proceeds to considering how normalcy as a normative foundation of both behavioral philosophy and philosophical counseling and of psychotherapy (along with pathology and pathologization) plays a role in the perspective of behavioral self-improvement sought by behavioral philosophy and by psychotherapy (for various reasons, depending on the psychotherapeutic school and methodology). The author concludes that normalcy, rather than pathology or mental disorder, is the focal concept to discuss in order to understand the role of spirituality and spiritual conviction and belief within the context of therapeutic change, whether it is interpreted philosophically or strictly psychotherapeutically.",
publisher = "Basel : MDPI",
journal = "Religions",
title = "“Normalcy” in Behavioral Philosophy and in Spiritual Practice",
number = "2",
volume = "15",
doi = "10.3390/rel15020205"
}
Fatić, A.. (2024). “Normalcy” in Behavioral Philosophy and in Spiritual Practice. in Religions
Basel : MDPI., 15(2).
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15020205
Fatić A. “Normalcy” in Behavioral Philosophy and in Spiritual Practice. in Religions. 2024;15(2).
doi:10.3390/rel15020205 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "“Normalcy” in Behavioral Philosophy and in Spiritual Practice" in Religions, 15, no. 2 (2024),
https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15020205 . .
1

Trauma, excuses and therapy

Fatić, Aleksandar

(2023)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://icpp2023.ro
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3288
AB  - The paper focuses on the prevalent culture of trauma in psychotherapy and the theoretical use of trauma as a universal alibi for various dysfunctionalities.
C3  - 17the International Conference of Philosophical Practitioners, Timisoara
T1  - Trauma, excuses and therapy
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3288
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper focuses on the prevalent culture of trauma in psychotherapy and the theoretical use of trauma as a universal alibi for various dysfunctionalities.",
journal = "17the International Conference of Philosophical Practitioners, Timisoara",
title = "Trauma, excuses and therapy",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3288"
}
Fatić, A.. (2023). Trauma, excuses and therapy. in 17the International Conference of Philosophical Practitioners, Timisoara.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3288
Fatić A. Trauma, excuses and therapy. in 17the International Conference of Philosophical Practitioners, Timisoara. 2023;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3288 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Trauma, excuses and therapy" in 17the International Conference of Philosophical Practitioners, Timisoara (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3288 .

Modal Logic in Integrative Philosophical Practice

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2023)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3035
AB  - The paper discusses the differences between a practical emphasis on binary logic on the one hand, and modal logic, on the other, specifically in the fields of philosophical practice and psychotherapy. Although studies of practical applications of modal logic in the helping professions are recent, the discussion largely revolves around the controversial application of modality in psychotherapy by C.G. Jung and Lacan’s psychoanalysis. The present argument touches on some of the conceptual dilemmas associated with the relationship between logical modality, intuition and scientificity in psychotherapy, all of which are a part of the philosophical foundation of psychotherapy.
AB  - U tekstu se raspravlja o razlikama izmedju praktičnog naglaska na binarnoj logici, s jedne
strane, i na modalnoj logici, s druge strane, u oblastima filozofske prakse i psihoterapije. Studije praktične primene modalne logike u pomagačkim profesijama su skorašnjeg datuma i
njihov sadržaj se u velikoj meri zasniva na kontroverzama u primeni modalnog mišljenja u
psihoanalizi C.G. Junga i u lakanovskoj psihoanalizi. Argumentacija teksta dodiruje neke od
pojmovnih dilema koje se tiču veze između logičke modalnosti, intuicije i naučnosti u psihoterapiji i filozofskoj praksi. Svi ovi aspekti savetodavnog procesa spadaju u same filozofske
osnove psihoterapije.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - Modal Logic in Integrative Philosophical Practice
T1  - Modalna logika u integrativnoj filozofskoj praksi
IS  - 3
VL  - 34
SP  - 424
EP  - 437
DO  - 10.2298/FID2303424F
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper discusses the differences between a practical emphasis on binary logic on the one hand, and modal logic, on the other, specifically in the fields of philosophical practice and psychotherapy. Although studies of practical applications of modal logic in the helping professions are recent, the discussion largely revolves around the controversial application of modality in psychotherapy by C.G. Jung and Lacan’s psychoanalysis. The present argument touches on some of the conceptual dilemmas associated with the relationship between logical modality, intuition and scientificity in psychotherapy, all of which are a part of the philosophical foundation of psychotherapy., U tekstu se raspravlja o razlikama izmedju praktičnog naglaska na binarnoj logici, s jedne
strane, i na modalnoj logici, s druge strane, u oblastima filozofske prakse i psihoterapije. Studije praktične primene modalne logike u pomagačkim profesijama su skorašnjeg datuma i
njihov sadržaj se u velikoj meri zasniva na kontroverzama u primeni modalnog mišljenja u
psihoanalizi C.G. Junga i u lakanovskoj psihoanalizi. Argumentacija teksta dodiruje neke od
pojmovnih dilema koje se tiču veze između logičke modalnosti, intuicije i naučnosti u psihoterapiji i filozofskoj praksi. Svi ovi aspekti savetodavnog procesa spadaju u same filozofske
osnove psihoterapije.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "Modal Logic in Integrative Philosophical Practice, Modalna logika u integrativnoj filozofskoj praksi",
number = "3",
volume = "34",
pages = "424-437",
doi = "10.2298/FID2303424F"
}
Fatić, A.. (2023). Modal Logic in Integrative Philosophical Practice. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 34(3), 424-437.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2303424F
Fatić A. Modal Logic in Integrative Philosophical Practice. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2023;34(3):424-437.
doi:10.2298/FID2303424F .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Modal Logic in Integrative Philosophical Practice" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 34, no. 3 (2023):424-437,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2303424F . .
1

What is normalcy?

Fatić, Aleksandar; Bulatović, Aleksandra; Korać, Srđan

(Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2023)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
AU  - Bulatović, Aleksandra
AU  - Korać, Srđan
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2926
AB  - Normalcy is a controversial concept in modern psychotherapy, which suffers from the postmodernist woes of seeking to question the very normative foundations of what is personal and collective wellbeing and thus, also, ‘mental health’. In this paper we reaffirm the concept of normalcy along the Lacanian psychoanalytic lines of socialization and internalization of projections of virtue and the underlying values adopted by the community. In the process, we distinguish between the constitutive elements of individual normalcy, resilience as an attribute of mental health (and, thus, of normalcy) that is associated with the propositional characteristics of individual normalcy, and institutional and social normalcy as parallel to individual normalcy.
PB  - Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
T2  - Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju (Bioethical viewpoints on mental health)
T1  - What is normalcy?
SP  - 75
EP  - 96
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2926
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar and Bulatović, Aleksandra and Korać, Srđan",
year = "2023",
abstract = "Normalcy is a controversial concept in modern psychotherapy, which suffers from the postmodernist woes of seeking to question the very normative foundations of what is personal and collective wellbeing and thus, also, ‘mental health’. In this paper we reaffirm the concept of normalcy along the Lacanian psychoanalytic lines of socialization and internalization of projections of virtue and the underlying values adopted by the community. In the process, we distinguish between the constitutive elements of individual normalcy, resilience as an attribute of mental health (and, thus, of normalcy) that is associated with the propositional characteristics of individual normalcy, and institutional and social normalcy as parallel to individual normalcy.",
publisher = "Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu",
journal = "Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju (Bioethical viewpoints on mental health)",
booktitle = "What is normalcy?",
pages = "75-96",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2926"
}
Fatić, A., Bulatović, A.,& Korać, S.. (2023). What is normalcy?. in Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju (Bioethical viewpoints on mental health)
Centar za bioetiku Fakulteta filozofije i religijskih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu., 75-96.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2926
Fatić A, Bulatović A, Korać S. What is normalcy?. in Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju (Bioethical viewpoints on mental health). 2023;:75-96.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2926 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, Bulatović, Aleksandra, Korać, Srđan, "What is normalcy?" in Bioetička motrišta o mentalnom zdravlju (Bioethical viewpoints on mental health) (2023):75-96,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2926 .

Filoterapija kao drustvena delatnost

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Beograd: Filozofsko društvo Srbije, 2023)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2924
AB  - The paper focuses on emotional subjectivity (a sense of own identity based on an emotional reception of values), on the one hand, and the constitution of an organic community (one characterized by immediacy, as oppose to a formal community, which is permeated with by institutional relations that mediate the inter-subjective relationships between the community's members.
AB  - : Tekst se bavi odnosom između emocionalne subjektivnosti (doživljaja
sopstvenog identiteta na osnovu emocionalne recepcije vrednosti) s jedne, i konstitucijom organske zajednice (zajednice koju odlikuje neposrednost, za razliku od neophodnosti institucionalnog posredovanja) s druge strane. Ideju o tome da emocije predstavljaju dinamički sadržaj procesa donošenja odluka, nasuprot racionalnoj deliberaciji,
podržavaju nalazi savremene neuronauke. Posledice te ideje za razumevanje vrline,
individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta i načina na koji se organski formiraju zajednice
su značajne. Argumentacija ovog teksta tiče se pre svega posledica razumevanja emocionalne subjektivnosti kao dominantnog identiteta za društvenu ulogu filozofske prakse
i pomagačkih profesija, poput psihoterapije. Društvena uloga različitih psihoterapeutskih pravaca, poput psihoanalize, dobro je poznata, dok društveno aktivistički aspekti
filozofske prakse i posebno filozofskog savetovanja ostaju velikim delom nerazlučeni
od političkog i ideološki motivisanog delovanja. U tekstu se argumentiše da je društvena uloga filozofske prakse prisutna kako u terapeutskom procesu (kroz terapijsku dimenziju vrednosne socijalizacije ili resocijalizacije pojedinca ili grupe), tako i u širem
društvenom diskursu (kroz filozofsko edukativnu ulogu u artikulisanju odgovarajućih
vrednosti i razvijanju kolektivnog senzibiliteta za te vrednosti.
PB  - Beograd: Filozofsko društvo Srbije
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Filoterapija kao drustvena delatnost
IS  - 3
VL  - 66
SP  - 125
EP  - 140
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2303125F
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper focuses on emotional subjectivity (a sense of own identity based on an emotional reception of values), on the one hand, and the constitution of an organic community (one characterized by immediacy, as oppose to a formal community, which is permeated with by institutional relations that mediate the inter-subjective relationships between the community's members., : Tekst se bavi odnosom između emocionalne subjektivnosti (doživljaja
sopstvenog identiteta na osnovu emocionalne recepcije vrednosti) s jedne, i konstitucijom organske zajednice (zajednice koju odlikuje neposrednost, za razliku od neophodnosti institucionalnog posredovanja) s druge strane. Ideju o tome da emocije predstavljaju dinamički sadržaj procesa donošenja odluka, nasuprot racionalnoj deliberaciji,
podržavaju nalazi savremene neuronauke. Posledice te ideje za razumevanje vrline,
individualnog i kolektivnog identiteta i načina na koji se organski formiraju zajednice
su značajne. Argumentacija ovog teksta tiče se pre svega posledica razumevanja emocionalne subjektivnosti kao dominantnog identiteta za društvenu ulogu filozofske prakse
i pomagačkih profesija, poput psihoterapije. Društvena uloga različitih psihoterapeutskih pravaca, poput psihoanalize, dobro je poznata, dok društveno aktivistički aspekti
filozofske prakse i posebno filozofskog savetovanja ostaju velikim delom nerazlučeni
od političkog i ideološki motivisanog delovanja. U tekstu se argumentiše da je društvena uloga filozofske prakse prisutna kako u terapeutskom procesu (kroz terapijsku dimenziju vrednosne socijalizacije ili resocijalizacije pojedinca ili grupe), tako i u širem
društvenom diskursu (kroz filozofsko edukativnu ulogu u artikulisanju odgovarajućih
vrednosti i razvijanju kolektivnog senzibiliteta za te vrednosti.",
publisher = "Beograd: Filozofsko društvo Srbije",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Filoterapija kao drustvena delatnost",
number = "3",
volume = "66",
pages = "125-140",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2303125F"
}
Fatić, A.. (2023). Filoterapija kao drustvena delatnost. in Theoria
Beograd: Filozofsko društvo Srbije., 66(3), 125-140.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2303125F
Fatić A. Filoterapija kao drustvena delatnost. in Theoria. 2023;66(3):125-140.
doi:10.2298/THEO2303125F .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Filoterapija kao drustvena delatnost" in Theoria, 66, no. 3 (2023):125-140,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2303125F . .

Magijsko mišljenje i magijsko objašnjenje u filozofiji i psihologiji

Fatic, Aleksandar

(2023)

TY  - GEN
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3336
AB  - U savremenim razmatranjima racionalnosti u objašnjenju mogu se različiti različita shvatanja magijskog mišljenja, koje su obično predstavlja kao suprostavljeno racionalnom, pa čak i „razumnom“ verovanju kao temelju saznanja. Jedna od najznačajnijih interpretacija ove vrste kategorijalne podvojenosti između legitimnog i nelegitimnog uverenja, odnosno između magijskog verovanja i pravog saznanja, potiče od Džozefa Agasija (Joseph Agassi). Ovo izlaganje će se baviti Agassijevom klasifikacijom magijskog i racionalnog objašnjenja, i dovešće u pitanje racionalističku ideju o tome da se saznanje može normirati samo kao legitimno verovanje potkrepljeno optimalnim dokazima. Ispostaviće se da je magijsko verovanje, odnosno verovanje koje se često pokazuje kao istinito, a zasnovano je na saznajnim procedurama koje neka epoha, kultura ili čak profesionalna disciplina ne priznaju kao legitimne procese saznavanja i objašnjenja, jednako praktično i društveno vredno kao i legitimno „saznanje“. Jedan od najočiglednijih primera je psihoanaliza: pristup koji je poslednjih nekoliko decenija faktički isključen iz brojnih poslediplomskih programa studija psihologije i psihoterapije, pre svega zbog toga što se smatra „magijskim“, nasuprot „psihologiji zasnovanoj na dokazima“ (evidence-based psychology). Ipak, iskustvo je pokazalo da su ključne psihoanalitičke postavke ispravne u psihoterapeutskom procesu i da njihove filozofske i psihološke ramifikacije određuju čitave krupne oblasti psihoterapije.
Savremena normativna interpretacija ličnosti u filozofiji i psihologiji, a posebno u filozofiji psihijatrije i filozofiji psihoterapije, u najvećem svom delu bi se, strogo posmatrano, tretirala kao oblast magijskog objašnjenja, jer njene postavke i argumenti ne podležu neposrednoj verifikaciji i počivaju na širokim interpretativnim temeljima koji omogućavaju visok stepen diskrecije i kreativnosti u praktičnoj primeni. 
Neka od najznačajnijih dela koja su formirala istoriju filozofije, iz persketive „naučnosti“ saznanja i danas dominantnih kriterijuma za utvrđivanje „magijskog“ nasuprot „pravom“ ili „naučnom“, ili „racionalnom“ saznanju, spadaju u domen čistog magijskog objašnjenja. Dovoljno je, ograničavajući se na modernu filozofiju, pomenuti Ničea, Spinozu, ili Junga, čije razumevanje ličnosti je utemeljilo čitavu jednu filozofsko-psihološku tradiciju u razumevanju identiteta, da bi postalo jasno koliko je magijsko temeljno za filozofsko i psihološko mišljenje. Naglasak ovog izlaganja je na afirmaciji magijskog kao komplementarnog racionalnom objašnjenju, uz istovremeno razmatranje moguće komplementarnosti magijskog saznanja racionalnom saznanju, uz uzimanje u obzir savremenih pristupa magijskom objanjenju poput „somaestetike“ Ričarda Šustermana (Richard Shusterman).
T2  - Konferencija "Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci", organizatori Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu
T1  - Magijsko mišljenje i magijsko objašnjenje u filozofiji i psihologiji
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3336
ER  - 
@misc{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "U savremenim razmatranjima racionalnosti u objašnjenju mogu se različiti različita shvatanja magijskog mišljenja, koje su obično predstavlja kao suprostavljeno racionalnom, pa čak i „razumnom“ verovanju kao temelju saznanja. Jedna od najznačajnijih interpretacija ove vrste kategorijalne podvojenosti između legitimnog i nelegitimnog uverenja, odnosno između magijskog verovanja i pravog saznanja, potiče od Džozefa Agasija (Joseph Agassi). Ovo izlaganje će se baviti Agassijevom klasifikacijom magijskog i racionalnog objašnjenja, i dovešće u pitanje racionalističku ideju o tome da se saznanje može normirati samo kao legitimno verovanje potkrepljeno optimalnim dokazima. Ispostaviće se da je magijsko verovanje, odnosno verovanje koje se često pokazuje kao istinito, a zasnovano je na saznajnim procedurama koje neka epoha, kultura ili čak profesionalna disciplina ne priznaju kao legitimne procese saznavanja i objašnjenja, jednako praktično i društveno vredno kao i legitimno „saznanje“. Jedan od najočiglednijih primera je psihoanaliza: pristup koji je poslednjih nekoliko decenija faktički isključen iz brojnih poslediplomskih programa studija psihologije i psihoterapije, pre svega zbog toga što se smatra „magijskim“, nasuprot „psihologiji zasnovanoj na dokazima“ (evidence-based psychology). Ipak, iskustvo je pokazalo da su ključne psihoanalitičke postavke ispravne u psihoterapeutskom procesu i da njihove filozofske i psihološke ramifikacije određuju čitave krupne oblasti psihoterapije.
Savremena normativna interpretacija ličnosti u filozofiji i psihologiji, a posebno u filozofiji psihijatrije i filozofiji psihoterapije, u najvećem svom delu bi se, strogo posmatrano, tretirala kao oblast magijskog objašnjenja, jer njene postavke i argumenti ne podležu neposrednoj verifikaciji i počivaju na širokim interpretativnim temeljima koji omogućavaju visok stepen diskrecije i kreativnosti u praktičnoj primeni. 
Neka od najznačajnijih dela koja su formirala istoriju filozofije, iz persketive „naučnosti“ saznanja i danas dominantnih kriterijuma za utvrđivanje „magijskog“ nasuprot „pravom“ ili „naučnom“, ili „racionalnom“ saznanju, spadaju u domen čistog magijskog objašnjenja. Dovoljno je, ograničavajući se na modernu filozofiju, pomenuti Ničea, Spinozu, ili Junga, čije razumevanje ličnosti je utemeljilo čitavu jednu filozofsko-psihološku tradiciju u razumevanju identiteta, da bi postalo jasno koliko je magijsko temeljno za filozofsko i psihološko mišljenje. Naglasak ovog izlaganja je na afirmaciji magijskog kao komplementarnog racionalnom objašnjenju, uz istovremeno razmatranje moguće komplementarnosti magijskog saznanja racionalnom saznanju, uz uzimanje u obzir savremenih pristupa magijskom objanjenju poput „somaestetike“ Ričarda Šustermana (Richard Shusterman).",
journal = "Konferencija "Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci", organizatori Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu",
title = "Magijsko mišljenje i magijsko objašnjenje u filozofiji i psihologiji",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3336"
}
Fatic, A.. (2023). Magijsko mišljenje i magijsko objašnjenje u filozofiji i psihologiji. in Konferencija "Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci", organizatori Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3336
Fatic A. Magijsko mišljenje i magijsko objašnjenje u filozofiji i psihologiji. in Konferencija "Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci", organizatori Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu. 2023;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3336 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Magijsko mišljenje i magijsko objašnjenje u filozofiji i psihologiji" in Konferencija "Objašnjenje i razumevanje u filozofiji i nauci", organizatori Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Odeljenje za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3336 .

Normalcy

Fatic, Aleksandar

(2023)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - https://philevents.org/event/show/107893#:~:text=with%20joy%20and%20undisguised%20enthusiasm,those%20in%20the%20online%20module.
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3536
AB  - The paper discusses the standards of normalcy in modern psychotherapeutic practice and their philosophical and specifically ethical ramifications.
C3  - Conference "Bioethics and Aporia of the Psyche", Croatian Bioethics Society
T1  - Normalcy
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3536
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper discusses the standards of normalcy in modern psychotherapeutic practice and their philosophical and specifically ethical ramifications.",
journal = "Conference "Bioethics and Aporia of the Psyche", Croatian Bioethics Society",
title = "Normalcy",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3536"
}
Fatic, A.. (2023). Normalcy. in Conference "Bioethics and Aporia of the Psyche", Croatian Bioethics Society.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3536
Fatic A. Normalcy. in Conference "Bioethics and Aporia of the Psyche", Croatian Bioethics Society. 2023;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3536 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Normalcy" in Conference "Bioethics and Aporia of the Psyche", Croatian Bioethics Society (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3536 .

Joseph Agassi and the various guises of magic

Fatic, Aleksandar

(Sage Publications, 2023)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2954
AB  - The paper discusses the various conceptions of magic, with a focus on Joseph Agassi's view that magic is a type of pre-scientific or pre-rational belief that, while it may be true, is still not knowledge. I argue in the paper that magic can also be a post-knowledge type of cognition, based on bodily and intuitive processes, whose truthfulness, usefulness and relevance do not fall behind scientific knowledge, especially in fields such as psychotherapy and religion.
PB  - Sage Publications
T2  - Philosophy of the Social Sciences
T1  - Joseph  Agassi and the various guises of magic
VL  - online first
DO  - 10.1177/00483931231200697
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper discusses the various conceptions of magic, with a focus on Joseph Agassi's view that magic is a type of pre-scientific or pre-rational belief that, while it may be true, is still not knowledge. I argue in the paper that magic can also be a post-knowledge type of cognition, based on bodily and intuitive processes, whose truthfulness, usefulness and relevance do not fall behind scientific knowledge, especially in fields such as psychotherapy and religion.",
publisher = "Sage Publications",
journal = "Philosophy of the Social Sciences",
title = "Joseph  Agassi and the various guises of magic",
volume = "online first",
doi = "10.1177/00483931231200697"
}
Fatic, A.. (2023). Joseph  Agassi and the various guises of magic. in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Sage Publications., online first.
https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931231200697
Fatic A. Joseph  Agassi and the various guises of magic. in Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 2023;online first.
doi:10.1177/00483931231200697 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Joseph  Agassi and the various guises of magic" in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, online first (2023),
https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931231200697 . .

Why narcissists are morally responsible

Fatic, Aleksandar

(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2953
AB  - The paper is a response to commentaries by Ronald W. Pies and Lydia Amir to the initial papere entitled "Narcissism as a moral incompetence". It focuses on the irreducible moral responsibility of narcissists for their choices given that, like everybody else, they are accountable for their own self-development to the extent that they are able to influence it. Some of the responses (including, importantly, arguments by Pies) questioned the assumption that narcissists can influence their own self-development on account of possible heredity in the development of narcissistic traits. This paper is a response to that critique.
PB  - Johns Hopkins University Press
T2  - Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology
T1  - Why narcissists are morally responsible
IS  - 2
VL  - 30
SP  - 177
EP  - 180
DO  - 10.1353/ppp.2023.a899949
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "The paper is a response to commentaries by Ronald W. Pies and Lydia Amir to the initial papere entitled "Narcissism as a moral incompetence". It focuses on the irreducible moral responsibility of narcissists for their choices given that, like everybody else, they are accountable for their own self-development to the extent that they are able to influence it. Some of the responses (including, importantly, arguments by Pies) questioned the assumption that narcissists can influence their own self-development on account of possible heredity in the development of narcissistic traits. This paper is a response to that critique.",
publisher = "Johns Hopkins University Press",
journal = "Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology",
title = "Why narcissists are morally responsible",
number = "2",
volume = "30",
pages = "177-180",
doi = "10.1353/ppp.2023.a899949"
}
Fatic, A.. (2023). Why narcissists are morally responsible. in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology
Johns Hopkins University Press., 30(2), 177-180.
https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.a899949
Fatic A. Why narcissists are morally responsible. in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology. 2023;30(2):177-180.
doi:10.1353/ppp.2023.a899949 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Why narcissists are morally responsible" in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 30, no. 2 (2023):177-180,
https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2023.a899949 . .

Narcissism as a moral incompetence

Fatic, Aleksandar

(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2023
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2771
AB  - In this paper I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not. My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgement, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, namely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psychopathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic.
PB  - Johns Hopkins University Press
T2  - Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy
T1  - Narcissism as a moral incompetence
VL  - 30
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2771
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2023",
abstract = "In this paper I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not. My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgement, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, namely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psychopathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic.",
publisher = "Johns Hopkins University Press",
journal = "Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy",
title = "Narcissism as a moral incompetence",
volume = "30",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2771"
}
Fatic, A.. (2023). Narcissism as a moral incompetence. in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy
Johns Hopkins University Press., 30.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2771
Fatic A. Narcissism as a moral incompetence. in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy. 2023;30.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2771 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Narcissism as a moral incompetence" in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Philosophy, 30 (2023),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2771 .

Reinventing education as therapy in the age of narcissism

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2022)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://ifdt.bg.ac.rs/2022/03/cfa-third-international-conference-why-still-education/?lang=en
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3287
AB  - The paper focuses on the psychotherapeutic interventions in the educational process and the key role played by values in governing the relationships that make up the substance of that process.
PB  - Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
C3  - Međunarodna konferencija Čemu još obrazovanje? Humanizam, posthumanizam, anti-humanizam: obrazovne perspektive : knjiga apstrakata / / Third international conference Why still education?
T1  - Reinventing education as therapy in the age of narcissism
T1  - Obrazovanje kao terapija u dobu narcizma
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3287
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2022",
abstract = "The paper focuses on the psychotherapeutic interventions in the educational process and the key role played by values in governing the relationships that make up the substance of that process.",
publisher = "Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory",
journal = "Međunarodna konferencija Čemu još obrazovanje? Humanizam, posthumanizam, anti-humanizam: obrazovne perspektive : knjiga apstrakata / / Third international conference Why still education?",
title = "Reinventing education as therapy in the age of narcissism, Obrazovanje kao terapija u dobu narcizma",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3287"
}
Fatić, A.. (2022). Reinventing education as therapy in the age of narcissism. in Međunarodna konferencija Čemu još obrazovanje? Humanizam, posthumanizam, anti-humanizam: obrazovne perspektive : knjiga apstrakata / / Third international conference Why still education?
Belgrade : Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3287
Fatić A. Reinventing education as therapy in the age of narcissism. in Međunarodna konferencija Čemu još obrazovanje? Humanizam, posthumanizam, anti-humanizam: obrazovne perspektive : knjiga apstrakata / / Third international conference Why still education?. 2022;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3287 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Reinventing education as therapy in the age of narcissism" in Međunarodna konferencija Čemu još obrazovanje? Humanizam, posthumanizam, anti-humanizam: obrazovne perspektive : knjiga apstrakata / / Third international conference Why still education? (2022),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3287 .

Normalcy and socialization: A Lacanian understanding of freedom

Fatić, Aleksandar

(2022)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://domomladine.org/debate/medunarodna-konferencija-znanje-i-sloboda/
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3289
AB  - Izlaganje se bavi lakanovskim razumevanjem slobode zasnovane na postojanju zdrave unutrašnje normativne stukture utemeljene na "glavnom signifajeru", Ime Oca.
C3  - Konferencija: Znanje i sloboda. Institut za studije kulture hrišćanstva
T1  - Normalcy and socialization: A Lacanian understanding of freedom
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3289
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Izlaganje se bavi lakanovskim razumevanjem slobode zasnovane na postojanju zdrave unutrašnje normativne stukture utemeljene na "glavnom signifajeru", Ime Oca.",
journal = "Konferencija: Znanje i sloboda. Institut za studije kulture hrišćanstva",
title = "Normalcy and socialization: A Lacanian understanding of freedom",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3289"
}
Fatić, A.. (2022). Normalcy and socialization: A Lacanian understanding of freedom. in Konferencija: Znanje i sloboda. Institut za studije kulture hrišćanstva.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3289
Fatić A. Normalcy and socialization: A Lacanian understanding of freedom. in Konferencija: Znanje i sloboda. Institut za studije kulture hrišćanstva. 2022;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3289 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Normalcy and socialization: A Lacanian understanding of freedom" in Konferencija: Znanje i sloboda. Institut za studije kulture hrišćanstva (2022),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3289 .

Forfeiting the Paradigm of Victimhood

Fatić, Aleksandar; Behzad Hadžić

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2022)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
AU  - Behzad Hadžić
PY  - 2022
UR  - https://journal.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/index.php/fid/article/view/1522
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2751
AB  - This paper is a philosophical meta-discussion of the current culture in psychiatry and psychotherapy that focuses on trauma as the source and predominant determinant of a large number of psychiatric complaints. Such a culture leads to increasing, rather the decreasing, the destructive role of traumatization and victimization throughout the life experiences of those affected, and (as culture) is exemplified by increasing calls by influential psychiatrists to expand the interpretative role of trauma to virtually all our experiences of social inadequacy and personal hurt. We argue here, from a philosophical and psychiatric point of view, that the transactions, semantics and affects that psychiatry and psychotherapy are concerned with in cases of trauma and victimhood are negatively affected by the culture of using trauma as an alibi and a kind of universal explanation of psychological dysfunctionality and suffering. We also argue that, contrary to the current culture of a sort of idolatry of trauma, more consistent and philosophically informed approaches to psychiatric and psychotherapeutic intervention, based on a different interpretation of less-than-radically adverse life experiences, might in fact reduce both the clinical occurrence of traumatization and the actual adverse impact of self-perceived victimization and traumatization on the prospects for achieving the goal of ‘the good life’.
AB  - Tekst je filozofska metadiskusija aktuelne kulture u psihijatriji i psihoterapiji koja se koncen triše na traumu kao izvor i preovlađujuću odrednicu velikog broja psihijatrijskih tegoba. Za hvaljujući pomenutoj kulturi, destruktivne uloge traumatizacije i viktimizacije se pojačavaju 
u svom uticaju na životna iskustva protagonista, ili žrtava tih iskustava, zavisno od toga kako 
se traumatizacija i viktimizacija posmatraju. Primeri ove vrste kulture uključuju sve češće po zive uticajnih psihijatara na širenje interpretativne uloge trauma kao delimičnog objašnjenja 
svih iskustava koja uključuju osećaj socijalne neadekvatnosti i lične povređenosti. U ovom 
tekstu, autori argumentišu da, sa filozofske i psihijatrijske tačke gledišta, transakcije, seman tika i afekti kojima se psihijatrija i psihoterapija bave u slučajevima trauma i viktimizacije, 
dobijaju dodatni destruktivni potencijal zahvaljujući upotrebi trauma kao univerzalnog alibija 
i objašnjenja za psihičku disfunkcionalnost i sa njom povezanu patnju. Nasuprot toj kulturi, 
autori sugerišu da bi, umesto idolatrije u vezi sa traumom, dosledniji i filozofski informisaniji 
pristupi psihijatrijskim i psihoterapetuskim intervencijama, koji bi počivali na drugačijim in terpretacijama onih negativnih životnih iskustava koja ne ugrožavaju psihičku egzistenciju 
radikalno ili ekstremno, mogli redukovati kliničku zastupljenost traumatizacije kao sindroma. 
Istovremeno, uzdržavanje od psihodijagnostičkog tretiranja traume kao univerzalnog alibija 
za disfunkcionalnost, smanjilo bi konkretne negativne efekte interpretacije sopstvenih isku stava kao viktimizacije i traumatizacije. Trauma kao alibi, u aktuelnoj kulturi, faktički onemo gućava efektivno ostvarivanja cilja „dobrog života“ kao filozofskog zadatka za svakog poje dinca, i kao nosećeg ideala u celokupnoj psihoterapiji, jer pruža normativni predložak za 
posmatranje i umerenih negativnih iskustava kao trauma, i za tretiranje nefunkcionalnosti 
kao faktički redovne, gotovo neizbežne, posledice takvih „trauma“.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Forfeiting the Paradigm of Victimhood
T1  - Odricanje od paradigme žrtve
IS  - 4
VL  - 33
SP  - 1022
EP  - 1036
DO  - 10.2298/FID2204022F
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar and Behzad Hadžić",
year = "2022",
abstract = "This paper is a philosophical meta-discussion of the current culture in psychiatry and psychotherapy that focuses on trauma as the source and predominant determinant of a large number of psychiatric complaints. Such a culture leads to increasing, rather the decreasing, the destructive role of traumatization and victimization throughout the life experiences of those affected, and (as culture) is exemplified by increasing calls by influential psychiatrists to expand the interpretative role of trauma to virtually all our experiences of social inadequacy and personal hurt. We argue here, from a philosophical and psychiatric point of view, that the transactions, semantics and affects that psychiatry and psychotherapy are concerned with in cases of trauma and victimhood are negatively affected by the culture of using trauma as an alibi and a kind of universal explanation of psychological dysfunctionality and suffering. We also argue that, contrary to the current culture of a sort of idolatry of trauma, more consistent and philosophically informed approaches to psychiatric and psychotherapeutic intervention, based on a different interpretation of less-than-radically adverse life experiences, might in fact reduce both the clinical occurrence of traumatization and the actual adverse impact of self-perceived victimization and traumatization on the prospects for achieving the goal of ‘the good life’., Tekst je filozofska metadiskusija aktuelne kulture u psihijatriji i psihoterapiji koja se koncen triše na traumu kao izvor i preovlađujuću odrednicu velikog broja psihijatrijskih tegoba. Za hvaljujući pomenutoj kulturi, destruktivne uloge traumatizacije i viktimizacije se pojačavaju 
u svom uticaju na životna iskustva protagonista, ili žrtava tih iskustava, zavisno od toga kako 
se traumatizacija i viktimizacija posmatraju. Primeri ove vrste kulture uključuju sve češće po zive uticajnih psihijatara na širenje interpretativne uloge trauma kao delimičnog objašnjenja 
svih iskustava koja uključuju osećaj socijalne neadekvatnosti i lične povređenosti. U ovom 
tekstu, autori argumentišu da, sa filozofske i psihijatrijske tačke gledišta, transakcije, seman tika i afekti kojima se psihijatrija i psihoterapija bave u slučajevima trauma i viktimizacije, 
dobijaju dodatni destruktivni potencijal zahvaljujući upotrebi trauma kao univerzalnog alibija 
i objašnjenja za psihičku disfunkcionalnost i sa njom povezanu patnju. Nasuprot toj kulturi, 
autori sugerišu da bi, umesto idolatrije u vezi sa traumom, dosledniji i filozofski informisaniji 
pristupi psihijatrijskim i psihoterapetuskim intervencijama, koji bi počivali na drugačijim in terpretacijama onih negativnih životnih iskustava koja ne ugrožavaju psihičku egzistenciju 
radikalno ili ekstremno, mogli redukovati kliničku zastupljenost traumatizacije kao sindroma. 
Istovremeno, uzdržavanje od psihodijagnostičkog tretiranja traume kao univerzalnog alibija 
za disfunkcionalnost, smanjilo bi konkretne negativne efekte interpretacije sopstvenih isku stava kao viktimizacije i traumatizacije. Trauma kao alibi, u aktuelnoj kulturi, faktički onemo gućava efektivno ostvarivanja cilja „dobrog života“ kao filozofskog zadatka za svakog poje dinca, i kao nosećeg ideala u celokupnoj psihoterapiji, jer pruža normativni predložak za 
posmatranje i umerenih negativnih iskustava kao trauma, i za tretiranje nefunkcionalnosti 
kao faktički redovne, gotovo neizbežne, posledice takvih „trauma“.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Forfeiting the Paradigm of Victimhood, Odricanje od paradigme žrtve",
number = "4",
volume = "33",
pages = "1022-1036",
doi = "10.2298/FID2204022F"
}
Fatić, A.,& Behzad Hadžić. (2022). Forfeiting the Paradigm of Victimhood. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 33(4), 1022-1036.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2204022F
Fatić A, Behzad Hadžić. Forfeiting the Paradigm of Victimhood. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2022;33(4):1022-1036.
doi:10.2298/FID2204022F .
Fatić, Aleksandar, Behzad Hadžić, "Forfeiting the Paradigm of Victimhood" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society, 33, no. 4 (2022):1022-1036,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2204022F . .
1

Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih političkih prava

Fatić, Aleksandar; Bulatović, Aleksandra

(Beograd : Institut za političke studije, 2022)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
AU  - Bulatović, Aleksandra
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2700
AB  - Pitanja o ljudskim pravima se danas diskutuju pre svega u kontekstu individualnih prava, kao suprotstavljenih kolektivnim interesima. U skladu sa dugom liberalnom političkom tradicijom, ljudska prava se uglavnom sagledavaju kao suštinski protivna kolektivnim pravima, koja mogu ograničiti slobodu pojedinca da pravi izbore koji bi mogli ugroziti relevantne kolektivne interese. U ovom tekstu se ljudska prava sagledavaju kao izvedena socijalna prava. Kao što priroda i identitet zajednice kojoj pojedinac pripada bitno određuju identitet tog pojedinca (Agambenov pojam „Socialitas”, ili „društvenosti”), individualna prava nemaju puno značenje van konteksta vrednosti, prava i interesa zajednice. Opisani kontekst tek omogućava postojanje autentičnog i čvrstog pojma nacionalnog interesa. Po definiciji, nacionalni interesi su povezani sa kolektivnim pravima i vizijama zajednice; oni nikad ne počivaju na pogledima i stavovima individualnog, izolovanog pojedinca. Jedno od ključnih kolektivnih prava, i u isto vreme kolektivnih interesa, koje konstituiše nacionalni interes je skup prava porodice. U ovom tekstu se argumentiše da odgovarajuća zaštita porodice i porodičnih prava baca senku na samu pretpostavku o moralnosti i političkoj legitimnosti različitih savremenih ideologija, uključujući i feminističku ideologiju, koje sugerišu da, umesto da se štite prava i interesi porodice kao primarni nacionalni interes, država treba da štiti pojedince od porodice. Ideologije koje porodicu predstavljaju kao toksičnu, kao izvor pretnje individualnoj dobrobiti, u stvari su antisocijalne, totalitarne ideologije. Najveći broj argumenata koje takve ideologije iznose protiv porodice u stvari se sa jednakom snagom mogu primeniti protiv socijalnosti bilo kog tipa. Stoga u ovom tekstu argumentujemo da se Agambenov „moralni imperativ” da svaki pojedinac doprinosi, na načine koji su mu na raspolaganju, socijalnosti njegovog društva, odnosi na odgovarajuće razumevanje porodice i treba da se shvati kao sama osnova anti-totalitarnog mišljenja.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za političke studije
T2  - Srpska politička misao
T1  - Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih političkih prava
IS  - 3
VL  - 25
SP  - 93
EP  - 117
DO  - 10.22182/spm.7732022.5
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar and Bulatović, Aleksandra",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Pitanja o ljudskim pravima se danas diskutuju pre svega u kontekstu individualnih prava, kao suprotstavljenih kolektivnim interesima. U skladu sa dugom liberalnom političkom tradicijom, ljudska prava se uglavnom sagledavaju kao suštinski protivna kolektivnim pravima, koja mogu ograničiti slobodu pojedinca da pravi izbore koji bi mogli ugroziti relevantne kolektivne interese. U ovom tekstu se ljudska prava sagledavaju kao izvedena socijalna prava. Kao što priroda i identitet zajednice kojoj pojedinac pripada bitno određuju identitet tog pojedinca (Agambenov pojam „Socialitas”, ili „društvenosti”), individualna prava nemaju puno značenje van konteksta vrednosti, prava i interesa zajednice. Opisani kontekst tek omogućava postojanje autentičnog i čvrstog pojma nacionalnog interesa. Po definiciji, nacionalni interesi su povezani sa kolektivnim pravima i vizijama zajednice; oni nikad ne počivaju na pogledima i stavovima individualnog, izolovanog pojedinca. Jedno od ključnih kolektivnih prava, i u isto vreme kolektivnih interesa, koje konstituiše nacionalni interes je skup prava porodice. U ovom tekstu se argumentiše da odgovarajuća zaštita porodice i porodičnih prava baca senku na samu pretpostavku o moralnosti i političkoj legitimnosti različitih savremenih ideologija, uključujući i feminističku ideologiju, koje sugerišu da, umesto da se štite prava i interesi porodice kao primarni nacionalni interes, država treba da štiti pojedince od porodice. Ideologije koje porodicu predstavljaju kao toksičnu, kao izvor pretnje individualnoj dobrobiti, u stvari su antisocijalne, totalitarne ideologije. Najveći broj argumenata koje takve ideologije iznose protiv porodice u stvari se sa jednakom snagom mogu primeniti protiv socijalnosti bilo kog tipa. Stoga u ovom tekstu argumentujemo da se Agambenov „moralni imperativ” da svaki pojedinac doprinosi, na načine koji su mu na raspolaganju, socijalnosti njegovog društva, odnosi na odgovarajuće razumevanje porodice i treba da se shvati kao sama osnova anti-totalitarnog mišljenja.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za političke studije",
journal = "Srpska politička misao",
title = "Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih političkih prava",
number = "3",
volume = "25",
pages = "93-117",
doi = "10.22182/spm.7732022.5"
}
Fatić, A.,& Bulatović, A.. (2022). Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih političkih prava. in Srpska politička misao
Beograd : Institut za političke studije., 25(3), 93-117.
https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7732022.5
Fatić A, Bulatović A. Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih političkih prava. in Srpska politička misao. 2022;25(3):93-117.
doi:10.22182/spm.7732022.5 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, Bulatović, Aleksandra, "Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih političkih prava" in Srpska politička misao, 25, no. 3 (2022):93-117,
https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7732022.5 . .

Životni planovi i životni ciljevi u filozofskoj praksi

Peričin, Ivana; Fatić, Aleksandar

(Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo, 2022)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Peričin, Ivana
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2702
AB  - Amid the ongoing and growing rise in the awareness of traditional schools of psychotherapy of the need for a more philosophical understanding of themselves and their clients, and the resulting return of the fragmented modern psychotherapy under the integrative aegis of philosophical practice (philotherapy), some of the ancient, practical philosophical issues have resurfaced with force in therapeutic practice. One is the issue of drawing an appropriate distinction between the concepts of life plan and life goals. The ancient philosophical figures tended to call the former „reason”, or „wisdom”. The modern age has re-actualized this distinction due to exceptionally forceful social and technological influences, many of which have caused large numbers of individuals to adopt life goals which, while socially highly desirable, in fact work against the implementation of their more authentic life plans. The outcome of this uncritical adoption of what seems as a thrilling and satisfying structure of life goals, while at the same time betraying one’s deeper life plan, or life strategy, is failure to achieve a high quality of life, or ‘the good life’.
PB  - Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Životni planovi i životni ciljevi u filozofskoj praksi
T1  - Life Plans and Life Goals in Philosophical Practice
IS  - 1
VL  - 65
SP  - 151
EP  - 165
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2201151F
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Peričin, Ivana and Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Amid the ongoing and growing rise in the awareness of traditional schools of psychotherapy of the need for a more philosophical understanding of themselves and their clients, and the resulting return of the fragmented modern psychotherapy under the integrative aegis of philosophical practice (philotherapy), some of the ancient, practical philosophical issues have resurfaced with force in therapeutic practice. One is the issue of drawing an appropriate distinction between the concepts of life plan and life goals. The ancient philosophical figures tended to call the former „reason”, or „wisdom”. The modern age has re-actualized this distinction due to exceptionally forceful social and technological influences, many of which have caused large numbers of individuals to adopt life goals which, while socially highly desirable, in fact work against the implementation of their more authentic life plans. The outcome of this uncritical adoption of what seems as a thrilling and satisfying structure of life goals, while at the same time betraying one’s deeper life plan, or life strategy, is failure to achieve a high quality of life, or ‘the good life’.",
publisher = "Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Životni planovi i životni ciljevi u filozofskoj praksi, Life Plans and Life Goals in Philosophical Practice",
number = "1",
volume = "65",
pages = "151-165",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2201151F"
}
Peričin, I.,& Fatić, A.. (2022). Životni planovi i životni ciljevi u filozofskoj praksi. in Theoria
Beograd : Srpsko filozofsko društvo., 65(1), 151-165.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2201151F
Peričin I, Fatić A. Životni planovi i životni ciljevi u filozofskoj praksi. in Theoria. 2022;65(1):151-165.
doi:10.2298/THEO2201151F .
Peričin, Ivana, Fatić, Aleksandar, "Životni planovi i životni ciljevi u filozofskoj praksi" in Theoria, 65, no. 1 (2022):151-165,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2201151F . .

Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih i političkih prava

Bulatović, Aleksandra; Fatić, Aleksandar

(Beograd: Institut za političke studije, 2022)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bulatović, Aleksandra
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2686
AB  - Pitanja o ljudskim pravima se danas diskutuju pre svega u kontekstu individualnih prava, kao suprotstavljenih kolektivnim interesima. U skladu sa dugom liberalnom političkom tradicijom, ljudska prava se uglavnom sagledavaju kao suštinski protivna kolektivnim pravima, koja mogu ograničiti slobodu pojedinca da pravi izbore koji bi mogli ugroziti relevantne kolektivne interese. U ovom tekstu se ljudska prava sagledavaju kao izvedena socijalna prava. Kao što priroda i identitet zajednice kojoj pojedican pripada bitno određuju identitet tog pojedinca (Agambenov pojam „Socialitas“, ili „društvenosti“), individualna prava nemaju puno značenje van konteksta vrednosti, prava i interesa zajednice. Opisani kontekst tek omogućava postojanje autentičnog i čvrstog pojma nacionalnog interesa. Po definiciji, nacionalni interesi su povezani sa kolektivnim pravima i vizijama zajednice; oni nikad ne počivaju na pogledima i stavovima individualnog, izolovanog pojedinca. Jedno od ključnih kolektivnih prava, i u isto vreme kolektivnih interesa, koje konstituiše nacionalni interes je skup prava porodice. U ovom tekstu se argumentiše da odgovarajuća zaštita porodice i porodičnih prava baca senku na samu pretpostavku o moralnosti i političkoj legitimnosti različitih savremenih ideologija, uključujući i feminističku ideologiju, koje sugerišu da, umesto da se štite prava i interesi porodice kao primarni nacionalni interes, država treba da štiti pojedince od porodice. Ideologije koje porodicu predstavljaju kao toksičnu, kao izvor pretnje individualnoj dobrobiti, u stvari su antisocijalne, totalitarne ideologije. Najveći broj argumenata koje takve ideologije iznose protiv porodice u stvari se sa jednakom snagom mogu primeniti protiv socijalnosti bilo kog tipa. Stoga u ovom tekstu argumentišemo da se Agambenov „moralni imperativ“ da svaki pojedinac doprinosi, na načine koji su mu na raspolaganju, soijalnosti njegovog društva, odnosi na odgovarajuće razumevanje porodice i treba da se shvati kao sama osnova anti-totalitarnog mišljenja.
AB  - Issues of human rights are prevalently discussed as pertaining to individual rights as opposed to collective interests. Following the long liberal political tradition, human rights tend to be seen as potentially in opposition to collective rights, which may limit the liberty of the individual to make choices that would militate against the relevant collective interests. In this paper, we argue that individual rights ought to be seen as derivative, social rights. Just as an individual’s identity is markedly determined by the nature and identity of the community one belongs to (Agamben’s concept of ‘Socialitas’ or sociality), individual rights have little meaning outside the context of values, rights and entitlements of one’s community. This is a context that gives rise to the concept of national interest. By definition, national interests are associated with collective rights, entitlements and visions; they are never associated with the views and positions of a single, discrete individual. One of the key collective rights that constitutes national interest is the set of rights of the family. We argue that protecting the family and family rights casts a shadow on the very morality and political legitimacy of the various ideologies of today, including that of feminism, which suggest that, rather than protecting family rights and interests as a primary national policy the state should protect individuals from the family. The ideologies which portray the family as toxic, as a source of threat to individual well-being, are in fact antisocial, totalitarian ideologies, as most of the arguments levied by such ideologies against the family can bear with equal force against Socialitas of any type, against sociality. We argue that Agamben’s ‘moral imperative’ for any individual to contribute, by whatever means one has at one’s disposal, to one’s sociality, applies to our understanding of the family and ought to be taken as a foundation of anti-totalitarian thinking.
PB  - Beograd: Institut za političke studije
T2  - Srpska politička misao
T1  - Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih i političkih prava
IS  - 3
VL  - 77
SP  - 93
EP  - 117
DO  - 10.22182/spm.7732022.5
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Bulatović, Aleksandra and Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Pitanja o ljudskim pravima se danas diskutuju pre svega u kontekstu individualnih prava, kao suprotstavljenih kolektivnim interesima. U skladu sa dugom liberalnom političkom tradicijom, ljudska prava se uglavnom sagledavaju kao suštinski protivna kolektivnim pravima, koja mogu ograničiti slobodu pojedinca da pravi izbore koji bi mogli ugroziti relevantne kolektivne interese. U ovom tekstu se ljudska prava sagledavaju kao izvedena socijalna prava. Kao što priroda i identitet zajednice kojoj pojedican pripada bitno određuju identitet tog pojedinca (Agambenov pojam „Socialitas“, ili „društvenosti“), individualna prava nemaju puno značenje van konteksta vrednosti, prava i interesa zajednice. Opisani kontekst tek omogućava postojanje autentičnog i čvrstog pojma nacionalnog interesa. Po definiciji, nacionalni interesi su povezani sa kolektivnim pravima i vizijama zajednice; oni nikad ne počivaju na pogledima i stavovima individualnog, izolovanog pojedinca. Jedno od ključnih kolektivnih prava, i u isto vreme kolektivnih interesa, koje konstituiše nacionalni interes je skup prava porodice. U ovom tekstu se argumentiše da odgovarajuća zaštita porodice i porodičnih prava baca senku na samu pretpostavku o moralnosti i političkoj legitimnosti različitih savremenih ideologija, uključujući i feminističku ideologiju, koje sugerišu da, umesto da se štite prava i interesi porodice kao primarni nacionalni interes, država treba da štiti pojedince od porodice. Ideologije koje porodicu predstavljaju kao toksičnu, kao izvor pretnje individualnoj dobrobiti, u stvari su antisocijalne, totalitarne ideologije. Najveći broj argumenata koje takve ideologije iznose protiv porodice u stvari se sa jednakom snagom mogu primeniti protiv socijalnosti bilo kog tipa. Stoga u ovom tekstu argumentišemo da se Agambenov „moralni imperativ“ da svaki pojedinac doprinosi, na načine koji su mu na raspolaganju, soijalnosti njegovog društva, odnosi na odgovarajuće razumevanje porodice i treba da se shvati kao sama osnova anti-totalitarnog mišljenja., Issues of human rights are prevalently discussed as pertaining to individual rights as opposed to collective interests. Following the long liberal political tradition, human rights tend to be seen as potentially in opposition to collective rights, which may limit the liberty of the individual to make choices that would militate against the relevant collective interests. In this paper, we argue that individual rights ought to be seen as derivative, social rights. Just as an individual’s identity is markedly determined by the nature and identity of the community one belongs to (Agamben’s concept of ‘Socialitas’ or sociality), individual rights have little meaning outside the context of values, rights and entitlements of one’s community. This is a context that gives rise to the concept of national interest. By definition, national interests are associated with collective rights, entitlements and visions; they are never associated with the views and positions of a single, discrete individual. One of the key collective rights that constitutes national interest is the set of rights of the family. We argue that protecting the family and family rights casts a shadow on the very morality and political legitimacy of the various ideologies of today, including that of feminism, which suggest that, rather than protecting family rights and interests as a primary national policy the state should protect individuals from the family. The ideologies which portray the family as toxic, as a source of threat to individual well-being, are in fact antisocial, totalitarian ideologies, as most of the arguments levied by such ideologies against the family can bear with equal force against Socialitas of any type, against sociality. We argue that Agamben’s ‘moral imperative’ for any individual to contribute, by whatever means one has at one’s disposal, to one’s sociality, applies to our understanding of the family and ought to be taken as a foundation of anti-totalitarian thinking.",
publisher = "Beograd: Institut za političke studije",
journal = "Srpska politička misao",
title = "Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih i političkih prava",
number = "3",
volume = "77",
pages = "93-117",
doi = "10.22182/spm.7732022.5"
}
Bulatović, A.,& Fatić, A.. (2022). Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih i političkih prava. in Srpska politička misao
Beograd: Institut za političke studije., 77(3), 93-117.
https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7732022.5
Bulatović A, Fatić A. Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih i političkih prava. in Srpska politička misao. 2022;77(3):93-117.
doi:10.22182/spm.7732022.5 .
Bulatović, Aleksandra, Fatić, Aleksandar, "Porodica kao kategorija kolektivnih i političkih prava" in Srpska politička misao, 77, no. 3 (2022):93-117,
https://doi.org/10.22182/spm.7732022.5 . .

Učešće u hijerarhiji kompetencija kao element normativne normalnosti društva

Fatic, Aleksandar

(Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Ogranak Novi Sad, 2022)

TY  - GEN
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3534
AB  - Tekst se bavi hijerarhijom kompetencija kao normativnim okvirom na artikulisanje ne samo kompetentnosti, nego i normalnosti pojedinaca i grupa u jednom društvu.
PB  - Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Ogranak Novi Sad
T2  - Konferencija: "Odgovornost i savremenost: Odgovornost u savremenom društvu". Organizator: Srpska akademija nauka i umestnosti, Ogranak u Novom Sadu
T1  - Učešće u hijerarhiji kompetencija kao element normativne normalnosti društva
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3534
ER  - 
@misc{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Tekst se bavi hijerarhijom kompetencija kao normativnim okvirom na artikulisanje ne samo kompetentnosti, nego i normalnosti pojedinaca i grupa u jednom društvu.",
publisher = "Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Ogranak Novi Sad",
journal = "Konferencija: "Odgovornost i savremenost: Odgovornost u savremenom društvu". Organizator: Srpska akademija nauka i umestnosti, Ogranak u Novom Sadu",
title = "Učešće u hijerarhiji kompetencija kao element normativne normalnosti društva",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3534"
}
Fatic, A.. (2022). Učešće u hijerarhiji kompetencija kao element normativne normalnosti društva. in Konferencija: "Odgovornost i savremenost: Odgovornost u savremenom društvu". Organizator: Srpska akademija nauka i umestnosti, Ogranak u Novom Sadu
Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Ogranak Novi Sad..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3534
Fatic A. Učešće u hijerarhiji kompetencija kao element normativne normalnosti društva. in Konferencija: "Odgovornost i savremenost: Odgovornost u savremenom društvu". Organizator: Srpska akademija nauka i umestnosti, Ogranak u Novom Sadu. 2022;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3534 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Učešće u hijerarhiji kompetencija kao element normativne normalnosti društva" in Konferencija: "Odgovornost i savremenost: Odgovornost u savremenom društvu". Organizator: Srpska akademija nauka i umestnosti, Ogranak u Novom Sadu (2022),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3534 .

Narcissism as a moral evil

Fatic, Aleksandar

(Academia Romana, 2022)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2022
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2704
AB  - Narcissism is one of the most widely debated toxic and destructive personality structures today, however key aspects of narcissism remain blurred both to practitioners, to health policy decision makers, and to victims and survivors of narcissistic abuse. To address a part of this blurred phenomenology of narcissism from a philosophical point of view, yet one that is relevant to psychotherapy, this paper focuses on the diagnostic issues between narcissism as a personality structure and Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a diagnosis. This distinction reflects a number of key controversies in the medicalization of personality failures which are traditionally subject to moral qualification. An understanding of narcissism in moral terms, and an association of the concepts of moral evil with mental disorder, allows for a re-conceptualization of narcissism as an ethical and cultural challenge with clinical ramifications and opens up a new vista on how narcissism can be philosophically viewed and institutionally treated in order to prevent it from generating the ultimate damage on the organic relationships in which hundreds of thousands of narcissists are engaged.
PB  - Academia Romana
T2  - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie
T1  - Narcissism as a moral evil
IS  - 2
VL  - 66
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2704
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2022",
abstract = "Narcissism is one of the most widely debated toxic and destructive personality structures today, however key aspects of narcissism remain blurred both to practitioners, to health policy decision makers, and to victims and survivors of narcissistic abuse. To address a part of this blurred phenomenology of narcissism from a philosophical point of view, yet one that is relevant to psychotherapy, this paper focuses on the diagnostic issues between narcissism as a personality structure and Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a diagnosis. This distinction reflects a number of key controversies in the medicalization of personality failures which are traditionally subject to moral qualification. An understanding of narcissism in moral terms, and an association of the concepts of moral evil with mental disorder, allows for a re-conceptualization of narcissism as an ethical and cultural challenge with clinical ramifications and opens up a new vista on how narcissism can be philosophically viewed and institutionally treated in order to prevent it from generating the ultimate damage on the organic relationships in which hundreds of thousands of narcissists are engaged.",
publisher = "Academia Romana",
journal = "Revue Roumaine de Philosophie",
title = "Narcissism as a moral evil",
number = "2",
volume = "66",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2704"
}
Fatic, A.. (2022). Narcissism as a moral evil. in Revue Roumaine de Philosophie
Academia Romana., 66(2).
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2704
Fatic A. Narcissism as a moral evil. in Revue Roumaine de Philosophie. 2022;66(2).
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2704 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Narcissism as a moral evil" in Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, 66, no. 2 (2022),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2704 .

In defense of integrative violence: How can philosophical practice augment organic social control?

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko drustvo i Filozofski fakultet, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2703
AB  - The paper explores the relationship between organic and institutional forms of social control from a potential contribution by philosophical practice to understanding social sanctions. The argumentation begins from the point of empirical fact that laws and constitutions
of various countries define the purpose of punishment in a utilitarian light in their preambles. This operational-utilitarian character of institutional social control is similar to the
utilitarian nature of philosophical consulting as practice. When control, which presupposes
a form of violence, is viewed in a broader understanding of the notion of violence, space
opens for a discussion on a challenging and controversial question about whether or not
can violence be integrative either in the sense of integrating values or in the sense of confirming someone’s social status after a transgression, and to what a larger degree than by
institutionalised and from an individual conceptually relatively distant forms of sanction.
PB  - Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko drustvo i Filozofski fakultet
T2  - Synthesis Philosophica
T1  - In defense of integrative violence: How can philosophical practice augment organic social control?
IS  - 1
VL  - 36
SP  - 109
EP  - 124
DO  - 10.21464/sp36107
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The paper explores the relationship between organic and institutional forms of social control from a potential contribution by philosophical practice to understanding social sanctions. The argumentation begins from the point of empirical fact that laws and constitutions
of various countries define the purpose of punishment in a utilitarian light in their preambles. This operational-utilitarian character of institutional social control is similar to the
utilitarian nature of philosophical consulting as practice. When control, which presupposes
a form of violence, is viewed in a broader understanding of the notion of violence, space
opens for a discussion on a challenging and controversial question about whether or not
can violence be integrative either in the sense of integrating values or in the sense of confirming someone’s social status after a transgression, and to what a larger degree than by
institutionalised and from an individual conceptually relatively distant forms of sanction.",
publisher = "Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko drustvo i Filozofski fakultet",
journal = "Synthesis Philosophica",
title = "In defense of integrative violence: How can philosophical practice augment organic social control?",
number = "1",
volume = "36",
pages = "109-124",
doi = "10.21464/sp36107"
}
Fatić, A.. (2021). In defense of integrative violence: How can philosophical practice augment organic social control?. in Synthesis Philosophica
Zagreb : Hrvatsko filozofsko drustvo i Filozofski fakultet., 36(1), 109-124.
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36107
Fatić A. In defense of integrative violence: How can philosophical practice augment organic social control?. in Synthesis Philosophica. 2021;36(1):109-124.
doi:10.21464/sp36107 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "In defense of integrative violence: How can philosophical practice augment organic social control?" in Synthesis Philosophica, 36, no. 1 (2021):109-124,
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36107 . .

Value identities: Personality as an ecology of values

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2701
AB  - The paper examines the concept of individual and
collective value identities based an emotionalist
understanding of values. The main perspective
it discusses is one where emotions are the most
important practical instruments for the clarification
of individual and collective values. The argument
implies that moral emotions are not irrational, but
have a logic of their own which can reliably pinpoint the persons’ value system; emotions are thus
crucial building blocks of an ethics which is able to
enhance personal and moral identity. This particular ecology of moral emotions is pivotal in crisis
periods, such as the global pandemics, wars or system crashes, either economic, or political, security,
diplomatic or cultural. In the current circumstances,
where the already shaken individual and collective
values throughout the world have been shaken by
the Covid 19 pandemic, understanding identities as
fundamentally couched in moral emotions may be
critical to saving our cultures and our legacies of
social and moral capital.
PB  - Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации
T2  - СОЦИУМ И ВЛАСТЬ
T1  - Value identities: Personality as an ecology of values
IS  - 2
SP  - 18
EP  - 35
DO  - 10.22394/1996-0522-2021-2-18-25.
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The paper examines the concept of individual and
collective value identities based an emotionalist
understanding of values. The main perspective
it discusses is one where emotions are the most
important practical instruments for the clarification
of individual and collective values. The argument
implies that moral emotions are not irrational, but
have a logic of their own which can reliably pinpoint the persons’ value system; emotions are thus
crucial building blocks of an ethics which is able to
enhance personal and moral identity. This particular ecology of moral emotions is pivotal in crisis
periods, such as the global pandemics, wars or system crashes, either economic, or political, security,
diplomatic or cultural. In the current circumstances,
where the already shaken individual and collective
values throughout the world have been shaken by
the Covid 19 pandemic, understanding identities as
fundamentally couched in moral emotions may be
critical to saving our cultures and our legacies of
social and moral capital.",
publisher = "Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации",
journal = "СОЦИУМ И ВЛАСТЬ",
title = "Value identities: Personality as an ecology of values",
number = "2",
pages = "18-35",
doi = "10.22394/1996-0522-2021-2-18-25."
}
Fatić, A.. (2021). Value identities: Personality as an ecology of values. in СОЦИУМ И ВЛАСТЬ
Российской академии народного хозяйства и государственной службы при Президенте Российской Федерации.(2), 18-35.
https://doi.org/10.22394/1996-0522-2021-2-18-25.
Fatić A. Value identities: Personality as an ecology of values. in СОЦИУМ И ВЛАСТЬ. 2021;(2):18-35.
doi:10.22394/1996-0522-2021-2-18-25. .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "Value identities: Personality as an ecology of values" in СОЦИУМ И ВЛАСТЬ, no. 2 (2021):18-35,
https://doi.org/10.22394/1996-0522-2021-2-18-25. . .

Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije

Fatić, Aleksandar; Bulatović, Aleksandra

(Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2021)

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
AU  - Bulatović, Aleksandra
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2452
AB  - U tekstu je reč o fundamentalnom razumevanju duševnog zdravlja kao nekoj vrsti društvene idealizacije: konceptualizacija idealno zdrave ličnosti u praksi je slična idealizaciji onih osobina ličnosti koje se u odgovarajućem društvu smatraju idealno poželjnim. Stepenovanje duševnog zdravlja zatim se vrši na osnovu aproksimacije tom idealu.
Ova vrsta shvatanja duševnog zdravlja podrazumeva i razumevanje dobro integrisane ličnosti kao manje ili više sinoniman pojam dobro socijalizovanoj ličnosti. U lakanovskoj psihoanalizi osnovni činilac socijalizacije, istovremeno nosical simbolizacije iskustva, pre svega moralno normativne simbolizacije, upravo je glavni signifikator "Ime Oca", koji upućuje na funkciju očinske figure u socijalizaciji deteta koju mogu vršiti različiti akteri u životu pojedinca.
Na osnovu razumevanja signifikatora Ime Oca, Lacan i lacanovci izvode jasno razgraničene koncepcije neuroze i psihoze, i, na osnovu toga, sasvim različite, metodološki radikalno raznorodne, pristupe u lečenju jednog i drugog.
U tekstu se razmatra različita funkcija moralne normativnosti u konstituciji subjektiviteta u slučaju neuroze i psihoze i nudi se jedna donekle originalna perspektiva u duhu lakanovskih interpretacija do sada, prema kojoj svest o značaju i instrumentalnoj korisnosti moralnog normativiteta definiše duševno zdravlje, a funkcioniše dinamički i strukturno različito u slučaju neuroze i slučaju psihoze.
AB  - The paper focuses on an understanding of mental health as a sort of social idealisation: the conceptualisation of an ideally healthy personality, in practice, usually overlaps with the idealisation of those personality traits which, in the respective society, are considered particularly desirable. The quantification of mental health is then conducted based on the approximation of an individual's situation with the mentioned ideal.
The described view of mental health presupposes a corresponding understanding of a well integrated personality as more or less synonimous with a well socialised personality. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the main factor of socialisation, and at the same time the carrier of symbolisation of experience (primarily of its morally normative symbolisation) is the main signified "Name of the Father", which suggests the morally formative role of the father figure in the socialisation of a child  (a function which, admittedly, can be performed by others, as well as by the actual father).
Based on an interpretation of the signifier Name of the Father, Lacan and the Lacanians derive clearly delineated conceptualisations of neurosis and psychosis and, consequently, methodologically radically different approaches to treating the former and the latter.
The paper discusses the roles of moral normativity in the constitution of subjectivity in the case of neurosis and of psychosis, and offers a perspective which is to some extent novel, however still in line with the main Lacanian interpretations offerred so far: the interpretation whereby it is the awareness of the significance of one's choices and the instrumental usefulness of the moral normativity one adopts that define mental health. This awareness of moral normativity functions dynamically and structurally differently in neurosis and in psychosis.
PB  - Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
T1  - Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije
T1  - Moral normativity and mental health: Lacanian view of neurosis and psychosis in the light of integrative psychotherapy
SP  - 203
EP  - 218
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2452
ER  - 
@inbook{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar and Bulatović, Aleksandra",
year = "2021",
abstract = "U tekstu je reč o fundamentalnom razumevanju duševnog zdravlja kao nekoj vrsti društvene idealizacije: konceptualizacija idealno zdrave ličnosti u praksi je slična idealizaciji onih osobina ličnosti koje se u odgovarajućem društvu smatraju idealno poželjnim. Stepenovanje duševnog zdravlja zatim se vrši na osnovu aproksimacije tom idealu.
Ova vrsta shvatanja duševnog zdravlja podrazumeva i razumevanje dobro integrisane ličnosti kao manje ili više sinoniman pojam dobro socijalizovanoj ličnosti. U lakanovskoj psihoanalizi osnovni činilac socijalizacije, istovremeno nosical simbolizacije iskustva, pre svega moralno normativne simbolizacije, upravo je glavni signifikator "Ime Oca", koji upućuje na funkciju očinske figure u socijalizaciji deteta koju mogu vršiti različiti akteri u životu pojedinca.
Na osnovu razumevanja signifikatora Ime Oca, Lacan i lacanovci izvode jasno razgraničene koncepcije neuroze i psihoze, i, na osnovu toga, sasvim različite, metodološki radikalno raznorodne, pristupe u lečenju jednog i drugog.
U tekstu se razmatra različita funkcija moralne normativnosti u konstituciji subjektiviteta u slučaju neuroze i psihoze i nudi se jedna donekle originalna perspektiva u duhu lakanovskih interpretacija do sada, prema kojoj svest o značaju i instrumentalnoj korisnosti moralnog normativiteta definiše duševno zdravlje, a funkcioniše dinamički i strukturno različito u slučaju neuroze i slučaju psihoze., The paper focuses on an understanding of mental health as a sort of social idealisation: the conceptualisation of an ideally healthy personality, in practice, usually overlaps with the idealisation of those personality traits which, in the respective society, are considered particularly desirable. The quantification of mental health is then conducted based on the approximation of an individual's situation with the mentioned ideal.
The described view of mental health presupposes a corresponding understanding of a well integrated personality as more or less synonimous with a well socialised personality. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the main factor of socialisation, and at the same time the carrier of symbolisation of experience (primarily of its morally normative symbolisation) is the main signified "Name of the Father", which suggests the morally formative role of the father figure in the socialisation of a child  (a function which, admittedly, can be performed by others, as well as by the actual father).
Based on an interpretation of the signifier Name of the Father, Lacan and the Lacanians derive clearly delineated conceptualisations of neurosis and psychosis and, consequently, methodologically radically different approaches to treating the former and the latter.
The paper discusses the roles of moral normativity in the constitution of subjectivity in the case of neurosis and of psychosis, and offers a perspective which is to some extent novel, however still in line with the main Lacanian interpretations offerred so far: the interpretation whereby it is the awareness of the significance of one's choices and the instrumental usefulness of the moral normativity one adopts that define mental health. This awareness of moral normativity functions dynamically and structurally differently in neurosis and in psychosis.",
publisher = "Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu",
booktitle = "Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije, Moral normativity and mental health: Lacanian view of neurosis and psychosis in the light of integrative psychotherapy",
pages = "203-218",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2452"
}
Fatić, A.,& Bulatović, A.. (2021). Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije. 
Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu., 203-218.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2452
Fatić A, Bulatović A. Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije. 2021;:203-218.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2452 .
Fatić, Aleksandar, Bulatović, Aleksandra, "Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije" (2021):203-218,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2452 .

An Ethics-Based ‘Identity-Proof’ of God’s Existence. An Ontology for Philotherapy

Fatić, Aleksandar

(Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2021)

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fatić, Aleksandar
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2278
AB  - A resurgence of scholarly work on proof of God’s existence is noticeable over the past decade, with considerable emphasis on attempts to provide ‘analytic proof’ based on the meanings and logic of various identity statements which constitute premises of the syllogisms of the ‘proof’. Most recently perhaps, Emmanuel Rutten’s ‘modal-epistemic proof’ has drawn serious academic attention. Like other ‘analytic’ and strictly logical proofs of God’s existence, Rutten’s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an ‘ethics-based’ identity proof of God’s existence. Such a proof, the first version of which, I believe, has been offered, indirectly, by Nikolai Lossky, utilizes the form and structure of the analytic proof, but fundamentally rests on the perception of moral values we associate with God and Godliness. The nature of the proof shifts the focus of the very attempt to ‘prove’ God’s existence from what I believe is an unreasonable standard, unattainable even in ‘proving’ the existence of the more mundane world, towards a more functional, practical and attainable standard. The proof proposed initially by Lossky, and in a more systematic form here, I believe, shows the indubitable existence of God in the sense of his moral presence in the lives of the faithful, at least with the same degree of certainty as the presence or ‘existence’ of anything else that can be epistemically proven in principle.
AB  - Tokom poslednje decenije uočljiva je intenziviran rad na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga, sa posebnim naglaskom na takozvane “analitičke dokaze”, koji su zasnovani na značenjima i logici različitih iskaza o identitetu, koji predstavljaju premise samog silogizma “dokaza”. Možda akademski najuticajniji skorašnji analitički dokaz o postojanju Boga izložio je Emanuel Ruten u formi svog “modalno-epistemičkog dokaza”.
Kao i za ostale analitčke i strogo logičke dokaze postojanja Boga, i za Rutenov je utvrđeno da je neispravan. Kroz kritiku Rutenovog dokaza, koju koristim kao uvod, ja u ovom tekstu rahzmatram mogućnost dokaza o postojanju Boga koji bi bio zasnovan na etičkim argumentima. Takav dokaz, Like other ‘analytic’ and strictly logical proofs of God’s existence, Rutten’s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an ‘ethics-based’ identity proof of God’s existence. Such a proof, čiju je prvu verziju, po mom mišljenju, već izneo Nikolaj Loski, koristi formu i strukturu analitičkih dokaza, ali se fundamentalno oslanja na doživljaj moralnih vrednosti koje povezujemo sa Bogom ili božanstvenošću. “Etički” dokaz pomera naglasak samog rada na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga sa jednog standarda za koji smatram da je nerazuman i koji se ne može dostići ni kada se “dokazuje” postojanje mnogo manje kontroverznih ontoloških kategorija, kao što su različite kategorije svakodnevnog, “običnog” sveta. Istovremeno, etički dokaz pomera naglasak dokazivanja ka jednom funkcionalnom, praktičnom i dostižnom standardu dokazivanja. Ovaj dokaz, i u formi u kojoj ga je izveo Loski, a i u sistematičnijoj formi u kojoj ga ovde izlažem, pokazuje nesumnjivo postojanje Boga u smislu moralnog prisustva Boga u životima verujućih ljudi. “Izvesnost” takvog dokaza nije ništa manja od izvesnosti bilo čega drugog što se uopšte može epistemički dokazivati.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - An Ethics-Based ‘Identity-Proof’ of God’s Existence. An Ontology for Philotherapy
T1  - Etički zasnovan ‘dokaz identiteta’ Božje egzistencije. Ontologija za filoterapiju
IS  - 3
VL  - 32
SP  - 428
EP  - 438
DO  - 10.2298/FID2103428F
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Fatić, Aleksandar",
year = "2021",
abstract = "A resurgence of scholarly work on proof of God’s existence is noticeable over the past decade, with considerable emphasis on attempts to provide ‘analytic proof’ based on the meanings and logic of various identity statements which constitute premises of the syllogisms of the ‘proof’. Most recently perhaps, Emmanuel Rutten’s ‘modal-epistemic proof’ has drawn serious academic attention. Like other ‘analytic’ and strictly logical proofs of God’s existence, Rutten’s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an ‘ethics-based’ identity proof of God’s existence. Such a proof, the first version of which, I believe, has been offered, indirectly, by Nikolai Lossky, utilizes the form and structure of the analytic proof, but fundamentally rests on the perception of moral values we associate with God and Godliness. The nature of the proof shifts the focus of the very attempt to ‘prove’ God’s existence from what I believe is an unreasonable standard, unattainable even in ‘proving’ the existence of the more mundane world, towards a more functional, practical and attainable standard. The proof proposed initially by Lossky, and in a more systematic form here, I believe, shows the indubitable existence of God in the sense of his moral presence in the lives of the faithful, at least with the same degree of certainty as the presence or ‘existence’ of anything else that can be epistemically proven in principle., Tokom poslednje decenije uočljiva je intenziviran rad na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga, sa posebnim naglaskom na takozvane “analitičke dokaze”, koji su zasnovani na značenjima i logici različitih iskaza o identitetu, koji predstavljaju premise samog silogizma “dokaza”. Možda akademski najuticajniji skorašnji analitički dokaz o postojanju Boga izložio je Emanuel Ruten u formi svog “modalno-epistemičkog dokaza”.
Kao i za ostale analitčke i strogo logičke dokaze postojanja Boga, i za Rutenov je utvrđeno da je neispravan. Kroz kritiku Rutenovog dokaza, koju koristim kao uvod, ja u ovom tekstu rahzmatram mogućnost dokaza o postojanju Boga koji bi bio zasnovan na etičkim argumentima. Takav dokaz, Like other ‘analytic’ and strictly logical proofs of God’s existence, Rutten’s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an ‘ethics-based’ identity proof of God’s existence. Such a proof, čiju je prvu verziju, po mom mišljenju, već izneo Nikolaj Loski, koristi formu i strukturu analitičkih dokaza, ali se fundamentalno oslanja na doživljaj moralnih vrednosti koje povezujemo sa Bogom ili božanstvenošću. “Etički” dokaz pomera naglasak samog rada na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga sa jednog standarda za koji smatram da je nerazuman i koji se ne može dostići ni kada se “dokazuje” postojanje mnogo manje kontroverznih ontoloških kategorija, kao što su različite kategorije svakodnevnog, “običnog” sveta. Istovremeno, etički dokaz pomera naglasak dokazivanja ka jednom funkcionalnom, praktičnom i dostižnom standardu dokazivanja. Ovaj dokaz, i u formi u kojoj ga je izveo Loski, a i u sistematičnijoj formi u kojoj ga ovde izlažem, pokazuje nesumnjivo postojanje Boga u smislu moralnog prisustva Boga u životima verujućih ljudi. “Izvesnost” takvog dokaza nije ništa manja od izvesnosti bilo čega drugog što se uopšte može epistemički dokazivati.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "An Ethics-Based ‘Identity-Proof’ of God’s Existence. An Ontology for Philotherapy, Etički zasnovan ‘dokaz identiteta’ Božje egzistencije. Ontologija za filoterapiju",
number = "3",
volume = "32",
pages = "428-438",
doi = "10.2298/FID2103428F"
}
Fatić, A.. (2021). An Ethics-Based ‘Identity-Proof’ of God’s Existence. An Ontology for Philotherapy. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 32(3), 428-438.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2103428F
Fatić A. An Ethics-Based ‘Identity-Proof’ of God’s Existence. An Ontology for Philotherapy. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2021;32(3):428-438.
doi:10.2298/FID2103428F .
Fatić, Aleksandar, "An Ethics-Based ‘Identity-Proof’ of God’s Existence. An Ontology for Philotherapy" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society, 32, no. 3 (2021):428-438,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2103428F . .

Anxiety

Fatic, Aleksandar

(2021)

TY  - GEN
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2021
UR  - https://www.bioetika.hr/blog/5-medunarodni-transdisciplinarni-simpozij-bioetika-i-aporije-psihe-online/
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3274
AB  - The paper focuses anxiety as an epistemic state and discusses the links between anxiety and the existential horizon of a person facing borderline life situations.
T2  - Conference: 5th Annual 'Aporia of the Psyche' conference, organized by the Croatian Bioethics Society, University of Zagreb.
T1  - Anxiety
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3274
ER  - 
@misc{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The paper focuses anxiety as an epistemic state and discusses the links between anxiety and the existential horizon of a person facing borderline life situations.",
journal = "Conference: 5th Annual 'Aporia of the Psyche' conference, organized by the Croatian Bioethics Society, University of Zagreb.",
title = "Anxiety",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3274"
}
Fatic, A.. (2021). Anxiety. in Conference: 5th Annual 'Aporia of the Psyche' conference, organized by the Croatian Bioethics Society, University of Zagreb..
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3274
Fatic A. Anxiety. in Conference: 5th Annual 'Aporia of the Psyche' conference, organized by the Croatian Bioethics Society, University of Zagreb.. 2021;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3274 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "Anxiety" in Conference: 5th Annual 'Aporia of the Psyche' conference, organized by the Croatian Bioethics Society, University of Zagreb. (2021),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3274 .

How could they have done such a thing: On psychopathy

Fatic, Aleksandar

(2021)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
PY  - 2021
UR  - https://www.susu.ru/en/news/2020/08/05/international-online-conference-philosophical-practice-gathered-500-participants-52
UR  - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7nlQXZI8uKI&list=PLn_gnoNJlPVyZWm3vPL3yFqIL0dXvH9QZ&index=1
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/3315
AB  - The presentation focuses on the social stigma and social dysfunctionality of psychopaths, coupled with the society's inability to fathom the choices made by psychopathic individuals in a range of social situations.
C3  - Conference: Philosophical practice for self-knowledge bz means of intellectual creativity". Organiyed by South Ural State University, St. Petersburg, Russia
T1  - How could they have done such a thing: On psychopathy
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3315
ER  - 
@conference{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar",
year = "2021",
abstract = "The presentation focuses on the social stigma and social dysfunctionality of psychopaths, coupled with the society's inability to fathom the choices made by psychopathic individuals in a range of social situations.",
journal = "Conference: Philosophical practice for self-knowledge bz means of intellectual creativity". Organiyed by South Ural State University, St. Petersburg, Russia",
title = "How could they have done such a thing: On psychopathy",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3315"
}
Fatic, A.. (2021). How could they have done such a thing: On psychopathy. in Conference: Philosophical practice for self-knowledge bz means of intellectual creativity". Organiyed by South Ural State University, St. Petersburg, Russia.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3315
Fatic A. How could they have done such a thing: On psychopathy. in Conference: Philosophical practice for self-knowledge bz means of intellectual creativity". Organiyed by South Ural State University, St. Petersburg, Russia. 2021;.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3315 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, "How could they have done such a thing: On psychopathy" in Conference: Philosophical practice for self-knowledge bz means of intellectual creativity". Organiyed by South Ural State University, St. Petersburg, Russia (2021),
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_3315 .

Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije

Fatic, Aleksandar; Bulatovic, Aleksandra

(Filozofski fakultet Zagreb, 2021)

TY  - BOOK
AU  - Fatic, Aleksandar
AU  - Bulatovic, Aleksandra
PY  - 2021
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/2726
AB  - U tekstu je reč o fundamentalnom razumevanju duševnog zdravlja kao nekoj vrsti društvene idealizacije: konceptualizacija idealno zdrave ličnosti u praksi je slična idealizaciji onih osobina ličnosti koje se u odgovarajućem društvu smatraju idealno poželjnim. Stepenovanje duševnog zdravlja zatim se vrši na osnovu aproksimacije tom idealu. Ova vrsta shvatanja duševnog zdravlja podrazumeva i razumevanje dobro integrisane ličnosti kao manje ili više sinoniman pojam dobro socijalizovanoj ličnosti. U lakanovskoj psihoanalizi osnovni činilac socijalizacije, istovremeno nosical simbolizacije iskustva, pre svega moralno normativne simbolizacije, upravo je glavni signifikator "Ime Oca", koji upućuje na funkciju očinske figure u socijalizaciji deteta koju mogu vršiti različiti akteri u životu pojedinca. Na osnovu razumevanja signifikatora Ime Oca, Lacan i lacanovci izvode jasno razgraničene koncepcije neuroze i psihoze, i, na osnovu toga, sasvim različite, metodološki radikalno raznorodne, pristupe u lečenju jednog i drugog. U tekstu se razmatra različita funkcija moralne normativnosti u konstituciji subjektiviteta u slučaju neuroze i psihoze i nudi se jedna donekle originalna perspektiva u duhu lakanovskih interpretacija do sada, prema kojoj svest o značaju i instrumentalnoj korisnosti moralnog normativiteta definiše duševno zdravlje, a funkcioniše dinamički i strukturno različito u slučaju neuroze i slučaju psihoze.
PB  - Filozofski fakultet Zagreb
T2  - Borislav Mikulić, Mislav Žitko i Srđan Damjanović (urs). Psihoanaliza i njezine sudbine
T1  - Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije
SP  - 203
EP  - 218
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2726
ER  - 
@book{
author = "Fatic, Aleksandar and Bulatovic, Aleksandra",
year = "2021",
abstract = "U tekstu je reč o fundamentalnom razumevanju duševnog zdravlja kao nekoj vrsti društvene idealizacije: konceptualizacija idealno zdrave ličnosti u praksi je slična idealizaciji onih osobina ličnosti koje se u odgovarajućem društvu smatraju idealno poželjnim. Stepenovanje duševnog zdravlja zatim se vrši na osnovu aproksimacije tom idealu. Ova vrsta shvatanja duševnog zdravlja podrazumeva i razumevanje dobro integrisane ličnosti kao manje ili više sinoniman pojam dobro socijalizovanoj ličnosti. U lakanovskoj psihoanalizi osnovni činilac socijalizacije, istovremeno nosical simbolizacije iskustva, pre svega moralno normativne simbolizacije, upravo je glavni signifikator "Ime Oca", koji upućuje na funkciju očinske figure u socijalizaciji deteta koju mogu vršiti različiti akteri u životu pojedinca. Na osnovu razumevanja signifikatora Ime Oca, Lacan i lacanovci izvode jasno razgraničene koncepcije neuroze i psihoze, i, na osnovu toga, sasvim različite, metodološki radikalno raznorodne, pristupe u lečenju jednog i drugog. U tekstu se razmatra različita funkcija moralne normativnosti u konstituciji subjektiviteta u slučaju neuroze i psihoze i nudi se jedna donekle originalna perspektiva u duhu lakanovskih interpretacija do sada, prema kojoj svest o značaju i instrumentalnoj korisnosti moralnog normativiteta definiše duševno zdravlje, a funkcioniše dinamički i strukturno različito u slučaju neuroze i slučaju psihoze.",
publisher = "Filozofski fakultet Zagreb",
journal = "Borislav Mikulić, Mislav Žitko i Srđan Damjanović (urs). Psihoanaliza i njezine sudbine",
title = "Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije",
pages = "203-218",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2726"
}
Fatic, A.,& Bulatovic, A.. (2021). Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije. in Borislav Mikulić, Mislav Žitko i Srđan Damjanović (urs). Psihoanaliza i njezine sudbine
Filozofski fakultet Zagreb., 203-218.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2726
Fatic A, Bulatovic A. Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije. in Borislav Mikulić, Mislav Žitko i Srđan Damjanović (urs). Psihoanaliza i njezine sudbine. 2021;:203-218.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2726 .
Fatic, Aleksandar, Bulatovic, Aleksandra, "Moralna normativnost i duševno zdravlje: lakanovsko razumevanje neuroze i psihoze u svetlu integrativne terapije" in Borislav Mikulić, Mislav Žitko i Srđan Damjanović (urs). Psihoanaliza i njezine sudbine (2021):203-218,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_rifdt_2726 .