TY  - JOUR
AU  - Simoniti, Jure
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/324
AB  - The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, “being”and “nothing” are entitled to emerge and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of “being” is linked to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute thesis of the “thetical judgement”. And the articles first thesis claims that Hegel couldn’t have placed “being”at the beginning of this great system, if the ground of its logical space had not been laid out by precisely those shifts of German Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason between “being” and “nothing”, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual beginning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by the invention of the “transcendental inter-subjectivity” in German Idealism, manifested, for instance, in Hegel’s life-and-death struggle of two self-consciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that “being” and “nothing” are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation of (at least) two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a sphere by the name of “public”whose structure is defined by the invalidation of two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorbing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
T1  - Hegel's Logic as the Exposition of God from the End of the World
SP  - 852
EP  - 874
DO  - 10.2298/FID1504852S
ER  - 

@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Simoniti, Jure",
year = "2015",
abstract = "The article attempts to reconstruct the logical space within which, at the beginning of Hegel’s Logic, “being”and “nothing” are entitled to emerge and receive their names. In German Idealism, the concept of “being” is linked to the form of a proposition; Fichte grounds a new truth-value on the absolute thesis of the “thetical judgement”. And the articles first thesis claims that Hegel couldn’t have placed “being”at the beginning of this great system, if the ground of its logical space had not been laid out by precisely those shifts of German Idealism that posited the ontological function of the judgement. At the same time, the abstract negation, the absence of a relation and sufficient reason between “being” and “nothing”, reveals a structure of an irreducibly dual beginning. The logical background of this original duality could be constituted by the invention of the “transcendental inter-subjectivity” in German Idealism, manifested, for instance, in Hegel’s life-and-death struggle of two self-consciousnesses. The second thesis therefore suggests that “being” and “nothing” are elements of the logical space, established in concreto in a social situation of (at least) two subjects one of whom poses an affirmative statement and the other negates it abstractly. From here, one could draw out the coordinates of a sphere by the name of “public”whose structure is defined by the invalidation of two basic laws of thought, the law of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason. The article shows how only the statements capable of absorbing negation, of sustaining a co-existence of affirmation and its symmetrical, abstract negation, can climb the ladder of public perceptibility and social impact.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society",
title = "Hegel's Logic as the Exposition of God from the End of the World",
pages = "852-874",
doi = "10.2298/FID1504852S"
}

Jovanov, R.,& Simoniti, J.. (2015). Hegel's Logic as the Exposition of God from the End of the World. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 852-874.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1504852S

Jovanov R, Simoniti J. Hegel's Logic as the Exposition of God from the End of the World. in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. 2015;:852-874.
doi:10.2298/FID1504852S .

Jovanov, Rastko, Simoniti, Jure, "Hegel's Logic as the Exposition of God from the End of the World" in Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society (2015):852-874,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1504852S . .

TY  - JOUR
AU  - Simoniti, Jure
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://rifdt.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/123456789/309
AB  - The article challenges the first premise of „speculative realism“, according to which, with Kant, the contact with the outside world was lost. Instead, it will be shown that the possibility of realism received its major impulse from two grand figures of German Idealism, from Kant as a precursor of the Romantic period and from Hegel as its, albeit critical, philosophical culmination. Based on three possible relations of knowledge to its outside, three ontologies will be distinguished, the ontology of immediacy, stretching from rationalists to the last empiricists, Kant’s ontology of totalization, and, finally, Hegel’s „ontology of release“or ,,de-totalization“. As opposed to Descartess thing being constantly doubted in its existence, as opposed to Malebranches occasion being invariably induced by God, as opposed to Leibnizs monad being an immediate embodiment of an idea, as opposed to Berkeley’s object vanishing when not perceived, and as opposed to Humes world lacking necessity, Kant philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of ideas produced by God and outside the constancy of the human gaze. Kant secured the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs and procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel’s absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. It was not until Hegel’s logic of indifférence of the notion to its immediate content that an egress of the circle of Kant’s totalization was made possible.
PB  - Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
T2  - Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
T1  - The Ontological Indifférence. A Realist Reading of Kant and Hegel
SP  - 369
EP  - 391
DO  - 10.2298/FID1502369S
ER  - 

@article{
editor = "Jovanov, Rastko",
author = "Simoniti, Jure",
year = "2015",
abstract = "The article challenges the first premise of „speculative realism“, according to which, with Kant, the contact with the outside world was lost. Instead, it will be shown that the possibility of realism received its major impulse from two grand figures of German Idealism, from Kant as a precursor of the Romantic period and from Hegel as its, albeit critical, philosophical culmination. Based on three possible relations of knowledge to its outside, three ontologies will be distinguished, the ontology of immediacy, stretching from rationalists to the last empiricists, Kant’s ontology of totalization, and, finally, Hegel’s „ontology of release“or ,,de-totalization“. As opposed to Descartess thing being constantly doubted in its existence, as opposed to Malebranches occasion being invariably induced by God, as opposed to Leibnizs monad being an immediate embodiment of an idea, as opposed to Berkeley’s object vanishing when not perceived, and as opposed to Humes world lacking necessity, Kant philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of ideas produced by God and outside the constancy of the human gaze. Kant secured the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs and procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel’s absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. It was not until Hegel’s logic of indifférence of the notion to its immediate content that an egress of the circle of Kant’s totalization was made possible.",
publisher = "Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju",
journal = "Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society",
title = "The Ontological Indifférence. A Realist Reading of Kant and Hegel",
pages = "369-391",
doi = "10.2298/FID1502369S"
}

Jovanov, R.,& Simoniti, J.. (2015). The Ontological Indifférence. A Realist Reading of Kant and Hegel. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society
Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju., 369-391.
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1502369S

Jovanov R, Simoniti J. The Ontological Indifférence. A Realist Reading of Kant and Hegel. in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society. 2015;:369-391.
doi:10.2298/FID1502369S .

Jovanov, Rastko, Simoniti, Jure, "The Ontological Indifférence. A Realist Reading of Kant and Hegel" in Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society (2015):369-391,
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1502369S . .